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「アジア統合のロードマップ」

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I、われわれの目指すものは何か

19 世紀の中ごろから、西欧の衝撃(ウエスタン・インパクト)に襲われて以来、今日に至るまで世界史の中心は常に西洋世界であった。20 世紀の初頭からアジアの大国となった日本は果敢に西洋中心主義に挑戦したが、アジアに大きな傷跡を残しつつ第二次世界大戦の敗北であえなく挫折した。第二次大戦後の冷戦世界も、冷戦後の米国一国覇権とグローバリゼーションの波もまた欧米を軸に展開している。もっとも 1960～70 年代の日本、80 年代の NIEs と ASEAN、90 年代以降の中国といった東アジア地域の目覚ましい経済発展は、今や「世界経済の推進力」、「成長のセンター」と呼ばれるようになっている。

にもかかわらず、1997 年の「アジア通貨危機」を思い起こすまでもなく、アジアで発生した問題をアジア各国の政府や人々が解決のために実質的に協力し合うといった情景はあまり見られなかった。地域紛争では国連安全保障理事会が、貧困問題や人権問題では IMF や世界銀行、あるいは国連人権委員会、難民高等弁務官事務所、ユニセフなどが中心的に活動している。地域協力が最も進んでいるといわれる経済分野でも、まだ FTA、EPA 締結の段階で、依然「デファクトとして進む地域統合」といわれるにとどまっている。

我々はこうした状況にこれからも甘んじ続けるべきではない。アジアが成長のセンターであり続けようとするなら、アジアの抱える課題・問題もまたアジア人が中心となって共に考え、解決できるようにならなければならない。そしてそのための枠組み＝「アジア共同体」創りにも本格的に取り組まねばならない。もちろんそのことはアジア以外の国・地域の人々を排除することを意味しない。アジア統合に理解を示す各国政府との連携・協力は言うまでもないが、さらに国連諸機関で様々な活動をしている人々、多国籍企業として、あるいは NGO 団体としてアジア域内で仕事をしている非アジア系の人々などもアジア共同体を支える重要な構成メンバーである。しかしアジアの問題ではアジアがイニシアティブをとれる態勢が必要である。そのためにこそ、それを担える高度な専門的な人材をアジアの中から育成することが枠組み作りと同時に不可欠になってくる。

II、アジア共同体構想と「アジア的価値」

まず自ら問わねばならない重要な問題は、未来のアジア共同体をどのようなものとして描き、いかなるロードマップを作成するかということである。アジア共同体を考える場合、アジア的価値をめぐる論争がある。これに呑み込まれてしまうことは避けるべきだが、これを無視するわけにもいかない。今日アジアの知識人たちの中で広く読み返されている竹内好は『方法としてのアジア』のなかで、「西欧的なすぐれた文化価値を、より大規模に実現するために、西洋をもう一度東洋によって包みなおす。逆に西洋自身をこちらから変革する、この文化的な巻き返し、あるいは価値の上の巻き返しによって普遍性を創り出す。……その巻き返す時に自分の中に独自のものがなければならない。」と語っている。

まさに西洋と東洋を相対化し、主体化したうえで両者のダイナミックなインターアクションを通じて、より高次の人類的価値の創造を目指そうとしたことが理解できる。インド建国の父といわれるマハトマ・ガンジーは「山の頂は 1 つだがそこに辿り着く道は様々にある」という有名な言葉を残し、「多様性の中の統一」を説いた。ここでも「アジア的価値」は頂上に登る「多様な道」、すなわち方法的価値におかれている。

もちろん古代ギリシャで生まれ、ルネサンスでよみがえったヒューマニズムやデモクラシーの精神などはアジアにとってもまた普遍的な重要性を持っている。しかしアジアでもまた、人間の平等と慈悲の心の尊さを説いた仏教、礼節など人間の修養と文化的権威の形成から社会秩序を説いた儒教、日本古来の独特な自然と人間の調和哲学など

からも、人間社会に内在する普遍的価値を十分にくみ取ることができるだろう。アブドラ・マレーシア首相は「平和・中庸・弱者救済はイスラムの基本原則である」と指摘しているが（『日経』07, 5.25）、それは仏教にも儒教にも通じる考え方である。

あえて言うなら、私は最近「方法としてのアジア」だけでなく、「価値としてのアジア」もあるのではないかなと思うようになっている。例えば普遍的概念である「秩序」「平和」について考えてみよう。西洋における代表的秩序観は次の3つである。①ホブズの秩序観＝人間の自然状態は混沌であり社会契約によって人間の諸権利を巨大な怪物・リヴァイアサン(国家)に委ねることによって秩序、平和が生まれると説く。②ロック的秩序観＝人間の自然状態は自由、平等でかつ平和な状態であり、政府は社会契約によって人民の権利を擁護するするが、それは受託者にとどまると主張。③カント的秩序観＝人間の内面的な道徳的自由ではない恣意行為に対して外から強制的に制裁を加える必要があり(外面的合法性)、そのような法の維持と保障のために国家が存在すると主張。内面的自由を獲得した自律的な近代的人間はその理性のもとに永久平和を目指すべき(規範的思考)で、その先に国家を超える統治制度の必要性をと説く。どのように人間および社会を見るかは3者互いに異なるが、「秩序」「平和」を維持する手段として契約、法、制度そして国家などを設定している点は共通している。

これに対して、アジアでは「秩序」「平和」は伝統的には必ずしもこのような契約、法、制度などから作り出され、保証されるものとは考えられてこなかった。アジアにおける人間社会の安定的な関係＝「秩序」は、主に以下のような要因によって生み出される。①儒教的統治論などのように人為的に作られる文化的権威への服従、②自然などに対して内発的に育まれる畏敬、尊厳への服従、③相互の扶助行為・共同作業などによって生まれる相互依存・信頼、④お上とか他の集落といった相手と自分との距離感(自分とは無縁)を意識し、その関係を安定的に維持しようとする思考(小国寡民思想＝伝統的村落共同体)などである。すなわちアジアにおける伝統的な秩序観とは、自然的であるか人為的であるかはともかく人々が他者との所与の関わり、関係を持続的に維持しようとする相関的な指向性、関係性(ネットワーク)によって形成される「状態」として認識される。

こうした秩序観は、今日アジアで唯一の制度化された統合組織とも言える ASEAN の中にも生きている。すなわちよく知られているように ASEAN Way は合意事項の非拘束化、組織の非制度化、内政不干渉、全会一致のコンセンサスによる意思決定などを重視し、できるだけ規範的な法や制度からの拘束を排除することによって ASEAN における安定、秩序をもたらしてきた。それは国家主権を制限し、統合の制度化・法制化を進めてきた EU とは対照的であった。

グローバリゼーションが急速に広がる今日、アジアにおいても西洋的な法・制度による規範化が否応なく浸透している。昨年、2015年に繰り上げて ASEAN 共同体を創設すると宣言した ASEAN 首脳会議は、同時に前文と13章55条から構成され「域内最高規範」となる「ASEAN 憲章」を採択した。民主主義や法の支配、人権と自由などを原則として、地域のあるべき姿や意思決定の方法などを明文化し、法にのっとった高度な地域機構を目指すことを謳った。しかし、依然として「デファクトとして進む経済統合」と言われるように、アジアでは法や制度以外に機能する重要なファクターを見落とすことはできない。

Ⅲ、アジア共同体は重層的な人間のネットワークを核にすべし

では、法や制度以外に機能する重要なファクターとは何か。単純化を恐れずに言うならば、それは様々なレベル、領域で現実に物事を動かし関係をつくっている人間のネットワークである。アジアにおいても、もちろんルールや法、制度が重要であるが、現実に規範としてそれらが機能するか否かは良くも悪くも、それを動かさうとする有能な人間がいるか否か、そのような人間群の相互作用があるかどうかが決定的に重要である。例えばどのような素晴らしい環境保護法を作ったとしても、それを守らせる、また守ろうとする人がいなければ環境悪化を防ぐことはできない。逆に極論するならば、環境の重要性を十分に理解している人々や考え方があれば法律、制度はなくても環境保

護は可能である。

ここで言うネットワークの対象となる人間は必ずしも一般的な人という意味ではなく、強い志・問題意識・状況分析力・専門的知識・行動力・組織力などをもったリーダー的な人間である。アジアの地域協力を持続させ発展させるためには、国を超えてこうした人間のネットワークを様々な分野で構築させ、それらの有機的な連携を推進し、横断的包括的に効果のある協力を恒常化、すなわち制度化していくことがとくに重要であると考ええる。いわゆるインテレクチュアル・ネットワークである。ASEAN の成功もその担い手である参加国のリーダー、シンクタンク・メンバーなどが幾度も会議外交やフォーラムを展開しネットワークを充実化し、重要な意味を持たせてきたところにある。

アジアにおいては依然として経済格差、教育格差、社会的不公平などが大きく、中間層の成長に伴う自律的存在としての市民（社会）の形成も遅れている。様々な NGO が急速に成長しているとはいえ、市民的権利意識と法やルールに基づいて物事を処理するメカニズムが未だ十分に形成されていないのがアジアである。そこでは各分野における知的な専門性を持つ人間、リーダー的な人間のネットワーク構築の意味は他地域以上に大きい。こうした人材の育成を長期的な戦略のもとに本格的に実施してこそ、既に存在し機能している様々な地域協力機関・メカニズムを効果的に運用することができ、さらには協力のための新しい意味のある人間のネットワークを構築することが可能となってくるのである。

アジアが直面し特に協力を必要とする問題を課題別に考えてみるなら、さしあたり以下の3つのタイプに分けられる。

第1に、課題解決協力型ネットワークである。

今日のアジアにおける主なものとしては、①貧困・社会問題解決協働メカニズムと、②環境保護協働メカニズム、③省エネルギー化協働メカニズムがあげられる。それぞれ世界銀行、アジア開発銀行（ADB）、国連各関連機関、各国政府、NGO などですでに取り組みされており、一定のメカニズムが構築されている。例えば①では、ADB が進めてきた GMS（グレート・メコン流域開発計画）、インドシナ東西回廊建設などは国を超えたインフラの整備、共同開発により貧困削減を進め東南アジア地域の一体化を図ろうとするものである。日本も ODA 援助、ADB への出資などを通じてこうした方面での積極的協力を進めてきた。

さらに貧困を内発的アプローチによって克服しようとするノーベル平和賞受賞者のムハマド・ユヌス氏の提唱した「グラミン銀行ネットワーク」は、ビジネスの目的を利益の最大化から社会の貧困削減、豊かさの追求に転換させようとしたもので、マイクロ・ファイナンス、ソーシャル・ビジネスの普及といわれ、今やバングラディッシュ国を超えた運動となりつつある。そのほか社会的弱者の人権保護、感染症、大規模自然災害などでの政府、専門家、民間などでの人間のネットワークの構築と連携が強く求められている。

②では、目覚ましい経済発展とともに大気汚染が急速に進むアジアでの取り組みが注目されている。とりわけ中国は来年度には CO₂ 排出世界 1 位が確実視され、また大気汚染深刻都市世界 20 位中 16 の都市を占め、都市人口の 4 億人が深刻な状況に置かれている。また淡水資源の不足も徐々に重大視され始めている。大気汚染防止、水質保護では森林資源の拡充が不可欠である。こうした問題に対しては政府関係期間、専門家の協力と同時に、環境保護に積極的な民間初団体の役割も大きい。2006 年 12 月に開かれた「アジア太平洋水サミット」では事務局長でシンガポール政策研究所会長のトミー・コー氏は「メコン川、ガンジス川など大型河川流域国の「水の統治」の協議体の必要性を訴えると同時に、そのためには「政府機関だけでなく、NGO や ADB、世銀など国際機関の参加が必要だ」と強調している（『日経』07, 7.14）。

