Asian Regional Integration Review

GIARI

Contents

Foreword

Asia continues to be a region of dynamic change. Japan in the 1960s-1980s, the NIEs and ASEAN in the 1990s, and China since 2000, have become the prime movers of the region's startling economic development and have attracted enormous attention, often being referred to as "engines of the world economy" or "growth centers."

Nevertheless, as clearly demonstrated by the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997, the reality is that the governments and people of Asia have rarely cooperated with one another to address challenges generated by regional crises. In regional conflicts, the UN Security Council, for problems of poverty, the IMF and the World Bank, and for human rights issues, the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees or UNICEF, respectively, have been the major actors. Even in the area of economics, where it is said that regional cooperation has made the greatest progress, partnerships at the present stage are still limited to the signing of partial FTAs or EPAs, and do not go beyond "de facto regional integration." Moreover, an atmosphere where the various actors willingly strive for closer cooperative relations has not yet developed. The East Asia Summit (EAS), which was launched in December 2005, provides a very important platform for building a framework of regional cooperation, but the initial enthusiasm has waned over the years. In Japan, as in other countries, debates on the creation of an East Asian Community, which were quite enthusiastic until a few years ago, seem to have rapidly cooled.

However, in the midst of the current unprecedented global financial crisis, the question of what kind of cooperative relations Asia intends to create has been raised anew. Furthermore, specific efforts to resolve various problems brought forth by the surge of globalization, including widening economic disparities, worsening environmental damage due to growth-oriented policies, and the danger of pandemics caused by the increasing mobility of people, are only realistic through regional cooperation. Also, a wide range of emerging problems, including terrorism, large-scale natural disasters, piracy, and political or economic refugees, make regional cooperation among Asian countries absolutely vital for tackling these issues.

Therefore, in order to address challenges and issues that are specific to Asia, we must earnestly work for the creation of a framework that will allow Asian people to take the initiative and join together to think about and solve them. This is the institutionalization of Asian regional cooperation and integration, or in other words, the creation of an "Asian Community." As a matter of course, this does not mean excluding people from other countries and regions. We must work together and cooperate with the governments that have adopted a positive stance toward Asian integration, of course, but also with people serving in various agencies at the UN organizations and non-Asian people who work within Asia for multinational enterprises or NGOs, and who are also important supporters of the Asian Community. In this context, it is critical that we begin to prepare a mechanism through which Asia can take the lead in addressing Asia-specific problems.

As discussed above, as the necessity for cooperation and mutual assistance in Asia continues to grow, what is to be done? The most critical task, but one that is not glamorous, is to clearly put Asian integration on the agenda and develop internationally-minded human resources who can address the issue of regional integration, have sophisticated expertise in diverse fields, and can take a broad view of things. Lofty arguments for ambitious concepts will be meaningless if the human resources to bring them into reality are not there. In Asia today, such human resources are badly lacking and not readily available.

Several institutions and governmental agencies have already become conscious of the importance of making such human resources available, and have begun working on human resources development. They include human resources development programs run by the Asian Development Bank and the ASEAN Secretariat, the Asian ERASMUS program, which was initiated by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology and the EARIA, a program proposed by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry.

In response to these developments, the Waseda University Global COE Program, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI), has been among the first to propose and put into practice such a human resources development program. Indeed, human development is a time-consuming project and requires a great deal of patience. At present, however, excellent human resources in Asia have begun to recognize the significance of GIARI and have gathered together under its banner. How can we take GIARI a

step further? A few of our efforts to flesh out the program include: （1） efforts to recruit excellent human resources who possess a clear sense of purpose; （2） strengthening of educational programs and the participating faculty; （3） creating education partnerships with major universities in Asia; and （4） increasing GIARI's appeal to governments and the business communities in Japan and the rest of Asia, and strengthening its support base. To this end, first, we launched a Summer Institute education program in 2008. Of course, the program is not fully adequate at present. However, through it, we are slowly but steadily bringing together human resources with excellent capabilities, and important achievements have been made in the acquisition of knowledge in specialized fields on Asia, the development of analytical capacity, and the building of a cooperative network.

One important achievement is the launch of the *Asian Regional Integration Review*. As a means to nurture many more excellent human resources, we aim to enrich this publication in terms of both quality and quantity, based on our profound wish to make it a forum that will be of great interest to various actors both in Japan and abroad.

Satoshi Amako, Ph.D., Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, GIARI Project Leader

Message from the Editorial Board

This is the inaugural issue of the *Asian Regional Integration Review*（ARIR）published by the Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration（GIARI）, Waseda University Global COE Program. The ARIR contains a collection of the selected papers presented by the participants of the GIARI's Summer Institute. The purpose of the ARIR is mainly two-fold, to provide an opportunity for graduate students in Ph.D. programs around the world who are interested in Asian regional integration to publish their research and to disseminate the research output of the GIARI's Summer Institute. The Summer Institute provides graduate students in Ph.D. programs interested in Asian regional integration to deepen their understanding of the issues involved from various aspects, including but not limited to politics, security, economics, sociology, culture, and multidisciplinary studies. The Institute is a one-week program at Waseda University, which consists of lectures by leading professors on the subjects, presentations and discussions by the participating students, and field trips to visit Japanese government agencies and businesses. The Institute provides a supportive environment for students to share their ideas, receive feedback on their research projects, and exercise their abilities to offer constructive critiques.

The GIARI plans to publish the ARIR once a year. To ensure high quality, the papers recommended for inclusion in this publication are subject to a rigorous refereeing process by the editorial board. This issue contains a selection of the papers presented at the Summer Institute held in 2008. The editorial board members sincerely hope that the ARIR will contribute to the nurturing of capable graduate students interested in policy-oriented research with a view toward Asian regional integration.

Shujiro Urata, Ph.D., Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, on behalf of the Editorial Board, Asian Regional Integration Review

Editor's Note

The papers included in this inaugural issue of the *Asian Regional Integration Review* represent a sample of the ongoing academic and policy debates on issues of regional integration and cooperation in Asia, as viewed by young scholars interested in the future shape and direction the integration will or should take. Some of the authors use theories as a guide for organizing their analysis, while others use them as a normative lens through which to assess the current state of regional integration. Still others attempt to gauge the theories' relevance to the process of regional integration. By and large the central interest of the seven studies presented here is an empirical examination and policy discussion rather than theoretical refinement or development. The topics examined range from social (e.g., migrant integration and labor migration), to economic (e.g., product safety as a trade issue), educational (e.g., the role of higher education in regional integration), security (e.g., arms embargo and balance of power), and ideational (e.g., integration ideologies and cultural exchange) issues. Methodologically, all of these analyses are based on case studies, with some cases drawn from the past and others from the contemporary period, some cases focused on bilateral relations with broader regional implications and others related to multilateral processes, and some cases representing national debates and others dealing with region-wide discussions. It should be added that the authors come from Canada, Japan, Russia, the Ukraine, the United States, and Vietnam.

Despite the diversity that characterizes this collection, all studies are motivated by concerns about the ongoing regional integration in Asia. The concerns relate to the (slow) pace of integration, the (possibly unfair) distribution of the benefits of integration, the (political, national security, and human security) consequences of integration, as well as the neglected aspects of integration (e.g., the role of ideology and culture). While the main purpose of the Summer Institute, for which and through which these studies have been developed, is largely academic – to encourage young scholars to develop the knowledge and skills necessary for rigorous inquiries into the subject --, the normative (policy and moral) implications of their studies are equally important and should be taken seriously by the more senior scholars in the field, as well as by the policymakers whose decisions and the consequences of their decisions are and will remain the target of these young scholars' inquiry.

As Managing Editor of this volume, I would like to express my sincere gratitude

to the colleagues of the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, particularly Professor Satoshi Amako, for his kind invitation for me to participate in this project, and Professor Shujiro Urata, whose able coordination of the Summer Institute produced the fine analyses presented here. Thanks are also due to the numerous colleagues at Waseda University who reviewed and commented on the earlier versions of the analyses included here. Even though their names are too numerous to mention, their interest in and encouragement of the authors were essential and are deeply appreciated. I am also grateful to Mr. Stephen Nagy, Associate Editor, for his timely and able editorial assistance despite his numerous other responsibilities, including as a recent Ph.D. recipient and as father of a newborn. This project would not have been possible without the administrative and logistical support of many other individuals, among whom Ms. Atsuko Tsuriya deserves a special "thank you" for her tireless work from the conception to the completion of this project.

We present these studies to encourage further investigation into Asian regional integration, one of the most important phenomena unfolding in this part of the world, which holds implications that go far beyond this region and this period of history.

Tsuneo Akaha, Ph.D., Professor of International Policy Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies and Visiting Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University

CONTRIBUTORS

Stephen Robert Nagy, Ph.D.
Research Associate, Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo,

Anastasia V. Kouznetsova Sutch
Labor Law Department, Law Institute, Far Eastern National University, Vladivostok

Troy Keith Knudson
Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo; Research Fellow, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

Olena Mykal, Ph.D.
Deputy Head of Department of Foreign Policy Strategies, National Institute of Strategic Studies of Ukraine, Kyiv

Anh Thuy Nguyen
Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University, Tokyo;
Lecturer, College of Economics, Vietnam National University, Hanoi

Takashi Saikawa
Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate Program for Transcultural Studies, University of Heidelberg; Research Fellow, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration, Waseda University, Tokyo until September 2008

Tomonori Sano
Ph.D. Candidate, Graduate School of Arts, Letters and Sciences, Waseda University; Research Fellow, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration, Waseda University, Tokyo

Migration and the Potential for International Cooperation in East Asia:
A Comparative Examination of State Integration Policies in Japan and Korea[1]

Stephen Robert Nagy（**Ph.D.**）

Abstract

This paper aims to comparatively examine the integration practices of Japan and Korea at the state level to help understand the measures being taken to mitigate some of the migratory pressures resulting from deepening Asian regional integration and to enhance human security in the region. Specifically, the author examines the state-led initiatives vis-à-vis Japan and Korea's burgeoning multicultural societies in an effort to comparatively analyze their approaches to securing the human rights and security of their growing migrant populations. Through identifying parallels and differences in the approaches of the Japanese and Korean governments in terms of securing human rights and security, the author will outline potential areas of cooperation in dealing with growing trans-border migration between these two countries and in Asia in general.

1. Introduction

The functionalist approach to international integration stresses economic enmeshment as its foundational component.[2] Initial institutional cooperation in the sphere of economics is expected to create a platform for further cooperation and eventually broader institutional cooperation in the spheres of economics, politics, society, and security. In contrast, the neo-functionalist approach to integration focuses, among other things, on the role of pressure groups in democracies and their ability to influence the direction of policy.[3] Specifically, it is argued that democratic governments provide political space for pressure groups to influence the direction of policy and subsequently these pressure groups become the primary instigators of cross-border economic liaisons in order to realize the comparative advantages that exist between one or more countries. Initial cooperation then leads to broader based cooperation and integration through economic complementarities. In both cases, economic cooperation through institutional cooperation is considered to be a precursor to narrowly defined integration in the economic sense, and broader integration that encompasses integration in political, social, cultural and security spheres.

An interesting theoretical and empirical question is whether, en route to broader integration in the Asian region, the economic dimension of integration can be circumnavigated by cooperation in other spheres and be used as a springboard for different kinds of institutional cooperation leading to broader integration. International migration may be fertile ground to address this question since much of the migration that takes place occurs at a regional level,[4] as it is the case in Asia. Regional organizations and forums such as NAFTA, MERCOSUR and APEC have engaged in discussions on cooperation in the area of migration; but to date only the European Union has adopted comprehensive common policies,[5] and Asia lags far behind.

Conspicuously absent from regional organizations with some interest in international migration are cooperative linkages among groups or organizations centered in Northeast Asia despite the fact that this part of Asia is home to a large and growing number of international migrations, 18,576,777 of them in 2005, for example.[6] In fact, rather than being known for cooperative ini-

tiatives to mitigate pressures and abuses stemming from international migration, Northeast Asian countries have been characterized as engaging in "benign neglect" with respect to migration.[7] Stephen Castles attributes this ambivalence to several factors, including interest conflicts in immigration countries, interest conflicts and hidden agenda in migration policies, the structural dependence on emigration, and structural dependence on immigrant labor.[8]

Notwithstanding this "benign neglect," in his 2004 article on cross-border migration, Akaha argues that increased flows of cross-border migrants have given rise to human security issues such as the rights of foreign laborers/foreign workers, human rights protection, and human trafficking. He adds, however, that these issues have yet to threaten national security interests and that we have yet to see cooperation between the major recipients of cross-border migration.[9] Similarly, Lee, Oishi, and Douglass and Roberts speak not only of the feminization of migration but also that countries in Northeast Asia are a source, transit, and destination for the trafficking of women for sexual exploitation, and nexuses where foreign migrants are exploited in trainee systems which do not meet national labor standards.[10]

I argue that recent developments in Japan and Korea in the area of social integration policies and multiculturalism are congruent with broader integration in the region based on potential institutional cooperation in the sphere of human security. Specifically, in this paper I examine the social integration practices of Japan and Korea at the state level to help understand the measures being taken to mitigate some of the migratory pressures resulting from deepening Asian regional integration at the economic level, to enhance human security in the region and perhaps act as a platform for further integration based on cooperation in the area of human security. By examining the state-led initiatives vis-à-vis Japan and Korea's burgeoning multicultural societies, we can glean an understanding of their approaches to securing the human rights and security of their growing migrant populations. Through identifying parallels and differences in the approaches of the Japanese and Korean governments we can delineate potential areas of cooperation in dealing with growing trans-border migration between these two countries and in Asia in general, which may act as a platform for further integration at a broader level, overcoming the challenges to integration identified by Frost.[11]

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section will limit the parameters of this paper by defining the terms migrant, human security, human rights, and social integration. In the second section, I will examine demographic data and the current data on the number of foreign residents in Japan and Korea in a comparative manner to demonstrate parallels and dissimilarities in terms of the two countries' demographic challenges. As part of this second section, I will also describe the integration practices of Japan and Korea, highlighting important turning points, policy emphasis, and specific measures which are being put into place to help meet the coming demographic conundrum. The third and final section will identify areas of potential cooperation that will help Japan and Korea better deal with the integration of foreign residents to manage their demographic plight.

2. Migrants, Human Security, Human Rights, and Social Integration

Before embarking on the main argument of this paper I should clarify several terms, beginning with the term "migrant". Migrant or someone who is considered a migrant is defined as a person who has lived outside his/her country of birth for at least 12 months.[12] More specifically, according to the UN Convention on the Rights of Migrants, a migrant worker is defined as a "person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national."[13] Separation from one's country of birth can also include for reasons such as marriage or education but does not include a result of human traffick-

ing or for the purpose of exploitation nor does it include refugees. Moreover, it should be noted that in some countries, such as Korea and Japan, the term "migrant" can include those foreign residents who are born within their borders, including Special Permanent Residents (*tokubetsu eijusha*) in Japan.

The second term to be defined is that of human security. Owing to the focus on Japan and Korea and in consideration of their high level of development, I would like to borrow and revise Lee Shin-wa's concept of maximum human security, which she defines as the ability of an individual to achieve self-development through equal opportunity, social and political empowerment, and the establishment of a sustainable civil society.[14] In this paper, with its focus on inter-regional immigration and the status of migrants in Korea and Japan, we must focus on Lee's criteria of the ability of an individual to achieve self-development through equal opportunity and social empowerment rather than political empowerment and the sustainability of civil society. The rationale for not focusing on the latter two criteria is that political empowerment is constitutionally limited in both states for non-citizens.