③では、省エネ化の技術協力は政府・専門機関の協力を強化していくことが軸になる。堀井伸浩アジア経済研究所研究員は、日本の省エネ基準・管理士の普及などソフト面を含め、日本が推進役となって「アジア省エネルギー・環境技術協力機構」といった多国間枠組みを立ち上げる時期に来ていると強調している（『朝日』07, 2, 6）。しか

し同時にエネルギー節約の教育や代替エネルギーの普及などの面では民間ネットワークの協力と地道な活動が重要な役割を担っている。

第2は、共同利益創出型ネットワークである。

主として①経済発展、②成長と社会環境充実、③安全保障などの共同利益が考えられる。まず①経済的共同利益創出の枠組み作りでは、いくつかの具体的で顕著な動きがあり特に多く説明しない。が、1つはアジア域内での多国籍企業の急増による利益共有の広がりである。2つには未だ進展にばらつきはあるものの今や2国間のFTA、EPAから「アジア地域EPA」「東アジアFTA構想」に踏み込む段階に入りつつある。さらに3つには、経済共同利益創出のためには、いずれアジアの共通通貨の創造が問われる。アジア金融危機の時日本が提唱した「アジア通貨基金(AMF)構想」、2000年の通貨スワップ方式で合意した「チェンマイ・イニシアチブ」、ADBなどが提唱するようになった通貨バスケットの「ACU」(アジア通貨単位)など、前向きな構想が少しずつ出されるようになっている。もっともADBの06年年次総会で自ら算出したACU提案に対して各国から評価算出をめぐり種々の異論が噴出し、国の壁が依然と厚いことが再認識された。

②では持続的な経済成長と社会環境充実の両立こそがアジア共通の利益になってきた。そのためには「クリーン開発メカニズム(CDM)」の発展と活用、新エネルギーの共同開発、エネルギー共同備蓄体制の構築などが重要課題として浮かんてくる。また今や地球温暖化への取り組みは国を超え、まずは近隣アジアで取り組み、それを通じて共同利益を創出できる課題となってきた。岡部直明日経主幹は「アジアを成長と環境を両立させるモデル地域にできれば、グローバルな危機は深まる。アジア統合では“環境・エネルギー共同体”の創設を先行させるべき時だ」(『日経』07, 5.21)と力説している。1988年設立の国連組織「気候変動に関する政府間パネル」は地球温暖化についての調査と政策提言でその重要性を増しているが、こうした枠組みの中でアジア各国が問題解決のために共同して取り組み、それを通して共同利益を実現することができる(『毎日』07.5.29)。

③として、現段階では自主防衛、同盟など依然従来型の安全保障が基軸になってはいいるがハードな安全保障、ソフトな安全保障ともいずれアジア地域を包括する協調的安全保障枠組みの創造が求められるようになってくるであろう。

第1、第2のネットワークづくりでは、各分野でのフォーラムやワーキング・グループを組織し、それらにおいて、①現状の分析と認識、②将来見通し(展望)、③戦略と政策の作業部会を設置し、それぞれの作業の上で、各分野を超えた総合的な連携作業を基本的な作業内容としてルーティン化し、相互のネットワークの連携を強めことによって重層的ネットワークのシナジー効果を引き出すべきである。

第3には、生活・文化アイデンティティ創出ネットワークである。

問題解決型も共同利益創出型も、確かに共同作業を通してお互いの理解や信頼が深まり、お互いの関係を緊密化していくことになるだろう。しかし「我々意識」はこうした共同作業だけではなかなか生まれてこない。共同意識に関しては生活とか文化が密接にかかわってくる。この点では確かに伝統的なアジアに共通性した思想・文化を指摘することは容易である。が、むしろここで強調すべきはそれ以上に、今日アジア各国間の人の移動、情報の移動、文化交流などは従来になく活発化し、それぞれの国の人々、特に若者が他国の実情や人々の考え方や感情を理解することが飛躍的に高まってきており、そうした中でアジアに共通した文化や思考、生活慣習などを再確認し、さらには他国の文化を自分の文化の一部として取り入れようとする風潮が強まっていることである。例えば日本のアニメ漫画、ポップ・ソング、ファッションのアジア流出、韓流と呼ばれる韓国ドラマの流行などはそうした典型であろう。また日本も韓国も台湾もアジア域内での国際結婚に一段と加速がかかり、企業の外国人雇用と合わせ多民族共生の空間が拡大している。アジアにおいて言語と歴史の壁が大きく崩れ始め、何となく欧米と異なるアジア世界、アジア・アイデンティティーが芽生えつつあるように見える。

以上を踏まえながら、まとめてみると第1を包括するプロセスを通して「相互扶助ネットワーク」、第2の活動

を通して「利益共有ネットワーク」、第3の交流や試みを通して「生活文化共有ネットワーク」が恒常的に機能するようになれば、そうした重層的な組み合わせの中に「アジア共同体」を展望することができるのではないだろうか。

IV、アジア共同体形成に向けてのアプローチ

ではどのように進めるべきか。ここでは特に3つのアプローチを提起しておきたい。

第1は、機能主義的アプローチである。課題解決型および共同利益創出型に関しては機能主義的アプローチが、現実的であり効果的でもある。もちろん以下で触れるボトムアップ式もこれら2つのネットワーク構築においては重要である。

第2は、戦略的調整的アプローチである。ハードな安全保障協力のシステム化あるいはエネルギーの共同開発・共同備蓄などをどう戦略的に推進し調整していくかというアプローチである。東アジア地域には、日米安全保障条約が秩序維持や平和構築において機能している。また、米韓安全保障条約もある。地域の安全保障協力メカニズムとしても、朝鮮半島における6カ国協議やARF（ASEAN 地域フォーラム）、上海協力機構（SCO）など、さまざまなプロセスが進んでいる。これらを戦略的にどう調整していくかがこれからの重要な課題となるであろう。

第3は、ボトムアップ式アプローチである。環境保護、感染症予防、貧困や人権の改善など人間の安全保障における教育、環境改善などソフトな部分での試みは主に民間のボランティア的な活動、特にNGOの協力をどうネットワーク化しシステム化していくかということが重要になる。無論人間の安全保障でも、環境改善でも専門家集団や政府の役割が重要であることは言うまでもない。したがってボトムアップを効果ならしめるのは、何らかの形で彼らとの相乗効果的な連携を図ることである。その意味では第2の戦略調整的アプローチをここでも使う必要がある。

このようにアジア共同体形成に向けてのアプローチを整理してみると、経済分野を中心とする機能主義的アプローチの積み重ねだけでは、今後の展望が開けないのではないかと考えられる。特にこれからますます重大になってくる人間の安全保障の取り組みを考えた場合、ボトムアップ式アプローチを特に強化し幅の広いものにしていく必要がある。さらにこのアプローチは人間の安全保障の充実に必要だけでなく、生活文化共有型においても民間主導の文化・教育・スポーツ交流、教育カリキュラムなどの共有、多民族の共生促進などまさにボトムアップ式アプローチが主流になるべきである。

以上、「アジア共同体」構築に向けての基本的なアプローチを論じたが、大切なのは上でも触れたように機能主義的アプローチ、戦略的調整的アプローチ、ボトムアップ式アプローチのどれが良いかを三者択一的にとらえるのではなく、それぞれを並行して行っていくこと、そしてそれぞれを常に有機的に関連付けながら包括的・戦略的に推進していく発想を強く持つべきである。もしこうした発想を持ち効果的に連携できるようになれば、共同体構築をめぐるゼロ・サム的なイニシアティブ争いは急速に減少し、信頼関係の構築につながり、不必要な対立を減少させプラスサムの地域協力の積み上げ、重層的で包括的な協力枠組みの制度化が進んでいくだろう。

以上が私自身の強い希望的観測も含めた、アジア共同体建設に向けての大まかなロードマップである。

East Asian Integration from the Perspective of ASEAN

Dr. SURIN Pitsuwan

Ladies and Gentlemen

1. We live in a time when everyone is 'futurizing Asia'. By 'futurizing Asia' one is referring to the tendency to reduce Asia into a growth center or pole of the 21st century. Often, those who 'futurizes' Asia are inclined to point to the total foreign reserves of China, Japan, and South Korea, indeed also member states of ASEAN.
2. Others go one step further to refer to the phenomenal trade surpluses of these countries with the West; invariably the seeming ability of China to manufacture almost anything at 'China prices.' The latest issue of Harvard Business Magazine had a lead article that affirmed, rather matter-a-factly, that "between now and 2030, China will account for one-third of the world's GDP growth."
3. In private sector and without, there is also a cottage industry that speaks of Asia in vainglorious terms. They range from the rise of China to India. In the latest National Intelligence Council report on "Mapping the Future", which is based on analysis provided by 16 intelligence agencies in the US, the growth of India and China, has been considered a "virtual certainty."
4. Most other forecasts indicate that by 2020 China's gross national product (GNP) will exceed that of individual Western economic powers except for the United States. India's GNP will have overtaken or be on the threshold of overtaking European economies.
5. In 2003, in a widely quoted research, the investment bank Goldman and Sachs, further attests to the trajectory of Asia to keep growing almost unstoppably, though. By 2030, the GDP of China and India combined will exceed that of US and European countries. I think I have made my point.

Ladies and gentlemen

6. Yet, in more ways than one, one can say that I haven't made my point too. Those are future projections of the world in 2020 and 2030. And, as one Japanese proverb goes: "In politics, an inch ahead is darkness." When so much of the future is associated with Asia, the present is missed too.

7. Indeed, if we survey the current international scene with the goal to link it to Asia, there are many issues that have only grown in importance. Take poverty, for instance. Of the fifty five countries that are condemned by Oxford economist Paul Collier as incapable of saving their people from poverty, Asia has three: Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. One does not necessarily have to agree with Collier. In the 1960s, when Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish economist spoke of the “Asian Drama,” he was no less pessimistic. Yet, events over the past forty years have shown Asia producing one economic ‘miracle’ after the other.

8. Be that as it may, Collier’s larger point cannot be missed: the current international system has “deadlocks and stalemates” that cannot be easily resolved. Over the last ten years alone, in spite of the “rise of Asia” there has been no resolution to the problems we faced.

9. The failure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to reform the financial system despite the lesson gained from the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The G8 is still without China, and India, Brazil, South Africa. The UN Security Council still without Japan. Perpetual disagreement over the value of some Asian currencies, coupled with the resistance block Asia from having Japanese yuan as the key trading currency. The trade and currency deficit of the US against China and Japan. All these problems have emerged with the rise of Asia. Yet the international system remains inadequate to the task of addressing them now.

10. Invariably, what can Asia contribute in the resolution of them ? What initiatives among the Asian countries to begin to construct our own architecture for better governance in Asia and the world ? Can there be an Asia driven process of reinventing of the international institutions ? These are important questions that we have to engage, rather than be lulled into believing in the inevitability of our own future as the future growth center. Indeed, it is often forgotten that to have a positive future, we need to understand and engage the present forces by which East Asia is now being shaped. Dealing with them requires an understanding of integration first.

Ladies and gentlemen

11. The lesson begins by understanding one crucial point, however: All regional integration **may or may not** occur as the result of conscious policy. This includes East Asia. Hence one often speaks of the difference between de facto versus de jure integration. While the former is a process of regionalization that occurs in spite of government intervention, due to the freer flow of capita, trade, information, goods and services, the latter comes about through government initiated schemes and plans.

12. However, since de facto and de jure integration can occur together, whereby the government tries to keep up with what the market forces demands and expects, any meaningful discussion of Asian integration would have to reconcile the gap of the two. In other words, what is otherwise occurring naturally in Asia, that the member states, especially those represented by

ASEAN, are seeking to jointly do without which the markets by themselves would not have been able to achieve ?

13. Answering this critical question requires one to look at four elements. Identity; Power Interest; Institutions; and market interactions. More precisely, it requires us to look at their spillover effects. Let us now proceed to explore them one by one.

Ladies and Gentlemen

14. Even if the Asian market forces can bring all of us together, in that they allow people across different nationalities, creeds and colors, to trade well and equitably with one another, it is clear that excessive market forces will split our Asian identity apart.

15. When market forces intervene, they can be very intrusive. Sovereign funds in Singapore can buy into the telecommunication sector in Thailand; and similarly Thailand's pop entertainment can penetrate Cambodia and Laos too. As events have shown in recent years, on both occasions these developments have brought about a whiplash national effects, where Thais begin to suspect the true motive of Singaporeans; while Cambodians and Laotians begin to question the predominance of Thailand in Indo China.

16. It is due to what economists call the "negative externalities" of market forces, some of which cannot be seen or understood until they manifest themselves in streets demonstrations and violence, that an entity like ASEAN----which seeks to equitably represent the interest of old and new members alike, even China, Japan and South Korea in ASEAN Plus 3---must be there to inject reason and rigor into the process of integration. Barring such a role, the process of an Asian identity would not be suitably formed; since it will be skewed by market forces. Some Asian countries will be able to ride on the market forces better than others, leading to pent up resentment.

Ladies and Gentlemen

17. When Asian integration is allowed to proceed through technological imperative, or market driven forces purely, at certain points power imbalances will occur; as indeed has happened too. The capacity to trade well, and extensively, allow countries to generate enormous reserves. Translated into simple terms, these are money that can be used for a variety of purposes. They range from foreign acquisition to defense modernization.

18. Indeed, 80 % of the intra regional trade in East Asia are now concentrated in China, Japan, and South Korea. The trajectory looks set to continue in view of the perpetual empowerment of the Middle Class. This has led the likes of Mentor Minister Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore to speak of "two Asia"; one relatively rich; and by the same token, one relatively poor.

19. When power is concentrated so heavily in one part of the region, and not the other, then countries that are worst off would be confronted with the option of forming a coalition of countries to counter check the emergent power. In Asian international relations, the tendency to rely on the United States, or to form a league of democratic countries to put a check on the more authoritarian members, represent such trends.

Ladies and Gentlemen

20. When power imbalances occur, the tendency to balance and counter check the other is extremely strong. This is due to the fear of being dominated and over-whelmed. In and of themselves, markets cannot create multilateral institutions to address such imbalances. At best, markets can only foster corporate social responsibility (CSR). But they won't be able to create public goods like peace, collective security, fair institutions, and clean environment.

21. Rather, to ensure that these public goods are not spoiled, or further undermined, it would redound on the governments, or the likes of ASEAN, to provide a framework of win-win cooperation.

22. Militarily, one of the ways to pre-empt unhealthy chain reaction of counter-balancing, or competitive arms races, for example, would be to create viable multilateral institutions that can address the tensions, fears, and suspicions at play. Within the context of East Asia, such a role is fulfilled through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which seeks to promote a region-wide assurance---rather than a zero sum---game.

Ladies and Gentlemen

23. Excessive market interactions could also lead to uncontrolled flow of people, goods, services, capital and information. Some of these flows may be positive, while on other occasions, they may be driven by organized crime, money laundering, illegal human traffic and unregulated flow of capital. Germs and pathogens also travel more easily than ever due to the advent of human travel. At any rate, each of these developments could bring about an adverse impact on the economy and social political structure of the neighboring countries.

24. Over the last ten years, we have seen how Asia has confronted the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998), the haze problem (1999), the terrorist bombings in Kuta, Bali (2002), SARS (2003) and the sporadic outbreak of bird flu (2005-2006). Each of these events has gained in velocity and magnitude by virtue of intense market interactions before, which create a rapid transmission belt of problems.

25. It is therefore clear that even as de facto integration is occurring, the negative ramifications are hard to ignore. Thus, it is vital for governments in the region---no matter how asymmetrical

their relations may be at this point---to jointly analyze and think through some of the problems as a result of their embrace of liberalism and Westphalian form of international relations.

Ladies and Gentleman

26. Naturally, when one thinks about regional integration, it is natural to cast one's eyes on ASEAN---granted that it has had forty years of experience in fostering a basic sense of "we-ness" in Southeast Asia.

27. To the extent the responsibility is placed on ASEAN---to be the driver of East Asian integration through modalities like East Asian Summit, and ultimately East Asian community----there is a need to understand whether the process is horizontal or vertical? Indeed, should the process be prioritized?

28. Horizontal integration is what Southeast Asia has gone through, as when the original pioneers of ASEAN accepted Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar into its fold to create one region. Guided by Bali Concord II agreed in 2003, member states are now attempting to create a security, economic and social cultural communities. When the leaders of China, Japan and Korea agreed to work hand-in-hand with leaders of Southeast Asia to create ASEAN Plus 3 in 1997, one is witnessing horizontal integration too.

Ladies and gentlemen

29. It is vital to understand de facto, de jure, and horizontal integration---and I have taken some ten minutes to explain these concepts---because the three processes are indeed occurring in the region from ASEAN perspective.

30. What is, however, not occurring is vertical integration, whereby power is ceded to a supreme or cardinal authority, so that one decision made at the top, as is the case with the European Council of Ministers, can apply to all members of ASEAN Plus 3.

31. So, when one speaks of integration, one has to ask oneself both a positive and normative question: Is it necessary to have Asian integration of the vertical form one day, if not, why not ?

Ladies and gentlemen

32. Although the question seems simple, it is not one that anyone---even an ASEAN Secretary General---can answer with any measure of conviction and equanimity. To begin with, Asia is diverse not merely in terms of cultures, and religions, but more specifically, in terms of regime types.

33. Each country has a different political system. And, that is only formal political system. Informally, various Asian countries are governed and run by power interest, cliques, and personalities that one may not even be aware of, not unless one does a very systematic and thorough study of where the nerve centers of power truly are.

34. One cannot answer when, or how much vertical integration can occur, because the very success of such an endeavor is contingent on all countries flourishing into real democracies, where referendums, polling, surveys and exit polls can be held at different intervals to assess the extent to which the citizenry of Asia can---or cannot---accept a certain decision from the top.

Ladies and Gentlemen

35. Granted that Asia is, in the interim, handicapped by structural forces and cultural diversity at play to be able to consider vertical integration in a systematic, and thoughtful manner, the strategy before us would have to be more creative almost by political necessity.

36. However, if necessity is the mother of invention, the degree to which one may succeed in marrying de facto integration and de jure integration in an equitable manner, depends deeply on human ingenuity and the speed with which one reacts to the demands of global events as well. Here, the record of ASEAN has been very good.

37. When President Richard Nixon announced the Guam Doctrine in 1972, followed by the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam in 1975, leaders of ASEAN emerged from their early preoccupation with domestic events, to gather at the first Bali Summit in 1976. Although this was a full nine years after the formation of ASEAN in 1967, it paved the way for cooperation, camaraderie, and a spirit of conviviality to be fostered. The fact that ASEAN leaders all spoke English did help matters somewhat in clearing the misunderstanding.

Ladies and Gentlemen

38. The ability to listen to the suggestion of other countries is also helpful in fostering regional integration, when vertical form of integration cannot be considered yet. Influenced by the wisdom of the Fukuda Doctrine in having a “heart to heart diplomacy”, the ASEAN Post Ministerial Meeting (AMM) was formed in 1976. The event was formalized after the Japanese Foreign Minister had found the heart to hear dialogues with the original member states like Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand to be helpful in regulating the relations between Japan and Southeast Asia.

39. Subsequently, due to the end of the Cold War, AMM was transformed into the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993; once again through the suggestion of the Japanese government

of which the likes of Ambassador Yukio Satoh, now the president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) played a major role.

40. ASEAN's free trade agreements with China, Japan, and Korea, which would be concluded in full with all three member states by 2010, are also triggered by the seeming lack of progress in the deregulation initiatives of the World Trade Organization (WTO); once again showing the speed with which member states of ASEAN Plus 3 react to external events.

Ladies and Gentlemen

41. That said, having the ability to listen and react well, sometimes, is not enough too. There must be the attempt to improve the very proceedings that are used to replace the need for vertical integration for now. The ARF, for example, is held every June. And, it has been around for more than twelve years. Yet, the success of ARF is often measured in terms of the presence---and absence---of the US Secretary of State. In this sense, ARF has not outgrown the need for external endorsement, nor become a substantive policy arena.

42. The ARF is too short too, as it is held over four days; barely enough to address the concerns of great; medium; and small powers alike even as market forces drive their growth rates and Gini co-efficient apart, both of which have a decided impact on balance of power.

43. Policy ideas generated at ARF are otherwise logged, and recorded, at the ARF Unit in ASEAN Secretariat---often with immense over lap as to what had been discussed before, with no further attempts to expedite them into enforcement. Thus, over the last decade, member states of ARF has stuck to the gun of discussing confidence building measures, when in fact, they should be venturing into preventive diplomacy (PD) as agreed in 1994. If repeated, over the long run, ARF could be super-ceded by random acts of mass terrorism, and concurrently, any progressive changes in the force structures and trajectories of member states.

Ladies and Gentlemen

44. In more ways than one, Asia is already a force to be reckoned with. The latter is plausible in terms of the cache it possesses in the form of multi-billion sovereign funds; and the USD \$ 1 trillion US denominated T bills to which various Asian countries continue to hold in abundance.

45. But, once again, before one can all excited about the growth, it is vital to understand if the current generation of Asians are indeed laying the right foundation to understand their Asian-ness ?

46. For close to five centuries, before Asia became an awe-inspiring point of geopolitical reference that it is today, it was also variously described as the Orient; Cathay; the Far East;

and to the extent the focus was on China; the Sick Man of Asia. Indeed, Asia was actually not Asia. Rather, it was described, narrated, and stereotyped into units convenient to the political imagination and, one can safely say, the agenda of Europe/the West.

Ladies and Gentlemen

47. Indeed, the origin of the term "Asia" goes back to ancient Greece even, where Asia denoted the areas across the Aegean Sea from Greece, being separated from Africa at Nile river. In particular, medieval European geographers attributed to the Greek's view of three continents, Europe, Asia and Africa, a religious connotation by linking each continent with a child of (Prophet) Noah.

48. And, it gets better: During the Renaissance period, this early Greek names and continental scheme was given a scientific status by geographers and utilized as an authoritative frame to categorize human societies and their characteristics. During the age of discoveries, geographers defined new boundaries for Asia, Africa and Europe. The latter is what modern scholars called Orientalism--the exercise of defining the Other for the sheer benefit of one's psychological, political, cultural, societal and economic interest.

49. To truly make Asian integration meaningful, we have to meet not at the market place, but at the interstices of our minds. In other words, we have to know each other through our history, culture, and ontological consciousness; specifically how Asians become Asians, and how we seek to capitalize on what we have now to contribute to world civilizations.

Ladies and Gentlemen

50. The task of doing so, I like to believe, is contingent on Asia having a well networked ASEAN Secretariat first; followed by what I called the Global Communities in Asian Nations (GCAN). Allow me to proceed with the former.

51. At various points, ASEAN has been called a "talk shop"; an "elite organization"; and a "neoliberal front." Whatever the misgivings of ASEAN, it is an entity that seeks to make the best of this imperfect world. And, the records do reflect this 'true' nature of ASEAN.

52. Documents which are easily accessible online at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia, clearly show that ASEAN has, time and again, reacted to some of the most pressing issues in international relations through strong political statements. They have revolved on Cambodia, Myanmar, North Korea, South China Sea sea, human rights, terrorism, even on apartheid in South Africa, and the imbroglio in Israeli-Palestinian peace too.

Ladies and Gentlemen

53. That ASEAN dares to speak out, often with un-even results, suggests a group guided by principles, rather than hoisted by power purely. Granted that Southeast Asia has been thoroughly penetrated by colonial and power politics before, there is a limit to what these statements can do.