Whereas human security focuses its limits on opportunity and social empowerment, human rights in the context of this paper echoes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights established in December 10, 1948. Although not universally agreed upon, this declaration can be used as a barometer when arguing potential areas of cooperation between Japan and Korea by stressing generally agreed upon notions of human rights including but not limited to the equality before the law, equal access to public services, the right to favorable conditions of work, and equal pay for equal work as laid out in the thirty articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[15]

Lastly, Wolfgang Bosswick and Friedrich Heckmann of the European Forum for Migration Studies (EFMS) at the University of Bamberg, Germany define social integration as "the inclusion and acceptance of immigrants into the core institutions, relationships, and positions of a host society," and further state:

> *Integration is an interactive process between immigrants and the host society. For immigrants, integration means the process of learning a new culture, acquiring rights and obligations, gaining access to positions and social status. For the host society, integration means opening up institutions and granting equal opportunities to immigrants.*[16]

In essence, this definition stresses the bidirectional process of adapting, acculturating, and opening institutions to newcomers such that through realizing their rights and obligations as new members of a society, they can prevent marginalization, while at the same time contributing to their new home if they choose to do so.

In this paper, the above definition of social integration needs to be expanded to include all categories of foreign residents, ranging from trainees and foreign workers, to long-term residents and permanent residents to Special Permanent Residents. The rationale for this inclusive definition is that neither Japan nor Korea has an official immigration policy; rather they admit foreigners into the labor force using various admission schemes. These schemes do not anticipate and, therefore, do not include a road map towards citizenship.

3. Demographic Conundrum: Twin Plagues of a Graying Population and Low Birth Rates

Japan

As of 2005, Japan's population began to decline owing to low birth rates, a reality that will affect the country's future economic vitality.[17] In fact, Japan has entered a longstanding depopulation process. The population is expected to drop to 115 million by 2030 and approximately 90

million by 2055 (see Figure 1.0) and according to Goodman and Harper this drop will have three major impacts: (1) increase in public spending on pensions; (2) high dependency rations between workers and nonworkers; and (3) slowdown in consumption.[18] At minimum, the greater tax burden on a smaller number of tax payers will result in a larger share of national budget allocated to health care, social services, and pensions, decreased economic strength because of lower consumption rates, loss of position in international society (lack of resources, decreased innovativeness), and a hollowing out of countryside (potential loss of agricultural independence).

Figure 1. Actual and Projected Population of Japan, 1950-2050

Source: *National Institute of Population and Social Security Research*. Tokyo: National
Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2006, *http://www.ipss.
go.jp/pr-ad/e/ipss_english.pdf*, p. 6. (Accessed January 3, 2009)

Like other nations, Japan is using foreign workers to compensate for this trend. Migrant workers find employment (legal and illegal) in Japan's manufacturing industries and other forms of employment deemed dirty, dangerous, and difficult (3 D's). Since 2003, we have seen a steady increase in the overall number of foreign residents in Japan (see Table 1).

In terms of the number of foreign nationals in Japan by status of employment, we have also seen a steady increase in the number of foreign workers since 2003 in all categories of visas excluding entertainment visas (see Figure 2). The drop in foreign workers with entertainment visa status was largely due to Japan's efforts to reduce human trafficking into Japan after being placed on the United States State Department's Tier 2 Watch List for Trafficking in 2003.

According to the Statistics Bureau of Japan, the number of foreigners living, working, and studying in Japan reached 2,084,919 in 2006, representing 1.63 percent of the total population (see Figure 3).[19] This number represents a 46 percent increase in the number of registered foreigners compared with 1994. This figure does not include the number of known illegal foreign residents which, according to the Ministry of Justice, has climbed to 207,299 (see Figure 4).[20] Moreover, the number of foreign residents could be much higher if we considered those children that result from international marriages called "daburu" in Japan.[21]

Table 1. Changes in the Number of Registered Foreign Residents

Status of Residence \ Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Total	1,915,030	1,973,747	2,011,555	2,084,919	2,152,973
Professor	8,037	8,153	8,406	8,525	8,436
Artist	386	401	448	462	448
Religious Activities	4,732	4,699	4,588	4,654	4,732
Journalist	294	292	280	273	279
Investor/Business Manager	6,135	6,396	6,743	7,342	7,916
Legal/Account Services	122	125	126	141	145
Medical Services	110	117	146	138	174
Researcher	2,770	2,548	2,494	2,332	2,276
Instructor	9,390	9,393	9,449	9,511	9,832
Engineer	20,807	23,210	29,044	35,135	44,684
Specialist in Humanities/International Services	44,943	47,682	55,276	57,323	61,763
Intra-company Transferee	10,605	10,993	11,977	14,014	16,111
Entertainer	64,642	64,742	36,376	21,062	15,728
Skilled Labor	12,583	13,373	15,112	17,869	21,261
Cultural Activities	2,615	3,093	2,949	3,025	3,014
Temporary Visitor	74,301	72,446	68,747	56,449	49,787
College Student	125,597	129,873	129,568	131,789	132,460
Pre-college Student	50,473	43,208	28,147	36,721	38,130
Trainee	44,464	54,317	54,107	70,519	88,086
Dependent	81,535	81,919	86,055	91,344	98,167
Designated Activities	55,048	63,310	87,324	97,476	104,488
Permanent Resident	267,011	312,964	349,804	394,477	439,757
Spouse or Child of Japanese National	262,778	257,292	259,656	260,955	256,980
Spouse or Child of Parmanent Resident	8,519	9,417	11,066	12,897	15,365
Long Term Resident	245,147	250,734	265,639	268,836	268,604
Spacial Permanent Resident	475,952	465,619	451,909	443,044	430,229
Without Acquiring Status of Residence	16,628	18,236	15,353	17,415	13,960
Temporary Refuge	30	31	30	30	30
Others	19,376	19,164	20,736	21,161	20,131

Source: The Ministry of Justice, "Immigration Control 2007," *http:// www.moj.go.jp, p. 20.* (*Accessed January 4, 2009*)

Figure 2. Changes in the Number of Foreign Nationals by Status of Employment

(people)	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	
Total	185,556	192,124	180,465	178,781	193,785	
Others	27,132	27,951	29,937	33,211	37,231	Others
Professor	8,037	8,153	8,406	8,525	8,436	Professor
Engineer	20,807	23,210	29,044	35,135	44,684	Engineer
Intra-company Transferee	10,605	10,993	11,977	14,014	16,111	Intra-company Transferee
Instructor	9,390	9,393	9,449	9,511	9,832	Instructor
Specialist in Humanities / International Services	44,943	47,682	55,276	57,323	61,763	Specialist in Humanities / International Services
Entertainer	64,642	64,742	36,376	21,062	15,728	Entertainer
(Year)	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	

Source: The Ministry of Justice, "Immigration Control 2008," *http:// www.moj.go.jp*, p. 21. （Accessed January 4, 2009）

Figure 3. Changes in the Number of Registered Foreign Nationals and Its Percentage of the Total Population in Japan

(＊1) "Number of registered foreign nationals" as of December 31 each year.
(＊2) The "Percentage of the total population in Japan" is caluated based on the population as of Octorber 1 every year from "Current Population Estimates as of October 1, 2004" and "Summary Sheets in the Population Census" by the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications.

Source: "2008 Immigration Control," Immigration Control Bureau, Japan, 2008, p. 18.

Figure 4. Estimated Number of Visa Overstayers by Major Nationality/Place of Origin

Source: "2008 Immigration Control," Immigration Control Bureau, Japan, 2008, p. 30.

What is driving the migration into Japan? The Ministry of Justice in its *Immigration Control 2007 Report* outlined six explanations for the increase: （1）availability of Trainee Programs; （2）special residency and opportunities for Nikkeijin[22]; （3）abundant jobs for foreign students and entertainers; （4）job opportunities for undocumented workers; （5）family reunion opportunities for those who belong to an international marriage; and （6）the ease at which foreigners can enter Japan and overstay their visa.[23]

It is clear from the above that Japan faces the challenge of untangling its own Gordian knot, namely, how to combat its declining population and, at the same time, how to successfully integrate the growing number of non-ethnic Japanese residents who are choosing to become perma-

nent residents in order that they can contribute to Japan economically, culturally, politically and socially.

An essential task in the integration of newcomers is the promulgation of substantive measures to prevent discrimination（racial or otherwise）, exploitation, and marginalization: videlicet, wage differences for equal work, barring of entry or refusal of services based on nationality,[24] truncated access to public rights including but not limited to national health care, social welfare programs, exclusion from family registries based on nationality,[25] education gaps,[26] high truancy among foreign youths,[27] and legal protection.

Korea

Korea is also experiencing a very rapidly graying population and a crisis-level low birth rate. As of 2007, Korean women were averaging just 1.26 children compared with Japanese women at 1.34.[28] This below replacement rate level compounds the current labor shortage as young Korean men and women tend to shun blue-collar employment opportunities for their white-collar counterparts.[29] Magnifying the problem associated with labor shortages and a declining tax pool, according to the Asian Demographic and Human Capital 2008 Data Sheet, Korea's aging population（those 65 years old and above）will represent 10 percent of the total population in 2007, 23 percent by 2030 and 32 percent by 2050.[30] More illustrative of coming crises is that in 2007 the aging population was supported by a tax base of 72 percent, but this is expected to drop to 65 percent in 2030, and then 57 percent in 2050. Echoing Goodman and Harper's analysis of the impact of Japan's population pyramid reversal, Korea will inevitably face similar economic and social hardships at a level even higher than Japan owing to a lower birthrate which will have the effect of having an even smaller tax base to contribute to existing social welfare programs and economic productivity.

Korea has also seen a large increase in the number of foreign residents working legally and illegally in country beginning in 1987.[31] According to Kwon Ki sup, Director of Foreign Employment Division of the Ministry of Labor, there is "an embedded structural demand for foreign labor, which is being compounded by Korea's aging population."[32] In 1987, Korea was home to approximately 6,409 migrant laborers, and the number soared to at least 640,000 in 2007（see Table 2）.[33]

Table 2. Increase in Legal and Illegal Foreign Residents in Korea between 2000 and 2005

Foreign Residents ［Unit : a person］

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Total	481,611	566,835	629,006	678,687	750,873	747,467
Registered	210,249	229,648	252,457	437,954	468,875	485,144
Short-term stayers	271,362	322,451	357,340	218,426	259,464	236,958
Resident report for ethnic Koreans		14,736	19,209	22,307	22,534	25,365

Source: "Immigration Bureau Publications," Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, 2008.

Table 3. Demographic Data on Japan and Korea through to 2050

	Japan	Korea
Total population	127,000,000	48,846,823
Foreign resident population	2,152,973	1,066,273
Percentage of total population	1.69%	2.20%
Number of overstayers	149,785	180,000
Projected % of population 2010 2020 2050	no data no data 10.00%	2.80% 5.00% 9.20%
International marriage rate	6.60%	11%
Number of foreign children	No data	30727
Population growth rate	-0.14%	0.39%
Children per family	1.34 (2007)	1.26 (2007)
Life expectancy	female: 85.59 years male: 78.73 years	female: 80.93 years male: 73.81 years
Age structure 0-14 years: 15-64 years: 65 years and over (2008 est.)	13.7% (male 8,926,439/female 8,460,629) 64.7% (male 41,513,061/female 40,894,057) 21.6% (male 11,643,845/female 15,850,388)	18.3% (male 4,714,103/female 4,262,873) 72.1% (male 18,004,719/female 17,346,594) 9.6% (male 1,921,803/female 2,794,698) (2007 est.)
Beginning of influx Rationale	Early 80s 3Ds	Early 90s 3Ds

Source: http://www.intute.ac.uk/sciences/cgi- bin/worldguidecompare.pl?country1=1024&country2=924&country3=%23&country4=%23&submit=Compare%21&compare=Population&compare=PopGrowth&compare=PopMig&compare=PopLife&compare=AgeStructure&compare=PopBirth&compare=PopDeath&compare=LabourForc（Accessed August 2008）

Above and beyond the influx of migrant laborers into Korea, brides hailing from Southeast Asia have also been major sources of the increase of non-Korean residents, resulting in a remarkable international marriage rate, 13.6 percent in 2006.[34]

The continued influx of migrant workers into Korea can be attributed to several factors. First, as with many developed nations, there is a structural demand for migrant workers that in part contributes to national economic prosperity by being able to continue to manufacture goods at competitive prices using cheaper foreign labor. Second, trainee programs continue to persist, creating a window to enter into the Korean economy. Third, proactive post-graduation employment programs for international students who have graduated from Korean universities boost the number of foreigners staying in Korea for work purposes. Fourth, the continued economic gap between Korea and sending countries makes Korea an attractive destination for migrant workers. Fifth, the continued dearth in potential spouses in the Korean countryside has created a niche for marriage migration, infusing the Korean countryside with not only foreign brides but also skyrocketing numbers of children who belong to international families.[35]

Japan and Korea share many similarities when we comparatively examine their demographic profiles and the numbers of foreigners continuing to settle in their borders（see Table 3）. In particular, both countries will experience a reversal of their respective population pyramids which will affect their socio-economic vitality and international standing. Both countries are also seeing a large influx of foreigners who come to each respective country as a foreign worker

or spouse, for education, or for other purposes. Collectively they present a difficult challenge in terms of how best to integrate them, protect their labor rights and from exploitation, and assure that their basic human security needs are met. They also present a great opportunity for them to contribute to the long-term socio-economic prosperity of each respective country.

4. Social Integration and Migration Practices in Japan and Korea

The recognition of the need to develop social integration and migration policy in Japan and Korea has had different roots. In the case of Japan, bottom-up and local government movements, such as the Kanagawa Prefectural government led by Governor Nagasu, were instrumental in the development of both social integration policy and the recognition of the challenges faced by foreign residents at the local level. First, it was the protection of human rights, recognition of needs, and the need for equality of Korean residents that were integral parts of the development of foreign resident policies.

Second, both bottom-up and top-down initiatives contributed to the creation and shaping of foreign resident policy. Bottom-up initiation was exemplified by Korean demands for equality and access to social welfare programs, whereas top-down initiatives were exemplified by the recommendations of the then Ministry of Home Affair's so-called local internationalization and Governor Nagasu's expansion of the parameters of the people-to-people diplomacy declaration.[36] Nagasu believed that local governments and internationalization were inextricably linked with the national government not being able to provide for all the needs of its citizens. This included the basic needs of citizen security and welfare for all residents of Kanagawa, Japanese and non-Japanese alike.

In part owing to the local government-led and grass-roots activism, in March 2006 Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC) promulgated the Plan for the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence. Its major pillars include: (1) communication assistance; (2) lifestyle assistance; (3) creation of multicultural coexistence; and (4) establishment of a system to promote multicultural coexistence.[37] The MIAC multicultural coexistence plan's recommended policies aim to overcome systemic, cultural, and language barriers in Japanese society. By overcoming these barriers, the MIAC plan is promoting more diverse social conditions which in turn can contribute to the development of a more pluralistic society. Policies espoused by the MIAC multicultural coexistence plan wed systemic, language, and cultural initiatives in an effort to open access to Japanese society and by consequence weave diversity into the fabric of society in the spheres of housing, education, and public services.

Notwithstanding the direction towards greater plurality in Japanese society that the MIAC policy seems to espouse, it is clear that at the cognitive and emotive levels multicultural coexistence as a means of creating a co-identity, as a tool for enhancing a shared national identity based on mutual respect and understanding of ethno-cultural backgrounds is absent from the MIAC multicultural coexistence policy.

Japan's Ministry of Justice (MOJ) has also put forth several strategies to manage Japan's labor shortage, to maintain its raison d'être of protecting domestic security, and to realize Japan's international commitments to economic partnership agreements. Specifically, the Ministry is advocating the acceptance of foreign workers in professional areas, the acceptance of high skilled laborers, the acceptance of non-professional/technical acceptance, and demand-based acceptance in areas such as nursing-care.[38] The Ministry of Justice has remained reticent to the idea of more open policies towards migration, stressing instead "that Japan should not rely on foreign workers, especially not the unskilled."[39] In fact, the Ministry of Justice prefers to maintain the temporary nature of migrant laborers, which manifests itself as a three-year nonrenewable system,[40] while

boosting immigration procedures to decrease the number of foreigners who come to Japan for work without the appropriate visa qualification.[41]

The newest proposed immigration plan 2008, put forth in June 2008 by a group of conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lawmakers, is the latest attempt to maintain Japan's economic competitiveness and contribute to abating the problems associated with Japan's population decline. The immigration proposal includes five major tenets: (1) raise population of non-Japanese residents to 10 percent of total population by 2050; (2) increase number of asylum seekers accepted to 1,000; (3) increase foreign students to 1 million by 2025; (4) guarantee "better" human rights; and (5) emphasis on accepting immigrants and their families as new Japanese nationals.[42] Collectively, the proposal aims to broaden the acceptance of individuals who can contribute to Japan socioeconomically and to those who have been educated and to some degree already assimilated into Japanese society.

The above three approaches to social integration and migration have different focuses. The MIAC initiative revolves around a strong focus on communication, lifestyle assistance, multicultural awareness, provision of services on par with Japanese, but offers no road to citizenship, nor a national action plan to promote integration at a significant level. The MOJ on the other hand conceptualizes policy related to migrant workers as temporary and thus sees no need for long-term investment in social integration programs. Lastly, the newly proposed immigration policy attempts to embrace the notion of immigration to combat Japan's declining population and labor shortage through a proposed system that prioritizes those immigrants who are already partially culturally assimilated through language or those who possess needed human capital to contribute to Japan's socio-economic prosperity.

To date, social integration and migration policies in Japan have been mostly initiated by local governments and grassroots organizations. Nonetheless, the LDP Immigration Plan and the Plan for the Promotion of Multicultural Coexistence by the MIAC mentioned above illustrate a shift towards top-down policy initiatives that aim to broach some of the challenges associated with migration and social integration in the country.

In contrast, Korea's social integration and migration policy development has been fuelled by three important factors: (1) sudden increase in international marriages; (2) the rapid rise in the number of foreign residents; and (3) government initiatives to protect the rights of migrant laborers (legal and illegal) in the early 1990s.[43]

International marriages brought to the forefront three important issues related to the need for social integration and formal migration policies. First, the substantial number of international marriages that were occurring in Korea vividly illustrated that Korea was undergoing a transformation of its ethnic composition from within, requiring policies that would smoothly integrate spouses of Korean nationals into Korean society. Second, Korean media revealed the widespread abuse of international spouses, prompting the Korean government to take firm measures to address the plight of a growing number of women settling in Korea. Third, and perhaps more importantly, international marriages highlighted the educational and social prejudice problems faced by children of mixed marriages, encouraging the Korean government to invoke several steps targeting issues associated with discrimination and social integration that will be outlined below.

The rapid increase of foreign residents since the 1990s and the associated rampant abuses of foreign residents, ranging from lack of pay for industrial accidents to low wages and clear violations of the Labor Standard Act in Korea, also brought to light the societal discrimination faced by foreign residents in Korea. As a result, Korea's Ministry of Labor announced initiatives to protect the rights of migrant laborers (legal and illegal), including the enforcement of the Labor Standards Act on companies that hired illegal foreign workers.[44]

The above three factors have been instrumental in Korea's about-face approach to multiculturalism, social integration policy, immigration policy, and anti-discrimination policy since 2004.

In 2004 the Ministry of Labor implemented the "Employment Permit System (EPS)" as a response to foreign migrant workers organizing unions to protect themselves from labor standards violations.[45] Protecting migrant workers from discriminatory wage treatment, the EPS regime ensures that migrant laborers do not settle in Korea by making the EPS a 3-year, non-renewable permit. The EPS was then followed by several initiatives directly related to the plight of spouses and children of international marriages, including the 2006 establishment of the "Council for the Protection of Human Rights & Interests of Foreign Nationals," the "2006 Plan for Social Integration of Mixed Bloods and Migrants," the 2006 "Plan for Social Integration of Marriage Migrants," and the 2006 "Basic Act on the Treatment of Foreigners" (effective July 18, 2007).[46] According to Yoon In-Jin, the promulgation of these initiatives was in part a result of several factors, including the 2006 announcement by the Ministry of Government Affairs and Home Affairs that "South Korea is rapidly becoming a multiracial and multicultural society" and "the transformation of S. Korea into a multiracial and multicultural society cannot be stopped."[47] Other scholars, such as Kim Hee Jung have a more sinister explanation for these policies, and assert that rather than targeting and protecting the human rights and treatment of all foreign residents, these policies in fact only target a very small number of foreign residents who belong to the Korean household through marriage.[48]

Despite the more pessimistic interpretations of recent social integration, human rights and immigration initiatives by the Korean government, I argue that the strong adherence to the Labor Standards Act in 1997, the legislation of the "Basic Act on the Treatment of Foreigners" in November 2006, and the establishment of the Council for Protection of Human Rights and Interests of Foreign Nationals are the strongest evidence supporting Korea's shift to towards social integration and migration policies that protect migrant workers using the same labor standards as those for Koreans. The initiatives also include the strong anti-discrimination measures, advocacy for the protection of human rights, and the inculcation of stronger multicultural awareness education programs, such as the recently announced "Overcoming Prejudice against Different Cultures" curriculum put forth by the Ministry of Education and Human Development.

5. Potential Areas of Cooperation

In arguing that it is in the interest of Japan and Korea to cooperate in the area of human security, I will borrow from Robert Scalapino who conceptualizes integration into three forces: (1) communalism; (2) nationalism; and (3) internationalism.[49] At the communalism level, Scalapino asserts that cooperation can be based on shared ethnicity, affiliation or regional identity.[50] In the case of Japan and Korea, local governments, grass-roots organizations, churches, and even unions have strong, established track records of cooperating transnationally, even at times at odds with respective national governments. Good examples include regional organizations such as the Northern Region Hokkaido Concept (hoppoken koso),[51] economic exchange/networks, municipal diplomacy,[52] and recently the joint workshop held by the ILO ápropos internationalizing labor standards.[53]

Cooperation in the sphere of human security which includes human and labor rights, between Korea and Japan can and should proceed first in the communitarian sense, to strengthen current social integration and migration polices, and approaches to labor and human rights as well as human security. The rationale for cooperation at this level is that it bypasses many of the challenges to integration outlined by Frost, such as border disputes, differences in historical interpretations, and a host of other obstacles to cooperation at high levels.[54]

First, in the area of labor rights, the protection of all workers' rights in both Japan and Korea is a useful example of potential communitarian-based cooperation between the two countries that

could be a basis for broader regional cooperation.[55] Both Rengo (Japanese Trade Union Confederation) and KOILAF (Korean International Labor Foundation) are strong proponents of labor rights protection for all workers, including foreign workers. To illustrate, Rengo's official stance vis-à-vis foreign workers is as follows:

> *All individuals working in Japan should be subject to labor laws and regulations guaranteeing proper working conditions and occupational health and safety standards, and be protected by labor and social insurance schemes. Even if foreign workers are illegal, in violation of the Immigration Act, and are thus engaging in unauthorized work, their human rights should be observed equally with those of Japanese. Also, as a matter of course, they should be subject to Japanese labor laws and regulations and should be given protection under labor and social insurance schemes.*[56]

This protective stance related to foreign workers in Japan resonates well with the enforcement of Korea's Labor Standards Act in 1997 for employers of foreign migrants but also with KOILAF's stance on foreign migrant workers, which states: "To protect the basic labor rights of foreign migrant workers, we provide labor relations education and grievance counseling to leaders of migrant worker communities and counselors of civil support organizations."[57]

With congruent views on the labor rights of foreign workers within each country's respective borders and a shared affiliation with workers of all nationalities, there is a foundation for regional, or at least bilateral cooperation in the communitarian sense to lobby each respective government to more strongly advocate labor rights for migrant workers and to fortify their social integration programs so that foreign workers can be more productive, even if the length of their stay may be limited. Owing to the structural dependence on foreign labor in both countries, labor unions in Japan and Korea also can have a key role in ensuring a steady supply of reliable foreign labor for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) by creating attractive working environments which not only pay well compared to sending countries, but are also attractive because of their strong advocacy of labor rights, human rights, and human security issues.[58] In this light, stronger cooperation between unions in both countries can broaden and increase the quality of labor and human rights for migrant workers and decrease exploitation of migrant workers while contributing to maintaining the economic productivity of each country. I would add that strong advocacy at the transnational level not only protects the labor and human rights of migrant workers in the receiving country, but also protects the labor and human rights of Japanese and Korean citizens while working in their own country.

According to Lim, Japanese and Korean labor unions such as the Zentoitsu Labor Union (ZWU) and the Labor Pastoral Center (LPC) have been effective in securing the labor rights of foreign migrants by appealing to international labor standards set forth by the ILO.[59] However successful both unions have been in securing labor rights and subsequently a component of human security for migrant workers, the bureaucratic agencies and employers still can ignore or subvert these progressive approaches because of what Lim points out as the lack of a judicial body that can enforce, rather than just persuade parties to abide by labor standards.[60]

Despite the challenge of lacking enforcement of labor standards, I reason that labor unions in both countries still have a vested interest in cooperating with each other to protect the labor rights of all workers for several reasons. Firstly, cooperation in the area of labor rights protection ensures that businesses do not opt for cheap foreign labor in lieu of more expensive domestic labor, thus securing their own employment. Secondly, broader cooperation between unions may enhance each union's ability to lobby their own respective government in terms of bringing to light the abuses and exploitation of migrant and non-migrant workers.

The second potential area of communitarian cooperation is at the local government level.

Japanese and Korean local governments are often the immediate interface for foreign residents with each respective society. Upon arrival in area country, foreign residents register with the local government in the area in which they reside. This registration process makes them eligible for social welfare, pensions, health care, and in many cases multilingual advisory services to help them navigate through administrative procedures, legal questions, etc. Because of the division of labor between the national and local governments, local governments have been the primary administrative bodies building the infrastructure to socially integrate foreign residents. These policies translate into communication assistance, language training, culture training, lifestyle assistance, multilingual information services, anti-discrimination awareness education, and counseling for newcomers.[61]

Here, Japanese local governments have a potential leadership role. Japanese local governments can and should share with their Korean counterparts their extensive successful and unsuccessful social integration strategies that have been in development since the early 80s. In particular, the Hamamatsu Declaration, with its focus on education, social security, and the revamping of foreign registration, offers a treasure trove of valuable suggestions on how to better integrate foreign residents into local communities.[62] Specifically, the Hamamatsu Declaration provides substantive strategies to deal with education issues faced by the children of migrant workers, the children of international marriages, and the establishment of language classes to equip foreign residents with the language and cultural skills they need to improve their life while in Japan. The declaration also offers concrete strategies to cooperate with medical organizations, NPOs, NGOs, and other volunteer groups, and consider creating a system where non-Japanese residents can avail themselves of multilingual medical care and information with peace of mind.

Similarly, other Japanese municipalities with multicultural coexistence plans, such as Shinjuku Ward, Adachi Ward, and Tachikawa City located in the Tokyo Metropolis, are well situated to share their well-developed multicultural coexistence plans which have been developed to meet each local government's particular needs. They have developed integration strategies which to different degrees focus on cultural, structural, interactive, and identificational integration.[63, 64]

Whereas the Japanese local government strength relies on more developed social integration strategies in accordance with their longer experience with foreign residents, Korean non-governmental organizations offer a third potential opportunity for communitarian-based cooperation. Korean NGOs can take the lead in social integration of foreign residents by sharing their experience in: (1) coordination with NPOs, unions, and church groups to facilitate social integration; and (2) strong advocacy of the protection of the human rights of foreign residents, which includes labor rights and protection against other kinds of exploitation.

In the case of coordination with NPOs, unions, and church groups to facilitate social integration, Seol and Skrentny and Yoon assert that non-governmental groups form strong lobby groups which not only influence the direction of policy development vis-à-vis foreign residents, but also provide a plethora of services to foreign residents. For example, citizen-led multiculturalism manifests itself as citizen-led NPOs and religious groups who assist foreign residents, marriage migrants, and children of international marriages. Activities are broad in scope but include the establishment of migrant women's counseling centers such as the Solidarity for Migrant Human Rights and the Joint Committee for Migrant Workers in Korea.[65] In each case, human rights, labor rights, and the protection from exploitation are the major tenets of these organizations and point to another potential area of cooperation that can be leveraged to broader integration between Korea and Japan.

Japan, with its relative dearth in citizen-led multiculturalism and advocacy groups for foreign residents, may have much to learn from Korea. With shared views on human rights, labor rights, and protection from exploitation, Japanese NGOs could find their Korean colleagues to be useful partners in promoting their agenda to local and state governments, but also in the areas of

organization and experience in inculcating international standards into their rhetoric in order to put pressure on concerned parties.

The benefit of cooperation at the communitarian level between non-governmental organizations is several fold. First, sharing resources and expertise allows both partners to enhance their domestic agenda. Simply, they can harness and learn from the successes and failures of each partner's experience to refine and strengthen domestic initiatives. For example, Korean non-governmental organizations have utilized the plight of marriage migrants and international children to broaden the human rights, labor rights, and human security agenda such that it applies to all foreigners in Korea.

Second, because of the more nebulous and apolitical nature of people-to-people cooperation at the NGO level, there is room to broaden cooperation beyond solely Korea and Japan.

Third, and equally important, is that bilateral networking can also be expanded to cooperation with human rights groups in the labor（migrant）source countries as well. Cooperation that results from liaisons between Japanese and Korean organizations and groups has the potential to enhance their collective leadership capacity vis-à-vis the migrant labor source countries, especially if the bilateral cooperation is extended to NGOs and other human rights advocacy groups in source countries. As a consequence of these activities, we could see multilateral cooperation emerge between Japan, Korea and a third country based on shared affiliation and interests.

6. Conclusion

Both Japan and Korea are seeing a rapid transformation of their ethnic composition resulting from low birth rates, aging populations, international migration, and international marriages. These Northeast Asian neighbors are also facing many similar challenges as a result of common demographic trends, structural dependency on foreign labor sources, and international marriages. Challenges include the best manner in which to integrate newcomers so that they can contribute to their new homes. Human rights and labor rights protection are also important challenges to be overcome in both countries. Policies that prevent the abuse of newcomers, migrant workers, and non-ethnic spouses and exploitation are areas that both nations can and should find areas to cooperate.

Using Scalapino's concept of integration at the communitarian level, I demonstrated that there already exists ample opportunity for Korea and Japan to cooperate at the non-governmental organization, local government, and the labor union level to deal with trans-border migration, securing human and labor rights as well as human security in general. This paper showed that it is in the interest of labor unions to cooperate, as it not only helps to secure the rights and prosperity of foreign migrant workers but it also enhances their own employment prospects by ensuring that SMEs do not engage in discriminatory employment practices that favor migrant workers because they do not fall under labor standard acts.

On the Japanese side, local governments and their initiatives in the area of social integration, human rights protection is also a realm ripe for cooperation. The experience and more developed social integration policies vis-à-vis foreign residents that already exist in Japan can and should be valuable learning devices for Korean counterparts on what programs are effective in integrating foreign residents.

Conversely, Korean NGOs have shown leadership and effectiveness in developing support programs that secure human and labor rights as well as protect foreign residents, marriage migrants, and children from international marriages from marginalization and/or exploitation.

Although a considerable vacuum exists at the national level in terms of cooperation that would contribute to broader integration in the area, integration between these two neighbors can

proceed at the communitarian level in the area of human security and human and labor rights protection. Being based on shared values, maintaining prosperity of citizens and non-citizens, and efforts to achieve international standards in the areas of labor and human rights and human security, this initial seed of cooperation at the non-state level can provide a strong foundation for broader regional integration efforts.