54. Furthermore, each regime has a different way of handling social and political problem, which frequently are not given to common articulation, let alone, common solution.

55. Under such trying circumstances, the best way to foster common consciousness---or Asian-ness---is for ASEAN Secretariat to function as the network by which Track 1, 2, and 3 dialogues could be fostered. The Asian Human Community (AHC) project at Waseda University, though academic and intellectual in nature, could seek the help of the Secretariat in designing conferences or seminars that meet the needs of scholars, students and diplomatic practitioners alike. In other words, instead of designing the meetings in isolation, ASEAN Secretariat can leverage on its vast networks in all track to lend a helping hand.

Ladies and gentlemen

56. On surface, although ASEAN do have Plus 3 dialogues, these dialogues are arranged sequentially with each of the three countries, and other Dialogue Partners too, during the ASEAN Summit at the end of each year. Therefore, the notion of East Asia as a collectivity---where leaders meet, and debate together---is still distant. To be sure, leaders of ASEAN are aware of the short comings, and have agreed to meet twice a year.

57. At the track 2 and track 3 levels, think tanks that have served the region well are also facing problems of manpower shortage and generational shifts; all of which are occurring at a time when more, rather than, less analysts and advocates are needed to consolidate what have been achieved a decade or two prior. From the above, it can be seen that Asian integration remains "work in progress".

58. In order for East Asian community to come into fruition, more efforts should be expended at creating the Greater Communities of Asian Nations (GCAN); ideally by creating more nodes and networks that can connect with, and to, the ASEAN Secretariat.

Ladies and gentlemen

59. Each local GCAN will have a national chapter of five members (ideally scholars, or journalists of senior standing) ultimately led, or chaired, by a panel of five eminent grist (i.e. former foreign ministers or PMs) on ASEAN and Asian affairs.

60. Forming a collaborative relationship, each member of GCAN would be expected to relay the insights, thoughts and views of the eminent persons on how East Asian integration can be put forward, in addition to their own. Their reports can be shared with others in ASEAN Secretariat and also senior officers through out the region.

61. The selection and pairing of members of GCAN with the panel of eminent grist will be done with the advice of ASEAN Secretariat. Each GCAN member can renew their membership in GCAN upon the recommendation of the ASEAN Secretariat Foundation. If need be, using their resources at the respective universities, members of GCAN can also encourage their graduate students to form virtual think tanks that would encourage blogging, reports and analysis on how to improve Asian integration.

Ladies and Gentlemen

62. Among others, the role of GCAN is to plug the weaknesses of various meetings from conceptualization, discussion to execution. This is done by serving as de facto policy ombudsman. Reports of GCAN will be circulated to:

I. ASEAN Secretariat;

II. Senior officials of various ministries assigned to work with and on ASEAN;

III. The parliamentary secretaries who advise their respective ministers in various portfolios;

IV. The political secretaries and aides to the Prime Ministers, and Presidents; and

V. The chancellors and deans of various universities responsible for Asian studies and integration.

Ladies and Gentlemen

63. For those familiar with Asian international relations, the diplomatic moniker of Plus 3, Plus 6 or Plus Plus, signifies the readiness to which pivotal powers like China, India, Japan, South Korea, the United States, commit themselves to creating a regional community along the lines of open regionalism.

64. Of the three 'modalities' above, China, Japan and South Korea have been among the first to agree to the importance of working with---and through---ASEAN in the creation of a regional community.

65. But how ASEAN is able to live up to the responsibility is dependent on the trilateral relationships of the great powers too. Tohyo Gyoten, an experienced Japanese diplomat and

thinker, has affirmed the importance of good Sino-Japanese relations as well as Sino-US and US-Japanese relations as the rudiments of a stable region. This view has been seconded by the likes of senior diplomats like Morton Abramowitz at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace.

Ladies and Gentlemen

66. Asian integration is not something to be trifled with. Aside from joint concern with the spillover effects of market forces, uneven formation of Asian identity, which could be skewed by wealth and income imbalances, there is a need to encourage great powers to have good triangular relations with one another too. Only then would Asian integration be able to proceed smoothly, without being penetrated by great power rivalry; as had been the case during the Cold War.

67. Indeed, the same Asian integration that we speak of today, could have been explored during Cold War. But the ideological atmosphere was too polarizing, and mis-guided different countries to taking opposite positions, when in fact they should have thought of nothing else except one Asia for all.

68. Narrow ideology, extreme power rivalry and zero sum mentality---all of which prevalent before---can therefore wrack havoc on Asian integration. Therefore, in order for Asia to claim its status as the leading economic locomotive in the world, it has to set its priorities in order. By this token ASEAN has to transform into a network secretariat that also promotes GCAN.

69. Invariably, I encourage Waseda University, which has long been the bastion of elite Asian education, to work closely with ASEAN Secretariat to create a more stable, and prosperous Asian human community. Indeed, it is to the credit of all the faculty members of Waseda University to be so determined and passionate in fostering a common Asian identity.

70. Without a doubt, this is a noble goal, as we are seeking to unite and improve the lives of close to 1/3 of the world's total humanity. Hence, if we all gather our networks, minds, and beliefs there is much that all of us can achieve together.

Four Scenarios of Asia Regional Cooperation

Amitav Acharya

Dr. Acharya

Four Scenarios of Asian Regional Cooperation

Outline of a Paper Presented to the Panel on: "Modelling a Scenario of Asian Integration: Political, Economic, and Cultural Approaches", Conference on Asian Cooperation, Integration, and Human Resources, Waseda University, Japan, January 17 – 18, 2008

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In this paper, I sketch four possible scenarios of regional cooperation in Asia. While these are not mutually exclusive, they do possess distinctive characteristics which will lead to different types of regionalism and regional order in Asia.

Concert

This type of cooperation assumes the primacy of great powers in regional order. Instead of competing with and balancing each other, great powers develop a common interest in the management of regional affairs. The weaker states are marginalized, or at best play a secondary role. The regional system remains anarchic, but the great powers develop rules, interactions and institutions not only to reduce conflicts among themselves, but also to manage other conflicts in the region.

The original model of a concert system is the European Concert that took shape after the defeat of Napoleon. The obvious candidates for membership in a contemporary Asian concert are: China, Japan, India and the United States, and possibly Russia. But an Asian concert may have distinctive features not found in the European model, especially because it has to accommodate ASEAN, whose members are weak states and small powers, but enjoy substantial collective diplomatic clout in regional affairs.¹ Moreover, an Asian concert, unlike the European one, cannot be founded on common political values, unless and until China goes through a process of democratic transition (and Russia reverses its democratic backsliding).

Under a great power concert, existing ASEAN-led regional institutions will lose their importance. The great powers will develop their own forum of interactions, including frequent usage of bilateral and "minilateral" summit diplomacy. The Asian concert will make its own rules and mechanisms for conflict management, which will essentially cater to the interests of the great powers themselves. There could be no territorial adjustments or conflict resolution without their consent. There will be a strong bias against revolutionary political change in the region. Regional mechanisms will become instruments of great power intervention in the internal affairs of the weaker and smaller states of Asia.

¹ Amitav Acharya, "A Concert of Asia?", *Survival*, vol. 41, no.3 (Autumn 1999), pp.84-101.

Hierarchy

A great power concert assumes a multiplicity of great powers, or a multipolar regional system. While such multipolarity is quite likely to characterise the Asian power structure (one might say it has already become a reality), it does not preclude a regional hierarchy with China at the top. A hierarchy is different from hegemony or a pure balance of power system, which implies preponderance or equilibrium of power respectively. Hierarchy is conceived as a benign ordering of powers, with none, including the top player, exercising absolute power and authority.

It is sometimes said that hierarchy is consistent with time-honoured Asian values. Just as hierarchy is accepted and followed in Asian societies and domestic politics, the argument goes, it should also function as a legitimate organizing principle of Asian international order. And in the Asian context, the natural candidate for the room at the top in a regional hierarchy is China. David Kang has put forth an elaborate argument about hierarchy in Asia. China's rise, he argues, returns Asia "back to the future" by recreating a Sino-centric regional order that prevailed during the tributary system. Moreover, he argues that such an order will be a stable one, because when China was rich and powerful, Asia was stable.² He dismisses realist pessimism about Asia's future resembling Europe's (late 19th century and early 20th century) past. Instead of being "ripe for rivalry", to use Aaron Friedberg's phrase, Asia will be "primed for peace", to quote Stephen Van Evera's metaphor for Europe after the Cold War.

If a hierarchical regional order develops in Asia, what would regional cooperation look like? First, China will be the natural leader of regional institutions, thereby supplanting ASEAN. China's interests will drive the agenda of Asian regionalism, which might translate into great prominence for ASEAN Plus Three or similar East Asian institutions to the detriment of the ASEAN Regional Forum and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, as well as ASEAN itself. Regional economic cooperation will be more about informal "developmental regionalism", rather than trade liberalisation. In the security sphere, China is unlikely to favour the creation of "problem-solving" regional mechanisms that engage in dispute settlement or conflict resolution. On the other hand, as long as China remains under communist rule, Asian regional organizations will not take on the role of promoting human rights and democracy. They will be essentially wedded to Westphalian sovereignty.

Community

A third scenario of regional cooperation is the development of a regional community. A community implies a relationship of deep socialization, trust and convergence of basic values. Regional communities can be economic, social and security-oriented. They can have different degrees of institutionalization.

² David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks." *International Security* 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 57-85.

An economic community in its technical sense refers to a free trade area and a customs union and a common market with free mobility of labour, capital and services across national boundaries. A socio-cultural community is characterized by a sense of collective identity, forged over interactions in social, cultural, educational and related areas. A security community is a group of states in which war has become “unthinkable”. Currently, ASEAN represents an attempt to develop a subregional community with three pillars: economic, security and socio-cultural, although it has a long way to go in realizing these objectives.

Some urge that Asia should aspire to become a multifaceted community just as ASEAN is striving to become. Proposals for an Asian economic community have been made by India). Visions have been articulated (such as by the East Asian Vision Group) for the development of an Asian (or East Asian) cultural community, with its own set of shared values and regional identity. Others have raised the possibility of an Asian security community.

Under this community scenario, existing Asian regional institutions will continue to be “led” by ASEAN which will remain at the “driver seat” of regional institutions such as ARF, APT and the East Asian Summit. The real challenge would be whether Asian regional organizations will continue to be informal, non-legalistic, and process-oriented, or go through a deepening of economic integration and security cooperation as would be necessary under the common market and “security community” models. Asian groupings will also continue to be inclusive, but this will conflict with the need for developing shared values that must underpin a community of any sort. An Asian regional community, if it is ever to materialize, would be different from its European counterpart, reflecting the great political and cultural diversity of the region.

Consociation

A fourth scenario for Asian regional cooperation may be called a consociational regional order. Derived from the notion of consociationalism in multi-ethnic societies, a consociational regional order is marked a number of features. One of them is the existence of cultural diversity. Another is an uneven and multipolar configuration of power among states rather than absolute dominance of a single power. These powers may balance each other, thereby ensuring stability. Unlike in a concert, the powerful states in a consociation respect decisions of the majority of the actors, rather than be governed by the whims of the great powers alone. Unlike a community, a consociation has no natural sense of collective identity or “we feeling”, but a sense of togetherness is constructed out of regular interactions. And while a regional consociation is not free from serious divisions and conflicts, these are managed through diplomatic processes and institutions so that they never reach breaking point.

Regional cooperation under a consociational framework is induced negatively, rather than due to a positive convergence of political values or collective identity. In other words, states cooperate not because they love and respect each other (although some may

do so to some others), but because the price of non-cooperation will be too high under existing conditions of high security and economic interdependence. Conflict (economic or political) will be avoided not because the members of ASEAN, ARF, APEC or EAS are bound by shared values and common identity, but their members view conflict avoidance as a necessary precondition for economic growth and development.

Conceptually, a consociational regional order combines elements of realism (balance of power), liberalism (especially economic interdependence and functional institutions), and constructivism (socially constructed, as opposed to naturally given, regional identity and norms). Figure 1 represents this scenario theoretically.

Conclusion


Neither a great power concert nor a Sinocentric hierarchy is likely to materialise in Asia under present or foreseeable conditions. An Asian concert is precluded by the lack of convergence of political values among Asia's great powers, and by the decades of regional deference to ASEAN, a club of smaller nations, which cannot be easily marginalized in the management of regional order.

China will never acquire the relative power to recreate the Sino-centric regional order, especially under conditions that are vastly different from the past. The simultaneous rise of Japan and India and the omnipresence of the United States in Asia militate against the possibility of a Chinese-centred hierarchy which is also incompatible with the Westphalian principles of sovereignty and equality that China itself espouses.³

Asia is abuzz with the rhetoric of community-building, but a consociation is what might really be possible. The community model might apply at the subregional level in Southeast Asia through ASEAN (although some would contest it), but replicating such a community at the regional level of Asia is far more daunting. Asia's cultural diversity and emerging multipolarity create the possibility of a regional consociation, in which the great powers as a regional minority accommodate the interests of the weaker nations who are in the majority. Conflicts, while never absent, are controlled before they lead to systemic collapse. The absence of shared values or collective identity is offset by a continuous process of socialization that reduces cultural barriers and promotes habits of cooperation. Such a regional consociation is the best Asia can really hope for and would be a singular achievement.

³ Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past be Its Future?", *International Security*, vol. 28, no.3 (Winter 2003-04).

A Consociational Regionalism



A consociational regional order is the political order of a culturally diverse region that rests on political and economic inter-connectedness, institutional arrangements and the cooperative attitudes of leaders (partly resulting from the perceived dangers of non-cooperation) reconciling their parochial national thinking with the regional common purpose.

Source: Amitav Acharya, Theoretical Perspectives on International Relations in Asia, Paper Presented at the Conference on International Relations in Asia: The New Regional System," George Washington University, 27-29 September 2007

10 issues regarding East Asian cooperation: A Chinese Scholar's perspective

Wang Yi Zhou

First of all, I would like to clarify my own thinking, the following 10 questions regarding the East Asian cooperation have no strict relations with each others, and the order they are presented is according to the author's understandings and immethodical ideals . Also there is no consensus about these 10 issues among Chinese scholars, who are just beginning to quest for the answers. I believe these 10 questions have a great potential for theoretical discussions, including deep perspectives in a global point of view, particularly among the thinkers and intellectuals.

1. Should East Asian cooperation extend to the Pan-East-Asian cooperation, or confine to the area of East Asia?

Presently there are huge disputes on the geographical extension of East Asian cooperation, should it be within East Asia only, or Pan-East-Asian area? In my own opinion, at the beginning stage, especially the commercial cooperation and free trade, it should start only within the East Asia, a comparably small and easily controllable area. As it goes on well, for instance, when the bilateral free trade reaches a higher phase, the East Asian cooperation would be able to extent to a wider area, inviting more countries. It does not simply mean to exclude the United States. It is just a careful thought on the needs for a stable development of East Asian cooperation. It is always helpful to start from an easier point.

2. How to settle or ease the disputes over sovereignty, which is a main obstacle to the cooperation?

East Asia is one of the areas which have most of the disputes over sovereignty.

Those troubles and conflicts would easily undermine communications and cooperation between countries. Almost between every major power in this area (the Korean Peninsulas, Japan, Russia, China and ASEAN) there have been large or small disputes. Some of them had military conflicts in the past, which are still

troubling. China is probably facing the most difficult challenge. To settle the disputes over sovereign is one of the keys for a significant progress in East Asian cooperation. Deng Xiaoping once brought forward an insightful propose “to put aside disputes and go in for joint development” on settling this issue. But even standing from current situation, it appears that, to achieve this goal, we still need the joint efforts of all countries.

3. How to balance the priority, between the traditional security (military security and territory disputes) and non-traditional security (global climate changes and financial crisis)?

It is a disturbing agenda for the East Asian cooperation, and it also makes this area distinctive from the others. For instance, in Europe and South America, there are basically no easily provoked territory disputes and military conflicts. (It is generally believed that the sovereign dispute between Turkey and Greece over the Aegean Sea would never end in war.) East Asian countries need to seriously balance and consider the delicate relationships between the traditional security threats and non-traditional ones. We have to, not only ease the sovereign disputes, but also avoid financial crisis and the climate issue changing into major disasters.

4. How to learn the experience and lessons from EU and other regional integrations?

There are at least 4 aspects: First of all, trade and business cooperation should be placed as the pioneer, as it is the very area that effects are easy to achieve. Secondly, deep trade and business cooperation may be capable of producing spillover effects, exemplified by the historical compromises between France and Germany. Thirdly, establishment of mutually recognized cultures and ideals is an important and long-term goal, serving as foundation stones. At last, formation of the legal system and security fields would be results in a superior phase, but security community is a must. No matter what specific formation is, these lessons should be referred by each East Asian country.

5. How and when will the Cold War structure, which still exists in the East Asian Integration, be ended?

One of the particularities about East Asian is the legacy of the Cold War still exists. A typical one is the military

confrontation and latent conflicts in the Korean Peninsulas. In my opinion, as long as the Cold War structure exists, there would be no more progress on the security or prosperity in East Asia. But the question remains, how will we end the Cold War? (For instance: via confrontation or dialogue? should it start from the Korean Nuclear issue or the regional free trade?) And when will we complete it? I am welcoming all the productive comments and opinions on this issue.

6. How to set up institutionalized, mechanized, consultative relationship in regional cooperation?

Some American scholars believe that the success of EU lies in the cooperation between countries guided by the laws and progressive institutions. The foundation of EU is mainly a process of expanding and deepening the laws. On the other side, in East Asia, the traditions and cultures incline towards a consultative manner, which flexibly promotes the cooperation between countries and sub-regions. This is the difference between the two cultural backgrounds. We shall not simply discriminate the merits. Moreover, there is also no easy way to change them in a short-term. So how we evaluate this?

7. Would the Six-Party Talks on Korean Nuclear Issue be institutionalized, becoming a common mechanism?

Some of the Chinese and Americans hold a opinion that , the Six-Party Talks could gradually be able to transform into a standardized, long-term and extended security mechanism, which may solve more problems: it can not only handle the Nuclear Proliferation issue, but also ensure the military transparency, prevent maritime conflicts and hold multi-joint military exercises. Presently it is only under discussion, far away from the policy-making level. I would appreciate to hear more opinions and suggestions, to verify this view.

8. What is the relationship between the Central Asian, South Asian, as well as other Asian regional cooperation and East Asian cooperation?

I believe that they are parallel and without interference with each other, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Central Asian cooperation focuses on the prevention of international terrorism, religious

extremism and ethnic separatism. The South Asian cooperation has just started, having few connections to the East Asian. In a long term, it is necessary and useful to have connections across areas. But due to the cultural and geographical difference, it is necessary for East Asia to make a suitable agenda for its own development firstly, and then promote other Asian sub-regional cooperation.

9. How to assess the leadership of the cooperation in East Asia and the role of United States in this region?

Most of the people believe that, there must be a leading country or at least core countries (like France and Germany in EU, the United States in North American) during the regional integration. But it is more complicated in East Asian. There seems to be no single leading country during the development of ASEAN. Also it is hard to distinguish a leader from China, Japan and Korean. Even being the world's superpower, the United States is facing difficulties in grabbing the leadership in East Asian cooperation. China does not exclude the United States from participating in this area, but I personally believe that the US should remain as an appropriate, constructive role, not hegemony.

10. What is the basic objective of China on the regional cooperation?

From my opinion, the main objective of China on promoting the regional cooperation is to secure a friendly neighborhood, which is good for its own reform, development and constructions. We may expect China's participation in every single deed beneficial to this main aim. China also hopes to witness East Asian's transformation to a peaceful, prosperous and progressive area, to embrace a better and safer place in the future world. China will never expect East Asia to be so-called Tributary State System or "Central Kingdom". Nowadays the Chinese elites know it clearly what the price and difficulties are to be hegemony, they will never and ever make such mistakes.

These are my personal views. I would appreciate that if they may evoke more comments and discussions from all of you, so as to verify them. Thank you very much. (2008/01)

Modeling Asian Integration

Education & Cultural Perspectives

Kai-ming Cheng
The University of Hong Kong

Waseda University, Jan 18, 2008

Starting from Education ...

1

**Common Trends & Paradigm Shifts
in Higher Education
Asia and Beyond**


Major items on the Higher Education agenda

- Rebuilding the national system
 - Expansion of higher education
 - Establishing elite institutions
- Re-conceptualizing student learning
 - Reforming the learning modes
 - Providing diversity of learning experiences
- Enhancing private participation
 - Re-positioning the private sector
 - Fostering the philanthropic culture
- Internationalizing higher education
 - Globalizing the institutions
 - Cross-border trades of education services

Industrial Society: the Pyramid



Industrial Institutions



Post-industrial: Workplace

Project Groups/Task Forces


Small Enterprises

Free-lancers

On-going processes of

- Re-engineering
- De-layering
- Down-sizing
- Out-sourcing
- M & A
- Closure

Higher Education



Education in Industrial Society

- People are prepared as manpower
- People are classified and ranked
- People & jobs are matched thro' signaling
- Signaling is realized through credentials
- Schooling prepares credentials
- Hence exams, syllabuses, classes, timetables, schools,


Students are processed by schools!

However, in post-industrial era ...


- Mismatch between education and work
- Preparation for multiple careers
- Emphasis on generic capacities
- Just-in-time and on-demand learning
- Expectations on innovations and creativity
- Emphasis on human/social competence
- Demand on self-confidence/-management
- Challenges in ethics, values, emotions, ...

**Credentials can no longer
embrace social expectations!**

Lives in Higher Education



Learning Experiences



Major items on the Higher Education agenda

- Rebuilding the national system
 - Expansion of higher education
 - Establishing elite institutions
- Re-conceptualizing student learning
 - Reforming the learning modes
 - Providing diversity of learning experiences
- Enhancing private participation
 - Re-positioning the private sector
 - Fostering the philanthropic culture

2

International Interactions

International Interactions

- Overseas studies
- Off-shore campuses
- “Brain-drain”

Overseas studies

- Massive scale of students abroad
- Unique providers at undergraduate level
- Even more in post-graduate studies
- Largely outside Asian
- Increasing mobility among Asian

Off-shore campuses

- Basically an import
- An economic discourse
- Cultural sensitivity
- Education Hubs

“Brain Drain”

- Diverse patterns of returning
- Relations to the home economy
- “Brain bank”

3

Culture vis-à-vis Integration

Culture vis-à-vis Integration

Diversity in Cultures

- The Chopsticks Culture
- The South Asian Culture
- The Moslem Culture
- Other cultures

c.f. Christianity in Europe

Culture vis-à-vis Integration

Collective Culture

- Emphasis on Human-Human relations
 - Rather than human-nature relations
- Coherence within cultures,
Indifference between cultures
- Diversity in political cultures

Thanks you!

kmcheng@hku.hk

Modeling a Scenario of Asian Integration: Political, Economic and Cultural Approaches⁵⁵

Tereso S. Tullao, Jr. PhD⁵⁶
De La Salle University-Manila
January 2008

I. Concept of economic regionalism

Globalization as well as liberalization measures have heightened regionalism, which has been broadly defined as a preferential trade agreement among a subset of nations (Bhagwati, 1992).