Notes

[1] The research that was undertaken to write this research paper was supported by the Waseda University Global COE Program, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration（GIARI）. In particular, I would like to convey my sincere gratitude for funding to conduct research in Korea and the opportunity to participate and present my initial findings at the Summer Institute on Asian Regional Integration 2008. I would like to extend my gratitude to Professor Tsuneo Akaha of the Monterey Institute for International Studies/Visiting Professor at Waseda University for his constructive and insightful comments which have proved so useful during the revisions of this paper.

[2] Paul Taylor, "Functionalism: the Approach of David Mitrany," in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, eds., *Frameworks for International Cooperation*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1994, pp. 125-138.

[3] R.J. Harrison, "Neo-functionalism," in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, eds., pp. 139-151.

[4] Stephen Castles, "The Factors That Make and Unmake Migration Policies," in Alejandro Portes and Josh DeWind, eds., *Rethinking Migration: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives*, New York: Berghahn Books, 2007, pp. 29-61.

[5] Ibid., p. 52.

[6] T. Akaha and B. Ettkin, "International Migration and Human Rights: A Case for a Regional Approach in Northeast Asia," in Martina Timmermann and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, eds., *Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional Steps towards Global Governance*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008, pp. 336-358.

[7] Global Commission on International Migration, "Regional Hearing for Asia and the Pacific, Manila, Philippines, 17-18 May 2004: Summary Report," Geneva: GCIM, 2004, p. 2.

[8] Castles, pp. 37-44.

[9] Tsuneo Akaha, "Cross Border Migration as A New Element of International Relations in Northeast Asia: A Boon to Regionalism or New Source of Friction?" *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 28, No. 2（2005）, pp.101-133.

[10] Lee Shin-wha, "Human Security Aspects of International Migration: The Case Study of Korea," *Global Economic Review*, Vol. 32, No. 3（2003）, pp. 41-66; Lee Shin-wha. "Kankoku ni okeru Imin Seisaku no Genjitsu（Migrant policies in Korea）," in Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva, eds., *Kokkyo wo Koeru Hitobito: Hokuto Ajia ni okeru Jinko Ido*（People crossing national borders: Movement of people in Northeast Asia）, Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2006, pp. 237-262; Oishi Nana, *Women in Motion: Globalization, State Policies, and Labor Migration in Asia*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006, pp.1-14; Mike Douglas and Glenda S. Roberts, "Japan in a Global Age of Migration," in Mike Douglass and Glenda S. Roberts, eds., *Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000, pp. 2-37.

[11] Ellen Frost portends that a plethora of obstacles contribute to the glacial pace of deeper integration in the region including: geography, culture, history, the dual nature of the effects of globalization, regional politics, problematic governance, corruption, as well as unpredictable threats such as the collapse of North Korea.（Ellen L. Frost, *Asia's New Regionalism*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2008, pp. 217-231.）I would add to this list two other drivers of integration that can play an enormously positive role or inhibitory role in further integration: United States involvement and overseas nationals. A United States that remains distracted by conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan will be unable to direct the resources necessary（material, political, and intellectual）to positively contribute to the region. Similarly, overseas nationals such as overseas Chinese and Indians who remain disinterested in their ethnic homelands, may inadvertently negatively affect the shape of Asian regional integration by not lending their experience, wealth, and ability to act as purveyors of human and social capital from the developed world to the developing world.

12 Castles, p. 38.

13 United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization's definition of migrant: http://portal. unesco.org/shs/en/ev.phpURL_ID=3020&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html（accessed December 5, 2008）.

14 Lee Shin-wa, "Human Security in East Asia: The Role of the United Nations and Regional Organization," *Korean Political Science Review*, Vol. 37, No. 4（2003）, pp. 317-342.

15 Overview of UN Declaration of Human Rights: http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html（accessed December 12, 2008）.

16 Wolfgang Bosswick and Friedrich Heckmann, "Integration of Migrants: Contribution of Local and Regional Authorities," in *European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2006*, Ireland: CLIP Network, Cities for Local Integration Policy, 2006, pp. 9-11.

17 *Economist*, January 7-13, 2005, pp. 29-30; *Economist*, July 28-August 3, 2007, pp. 11, 24-27; See also Hidenori Sakanaka, "The Future of Japan's Immigration Policy: A Battle Diary," *Japan Focus,* http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2396（accessed May 23, 2007）.

18 R. Goodman and Sarah Harper, "Japan in the New Global Demography: A Comparative Perspective," *Japan Focus*, http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2472（accessed August 2008）.

19 Ministry of Justice homepage: http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/070921-1/070921-1.pdf（accessed April 30, 2008）.

20 Ministry of Justice homepage: http://www.moj.go.jp/English/issues/issues05.html（accessed September 16, 2006）.

21 "Daburu" is the Japanese pronunciation of "Double". It refers to children who have one Japanese parent and one non-Japanese parent. Children who have parents from different countries but whose parents are not of Japanese nationality are called international children or just foreign children.（See Tabunka Kyosei Ki-wa-do Jiten Henshu Iinkai, *Tabunka Kyosei Ki-wa-do Jiten*［Dictionary of multicultural coexistence key words］, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2004, p. 71）. See also Eriko Suzuki, "Gaikokujin Shuju Chiiki ni miru Tabunka Kyoshakai no Kadai: 'Kyosei' wa Nanika?"（An examination of multicultural coexistent society in areas with a high concentration of foreigners: What does "coexistence" mean?）, *FIF Special Report*, No. 8, Tokyo: Fujita Mirai Keiei Kenkyujo, 2004, pp. 23-25.

22 The revision of Japanese immigration policy to allow individuals of Japanese ancestry（up to three generations）to return to Japan for work has resulted in an influx of Nikkeijin into Japan. The rationale behind this ethnic based immigration selection was that it was assumed that Nikkeijin would assimilate more smoothly than other foreigners because of their shared blood. See: Ministry of Justice, *Shutsunyukoku Kanri Kihon Keikaku*（Immigration control basic plan）, Tokyo: Ministry of Justice, 1992, p.12; Manolo I. Abella, "Asian Migrant Contract Workers in the Middle East," in Robin Cohen, eds., *The Cambridge Survey of World Migrations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 418-423; Hiroshi Kojima, "Foreign Workers and Health Insurance in Japan: The Case of Japanese Brazilians," *The Japanese Journal of Population*, Vol. 4, No. 1（accessed March 3, 2006）, pp. 78-92.

23 The Ministry of Justice, "Immigration Control 2007," http://www.moj.go.jp（accessed March 30, 2008）.

24 A vivid example of the widespread, illegal social-cultural discrimination can be seen in the plethora of Japanese businesses that overtly reject providing services to non-ethnic Japanese, <http://www.debito. org/roguesgallery.html>（accessed February 4, 2008）.

25 David Chapman argues that the current family registration system in Japan ensures that non-ethnic Japanese are indefinitely outside the Japanese nationality framework. As such, the final step in the identification process, both at the cognitive and emotive levels, remains an aloof. Specifically, Chapman demonstrated that only Japanese nationals can be registered as the head of household（*setai nushi*）on the *juminhyo*. See David Chapman, "Tama-chan and Sealing Japanese Identity," *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 3（2008）, pp. 423-443.

26 Hirohisa Takenoshita, "Nanbeikei Gaikokujin no Koyo to Rodo: Jinteki Shihon, Rodo Shijo Sekuta, Rodo Juyo no Kanten kara（Labor and education of South American foreigners: From the perspective of human capital, labor market sector, demand for labor）," in Ikegami Shigehiro, eds., *Gaikokujin Shimin to Chiiki Shakai e no Sanka: 2006 nen Hamamatsu Shi Gaikokujin Chosa no Shosai Bunseki*（Foreign residents and their participation in local community: A detailed analysis of the 2006 survey of foreigners in Hamamatsu）, Shizuoka Prefecture: Shizuoka Bunka Geijutsu Daigaku, 2008, pp.19-35.

27 In a study of young Brazilians at the Kurihama Reform School, the juvenile delinquents stressed that

inability to properly communicate in Japanese as one of the contributing factors that led them to engage in crime. The study indicated that many foreign children (in this case Brazilian children) tended to drop out of school because of an inability to keep up in class due to poor language abilities. As a result, they ended up engaging in petty crimes such as shoplifting. See Kazuaki Tezuka, "Foreign Workers in Japan: Reality and Challenges," *Japan Labor Review*, Vol. 2. No. 4 (Autumn 2004), pp. 48-71.

28 http://www.intute.ac.uk/sciences/cgibin/worldguidecompare.pl?country1=1024&country2=924&country3=%23&country4=%23&submit=Compare%21&compare=Population&compare=PopGrowth&compare=PopMig&compare=PopLife&compare=AgeStructure&compare=PopBirth&compare=PopDeath&compare=LabourForc (accessed August 2008).

29 T.C. Lim, "NGOs, Transnational Migrants, and the Promotion of Rights in South Korea," in Tatsuyuki Tsuda, ed., *Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration,* Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006, pp. 235-269.

30 Asian Demographic and Human Capital 2008 Data Sheet: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/datasheets/VID_asianDataSheet08_web.pdf (accessed September 2, 2008).

31 Dong-Hoon Seol and John D. Skrentny, "South Korea: Importing Undocumented Workers," in W.A. Cornelius, T. Tsuda, P.L. Martin, and J.F. Hollified, eds., *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective*, 2nd Edition, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 481-513.

32 Kwon Ki Sup, "The Prospects and Challenges for the Employment Permit System," a paper presented at the 3rd Meeting of the Immigration Policy Forum, Gwacheon Government Complex, Gwacheon, Korea, June 17, 2004.

33 Dong-Hoon Seol, *Nodongryeok eui gukje idong,* Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2000. This number includes more than 180,000 workers with authorized working permits, 230,000 ethnic Koreans, 28,000 industrial trainees and foreign residents, and 202,000 illegal immigrants. See: http://www.korea.net/news/news/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20080218023&part=114&SearchDay=&source= (accessed September 1, 2008).

34 Jang Ha-jin, Minister of Gender Equality of Korea, released a statement in November 2006 outlining the extent of international marriages in Korea. According to the minister, the international marriage rate was 1.6 percent in 1990, but the rate has increased to 13.6 percent in the cities and up to 1/3 of the total marriages in farming and fishing villages. http://english.moge.go.kr/index.html (accessed September 15, 2008).

35 Yoon In Jin, "The Development and Characteristics of Multiculturalism in South Korea: With a Focus on the Role of the State and Civil Society," International Conference on Multiculturalism in Asia, Korea University, October 10, 2008.

36 Borrowing Sakamoto Yoshikazu's principle of "minsai gaiko," or people-to-people diplomacy, Governor Nagasu advocated a revolution at the local government level in which citizens would become the medium for international relations. See Yoshikazu Sakamoto, "Image of Changing Peace," *Asahi Shimbun,* 1972; Kazuji Nagasu, *Jichitai no Kokusai Koryu: Hirakareta Chiho wo Mezashite* (International cooperation of local governments: Toward open local regions), Tokyo: Gakuyoshobo, 1983, pp. 3-16 and 21-23.

37 Somusho, "Tabunka Kyosei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyukai Hokokusho, 2007" (Report of the study group concerning the promotion of multicultural coexistence, 2007), Tokyo, 2007, *http://www.soumu.go.jp/s-news/2007/pdf/070328_3_bt1.pdf* (Accessed September 20, 2008).

38 "2007 Immigration Control," Immigration Control Bureau, Japan, 2008.

39 Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Kimberly A. Hamilton, *Reinventing Japan: Immigration's Role in Shaping Japan's Future*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2000, pp. 47-48.

40 *Asahi Shimbun*, May 17, 2007; Arudou Debito, "Japan's Future as an International, Multicultural Society: From Migrants to Immigrants," *Japan Focus*, http://www.japanfocus.org/_Arudou_Debito-Japan_s_Future_as_an_International__Multicultural_Society__From_Migrants_to_Immigrants/ (accessed February 16, 2008).

41 Beginning November 20, 2007, the Japanese Government began requiring all non-Japanese entering Japan to be photographed and finger-printed as part of their efforts to prevent terrorism and decrease the number of foreigners coming to work illegally in Japan. See outline for new immigration procedures published by General Affairs Division, Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice: http://www.hk.emb-japan.go.jp/eng/docs/20071024Outline_newImmi_e.pdf (accessed September 2008).

42 "Radical Immigration Plan under Discussion," *The Japan Times*, June 19, 2008; "Let 10% of Japan be

Foreigners: Nakagawa," *The Japan Times*, June 13, 2008.

43 "Court Rules Invalid Government Denial of Foreign Worker's Right to Industrial Accident Compensation," *Korea Times*, January 21, 1997; T.C. Lim, "NGOs, Transnational Migrants, and the Promotion of Rights in South Korea," in Tsuda Tatsuyuki, ed., *Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration*, Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006, pp. 235-269.

44 Ministry of Labor Press Release, October 14, 1998.

45 "Immigration Bureau Publications," Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, 2008.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Hee Jung Kim, "Korea's Government-led Multiculturalism: Theories of Multiculturalism and Their Application," in *Korea's Multiculturalism: Reality and Issues,* Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2007.

49 R. Scalapino, "Northeast Asia at a Historical Turning Point," in Tsuneo Akaha, ed., *Politics and Economics in Northeast Asia: Nationalism and Regionalism in Contention*, New York: St. Martin's, 1999, pp. xi-xxii.

50 Ibid.

51 http://www.pref.hokkaido.jp/soumu/sm-tksai/nforum/rekishi%20hongenkou.files/rekishisaishu.htm（accessed September 5, 2004）．Geographically Hokkaido is located in an ideal and significant location in the northern hemisphere. With that understanding in mind Hokkaido believes it has an important role in Japan as an exchange base with countries located in the northern hemisphere, facilitating further prosperity and development.

52 Hanekai Masami and Osawa Hiroshi, *Jichitai Gaiko no Chosen: Chiiki no Jiritsu kara Kokusai Koryuken no Keisei e*（Challenge of local government diplomacy: From local self-reliance to the formation of international exchange zones）, Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1994, pp. 1-41.

53 Federation of Korean Trade Unions website: http://www.efktu.or.kr/~fktueng/ （accessed August 8, 2008）．

54 Ellen L. Frost, *Asia's New Regionalism*, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2008, pp. 217-231.

55 http://www.jilaf.or.jp/English-jilaf/seminar/index.html （accessed September 3, 2008）．

56 Rengo homepage: http://www.jtuc-rengo.org/specialtopics/foreignworkers03.html （accessed September 2008）．

57 *http://www.koilaf.org/KFeng/engLaborlaw/bbs_read_dis.php?board_no=28* （accessed September 21, 2008）

58 According to "Direction for the Implementation of the National Policy for Labor Affairs," Korea is already considering increasing the upper limit of the number of foreign migrant workers to 132,000 per year to combat the labor shortage in small and medium-sized enterprises. See "Direction for the Implementation of the National Policy for Labor Affairs," Ministry of Labor, 2008, p.10.

59 T.C. Lim, "NGOs, Transnational Migrants, and the Promotion of Rights in South Korea," in Tsuda Tatsuyuki, ed., pp. 235-269.

60 Ibid.

61 Jichitai Kokusaika Kyokai, "Kankoku Shakai wo Torimaku Saikin no Shojosei"（Recent developments in Korean society）, Jichitai Kokusaika Foramu, No. 211, May 2007, pp. 2-6.

62 Hamamatsu Declaration: http://www.debito.org/hamamatsusengen.html （accessed September 12, 2008）．

63 Identificational integration refers to immigrants identifying with the goals of the host country's institutions and having developed a sense of belonging to society in general. Furthermore, identificational integration can be interpreted as the host society creating policies that encourage, foster, and develop a sense of belonging in society. In the case of local governments, this would be a sense of belonging in the local community that is nurtured through policy that advocates shared interest and identity of all residents of a particular local government's community. See: Bosswick and Heck, pp. 9-11.