The establishment of the European Free Trade Area in 1959 ushered the initial stage of regional cooperation and integration. The second stage was brought about by the transformation of Western Europe into a single market and the active participation of the US in regionalism with the formation of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The Asia-Pacific soon caught up in 1992 with the formation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).

However, there are major differences in these two of regionalism in terms of scope and focus. The first stage stressed on tariff reductions and preferential treatment of member countries while the second phase of was focused on outward-looking orientation beyond tariff reductions which has a deeper impact on regional integration (Austria, 2003).

The literature on regional integration started with the seminar paper by Viner (1950) by analyzing the merits and costs of removing tariffs among member countries in terms of trade creation and trade diversion. The removal of customs tariffs can lead to a trade creation effect by moving resources within the union where cost of production is most efficient. On the other hand, a trade diversion effect is the displacement of the most efficient producer which is not part of the regional trade accord.

There are conditions for maximizing the net benefits of a customs union including the competitiveness of the products being traded, the level of tariffs, the role of intra-regional trade, and the similarity of the level of development of member countries.

II. Economic, social and demographic differences: basis of East Asian integration

⁵⁵ Paper read at the International Symposium on Asian Cooperation, Integration and Human Resources. Waseda International Conference Hall, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. January 17-18, 2008. This paper was drawn from a paper entitled "Economic, Social and Demographic Diversity in Southeast and East Asia: Hindrance or Opportunities for Regional Integration" submitted to the Yuchengco Center of De La Salle University. Research assistance provided by Edward Tullao and John Paolo Rivera is greatly appreciated.

⁵⁶ Professor of Economics at De La Salle University-Manila.

The East and Southeast Asian region is probably the most economically dynamic region in the world today. It has a number of economies that has been significantly transformed in the last three decades including Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. China, on the other hand, has emerged from the lethargy of inward-looking economic policies of the past and is considered one of the fastest growing economies in the world today. On the other extreme, included in the region are some of the poorest nations in the world like Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, East Timor and North Korea. In the middle of these extreme economies are emerging economies including Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam with sustained economic growth, relatively stable macro-economic fundamentals, improving infrastructure that has attracted foreign direct investments. However, in spite of the relative performance of these economies, a sizable portion of their population is still poor (Tullao, 2007).

Because of the diversity of the socio-economic and demographic make-up of the region, the basis of regional cooperation and integration is complementation. In trade, because of the mixed level of economic development countries the pattern of trade is not founded on the similarity of products but on product complementation as shown by the significant increase in intra-regional trade brought about by intra-firm trade and the rise of the region as a hub for regional production networks (RPN).

In the area of macro-economy, successful regional coordination cannot be pursued aggressively because of variations in the movement of macroeconomic variables, differences in objectives of macroeconomic policies, and the absence of well developed financial sector. As a result the surplus funds in the region are not being channeled through the regional capital markets for use of countries and companies with deficient funds. Instead of through financial intermediaries the imbalances in regional funds are being addressed through the flows overseas development assistance (ODA) by the public sector and foreign direct investments (FDI) by the private sector.

In addressing regional labor and demographic asymmetries, the exhaustion of the labor reserves of Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan is met by neighboring Southeast Asian countries with less dynamic economies but with abundant labor supply (Abella, 2004). This movement of workers across the region is a response to the asymmetries in demography and labor markets.

In the provision of regional public goods, common concerns have pressured countries in Southeast and East Asia to cooperate. The financial crisis together with environmental concerns, the spread of avian flu and more recently, cross-border crimes and international terrorism have emphasized the need to join forces and have common stand on these cross-border issues and problems.

However, fostering cooperation among countries on the provision of regional public goods is rather difficult because of a problem of valuation. Countries of different economic development may value the benefits of cooperation and public goods differently, which makes it difficult to coordinate the production of these cross border goods (Ferroni, 2004).

III. The need for regional efforts towards socio-economic convergence

Southeast Asia together with East Asia is an extremely diverse region in terms of income levels, living standards, cultures, governments, and overall socio-economic conditions. These various forms of asymmetries are restricting the region in maximizing the potential gains it could reap from regional integration.

However, current regional cooperation has been faced with problems. In stabilizing the macro-economy, coordination of monetary policies are making it more difficult to attain because of the diversity of the policy goals extending beyond economic stability in many low and middle income countries. In addition, the reluctance of low income countries to trade liberalization may stem from their apprehension on the employment and income dislocation of key sectors in the economy. In the promotion of public goods particularly environment, it may be difficult to convince developing countries in the region to pursue regional goals since the level of economic development dictates to a great extent the countries preference for these long-term and cross border goals.

Given that complementation has been the current motor for regional cooperation and integration, there is need to address socio-economic disparities and move towards regional convergence since uneven economic development has the potential of impeding regional integration. To deepen regional cooperation and integration the countries in East and Southeast Asia should go beyond exploiting the opportunities of various socio-economic and demographic asymmetries and focus their efforts towards socio-economic convergence.

In the regional production networks, if regional integration will proceed along existing asymmetry in production cost, poorer and middle countries may become vulnerable as production sites may shift because of changes in location advantages. To prevent such vulnerability, local suppliers and sub-contractors should be given a chance to graduate from being mere assemblers based on low labor cost and become contract manufacturers based on highly specialized human capital. This can only occur if the brand leaders in these regional production networks will transfer technology to the local sub-contractors in middle income countries. On the other hand, the local manufacturers should also have the capacity to absorb the technology being transferred for technology transfer to be successful. The absorptive capacity, in turn, is based on a regional human resource cooperation meant towards convergence in human capital.

In macro-economic stability, there is a need to develop the financial system and institutions as well as the regulatory framework and institutions in poorer countries so that they can easily participate in regional undertaking on stabilizing the economy. Low-income countries must strengthen the structural, institutional foundations of their economic systems through building both hard infrastructure such as transportation and telecommunications

facilities and soft infrastructure such as legal, judicial and governance systems and develop skilled human resources. (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2007).

In migration, the transfer of technology of migrant workers can proceed if trainees are encouraged to return to their home countries after their stints in developed countries. As convergence proceeds, the massive dislocations brought about by migration of professionals and other important laborers from low and middle income countries may be mitigated. If ever, any labor dislocation will be insignificant and temporary.

In the field of education cooperation, transfer of technology and convergence may bring about the return of recipients of educational scholarships to their home countries and contribute to the human resource development particularly in education of their home countries and participate in regional efforts in understanding and studying regional concerns.

Economic and social disparities in the region are widening due to unequal linkages to the global economy. Inadequate access to markets, finance and technology prevents some countries from benefiting from regional growth. Moreover, with the changing global investment trends, Asia must strengthen its comparative advantage to compete. Firms are looking less for cheap labor, and more toward economies that can offer a skilled workforce, adequate infrastructure, stable and efficient legal and financial systems, competent suppliers, and institutions that can effectively harness technology in order to attract investment. In many parts of Asia, this will best be achieved by combining forces at a regional level.

The more immediate concern in strengthening regional integration in East and Southeast Asia is to address socio-economic and demographic asymmetries and work toward regional convergence. There is a need for developed economies in the region to take an active role in financing, through overseas development assistance, various programs and projects that would narrow the socio-economic and demographic gaps among the diverse countries in the region.

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Modeling a Scenario of Asian Integration: *Political, Economic and Cultural Approaches*

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De La Salle University – Manila

January 2008

Economic Regionalism

► Globalization & Liberalization Measures

- Heightened **REGIONALISM**
 - broadly defined as a preferential trade agreement among a subset of nations (Bhagwati, 1992)

► European Free Trade Area (1959)

- Ushered the initial stage of regional cooperation and integration.
- Stressed on tariff reductions and preferential treatment of member countries

► North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).

- The second stage of regional cooperation and integration.
- Focused on outward-looking orientation beyond tariff reductions which has a deeper impact on regional integration (Austria, 2003)

Regional Integration

- ▶ **The literature on regional integration started with the seminar paper by Viner (1950)**
 - Analyzed the merits and costs of removing tariffs among member countries in terms of trade creation and trade diversion.
 - Removal of customs tariffs
 - ▶ Trade creation effect
 - moving resources within the union where cost of production is most efficient.
 - ▶ Trade diversion effect
 - the displacement of the most efficient producer which is not part of the regional trade accord.
- ▶ **Conditions for maximizing the net benefits of a customs union**
 - competitiveness of the products being traded
 - level of tariffs
 - role of intra-regional trade
 - similarity of the level of development of member countries.

Basis of East Asian integration

► Economic, social and demographic differences

- The East and Southeast Asian region is probably the most economically dynamic region in the world today.
- It has a number of economies that has been significantly transformed
 - Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan
 - China
 - emerged from the lethargy of inward-looking economic policies of the past
- It also includes some of the poorest nations in the world
 - Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, East Timor and North Korea.
- It also includes emerging economies
 - Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam
 - sustained economic growth
 - relatively stable macro-economic fundamentals
 - improving infrastructure that has attracted foreign direct investments.
 - a sizable portion of their population is still poor (Tullao, 2007).

Basis of East Asian integration

► **COMPLEMENTATION**

- Basis of regional cooperation and integration due to the diversity of the region

► **In trade:**

- the pattern of trade is not founded on the similarity of products but on product complementation

► **In the area of macro-economy**

- imbalances in regional funds are being addressed through the flows overseas development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investments (FDI)

Basis of East Asian Integration

► In addressing regional labor and demographic asymmetries

- the exhaustion of the labor reserves of Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan is met by neighboring Southeast Asian countries with less dynamic economies but with abundant labor supply (Abella, 2004).

► In the provision of regional public goods

- common concerns have pressured countries in Southeast and East Asia to cooperate and join forces
 - financial crisis
 - environmental concerns
 - spread of avian flu
 - cross-border crimes and international terrorism
- problem of valuation
 - Countries of different economic development may value the benefits of cooperation and public goods differently, which makes it difficult to coordinate the production of these cross border goods (Ferroni, 2004).

Socio-Economic Convergence

- ▶ **Current regional cooperation has been faced with problems.**
 - coordination of monetary policies
 - ▶ because of the diversity of the policy goals extending beyond economic stability in many low and middle income countries.
 - reluctance of low income countries to trade liberalization
 - ▶ stem from apprehension on the employment and income dislocation of key sectors in the economy.
 - promotion of public goods particularly environment
 - ▶ difficult to convince developing countries in the region to pursue regional goals since the level of economic development dictates to a great extent the countries preference for these long-term and cross border goals.
- ▶ **Solution:**
 - Complementation
 - To deepen regional cooperation and integration:
 - ▶ go beyond exploiting the opportunities of various socio-economic and demographic asymmetries
 - ▶ focus efforts towards socio-economic convergence.

Socio-Economic Convergence

► In the regional production networks

- brand leaders should transfer technology to the local sub-contractors in middle income countries.
- local manufacturers should also have the capacity to absorb the technology being transferred
- The absorptive capacity, in turn, is based on a regional human resource cooperation meant towards convergence in human capital.

► In macroeconomic stability

- Develop the financial system and institutions
- Develop as well as the regulatory framework and institutions in poorer countries
- Low-income countries must strengthen the structural, institutional foundations of their economic systems (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2007).

Socio-Economic Convergence

► In migration

- the transfer of technology of migrant workers can proceed if trainees are encouraged to return to their home countries after their stints in developed countries.
- As convergence proceeds, the massive dislocations brought about by migration of professionals and other important laborers from low and middle income countries may be mitigated.