64 Ibid., p. 2.

65 Dong-Hoon Seol and John D. Skrentny, "South Korea: Importing Undocumented Workers," in Cornelius et al., eds., *Controlling Immigration*, pp. 481-513.

Regional Integration and Migrant Workers' Rights Protection in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Case of the Republic of Korea

Anastasia V. Kouznetsova Sutch

Abstract

Economic globalization exacerbates the fragmentation of labor in many ways, but at the same time it generates commonalities in the experience and aspiration of workers not only regionally but worldwide. This approach gives the phenomenon of what political scientists call "labor solidarity" the new urgency; this gives us the reasonable belief that suggesting labor unions are out of date is inaccurate. The ongoing regional integration and globalization did not open up new issues, but rather transformed an old problem into a broadened arena related to the issues arising from comparative labor law and its application to legal regimes. One of the biggest and the most problematic questions is the legal protection of labor migrants, including illegal labor migrants. While the modern global world provides labor force with many opportunities to move around, it provides little support and protection for the migrant workers.

The entire region of the Asia-Pacific Rim faces a big challenge due to illegal labor migration. Comparative studies, such as this, should help to find fruitful ways to ensure the protection of the labor rights of this group of workers through labor unions. The main hypothesis of the present study is that labor unions can provide effective protection for the rights of migrants and this protection will not damage the security of national workers. The legal definition and legal status of documented (legal) migrant workers are based on the national legislation of the countries examined and the position of international organizations also reviewed in this study. This analysis indicates the need for the implementation of official regional regulations that will help to develop effective inter-regional labor protection in question by national labor unions.

1. Introduction

More than ten years ago Beverly May Carl in her book *Economic Integration among Developing Nations: Law and Policy*[1] wrote about the ups and downs for the integration of developing nations. The depth of their poverty and the extent of their economies' orientation toward the "First World" made regional integration difficult. Compounding this process is the great diversity that exists within the Asia-Pacific region. According to students of economic integration the process of integration will be successful only when the integrating countries are more or less at the same level of development. The diversity and the varied levels of economic development in the Asia-Pacific pose serious problems for regional integration. However, the spirit of integration still lives on. Despite occasional setbacks, the developing countries in this part of the world do manage to come together, revise or rewrite treaties on trade and economic relations, and their movement toward integration inches forward.

With the current trends towards even greater regional integration in Asia-Pacific, labor migration is expected to intensify in order to support the development of regional production networks and supply chains. To facilitate the movement of labor within the region, it is necessary, first, to look at measures to enhance the development of skills in a more concerted manner and,

second, to review the current migration policies and practices to ensure that they are sufficiently supportive of intra-regional labor movement while providing necessary measures to address and minimize possible adverse impacts associated with such movement.

When we discuss integration in the context of migrant workers, the term "integration" can be understood differently. Much of the scholarly discussion is about the social integration of migrants. However, in this paper we will look at integration and the movement of labor in terms of the system integration of migrants following Lockwood's sociological theory of social systems with particular reference to the concepts of system integration and social integration.[2] System integration is the result of the anonymous functioning of institutions, organizations, and mechanisms, involving the state, the legal system, markets, corporate actors or finance. Social integration, by contrast, refers to the inclusion of individuals in a system, the creation of relationships among individuals, and their attitudes towards the society. It is the result of the conscious and motivated interaction and cooperation of individuals and groups.

Conceptually integration presumes the stability of relations among the parts of a system-like whole, and the borders of the integrated system clearly separate it from its environment; in such a state, the system is said to be integrated. Three other aspects of integration relate to the processes of integration and the resulting degree of interconnectedness or quality of relations within the whole: (1) the process of single elements relating to one another and, out of this process, forming a new structure; (2) adding single elements or partial structures to an existing structure, and forming an interconnected whole; and (3) maintaining or improving relations within a system or structure. This conceptual understanding of integration will aid our analysis of the movement of migrant labor and its role in regional integration.

Migrants have become highly visible in most developed countries. They tend to occupy jobs at both ends of the scale, in both high-skilled and low-skilled sectors. A 2005 report of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) emphasizes the role of well-managed migration in helping the economy of the host country and points out that, despite fears of migration, foreign workers play an important role in plugging the labor gaps left by falling birth-rates. The report also states that competition between migrant and local workers for the same jobs is, in fact, seldom seen.[3] Foreign workers usually cluster around the top and bottom ends of the job market, filling roles that the local labour supply is unable to meet. IOM Director General Brunson McKinley states, "We are living in an increasingly globalized world that can no longer depend on domestic labor markets alone."[4]

Can it be said that migration is a problem of one country that should be decided by the state? Can the state take a unilateral decision on how it will manage migration when migration is needed not only by that economy but also by other economies? Unfortunately, the unilateral approach no longer works. It is increasingly the case that countries need to join forces to solve migration issues with a view to harmonizing the treatment of migrant workers according to the standards of basic human rights. When we are not able to stop migration, whether it is legal or illegal, we need to develop a legal approach at the national and the international level that will help to protect the rights of migrant workers.

Why do we need to protect the migrants' rights? First, studies show that labor standards are connected to the performance of an economy. Stephen Flanagan states, "[C]ontrary to the race to the bottom hypothesis, [his] analysis did not find significant linkages between export performance or FDI inflows and the measures of labor standards. In sum, the paper finds no evidence that countries with lower standards gained competitive advantage in international markets. Poor labor conditions often signal low productivity or are one element of a package of national characteristics that discourage FDI inflows or inhibit export performance."[5] If the will to protect labor rights does not come from concern for the human rights, then it should be motivated by simple economic reasons.

There are different measures for protecting the rights of the migrant labor. Some researchers believe that it is the responsibility of international organizations.[6] Others think differently; for example, David empathizes that labor unions' solidarity with migrant workers might help them to get back to the basic principles of the labor movement. That is, we have a win-win situation.[7] In this paper I will try to suggest some ways to defend the labor rights of migrant workers through labor unions as the main workers' agent for labor rights protection. The issue of migrant labor and the rights of migrant workers are linked to workers' rights in general and, therefore, should be a concern to the labor unions. However, the issue of migrant labor rights is a complex issue for unions, because the nature of migration flows and the legal status of migrants vary. Many migrant workers, including those in the construction, wood, and forestry industries, are effectively invisible. Globalization means that access to travel and awareness of "other places" have increased, and workers are driven to migrate beyond their national borders, legally or illegally. Gaps in the labor market need to be filled, and the most readily available source is often migrant workers, whether authorized or not. Just as labor unions developed historically as an instrument to protect workers' rights, so that instrument should be applied to the modern situation as well. There is no need to invent a new institution that will play the function of labor unions.

At the same time, labor movements around the world are deepening their analysis of globalization, particularly when it comes to free trade. Unions both in developing and developed countries are aware that globalization offers opportunities, but they also realize that globalization can have deleterious effects. It is clear that people want to be part of the decision making process that affects their lives and that the role of unions has been complemented by the role of NGOs. Unfortunately, however, NGOs do not always have the necessary means to perform the protection function for workers in the industrial relations; and this is where the labor unions have to take the lead.

The aim of this study is to address the question of how to protect effectively the labor rights of migrant workers, both legal and illegal, through the labor (trade) unions by a case study of the situation in the Republic of Korea. The hypothesis is that labor unions can provide a more effective protection for the rights of foreign migrants and that such protection will not damage the welfare of national workers.

The following section will offer an historical-institutional analysis that considers the socio-structural context in which the movement towards the protection of migrants' labor rights emerged – sociological opportunity-structure – , followed by a discussion of the possible protection by labor unions of the labor rights of migrants – institutional opportunity-structure. The analysis will use empirical, quantitative, and qualitative methods.

2. International Migration

The causes of international labor migration are numerous and complex, and this section only focuses on what are arguably the principal causes. At the most basic level, migration for employment is caused by complementary "push" and "pull" factors; the former is characterized by poor living conditions in the country of origin and the latter by the availability of well-paid work (in relative terms) in the country of employment. The labor migration process is then facilitated by improving communications, the availability of transportation, and by social or ethnic networks.

Most international labor migration movements are linked to poverty and economic underdevelopment in the countries of origin,[8] chronic underemployment in the sending countries in contrast with the relative demographic stability in the receiving countries.

The International Organization for Migration observes that the main receiving countries are the United States, Russia, Germany, France, and India. This contradicts the theory of some econ-

omists that developed countries are attractive for migrant workers.

Table 1. Countries Receiving Migrant Workers

Country	Migrants	Population
USA	35million	295million
Russia	13.3million	141.5million
Germany	6.3million	82.5million
France	6.3million	60.7million
India	7.3million	1.1billion

Source: UNSG Report on International Migration and Development, 2005; available at: *http://www.un.org/esa/population/hldmigration/Text/Report%20of%20 the%20SG（June%2006）_English.pdf*.

The main reason for the high migration flow is demand for cheap labor. Hanson argues that there is no evidence that legal immigration is economically preferable to illegal immigration. Illegal immigration responds to market forces in ways that legal migration does not. The example of the United States shows that illegal migrants tend to arrive in larger numbers when the U.S. economy is booming relative to Mexico and the Central American countries that are the main sources of illegal immigration to the United States, and their main destinations are regions where job growth is strong. Legal immigration, in contrast, is subject to arbitrary selection criteria and bureaucratic delays, which tend to disassociate legal inflows from U.S. labor-market conditions.[9] This gives us the reasonable belief that, contrary to the common assumption and fear, migration in fact can benefit the economy of the receiving country. In other words, illegal immigration follows a clear economic logic; accordingly, repatriation of all illegal immigrants would reduce the U.S. labor force by 5 per cent and the low-skilled labor force（workers with less than a high school education）by 10 per cent or more. In 2005, illegal migrants accounted for 24 per cent of workers employed in farming, 17 per cent in cleaning, 14 per cent in construction, and 12 per cent in food preparation. Losing this labor would likely increase prices for many types of non-tradable goods and services, increase wages for low-skilled resident labor, decrease incomes of employers that hire these workers, and increase the incomes of taxpayers that pay for the public services these individuals use. The net impact of these changes would be small, although in some regions and industries the dislocation caused by the labor outflow would be considerable. If, instead, illegal migrants were allowed to remain in the country and obtain legal residence status, the economic impact would depend on the rights granted to these individuals. In the short run, the economic impact of legalization would likely be minimal.[10]

As noted earlier, illegal migrant workers are effectively invisible, making it difficult to obtain adequate and reliable data as a basis for useful analysis and planning. The majority of countries in the Asia-Pacific region are experiencing economic reform, with the adoption of market economies, trade liberalization, and new forms of international trade agreements and cooperation. Structural adjustment programs have contributed to the loss of jobs, resulting in declines in traditional industries and public sector employment. As earning opportunities drop in these countries, the pressure to move elsewhere for job opportunities mounts. Increased awareness of "other places," a result of globalization, drives workers to migrate, legally or illegally. Developing nations in the Asia-Pacific region continue to have a strong demand for cheap, low-skilled labor. Rather than moving where labor can be found, many companies restructure and subcontract, as part of their search for cheap labor. Labor supply gaps need to be filled, and the most avail-

able source will be migrant workers, whether authorized or not. Moreover, there is a demand for migrant labor to provide additional taxpayers who can contribute to state-run pension schemes in aging societies.

In the Asia-Pacific region migrant labor comes largely from India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. In the last two decades, newly industrialized countries (NICs) within Asia drew intra-regional sources of labor as workers migrated to new locations for employment. There are some cases where migrant workers are allowed in on the basis of specific agreements between governments and companies. In Australia, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Pakistan, there have been some examples of migrant workers being recognized for particular projects. However, they are often under unsatisfactory conditions or severe limitations. In some cases, workers are brought in despite general policies of not welcoming them. Where this happens, there is often a wide gap between the estimated numbers of legal and irregular migrant workers, as companies and project managements find alternative sources when they are legally prevented from hiring migrant labor. These illegal workers are very vulnerable and it is this illegal status of many individual migrant laborers, particularly in the construction industry, that creates the greatest difficulty for trade unions to act and react in workers' interests.

Labor unions not only need to react to the needs of migrant workers; they also need to be proactive. These irregular migrants have no access to trade unions and therefore no avenues for insisting on basic workers' rights. With no rights, they can be manipulated to depress salaries, standards, terms, and conditions for local workers who may be members of trade unions. They may also be used as strike-breakers. Trade unions are constantly hindered by not knowing the numbers and origins of illegal workers and by the inability to contact and engage with them. There is often anecdotal knowledge, but the risky and uncertain lifestyle of illegal immigrant laborer makes it virtually impossible to substantiate stories even of severe abuse and exploitation. Many trade unions, particularly in the construction industry, have therefore concentrated on limiting the potentially harmful impact of irregular migrant workers on the terms and conditions of union members. This must continue with vigilance and with determined action against opportunistic employers who are ready to set workers against one another.

Some migrant workers may come from countries where there are active labor unions. So they may be so used to having unionized protection that they want to obtain it again, if they can overcome the risks involved in becoming visible. These people may constitute a new reservoir of labor union membership. It is essential that unions recognize these workers and understand the forces that drive them and the contexts in which they operate. It is not surprising, therefore, that with barriers to legal migration, illegal migration has developed and grown to meet labor market demands. Most of these workers were in manufacturing prior to their move, but it is an example of how some governments pick and choose when to turn a blind eye to illegal labor, and how they exploit the availability of an unregulated workforce. Undocumented foreign workers are estimated to receive less than half the wages of average Korean workers doing the same job and have few if any benefits in case of accidents. Labor unions may do better by addressing the needs of workers at their source, by educating workers about their rights in whatever country they are employed, and by finding ways to make contact with illegal workers.

3. The Case of the Republic of Korea

Background

Before discussing the precise characteristics of the Korean labor unions and their effect on the labor migrant protection, we will take a brief look at the historical background to the cur-

rent situation in the Republic of Korea（hereafter simply "Korea"）. Korea launched democratic reform in 1987, undertaking major changes in its political system, economic structure, and society. The authoritarian regime had been replaced by democratic politics. The economy has been through booms and busts that have reduced the central role of the dominant *chaebol* conglomerates.

As in most other East Asian societies, law in Korea has traditionally been described as reflecting the Confucian tradition, adopted at the outset of the Yi dynasty（1392-1910）.[11] The Confucian legacy is complex, but several elements of it have drawn attention as having particular consequences for the Korean legal system. First, Confucianism is usually seen to incorporate an aversion to litigation and a preference for social norms as the primary regulatory mode. Second, Confucianism is based on notions of social hierarchy, which contrast with the liberal assumptions of formal equality. Third, Confucianism reflects a notion that positive law is to be understood in instrumental terms as primarily a tool of the state, rather than an external constraint on state power. The traditional attitude can be characterized as rule *by* law, as opposed to the rule *of* law.

These notions comported well with the state-centric legal and political structure introduced during the Japanese colonial period（1910-45）. During this period, Japan introduced Western notions of law that had, in turn, been borrowed from France and later Germany, i.e., the Roman-Germanic legal system. It was under colonialism that Korea assumed the formal structure of a modern legal system, with distinct judges, prosecutors, and private lawyers. Korea uses specific judges and lawyers for each area of law such as labor, family, and criminal. However, because of the colonial character of the state, notions such as judicial independence, separation of powers, and constitutional rights were minimal, and the paradigmatic function of the legal system was social control through criminal law.[12]

Since the democratization of the Korean society began in 1987, industrial relations in Korea have undergone a rapid transformation. The period between 1987 and 1997 was marked by growing resistance to the pattern of authoritarian labor relations that had predominated in the era of rapid development, and by efforts to build a new dynamic of industrial relations. The Korean labor legislation, which had not been significantly changed in the 43 years since its enactment in 1953, was not suitable to cope with the challenges of the new business environment. As a result, labor laws were drastically revised in 1997 to improve labor-related systems and to enhance basic labor rights. One of the centerpieces of the new reforms was the creation of the Commission of Labor, Management, and Government（"Tripartite Commission"）. The Tripartite Commission was a new type of decision-making mechanism, bringing together opposing social interests in a way that had not previously been possible. On the one hand, trade unions, which had often prevailed in collective bargaining in the past, geared to devise a new strategy, in the face of the economic crisis that the country experienced during the reform period. Labor unions gathered and formed industrial unions. Along with the growth of participatory and cooperative industrial relations, decentralization of collective bargaining proceeded. This development indicates that while the trade unions have played a powerful role in past collective bargaining, spurring the centralization of collective bargaining, the decentralization of the firm structure, involving the horizontal changes in the enterprise organization and empowerment, has led to a decentralization of the bargaining structure. In addition, with the interface between the trend of globalization and information economy, the importance of the issues at the level of work organization and workplace has increased.[13]

The labor movement in Korea has traditionally found the greatest support from regular workers, and has been challenged by the dramatic increase in the number of non-regular workers, which is the result of a more flexible labor market. Consequently, labor-labor conflicts have risen. The regular worker unions have opposed allowing non-regular workers to join their unions for fear that working conditions would fall to the level of those currently accorded to non-regular

workers by the employers. However, the national labor unions, such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions and the Federation of Korea Trade Unions, have supported the organization of unions, especially for non-regular workers and are now fighting for the improvement of non-regular workers' working conditions and unstable employment status, demanding legislative protection and social welfare. This has served as the foundation for the subsequent labor union support for migrant workers. In addition to the private sector, civil servants and college professors have also taken steps to organize trade unions. This goes against the long tradition of constraining such workers' right to organize; so when they have been allowed to do so, it has meant a positive break-through.

The problem with migrant workers in Korea appeared in the early 1990s when very few people were anticipating it. Before the 1997 financial crisis, Korea's economy enjoyed rapid growth, and the resulting prosperity has in turn created new challenges in the form of severe manual labor shortages. Having grown accustomed to prosperity, Korean workers have demanded and received gradual reductions in their working hours. Furthermore, Korea's well-educated young people balk at performing what are referred to as "3D" jobs - dangerous, dirty, and difficult. Many industries have addressed the problem by looking abroad for the required manual labor. Although the use of unskilled labor has never been officially allowed by immigration authorities, hundreds of thousands of unskilled laborers have nonetheless entered the country to fill the demand.

To understand the situation deeper, let us take a close look at Korean immigration policy. Until very recently, there has been no legislative act in Korea to deal explicitly with the labor rules for foreign migrant workers. This has been one of the major shortcomings in the Korean legal system. Instead, these workers have been regulated by the Immigration Bureau through the enforcement of a number of immigration laws. The authority exercised by the Immigration Bureau stems from five principal sources: （1）the Constitution of Korea; （2）statutes enacted by the National Assembly, chiefly the Immigration Control Act of 2002; （3）the Presidential Decree implementing those statutes; （4）published administrative regulations implementing those decrees; and （5）guidelines issued by the Minister of Justice. In addition, the employment of foreign workers is strictly limited as part of the protectionist policy, i.e., to offer the best employment opportunities to native Koreans. While outlawing the practice of hiring foreigners in general, the current law allows the employment of foreigners under special circumstances.

This has led to numerous informal "back-door" mechanisms for importing unskilled foreign labor, in some cases on a *de facto* permanent basis. The most popular back-door channel has been the "foreign industrial trainee system" that was originally designed to teach specific skills to foreigners, but became an insidious tool to import foreign labor. According to one observer, employers provide very little actual training, and most companies simply use the trainees as a source of cheap, unskilled labor.[14] Clearly, these industrial trainees are a valuable labor resource for Korean industry but the government treats them merely as "trainees", depriving them of all the rights and privileges of "workers". Since foreign trainees are not considered regular employees under the Korean labor law, they do not receive regular wages, health insurance, worker's compensation, or other fringe benefits.

Migrant Workers in the Republic of Korea

Since the early 1990s, Korea has undertaken a national and international campaign of "internationalization", proclaiming "Korea's role in the world community," with the aim of counteracting its xenophobic and isolationist image and fostering an international philosophy more on a par with its global economic power. Working towards more regional integration Korea has transformed itself from a labor-exporting country to a labor-importing country, and emerged as a leading nation among rapidly industrializing countries. The globalization of its economy has forced Koreans to come increasingly into contact with foreign people and cultures. In an era of

free trade and regional integration, the problems related to foreign migrant workers may be a test case for Korea.

Korea hosts approximately 693,697 foreign workers, including 304,000 illegal entrants (mostly from Bangladesh, the Philippines, India, Nepal, Pakistan, China, and Vietnam), according to the Ministry of Justice. Of these foreign workers, about 60,000 are industrial trainees (see Table 2). Most of these workers go to fill the demand in the construction industry or in small- to medium-sized manufacturing companies. Others fill labor gaps in rural areas and the rest consist of low-wage jobs, ranging from textiles and needlework to plastics, leather, computer chip assembly, and injection molding.

Table 2. Foreigners in the Republic of Korea

	Total	Legal Residence	Illegal Residence		Portion of Illegal Residence (%)
			16~60 yrs	Total	
Total	693,697	483,746	187,908	209,951	27.1
China (Korean)	142,456	96,311	37,228	46,145	26.1
China (ethnic Chinese)	114,139	66,533	43,354	47,606	38.0
Philippines	35,945	22,080	13,596	13,865	37.9
Indonesia	25,311	19,172	6,099	6,139	24.1
Thailand	28,498	16,611	11,729	11,877	41.2
Vietnam	34,376	23,390	10,944	10,986	31.8
Bangladesh	16,275	1,231	14,880	15,044	91.4
Mongolia	20,578	9,567	10,633	11,011	51.7
Russia	11,944	7,074	3,481	4,870	29.1
Uzbekistan	14,524	7,561	6,888	6,963	47.4
Pakistan	11,365	5,993	5,285	5,372	46.5
India	6,487	3,307	3,123	3,180	48.1
Sri Lanka	9,234	526	2,754	2,768	29.8
Nepal	5,608	3,474	2,131	2,134	38.0
Iran	1,815	472	1,334	1,343	73.5
Kazakhstan	3,378	2,071	1,276	1,307	37.8
Myanmar	3,378	1,550	1,820	1,828	53.9
Nigeria	1,690	661	1,020	1,029	60.4
Other	47,174	45,150	6,403	7,964	13.6

Source: Ministry of Justice, *International Crimes*, Seoul: Ministry of Justice, 2005, p. 33.

Foreign workers are typically recruited by experienced Korean labor brokers who are often conveniently connected with the construction industry.[15] The Korean policy that aims to avoid the permanent settlement of unskilled foreign workers makes labor brokering a prominent feature of migrant labor markets in the country. Conditions for these workers are usually harsh. Broken contracts, rampant discrimination, and violation of civil rights, along with legal issues involving marriage and family, make life for migrant workers in Korea difficult. According to the Ministry of Labor, migrant workers generally receive at least 60 percent less wages than their Korean co-workers for the same work,[16] partly because they are unable to demand full compensation and partly because their employers must pay kickbacks to the brokers who have arranged for their

employment. In constant fear of deportation and living on tiny budgets, workers typically share one-room apartments with several colleagues and live on a diet of instant noodles and other foods of questionable nutritional value. Even though they work an average of ten to twelve hours a day, they receive neither pay for over-time work, based on eight-hour work day, nor compensation for working on holidays. Given the unstable status of migrant foreign workers, their employers also typically relax or ignore common health and safety standards; this problem is exacerbated by the fact that injured workers often receive no compensation for their injuries and may even be fired or deported as a consequence. This situation generally arises because the worker is either too afraid of discovery by the authorities to complain, or is required to waive health and safety coverage as a condition of employment. For similar reasons, many workers quietly endure verbal and physical abuse at the hands of their employers and co-workers. As for health care, most workers are often unwilling and unable to seek out or pay for medical care. This may mean dangerous neglect of serious illnesses or injuries, sometimes leading to debilitation or death. It also has the potential to create broader public health concerns.[17]

Korean and foreign workers are in constant interaction at the workplace. These cross-cultural encounters often lead to cultural conflict. The most significant problem is the language difficulty. The language barrier not only contributes to foreign workers' discomfort, but also shapes a negative interpersonal relationship between them and Korean workers. Due to the lack of mutual understanding of cultural differences, foreign migrant workers are often subject to verbal abuse and physical attack.[18]

Koreans tend to divide the concept of "foreigners" into two categories: Westerners and non-Westerners. Westerners represent modernity and civilization, whereas non-Westerners symbolize pre-modernity and inefficiency. This dual perception of foreigners fits well with the current composition of foreign workers in the Korean labor market. Workers from Western countries such as the United States and Europe mostly work in professional fields such as business, high technology, and language instruction, whereas workers from non-Western countries are typically engaged in menial physical labor. Korean workers often look down on foreign workers who are engaged in menial manual labor. The personal interaction between Koreans and foreigners in the workplace inevitably leads to an unequal hierarchy, which places foreign workers at the bottom of the social scale.[19] One study shows that Koreans are not so much opposed to the reception of Korean-Chinese as they are to the reception of other foreign workers.[20]

4. Labor Unions and Migrant Workers

Labor Unions and Migrant Workers in the Republic of Korea
Unions traditionally ignored migrant workers. Although migrants perform an important function for the economy, as they reduce unemployment rates, meet opportunities for acquisition of skills, and remit foreign currency, they have remained largely outside the interest of labor unions. Trade unions have normally been preoccupied with other larger and more pressing domestic issues directly affecting their welfare. Usually trade unions see migrant workers possess little bargaining power. Sometimes they have also been opposed because they diminish the standards and contractual strength of national workers.

Globalization brings about a change of perspective, since unions realize that migrants are not necessarily in direct competition for jobs with local workers and that increasing the standards for migrants will result in better standards also for national workers. Unfortunately not many unions' leaders understand this. For example, the leaders of the Federation of the Labor Unions in Russia completely miss the point and talk about a threat from the migrant workers and damages that they bring to the wages of Russian workers. A change of attitudes among union mem-

bers is in order. It needs to be reaffirmed that migrant workers must be included in the concerns of the trade unions. Not only is the mission of trade unions all encompassing, but also allowing differential treatment among workers does not serve the cause of workers in general. Changing the attitudes of union leaders will not be easy. First, migrants sometimes work for many different employers and in a variety of sectors. Second, migrants are not very accessible because of the lack of language skills and cultural understanding. Third, migrants are often not educated and do not know about labor unions. In addition, there are restrictive polices and practices in receiving countries together with widespread pressure from employers not to join labor unions under the threat of losing the job. Migrants with huge migration costs cannot afford to take the risk of losing their only source of income. Unions, in their turn, also suffer from lack of resources, limited networking, and a basic aversion among their members to extending services to migrants.

The Republic of Korea presents a very interesting example of well-manage coexistence between organized labor and migrant workers. The Korean labor movement in the eyes of many foreigners seemed very strong, even "militant". According to President of FKTU Young Deuk Lee, the mass media presents Korean unions as very militant, as the cause of the "focus on unionized workers," their demonstrations, and protest actions but this needs to be viewed through the Confucianism of Korean workers, who generally see their work place as indispensable to their life, and thus feel more passionate about and attached to their company than workers of any other nation.[21]

Most labor unions in Korea are affiliated with one of the two national organizations: the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). It can be said that while FKTU takes a moderate rationalist stance, placing more emphasis on dialogue than on struggle, KCTU has been relatively struggle-oriented in its practice of labor movement.

In Korea any labor union is ready to help its allies. Although there are quite strong feelings of suspicion among Koreans towards all foreign migrant workers, labor unions are ready to work together with migrants. A protest organized by the Migrants Trade Union, an affiliate of KCTU, in April 2002 demonstrated this. Over 1000 migrant workers protested against the South Korean government's unfair immigration policy in several rallies and demonstrations. As a part of this campaign the Equality Trade Union's Migrants' Branch (ETUMB) conducted a sit-down demonstration in front of Myongdeung Cathedral for 77 days and two key leaders of the ETUMB carried out a hunger strike at the Hwa Sung immigration detention center after they were arrested for labor activities.

On July 31, 2003, the South Korean government approved a new migrant worker management system, entitled the "Act on Employment of Foreign Laborers," otherwise known as the Employment Permit System (EPS). The law, which went into effect on August 2004, along with the Industrial Trainee System, provided that migrant workers could work in South Korea for only three years and for only one employer. Since migrant workers could not change their work place, the employer basically would have complete control over the wages and working conditions of migrant workers; thus these workers would be bound to their employer. This outraged ETUMB and other migrant workers, prompting them to carry out a sit-down demonstration in front of Myongdeung Cathedral from November 15, 2003 to November 28, 2004.

Through these actions, migrant workers who were "invisible and voiceless" were finally able to put their issues to the forefront of South Korean society. More importantly, their demonstrations led to the formation of the Migrant Workers Trade Union (MTU), an independent union organized and led by migrant workers.

The South Korean government refused to recognize the Migrant Workers Trade Union (MTU) and publicly announced that the MTU could not have the three basic labor rights – the right to organize, the right to strike, and the right to collective bargaining. In addition, the gov-

ernment launched an all-out campaign to repress the MTU. During a press conference held by the MTU to announce its formation, immigration officials secretly videotaped the proceedings in an effort to specifically target migrant workers participating in the MTU. Clearly, the arrest of MTU President Anwar was a direct attempt by the South Korean government to repress the newly formed union and crack down on migrant workers in the country.

The repression by the South Korean government is not new. The government has consistently targeted migrant worker activists by arresting and deporting them. In 2003, many migrant workers were labeled as "terrorists" and forcibly deported. Samar Thapa, a key leader of the ETUMB and the Myongdeung sit-down demonstration mentioned above was "kidnapped" in broad day light by immigration officials and deported in an effort to stop the mobilization efforts by the migrant worker.

Just as all workers in South Korea should be treated with dignity and respect, so should migrant workers in the country. Migrant workers should be guaranteed the same fundamental labor rights that are enjoyed by native workers. Despite the government crackdown and threats of deportation, the MTU is determined to continue to organize and fight for the rights of migrant workers. On behalf of more than 400,000 workers in South Korea the MTU calls on the South Korean government to stop the crackdown against migrant workers and recognize the labor rights of migrant workers. The MTU, which resulted from the merger of several migrant workers unions and groups in Seoul, Incheon, and Kyongido, is an effort by migrant workers in South Korea to organize and fight for their rights. The roots of the MTU can be found in the Equality Trade Union Migrants' Branch, which was formed in 2001 to address the discrimination and labor abuses suffered by migrant workers and the unjust immigration policy of the South Korean government.[22]

Labor unions should not forget about their basic role and purpose to defend workers, to guarantee their labour rights, regardless of where the workers come from. The labor rights are guaranteed to everybody according to international law and therefore should also be guaranteed by national laws. Labor Unions should not be devoting their energies and resources to the discussion of political issues over which they have no influence. Such was the case with one labor union that was discussing the Iraqi War at one of its plenary meetings, while there were other issues that were more essentially and immediately related to the purpose of the organization.

5. Labor Unions, Migrant Workers, and Regional Integration

As labor unions develop both awareness and understanding of the issues of migrant worker rights, many NGOs can provide models of research as well as related data and insights. Labor unions will need to increase their own expertise in making the links between macroeconomic policy and the impact on the ground for workers in the construction, wood, and forestry sectors, where many foreign workers are employed. Reaching out to the unorganized and the vulnerable needs to be a key part of ensuring the future relevance of the trade union movement. This requires a new effort on the part of unions, particularly in the case of migrant workers. At times, difficult issues may be involved.