► In the field of education cooperation

- transfer of technology and convergence may bring about the return of recipients of educational scholarships to their home countries and contribute to the human resource development

Conclusion

- ▶ Economic and social disparities
 - due to unequal linkages to the global economy.
- ▶ Inadequate access to markets, finance and technology
 - prevents some countries from benefiting from regional growth.
- ▶ With the changing global investment trends:
 - Asia must strengthen its comparative advantage to compete.
 - Firms are looking less for cheap labor, and more toward economies that can offer a skilled workforce, adequate infrastructure, stable and efficient legal and financial systems, competent suppliers, and institutions that can effectively harness technology in order to attract investment.
 - Address socio-economic and demographic asymmetries and work toward regional convergence.
 - Role of Developed Countries:
 - ▶ Take an active role in financing, through overseas development assistance, various programs and projects that would narrow the socio-economic and demographic gaps among the diverse countries in the region.

Bottom Up Contribution to Regional Integration in East Asia: An Appraisal

PHAR Kim Beng

Bottom-up regional integration, in and of itself, seems to be an unproblematic concept. Very simply, it refers to citizen and civic initiatives---with or without the consent of the authorities in the region---to foster cross border relationships either tangibly, or otherwise (i.e. through intellectual advocacy).

Used in East Asia, however, bottoms-up regional integration is a concept that may invite skepticism too. This is because most parts of East Asia remain ruled, and governed, by authoritarian and semi authoritarian regimes; including illiberal democracy. In other words, there is no dynamic civil society, let alone, a nationalised labor movement to drive any regional processes forward to begin with.

For example, despite more than ten years of constant lobbying, the junta in Myanmar remains as entrenched as ever; this in spite of rhetorical support from other member states too. While Track 2 diplomacy has made progress on fostering regional dialogue to improve confidence building, other than defusing the tension, and delaying the resolution, it has not achieved any progress at all on the South China Sea dispute; for that matter moved the region from the confidence building phase of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to preventive diplomacy or regional peacekeeping.

The non existential progress on Myanmar, further reflects the extent to which power, and capital, have sapped, if not subverted, the well spring of civic energy in most Asian societies from the top to the bottom too.

If and when local perturbation leads to dramatic outburst of displeasure or sustained street demonstration, the initiatives almost always come from the moral authority of the King (i.e. Thailand); the Church (i.e. the Philippines); the religious scholars (i.e. Indonesia); and the charisma of the opposition leader (i.e. Malaysia).

Barring the above, bottom up civic initiatives often do not succeed locally, let alone in East Asia. The recent ASEAN Charter, for example, allowed the ASEAN Eminent Persons Groups and the ASEAN High Level Task Force on ASEAN Charter to speak to a variety of civic organizations during their two year deliberations from 2005-2007⁵⁷. In the end, it was the views and positions of the Senior Officials Meetings (SOM) that held sway, however; leading critics to accuse the ASEAN Charter as a "watered down version."

⁵⁷ Kindly refer to *Solidarity for Asian people's Advocacy (SAPA), Working Group on the ASEAN Submission on the Economic Pillar* for the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, 28 June 2006, Singapore.

That said, bottom up regional integration is not necessarily a lost cause in East Asian integration. Here, we need to equilibrate the earlier minuses with some pluses too.⁵⁸ Invariably, the extent to which groups can make an impact on the policy depends on four conditions. Although they exist in no particular sequence or order of priorities, all are necessary conditions. In other words, they must exist altogether to enhance any long term prospect of bottom up regional integration being meaningful at all.

1.The ideological proximity of the groups to the governments (e.g. ASEAN Chamber of Commerce and ASEAN ISIS);

2.The willing-ness to tolerate the absence of any discernible policy change over the short and mid-term (e.g. ASEAN Civil Society Conference I and II; ASEAN People Assembly I, II and III)

3.The strategic dexterity to penetrate local, national and regional politics in other ways (e.g. the election of Dr Surin Pitsuwan, an erstwhile Thai politician and democratic advocate, as the New Secretary General).

4.The readiness to see economics and security issues as inter-linked, rather than separated.

Under condition 1, ASEAN Chamber of Commerce, since 1972, and ASEAN-ISIS, since 1992, have respectively urged the member states in the region to adopt a more integrationist strategy; though spanned over the longer term.

Under condition 2, the ASEAN Civil Society Conference and the ASEAN People Assembly have further impressed upon the member states of ASEAN, of their seriousness in not being taken lightly.

Under condition 3, the likes of Dr Surin Pitsuwan, who having served as the former foreign minister of Thailand at the height of the Asian financial crisis, is also one of the most discerning Thai intellectuals to have been elected by the select committee in his home country to promote ASEAN. Dr Surin Pitsuwan, in various places, including this conference in Waseda, has referred to the importance of creating a Networked ASEAN Secretariat that marries the energy and initiatives of Track 1, 2 and 3; and also the putative Global Communities of Asian Nations or GCAN which seek to promote Asian Solidarity further.

Under condition 4, the paradigm of human security advocated by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has also been adopted; thus allowing civil society and member states in the region to see economic growth and state and national security as two sides of the same coin. The latter has allowed the member states to take the views of Track 2 and Track 3 more earnestly; even while other issues verging on sovereignty remains unsolved.

⁵⁸ Jurgen Ruland, *The Contribution of Track Two Dialogue towards Crisis Prevention*, ASIEN, October 2002, 85, s, 84-96.

That said, how do we understand the effectiveness of bottom up regional integration in East Asia beyond knowing the four conditions above ? Indeed, how do we locate the locus of their involvement or activities ?

One must begin by understanding different forms of regionalisms first, and the extent to which, these regionalisms are further embedded--and concurrently promoted---by local and foreign government and non governmental entities together.⁵⁹

According to Donald Weatherbee at Stanford University East Asia has seven forms of "regional configurations" that have manifested themselves into different institutional personalities over the past and present:

a.Sub-regional MAL-SIN-INDO i.e.economic triangles in Batam, Johor, and Singapore

b.regional ASEAN

c.inter-regional Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)

d.selectively sub-and-extra-regional Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA)

e.regional hub-and-spoked ASEAN plus 1

f.selectively enlarged extra regional ASEAN plus 3 (i.e. APT) and APEC

g.selectively enlarged super-regional East Asian Summit (EAS)

Of the seven forms below, ASEAN (or, b) is considered the most prominent and useful forms of regionalism. China, Japan and South Korea support it, and have formed ASEAN Plus 3 meetings too; indeed since December 2005 also the EAS as well. Inter-regional meetings like ASEM, or super-regional events like APEC, are in the "news" only if and when there is an impending summit.

The scope, prospective success and scale of bottom up regional integration surprisingly follow the "thrust" of the member states and foreign governments first.

Therefore, instead of challenging, say, the military agreements of FPDA, which is a colonial throwback anyway, groups like Solidarity for Asian Peoples' Advocates (SAPA) tend to focus their disapproval and

⁵⁹ Donald Weatherbee, *Southeast Asian Pacific Frameworks: What do they frame and what work do they do ?*, a paper drafted to stimulate discussion at a roundtable on "Old Wine, New Bottles ? Regional Frameworks in the Asia-Pacific" at the 47th Strategy for Peace Conference, Stanley Foundation, Airlie Center, Warrenton, Virginia, 12-21 October 2006.

dissent on ASEAN only.

Naturally, by focusing on ASEAN, it is hoped that it can focus its critique on all other forms of imperfect regionalism that have substantial overlap with ASEAN; or are currently led in a titular manner by it (i.e. APT; ASEAN Plus 1; EAS).

To this extent, one can say that the political economy of critique is geared, or bias towards, a frontal engagement of ASEAN to the exclusion of all other forms of regionalisms.

What is ironical about this strategy is that groups like SAPA, which is represented by other non governmental organizations too, assume almost automatically---if not by de fault---that regional integration will be most "impactful" or decisive when led by ASEAN, albeit in relative terms i.e. as compared to other "regional configurations."

Just why do perfectly rational non governmental organizations make this all important critical assumption is vital. And, it requires some systematic treatment to understand the issue further.

According to Alexander Chandra at the Institute of Global Justice in Jakarta, Indonesia, there are numerous reasons for a direct civil society engagement with ASEAN. The first and foremost reason "is ASEAN's intention to establish an ASEAN Community by 2020, as enshrined in the Bali Concord" II. Indeed, in 2006, this schedule has been accelerated to 2015.

This agreement promotes political, economic and socio-cultural co-operation through the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) respectively.

Many observers in Track 1, 2 and 3 regard the ASEAN Community as ASEAN's most ambitious plan; one that has forces civil society organizations to take ASEAN more seriously.

Secondly, "Southeast Asian civil society organizations are increasingly of the opinion that ASEAN is a platform from which to influence policy at the regional level; especially when ASEAN signs a bilateral free trade agreement with economic behemoths like China that can influence the welfare and fate of all."⁶⁰

Going by the above logic, one can almost conclude that ASEAN and ASEAN civil society organizations

⁶⁰ Alexander Chandra, *Southeast Asian Civil Society and the ASEAN Charter: The Way Forward*, Institute for Global Justice (IGJ) and Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy (SAPA) Working Group on ASEAN Charter.

are now on the verge of being 'locked in a policy debate'. The tone of this debate may, on surface, be adversarial, even critical of ASEAN. ASEAN may, for example, be labeled an elitist organization, or a neo-liberal front.

But in the long run, it is these arguments that would compel ASEAN to take the ASEAN civil society organizations more seriously.

Although ASEAN, to date, remains poor at listening to the views of non governmental organizations---except traditionally designated think tanks like ASEAN ISIS; Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC); Council the Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and also the Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT)---the fact that it was willing to initiate the existence of ASEAN People Assembly and ASEAN Civil Society Conference represents a step in the right direction.

Granted that bottom up regional integration in an "illiberal Asia" is a dependent---rather than an independent variable---there is of course no telling how effective can their critique and dissent be.⁶¹ But if the more outspoken fringe of civil society organizations are willing to mobilize their resources to critique not just the policy of ASEAN, but the neo-liberal assumptions of other forms of regionalism, the prospect of a sustained, and constructive, dissent, may be what Asia needs to face globalization more equitably, rather than to throw its gates wide open to free trade all the time, even when its societies are ill equipped for such hyper competition.

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2. Jurgen Ruland, *The Contribution of Track Two Dialogue towards Crisis Prevention*, ASIEN, October 2002, 85, s, 84-96.
3. Donald Weatherbee, *Southeast Asian Pacific Frameworks: What do they frame and what work do they do ?*, a paper drafted to stimulate discussion at a roundtable on "Old Wine, New Bottles ? Regional Frameworks in the Asia-Pacific" at the 47th Strategy for Peace Conference, Stanley Foundation, Airlie Center, Warrenton, Virginia, 12-21 October 2006.
4. Solidarity for Asian people's Advocacy (SAPA), Working Group on the ASEAN Submission on the Economic Pillar for the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, 28 June 2006, Singapore.
5. David Capie, *Rival Regions ? East Asian Regionalism and Its Challenges to the Asia Pacific*, unpublished/undated paper.

⁶¹ David Capie, *Rival Regions ? East Asian Regionalism and Its Challenges to the Asia Pacific*, unpublished/undated paper.

Bottom-Up Approach to Regional Integration

ボトムアップ・アプローチからの統合論

李 起豪 (Yi Kiho)

Bottom-Up Approach to Regional Integration

ボトムアップ・アプローチからの統合論：


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Nautilus Institute@Seoul, Director

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1. Parts of Asia



2. Changes in Asia

1) Change of Territory:

Territory as Curiosity and Borders (by Westerners):

→ Territory as Life (by Asians) and Transborders: **Locals as Life World and Working Place; Cultural Cyber Places(CCPs); Sympathy and Enjoy**
(暮らす場、働く場、遊び場、サイバー文化体験場としてアジアの領域の変化)

2) New Challenges: Traditional Security → New Security: **Human Security; Global Climate Change; New Disease(AI, HIV, AIDS etc)**

3) Transformation of Nation State within the Context of Democratization, Modernization and Globalization: **Strong State by the Return of New Conservatism vs Civic State/Green State/Peace State/Local State**


4) Competing Hegemony in Asia to build up and reform the Regime **ASEAN+3+3, ARF, APEC, 6 Party Talks, etc**

3. Efforts for Reconstructing Time and Space in Asia

1) History: Common History book Published by China, Japan and Korea

Common efforts by the citizens' from Japan, China and Korea against 'New History Text Book' by Fusosha, which has been since 2002 March Nanjing Meeting to 2005 March publication through more than 11 times transnational meeting.