Where possible, it would be helpful for unions in sending and receiving countries to strengthen their contacts concerning migrant labor, through meetings and other regular channels of communication. In today's increasingly connected world, such contacts are easier than ever before and should become a priority. There are some examples of Indonesian migrant workers organizing, with the support of trade unions and NGOs. In Hong Kong, Indonesian workers have marched and demonstrated in front of the Indonesian consulate, raising issues of protection and corruption. Unions in Malaysia have also made some efforts to organize migrant workers. How-

ever the vulnerability of these workers, when they seek to organize, remains a major problem.

Although the concerns of migrant workers and workers in the formal employment sector may seem far apart, there are in fact some clear linkages and common interests. First, many labor union members in the formal urban economy come from villages and areas that also send workers abroad. There are family and community ties linking trade unionists with migrant workers. Second, the key issue of self-organization to promote better working conditions, which applies to the formal sector, can also be applied to migrant workers, but new and imaginative approaches are required. Third, basic legislative protection and enforcement, which are critical for workers in the labor union movement, are also critical for migrant workers. The skills of unions in seeking improved labor legislation can be used to advance a legislative framework favorable to migrant workers as well. Fourth, respect for the International Labor Organization's fundamental principles and rights at work apply to all workers. Unions need to develop a strategy for obtaining knowledge about how to help migrant workers, the key interventions required, and how to employ such interventions. The strategy should aim to increase the protection of workers before their departure, during their employment abroad, and on their return.

In developing a strategy for migrant workers, unions need to think about the role of *targeted education*. Unions could use their education activities in areas that send large numbers of workers abroad, as a vehicle for reaching out to communities directly involved in migration. The skills and networks available to labor unions should lend themselves to: (1) working with NGOs and others who have a history of support to migrants; (2) public information campaigns; (3) providing advice to prospective migrant workers prior to their departure; (4) organizing and recruiting migrant workers; (5) organizing support groups; (6) monitoring and reporting abuses; (7) improving cooperation between labor unions in sending and receiving countries; and (8) developing deeper working relationships with regional organizations in the Asia-Pacific. All regional organizations should be mobilized to normalize the situation with migration. In this context, we will look specifically at Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

APEC began as a relatively informal group of government officials, mainly from departments of trade or the equivalent. It claims to be the only inter-governmental group in the world operating on the basis of non-binding commitments, open dialogue, and equal respect for the views of all participants. In contrast to the EU, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and other multilateral trade bodies, APEC does not require treaty obligations of its participants; members make commitments only on a consensual and voluntary basis. This explains why many of APEC's goals are expressed in vague terms, which are more practicable for diplomats to agree on. APEC has become a vehicle for promoting the liberalization of trade and investment around the Pacific Rim. This includes promoting FTAs and other forms of practical economic cooperation, such as the facilitation of economic development, the growth of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the mobility of businesspeople, and more equitable participation by women and young people in the labor market. The economic agenda of APEC should include issues regarding the labor markets in the region, but the question is, to what extent?

As noted earlier, the Asia-Pacific includes countries at hugely different levels of development. For easier understanding we can mention three broad categories. First, countries with higher levels of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, include the United States, Japan, and Australia. Second, "newly industrialized economies" include South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. Those countries are moving towards the first category of countries but have not yet caught up. The third category of countries, the "next generation industrializers," includes China, Indonesia, Russia, Thailand, Malaysia, and other countries. In most cases, their GDP per capita is significantly lower than in the first two groups of countries. They have been experiencing growth in terms of their populations and labour forces, but are also confronting labor market issues as there is industrialization and migration from rural areas to the cities.[23]

APEC represents the most dynamic economic region in the world, which is fuelled especially by the growth of China and other economies in the region. APEC's decision-making by consensus and the diversity of its membership are at the same time a source of strength and weakness. The main problem for APEC is the diversity among its members as noted above.

APEC has generally not focused directly on employment relations or union-related issues, even though Bob Hawke, former president of the Australian Council of Trade Unions, while being Australian Prime Minister played a leading role in founding APEC. This inability to focus on employment relations is understandable because it is difficult to achieve intergovernmental consensus on such issues. Nevertheless, unions and other representatives of workers' interests continue to demand that more labor-related issues be taken up by APEC. Nigel Haworth and Stephen Hughes identified the key concerns facing labor-market and employment-relations policymakers in APEC member countries. They included, among many other issues, the following topics: （1）defining and managing an appropriate response to labor migration; （2）managing industrial relations; and （3）responding to the contemporary labor standards debate.[24]

Several inter-governmental organizations formally recognize input from the relevant social partners: employers and employees and their representatives. This is the case with the EU, NAFTA, ILO, and OECD. APEC recognizes input from employers, via the APEC Business Advisory Council （ABAC）, but APEC does not formally recognize input from employees and their representatives （labor unions）. By contrast, the EU recognizes input from employees and their representatives, especially via the European Trade Union Congress （ETUC）, which exerts considerable influence particularly with regard to social, employment, and labor issues. The ETUC includes all European affiliates of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions （ICFTU）.[25]

APEC can play a much bigger role helping the labor unions and migrant workers stabilize the labor market situation in the region, just as the EU is doing in Europe. Could APEC become a form of an Asia-Pacific Union, with some parallels to the EU? This is conceivable; however, there are at least four hurdles to such a development. First, APEC covers a much larger terrain and includes more diversity than the EU, for instance, in terms of geography, culture, religions, races, income levels, industrial structure, systems of political economy, and stages of economic development.

Second, despite the growing role of China led by a Communist government, there is a greater propensity toward right-of-center governments in many Asia-Pacific economies than in Europe. Social-Democratic/Labor politicians and labor unions have driven the EU's social chapter. As a generalization, moreover, trade unions are weaker and more fragmented in APEC than they are in the EU. For example, in two of APEC's most highly populated members, neither the All-China Federation of Trade Unions （ACFTU） nor the Indonesian Trade Union Congress （ITUC） is affiliated with the ICFTU. APEC economies are not well positioned to press for the inclusion of an EU-style social chapter in the APEC region.

Third, employers' interests have strong influences on most governments of APEC members and such interests generally do not support APEC or other international inter-governmental groups focusing on the contested terrain of employment relations. Employers' interests oppose any notion that APEC might follow the EU's lead in fostering a social chapter. Therefore, an EU-style Asia-Pacific Union would confront even greater obstacles than the EU social chapter.

Hence the notion of an "Asia-Pacific community" remains more of an aspiration than a realistic prospect. Nonetheless, it seems likely that APEC will continue to develop more influences in labor markets, though such influences will be constrained by prevailing attitudes, ideologies, and political-economy realities.

Fourth, before APEC can make decisions it has to reach unanimity, which is very difficult to achieve among such a diverse group of economies. In the EU, there is less diversity and there is

scope for making some decisions by majority voting.

In terms of its economic power and dynamism, the Asia-Pacific is one of the world's most important regions. If APEC were to pursue even a part of the trajectory that the EU has followed, APEC's influence on economic, political, and social relations between and within the Asia-Pacific nations could become much more significant. The political economy of the Asia-Pacific region is worthy of more research, not least as a context for the practice of employment relations.

6. Conclusion

It is not a simple task to formulate and implement practical and effective policies around migration, which take into account the needs of both the receiving economic community and the workers who make up a migrant labor pool. Responses may be polarized.

In response to economic globalization, labor unions are organizing the globalization of solidarity in defense of migrants. Here are two illustrative examples. First, in summer 2005, after the Malaysian government's brutal expulsion of migrant workers, which was accompanied by reports of inhuman conditions inflicted upon thousands of Filipino and Indonesian migrant workers in detention camps, the Asia-Pacific Regional Organization of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, in cooperation with the Malaysian Trade Union Congress, the Bangladeshi ICFTU-BC, and the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, asked the Malaysian government to review its policy and to ensure the protection of migrant workers, who are vital to the country's construction, plantation, and domestic service sectors. Second, there were reports that a major French industrial group was accused of anti-union harassment at one of its American plants, in Indiana. In response, French union confederations CFDT, FO, and CGT put some noisy public pressure on the parent company. In cooperation with the services and textile workers' internationals UNI and ITGLWF, the French unions denounced the expulsion threats made against workers at the Indiana plant, most of whom were Hispanic immigrants, in a bid to stop them from joining a union. If today's migrations know no frontiers, neither do today's unions.

It is difficult to identify specific skill areas needed as a basis for successful migration for job seekers. There is often a time lapse, for example, and it can result in problems, for migrant workers looking for employment in the construction industry characterized by abrupt shifts. What is clear, though, is that a review and sensible overhaul of most government policies is urgently needed. These policies impact the lives of countless workers in the construction industry around the world. International conventions and agreements can provide standards and benchmarks for the treatment of workers. They are particularly relevant and applicable to legally migrating workers in many countries. Ratification and implementation of these agreements would provide a useful framework for trade policies. However, as long as discrepancies continue between immigration policies and labor needs, illegal migration will also continue. The causes of this problem need to be highlighted while criminal operations are policed and penalized. Essential to dealing with the role of labor unions in defending and contacting irregular migrants will be recognizing the extent to which Asia-Pacific governments do or do not ratify established international agreements regarding the rights of workers in general and those of migrant workers in particular. There are many national, regional, and global networks of NGOs concerned with migration issues. Not all of them have a direct focus on workers in the construction industry, however.

Both immigration and its social effects are deeply influenced by the nature, operation, and institutional structure of immigration. This structure consists in its ideal form of three main interrelated and complementary components: （1） an immigration policy; （2） an immigrant policy; （3） and an ethnic relations policy. Each policy enhances the selectivity of immigration, shape public conceptions, set up safeguards for social interaction, and provide for required adjustments

between the host and immigrant populations.

As immigration flows are often influenced by the nature and degree of economic ties between the sending and receiving states, the new immigration flow into Korea may be seen partly as a consequence of the globalization of Korea's economy. As Korean society expands along with its economy and comes to incorporate increasingly diverse elements, it is important to learn how to effectively integrate these new elements into the consensus-building process if the country is to escape its isolationist image and maintain the process of integration.

The issues regarding foreign migrant workers represent a unique and profound challenge to the Korean people and their culture. Analysis of immigration control in the country suggests that many of the socio-political forces that are shaping international migration to Korea today have deep historical and cultural roots. The arrival of substantial numbers of foreign workers may fundamentally challenge some of the cultural assumptions of the Korean society, particularly the images of social harmony and racial homogeneity.

As in other areas of public policy, Korea's immigration policy has been primarily shaped by administrative agencies. However, courts have made some significant rulings regarding the specific problem of foreign workers' compensation. A group of public-interest lawyers and some social movement organizations are actively engaged in promoting public awareness in this area. Thus, immigration policy provides some insight into the shifting balance among various actors in the policy process. Traditional assumptions of state dominance are being challenged at the margins by courts and civil society.

International norms play an important role in providing standards that can be used in this policy area. Yet the current regime of international human rights law falls short of providing migrant workers comprehensive protection or relief. While the resources necessary to realize such protection can be found in the existing corpus of law, Korea has thus far shown little willingness to implement laws on comprehensive migrant protection. In the short term, then, effective incorporation of international human rights principles into Korean case law may require an indirect incorporation approach, whereby international norms are used to inform the interpretation of Korean law.

Only labor unions originally were created for the protection of workers on the state and the international level. With growing integration of countries of the Asia-Pacific Rim, we see more and more productive and relevant regional organizations. Those organizations are designed to address important political, economic, and social issues in the region. That is why it is important to encourage labor unions to actively participate in consultations with those organizations. No non-labor NGO can represent the workers（national, migrant workers, including illegal migrants）in the international arena as meaningfully as labor unions, which know（or should know）the labor-related problems in their countries. Hence, the urgent need for labor unions to pay more attention to the issue of the protection of migrant workers' rights along with those of the national workers they represent.

Notes

1 Beverly May Carl, *Economic Integration Among Developing Nations: Law and Policy*, Boulder, CO: Praeger, 1986.
2 David Lockwood,“Social Integration and System Integration,”in K. Zollschan and W. Hirsch, eds., *Explorations in Social Change*, London: Routledge and Kegan, 1964, pp. 244-257.
3 *IOM Report World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of International Migration*, <http://www.iom. int/>（accessed May 12, 2005）.
4 “Workers of the World Migrate: *IOM Report Says Mobile Populations Boost Global Economy,*”the RN *Internet desk*, 22 June 2005, <http://www2.rnw.nl/rnw/en/currentaffairs/region/internationalorganisa-

tions/iom050622?view=Standard> (accessed July 14, 2006).

5 Stephen J. Flanagan, "Labor Standards and International Competitive Advantage," in Flanagan and Gould, eds., *International Labor Standards: Globalization, Trade and Public Policy*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, pp. 15-61.

6 Cécile Vittin-Balima, "Migrant Workers: The ILO Standards," *Migrant Workers. Labor Education*, No. 129, 2002, pp. 5-12.

7 Natacha David, "Migrants Get Unions Back to Basics," *Migrant Workers. Labor Education*, No. 129, 2002, pp. 71-76.

8 D.G. Papademetriou and P.L. Martin, "Labor Migration and Development: Research and Policy Issues," in *The Unsettled Relationship: Labor Migration and Economic Development*, No. 14, 1991, pp. 56-69.

9 Gordon H. Hanson, *The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration*, The Bernard and Irene Schwartz Series on American Competitiveness, CSR No. 26, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2007, pp. 1-34.

10 Ibid.

11 Pyong-choon Hahm, *The Korean Political Tradition and Law*, Seoul: Seoul Computer Press, 1987, p. 342.

12 U.J. Choe, "Status of Foreign Illegal Workers," in *Controlling Foreigners,* Seoul: Beop J. Association, 1994, pp. 45-67.

13 Weon-dong Lee and K.S. Choi, *Labor Market and Industrial Relations in Korea: Retrospect on the Past Decade and Policy Directions for the 21st Century*, Seoul: Korea Labor Institute, 1998, p. 87.

14 Seol-sok Kim, "Human Rights Issues of Foreign Workers in Korea," in *Citizen and Lawyers*, Vol. 12, Seoul: Seoul Bar Association, 2005, pp. 24-30.

15 Choe, 1994, pp. 45-67.

16 Kim, 2005, pp. 24-30.

17 Seung-Ho Kwon and Michael O'Donnel, *The Chaebol and Labour in Korea: The Development of Management Strategy in Hyundai,* London: Routledge, 2003, p. 231.

18 Mieak-koung Yoo, "A Study on the Cultural Adaptation of Foreign Workers in Korea," *Korean Cultural Anthropology*, No. 27, 1995, pp. 67-78.

19 Ibid.

20 Weon-dong Lee, *Labor Policies in Korea*, Seoul: Korea Labor Institute, 2001, p. 108.

21 Jeong Hee Lee, "What Foreign Investors Don't Know (but Should) About Korean Trade Unions," *Korea Labor Review.* Vol. 1, No 2 (2005), pp. 14-18.

22 *South Korea. Migrant Workers Struggle,* June 2005, available at *http://croatia.indymedia.org/news/2005/05/878.php.*

23 Ryh-song Yeh, "Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)," in Malcolm Warner, ed., *International Encyclopedia of Business and Management,* Thomson Learning; 2nd edition, Vol. 1, 2002, pp. 209-217.

24 William D. Coleman and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill, *Regionalism and Global Economic Integration: Europe, Asia, and the Americas,* London: Routledge, 1998, p. 254.

25 Nigel Haworth and Stephen Hughes, "The APEC Forum: Human Resources Development and Employment Relations Issues," in Greg J. Bamber et al. eds., *Employment Relations in the Asia-Pacific: Changing Approaches*, Sydney, Australia: Business Press/Thomson Learning, 2000, pp. 207-226.