→ Common History based on Universalism like human right and Peace rather than National History based on National Supremacy.



2) Peace: GPPAC(Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict)

2-1: **GPPAC** is an international network of civil society organizations working for conflict prevention worldwide. It was formed in response to a call by (then) United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan for civil society to take more initiative and help build a new international consensus on the prevention of violent conflict and peacebuilding.

2-2: Action Agenda

- Building a regional system for peaceful coexistence through disarmament and demilitarization
- Promoting humanitarian assistance and development assistance
- Building a society that recognizes justice, human rights and diversity
- Realizing a sustainable economy and economic justice



3) Ecology / Green: APGN (Asia Pacific Green Network)

Just days before the effective start date of the Kyoto Protocol Treaty on Climate Change in 2005, more than 100 Greens gathered from 23 Asian and Pacific nations, along with 300 more from Japan, and Green observers from Europe and the Americans.

The primary aim of Kyoto in 2005 was to now formalize the Asia Pacific Greens Network, with its primary functions to

- 1) Facilitate information exchange and networking
- 2) Cooperate politically towards implementation of the Global Green Charter
- 3) Participate in the Global Greens



4. The Roles of Intellectuals for ARI

1) To Overcome the Cold War System

2) To Rethink Democracy after Democratization

3) To Save and Strengthen Publicity from the Commercialization

4) To Grow up Flexible Citizenship as (East) Asians (東アジア人)
to Cultivate the Common Place (Public Space)



1) To Overcome the Cold War System

Cold War System yet left in Asia still activate the alliance diplomacy which needs to suppose 'enemy'. 'N.K issue' is to be said the very symbol of Cold War System in Asia. Also this enables the USA unilateralism and intervention in Asia.

If we look deep into the concept of Asia, to define Asia is very competitive not only in discourse but also IR(international Relation) reality as named like APEC, ASEAN, ASEAN+3(+3), EAC, ARF etc.

However without any answer to how to deal with N.K and how to dismantle the cold war system it is not easy to build up Asian Human Community.



2) To Rethink Democracy after Democratization

Democratization replace sudden political changes by gradual reforms in Asia, however democratization in Asia has been processed by globalization based on neoliberalism.

Paradoxically democratization weakens the energy of social movement or civil society and expanded indifference to politics. Also less commitment to politics reinforce more social gap(bipolarization).

On the other hand, the role of political party began to play more crucial role, however political parties became very apt to play to popularity without accountability.



3) To Save and Strengthen Publicity from the Commercialization

Publicity could be considered as public value, public space or sector, public service and public intellectuals or people.

Unfortunately 'publicity' is seriously contaminated or initiated by commercialization. One of the main reasons, I think, is that public intellectuals on the whole transformed into client intellectuals. This also means that intellectuals having influence to political decision makers do not have their own grassroots filed or they're essentially commercialized.



4) To Grow up Flexible Citizenship as (East) Asians(東アジア人) and to Cultivate the Common Place (Public Space)

State in Asia has been absolute community concept rather than any other community. Especially State in Asia after WWII, was supreme value to secure its people and develop economy, however very separately and competitively.

Nature of State, however, has faced new challenges when it should open and cooperate with neighboring countries. Now 'state' is standing in turning point. One way is to return to nation-state again with emphasizing 'nationalism' and 'strong state', the other one is to reframe or transform 'nation-state' into civic state, peace state or green state.

The perspective of new state might be in the level of blue print or discourse only. But such imagination by intellectuals should be the fundamental force and energy to transform the state.



5. Agenda for ARI



6. Strategy of ARI

Go Board(囲碁)





- Position:
Even and Relative
- Rule:
Make more than one house(hole)!
- Discipline:
Network !

Chess board(将棋)




- Position:
Hierarchy and Absolute
- Rule:
Kill the King !
- Discipline:
Remove!

7. The Infrastructure of the ARI




8. *EA_PSI (Peace Space Initiative)*

Based on Civil Societis of Korea Japan, China



9. Bottoms-Up Design of ARI



オールタナティブな発展論と NGO 協力 —Alternative Development and NGOs—

2008.1.18 村井吉敬（上智大学教授・早稲田大学客員教授）

はじめに

20 世紀システムの「崩壊」は従来の発展論・開発論の枠組みをも崩壊させているのではないだろうか。ここでは 1970 年代あたりから芽生えてきたオールタナティブな発展論と、そこに深く関わる実践者としての NGO について論じてみたい。

I. 20 世紀システム(近代システム)の「崩壊」とは何なのか？


20 世紀システム

- *国家と企業が作り出した 20 世紀 戦争と進歩
- *東西冷戦体制 イデオロギーの戦争
- *成長主義・開発主義 それを支えた経済イデオロギー（ケインズ主義、新古典派、マルクス主義など）

崩壊への流れ

- *環境の天井 ローマ・クラブ「成長の限界」 公害
- *格差の広がり と貧困化
- *ジェンダー意識の台頭
- *国境を越える人 難民、労働力移動など
- *国境を越える感染症 HIV、SARS、鳥ウィルスなど

II. グローバル化の本格化 1990's 以降



価値の普遍化 民主主義、自由、人権、公正など

オルタナティブな発展論の模索

成長主義・開発主義 それを支えた経済イデオロギー
(ケインズ主義、新古典派、マルクス主義など)
単系発展段階論(近代化論)



自力更生論、集团的自力更生論、従属論、内発的发展論
貧困の再定義、ジェンダー論、ラディカル・デモクラシー論、越境参加民主主義論 etc.

III. NGO の目指すもの

NGO アドボカシー型 NGO

開発教育型 NGO

開発協力型 NGO

緊急救援型 NGO

事例) *Abantu(ケニア)

*PP21

- (1) 人間と自然—破壊から調和へ—
- (2) 抑圧からの解放—新しい社会と文化をつくる—
- (3) 強者の支配をくずす—国家をかえる、国際関係をかえる—
- (4) 経済をとりもどす—モノとモノの関係からひととひとの関係へ—
- (5) 共同の未来へ—民衆のたましい、民衆の連帯—

*ジュビリー2000

*OXFAM

*日本の NGO

開発協力型 JVC、シャプラニール、APEX など

緊急救援型 ピースウィンズ・ジャパン、AMDA など

アドボカシー型 PARC、JATAN、日消連、アジアと水俣を結ぶ会、置賜百姓交流会など

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Pursuing human security from below: Agenda for academic community

Chantana Banpacirichote-Wungaeo

Pursuing human security from below: Agenda for academic community



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Faculty of Political Science
Chulalongkorn University
Bangkok, Thailand
18 January 2008
At Waseda University

Transcending Traditional Security

- Demystifying traditional security
 - From state to people's security
 - From national to common regional interest



Transforming Security : Agenda Setting

- Building Regional humanized community
 - Visibility of people's organizations
 - Alternatives
 - Monitoring changes
- Rediscovery of real security issues
- Trans-disciplinary policy innovation
- New governance for cross-border and transnational human security issues

Transnational social movements

- World social forum
 - 1730 organizations registered, 492 groups, 1370 activities, 4615 individual
 - 50,000 participants in WSF 2007 in Nairobi
- Human rights protection, ESCR
- Environmental protection, global warming
- Peasant's and labor union movements
- Anti-Free trade area, global justice movements
- International migration and IDP
- Stateless people
- Peace and non-violence
- Women and development
- Water and natural resources governance
- Indigenous people
- SVN social venture network on CSR



People's initiatives

- **World Social Forum Asia** (another world is possible, Act together now, identity expression)
- **SAPA** (solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy on ASEAN Charter)
- **APA** (Asean's People Assembly on security issues by ASEAN ISIS)
- **Compulsory licensing exercise for heart and AIDs drugs by Consumer org network of HIV infected people**
- **Mekong memorandum on trafficking-working group on child trafficking**


Child Trafficking



1. Trafficking incidences
2. local rescue of victims
3. National policy forum
4. Mekong Sub-regional consultation (bilateral)
5. Memorandum on child and woman trafficking
6. Women and children reintegration back in origin communities

Compulsory licensing exercise

- Call for drugs by patients
- Network of patients and NGOs (consumer protection foundation and HIV network)
- Linkage of national NGOs and INGO (Medicines Sans Frontieres)
- Global norm on trade (Trips)
- NGO- GO cooperation, policy on CL
- Drug delivery




Levels of interactions




What and where is Asian Public Space ? Where do people voice their concern and where do they interact and link

- In regional organization, ASEAN, APEC, or floating
- What and where are the sources of inspiration for the people of Asia
- What is the authority of NGOs in the national and int community
- What is the level of solidarity ?
- What are resources of people's power ?
- Where and what is the platform for actions or deliberation
- Virtual public space ?
- The quality of regional civil society rest upon the country political conditions ?
- Limited and fragmented actions
- Lack of regional knowledge and perception, starting from the university
- How people of Asia relate to one another?



Regional public space ??

- Limited face to face interaction
- No official platform
- Floating locations
- Oversea Networking
- Cyber space




Regional values and human security I

- Another world is possible (World Social Forum)
- Diversity and multiculturalism
- Democracy and protection of human rights
- Sustainable development: poverty and environment
- Gender equality
- corporate social responsibility




Regional values and human security II: SAPA's Non-Conventional Security Issues

1. Banned weapons;
 2. Trans-boundary environmental issues (e.g. haze and pollution, over extraction);
 3. Transnational crimes;
 4. .Drug trafficking;
 5. Trafficking in persons (including women and children for prostitution and labor);
 6. Terrorism;
 7. Transnational Corporate crimes;
 8. Enforced slavery;
 9. Economic crimes;
 10. Trans-boundary health problems (e.g. SARS, HIV/AIDS, etc.);
 11. Internal conflicts (including issues on refugees and internally displaced persons);
 12. People's mobility, including undocumented migration;
 13. Non-objective security threats (e.g. food security, economic/structural adjustments); etc.
- 

Asian Citizenship and new values

- Can people in Asia become one in regarding shared culture and the protection of rights and violence?
- Asserting on rights and responsibility
- Enhancing freedom of mobility



Political opportunity of social actors

Favorable environment

- Expanding and emerging networks
- Emerging CSR in private sector
- ASEAN Charter ??

Constraints

- Inadequate awareness of regional connections and implications
- Asymmetric State-civil society relations
- Stability of national politics




SAPA's identification of stakeholders

- Peoples Movements/organizations
- Trade Unions
- NGOs
- Media
- Parliamentarians
- National Human Rights Institutions/domestic human rights institutions
- Academic institutions
- Private sector: corporate social responsibility




Initial Assessments of transnational networks in Asia

- Radical actions with incremental change
- mass-based organization, no longer have peasants movement
- Vulnerable, depending on resources from the west
- Fragile voluntarism
- Trust
- Institutional constraints
- Limited and unstable national and regional democratic space



Agenda for Academic Community: reinforcing human security from below (I)

- Rediscovery of real security issues (security discourse)
 - Recognize and sensitize small people's efforts
 - Share, assess and propagate people's agenda
 - Constructing theory of human security
 - Policy community
 - Initiate policy platform dealing with concrete problems
 - Encompass people's initiatives
 - Multi-stakeholders participation
 - Inventing innovative trans-border policy platform
- 

Agenda for Academic Community: Reinforcing human security from below (II)

- Mechanism for regional social learning
 - Teaching, knowing one another
 - Cross cultural exchange
 - Face to face interaction
 - New Asian values
 - Becoming Asian citizen