Problem Defining the United States Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act: Perceived Causes and Implications for Asian Economic Integration

Troy Keith Knudson

Abstract

This study compares the treatment of the 2007 toy recall issue in the elite Unites States news media and in a legislative debate. Problem definition is utilized to determine how the issue's main problems, causes, and solutions were emphasized. Results show that articulations of individual causes in the debate were very similar to those given by the media in the months before the debate. Three levels of the implications of the findings for Asian economic integration are discussed: first, regarding the legislation itself; second, regarding the perception of Chinese manufacturing as a cause of the recalls; third, regarding the role the news media can play in legislation for complex system failures such as export and import safety control.

1. Introduction

On August 14, 2008, United States President George W. Bush signed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act（CPSIA）into law, guaranteeing a new beginning for an agency that had for years been incapable of fulfilling its mandated function. Established in 1973, "the Consumer Product Safety Commission's（CPSC）statutory purposes are to: 1）protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products; 2）assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products; 3）develop uniform safety standards for consumer products and minimize conflicting state and local regulations; and 4）promote research and investigation into the causes and prevention of product-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries."[1]

This responsibility is irrespective of whether products are consumed through domestic or international commerce.[2] However, since the CPSC's establishment, the globalization of the world economy has increased the role of the United States as a consumer of products manufactured in other countries.[3] In particular, products from China have contributed to a growing part of this role since the early 1990s.[4] Indeed, in 2007, China overcame Canada as the world's largest exporter to the United States. Yet, despite larger numbers of imports coming into the United States, annual resources provided for the CPSC had generally decreased until the CPSIA became law.

The CPSIA consists of two titles that officially aim to serve two separate but related functions. Title II is the more extensive and is responsive to the agency's deficient human and financial resources. It also seeks to remedy the lack of CPSC authority to punish increasingly more evasive standards violators. Title I is specifically responsive to the large number of children's products recalled by the CPSC in 2007. A majority of these recalls were due to unacceptable amounts of lead used in paint on toys during manufacturing. This title raises the standard for acceptable amounts of lead used in products intended for children and established a stricter and more decentralized method of testing to ensure product safety.

As the CPSIA has just recently been made law the extent of its implications is not yet known. However, it has been argued that the enactment of both titles will bear short- and long-term implications on domestic[5] as well as international[6] actors operating in the global market. This inquiry examines the explicit recognition of such actors by policymakers as they debated

feasible solutions to the issues addressed by the CPSIA. In this regard, the concept of policy-making as a process of *problem definition*, identifying "where problems come from and, based on the answer to this question, what kinds of solutions should be attempted"[7] is employed as a tool of analysis. Problem definition implies that in the course of legislative debate, not only will problems be discussed and their solutions negotiated, but also one or more perceived causes of a problem will be identified and tied to proposed solutions.

This study has two central arguments: one regarding problem causes of the CPSIA; the other regarding the policy's implications. The first is that a major cause perceived by policymakers was the lack of safety and potentially adverse effects, especially to children, of products manufactured in China. It is argued that the United States elite news media, when reporting about a hazardous product, contributed to this perception by emphasizing the role of the product's location of manufacture. Since the CPSIA itself does not explicitly reveal the causes of problems it was written to solve, analyzing a debate that helped advance the legislation through the United States House of Representatives is warranted to assess the validity of this claim. However, "problem definition is about much more than just finding someone or something to blame." It also involves "a situation's perceived social significance, meaning, implications, and urgency."[8]

The second argument of this analysis is that there are implications of the CPSIA specifically regarding the phenomenon of Asian regional economic integration. Although both positive and negative scenarios can be entertained in this regard, implications are considered plausible for two interrelated reasons: first, the United States is one of three main final destinations of products manufactured in China; second, for many of these products, the parts are first imported by China from other Asian countries.[9] Thus, if improvements to the United States' mechanism for import control are made through China's being identified as a problem cause, implications that specifically affect the process by which Chinese manufactured products are exported to the United States can also be expected. In this light, "definitions matter because they determine the nature of public and private mobilization efforts to encourage or discourage a particular activity."[10]

Finally, if the results of this analysis are any indication of why United States policymakers believed this legislation was necessary, then the CPSIA represents how these policymakers perceive China's present role as the largest exporter to the United States. Furthermore, as bills designed to improve other agencies similar to the CPSC, which oversee other import categories dominated by products made in China, are also currently being deliberated, it will be important to know if in future legislative debates China can be expected to be identified as a major problem cause.[11] This study suggests that such a possibility may depend on how the issue is first covered by the United States elite news media.

2. Problem Identification and Solution

Rochefort and Cobb argue that "the question of culpability is the most prominent of all aspects of problem definition. One important distinction is whether attribution is made to individual versus impersonal causes."[12] However, this distinction is relative in that individual causes may not necessarily identify the actual names of specific persons, but rather causes that are more individual in nature than the alternatives. Taking this study's issue of focus as an example, compared to the failure of a complex system like international export and import control, the failure of specific companies, government agencies, or even countries as actors within this complex system is a relatively more individual type of failure.

This distinction is significant in that "a decision about problem causality can be the linchpin to a whole set of interdependent propositions that construct an edifice of understanding about a particular issue."[13] Such distinctions may determine the political survival of an issue, either "help-

[ing] to push [it] onto the front burners of policymaking or result[ing] in officials' stubborn inaction and neglect."[14] The issue of reforming the CPSC to better deal with the growing number of products exported to the United States and the increasingly complicated systems of manufacturing that produce these products had long been subjected to inaction. It was not until millions of children's toys coated with lead paint in China were recalled in the summer and autumn of 2007 that a bill proposing a major overhaul of the CPSC, presented alongside a title proposing the highest lead standard in the world, could be found near the top of the political agenda.[15]

In this light, Rochefort and Cobb argue that "multicausal explanations and the multipronged solutions they engender can be among the most sophisticated policy endeavors and also those that have the greatest chance of building support."[16] Perhaps due to such a multicausal explanation, on the day of the debate analyzed here, the CPSIA was passed unanimously in the United States House of Representatives. However, despite the CPSIA's fragmented nature, one connecting element of its two titles is their inclusion of solutions that are international in scope and clearly recognize the role of the United States as a country whose consumption depends heavily on imports.

The international trade environment in which the CPSC operates is definitive of the reasons it became unable to operate effectively. As the agency explains, "The economics of manufacturing today means that component and product suppliers are often foreign firms selling to United States importers. The growing volume of imports is one factor challenging the agency, but there are many others, including···products that are increasingly not 'from' any one place, but rather consist of parts and components from any number of countries."[17] It is the difficulty in dealing with this type of production process that makes solutions in the CPSIA especially relevant for Asian manufacturers and their exports to the United States. According to the Asian Development Bank, "more than seventy percent of intra-Asian trade consists of intermediate goods used in production."[18]

To address the CPSC's problems related to operating within this international environment, such as difficulties in obtaining information about products from foreign actors, Title II allows the CPSC to more easily cooperate with foreign government agencies by sharing information and exchanging knowledge. This provision allows information that manufacturers had previously been able to designate as confidential to be "available to any federal, state, local, or foreign government agency."[19] Title II also sets an agenda for future provisions that would recommend the "inspection of foreign manufacturing plants by the [CPSC]" and "requirement of foreign manufacturers to consent to the jurisdiction of United States courts with respect to enforcement actions by the [CPSC]."[20]

Administrative difficulties that had exacerbated the CPSC's inability to cope with the international environment included its operation for extended periods without the minimum three commissioners required for a quorum.[21] Although Title II requires the agency to seat all five commissioners according to the original 1972 Act, it allows the current two commissioners to constitute a quorum until another seat can be filled. Thereafter, two commissioners can constitute a quorum any time for up to one year as long as they are not from the same political party. This provision is expected to allow rules regarding product safety standards that require a vote by the commission to move forward more easily.[22]

In contrast, Title I addresses problems more closely related to products themselves, particularly those intended for children. In 2007, there were substantially more children's products recalled by the CPSC than in any year since the agency began issuing recalls. Figure 1 elucidates this fact by comparing the number of toy recalls in 2007 with those from 1983 to 2006. Title I specifically addresses the hazard that caused the majority of these recalls – high lead content – in addition to the CPSC's difficulty in tracking the exact location where many of the products were manufactured. The salience of lead content as a hazard in recalled toys in 2007 can be observed by comparing it with other hazards from 2007 and from previous years, as shown in Table 1.

Figure 1: Amount of Toy Hazard Recalls per Year（1983-2007）

Source: Author's analysis; data from Consumer Product Safety Commission

Table 1: Number of Toy Hazard Recalls per Hazard Type（2004-2007）

	Choking/ Aspiration	Entrapment	Fire/Burn	Laceration	Lead Poisoning	Magnet Ingestion	Poisoning （Not Lead）	Projectile
2004	15	0	1	5	4	0	1	4
2005	16	2	3	4	5	0	0	1
2006	17	2	6	5	3	2	0	2
2007	18	0	3	6	42	10	2	2

Source: Author's analysis; data from Consumer Product Safety Commission

In response, Title I imposes a gradual tightening of the standard of acceptable lead content,[23] and requires manufacturers to "place permanent and distinguishing marks on the product and its packaging that will enable the purchaser to ascertain the location of production."[24] As the content of lead is set to achieve a standard yet to be determined "technologically feasible,"[25] it is expected to "significantly affect companies that manufacture, import, distribute, wholesale, or retail a wide range of consumer goods."[26] Furthermore, the requirement that products themselves, in addition to their packaging, must be labeled with complete tracking information will shift more of the burden of responsibility for product safety to foreign manufacturers.

3. Problem Definition in Two Elite United States Newspapers

The CPSIA was introduced in the House of Representatives on November 1, 2007. It was passed unanimously by the House on the day of the debate examined below on December 19, 2007. It was passed by the Senate on the day of another debate on March 3, 2008. Finally, it became public law with the president's signature on August 14, 2008. The total life of the bill was less than ten months, making the CPSIA an example of very fast deliberation when considering the possible extent of the law's implications.[27]

Baumgartner and Jones argue that any given issue "can be associated with many topics, and

these topics of attention are closely related to the nature of governmental response."[28] In light of the CPSIA's solutions regarding – and in response to – the international trade environment, it is necessary to systematically examine how the CPSIA arrived on the United States political agenda and became law so quickly. The woes of the CPSC addressed in Title II were insufficient by themselves to draw enough political attention to be solved. Clearly, the issues addressed by Title I comprised a necessary factor. But how were these issues defined in such a way that the political processing of a government agency's reform was expedited? Furthermore, what actors can be attributed to the initial defining of these issues?

The agenda building model, which emphasizes the role and influence of public institutions in the political processing of a new issue, provides one way to move forward in addressing these questions. This model distinguishes between issues that have high, medium, and low thresholds of public sensitivity. Issues with high thresholds are "generally remote from just about everyone," while those with medium thresholds are "selectively experienced." Low threshold issues "arise out of conditions that directly affect nearly everybody in the same way."[29] Such issues, "because of their link to personal concerns, almost compel attention from political elites as well as the news media. This increases the likelihood that they will either displace or become assimilated into issues already on public agendas."[30]

A downturn in the economy is the classic low threshold issue. Issues about the safety of children's products is also considered a low threshold issue here because of the large percentage of people that have children, or at least know someone who has children and could plausibly purchase a product for a child at some time. However, whereas economic problems "would be of general concern even without attention from the news media,"[31] other low threshold problems that focus more on people's confidence in things they take for granted require more communication to increase the public's awareness. In these cases, public institutions like the news media act as gatekeepers for such awareness.

Indeed, the process by which doubts about the safety of products are made publicly known is indicative of the role of the news media. A product designer, manufacturer, or importer may post a notice on its website or, in the case of upper end products, send one by mail to consumers who had the product registered, but for most products the main avenue to ensure the public's awareness about dubious products is the press release issued by the CPSC to the main news media in the United States. In this study, media attention is considered a necessary condition for the emergence of the issue of toy recalls.

However, the media are not required to incorporate product recalls into their news coverage. In this sense, *salience* becomes an important concept. Although salience is often used in measurements of the media's influence, "salience can [also] dictate media coverage."[32] In Figure 1 it can be seen that the number of toy recalls issued in 2007 was drastically larger than in previous years. Each time one of these recalls was made, the CPSC issued a press release. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that the reason for this overall increase was due to the larger number of recalls for high lead content specifically.

This sudden increase in salience of recalls for a particular type of product with a particular type of hazard can explain the trend in attention given to the issue in two elite United States newspapers. The *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* are used here because in addition to their ability to "produce the news that the 'derivative' media then adopt and disseminate throughout the United States,"[33] they are among the newspapers read most widely by United States policymakers.[34] In these two newspapers combined, the number of articles with the words toy and either lead or recall in the article lead from 2004 to 2007 are the following: 2004, 4; 2005, 1; 2006, 4; 2007, 70.[35] The fact that a much larger number of articles appeared in 2007 implies that the high salience of recalls of children's products containing lead resulted in a much higher degree of attention from the elite news media.

How did the 2007 articles define the problem? More specifically, who or what were the main culprits identified in the coverage? Having argued that the salience of press releases contributed to the increase in news coverage, it is important to note that each press release contains information (if available) about the company that designed the product, the name and location of the factory or factories where the product was assembled, and, in case of an import, the name of the importer as well as the port where the product entered the United States and was presumably tested for safety. This information outlines the life stages of the recalled product before it reached consumers and provides three plausible culprits the media might emphasize in reporting: the process of the product's design, the process the product's manufacture, and the process by which the product was tested for safety before becoming part of United States commerce.

After reviewing the news articles (70 all together), it became clear that three actors symbolic of the three product life stages outlined above were highlighted in the coverage: Mattel, the largest toy company in the United States and the company that had the most products recalled in 2007; China, the country where the majority of toys in the United States are manufactured;[36] and the CPSC, whose mandate is to ensure the safety of imports that enter the United States. In terms of individual versus impersonal causes, the news media highlighted concrete actors in their stories rather than relying on abstract descriptions of the process by which foreign made products are imported into the United States.

The seventy articles were categorized according to the life stage that received the most attention in the article. In instances where the symbolic actor was emphasized rather than the life stage itself – for example, if the words *Mattel*, *China*, or *CPSC* appeared in the article's headline – the article was categorized according to the life stage being symbolized. Table 2 shows the results of the review of news coverage by month in 2007. As no news articles appeared until June, the table does not list the months January-May.

Table 2: Number of News Articles on Toy Recalls per Emphasis (2007)

	Design	Manufacture	Testing	Total
June	1	4	0	5
July	1	2	0	3
August	3	15	2	20
September	7	9	9	25
October	2	2	2	6
November	0	2	7	9
December	0	0	2	2
Total	14	34	22	70

Source: Author's analysis; data from LexisNexis database of articles from the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* – combined search

Table 2 shows that in the news coverage between June and December of 2007, the process of manufacturing the recalled products was portrayed overall as the most culpable life stage. However, this portrayal was not consistent throughout the entire period. Rather, there appear to be three segments in which the different product life stages were emphasized. The first was from June through August when the process of manufacturing was emphasized. The second was from September through October when all three life stages were given almost equal emphasis. The third was from November through December when the process of product testing was portrayed

as the most culpable.

Petracca argues that "how an issue is defined...influences the type of politicking which will ensue around it [and] its chances of reaching the agenda of a particular political institution."[37] If the problems addressed by Title I of the CPSIA comprised a necessary factor that helped the already existent designs to reform the CPSC move forward, then the way these problems were defined before they reached the political agenda need to be discerned. Here, the three different segments of media coverage become important.

As the CPSIA was introduced on November 1, it is likely that some of the emphasis on the process of product testing in the third segment of news coverage resulted from the introduction of the bill. In this light, regarding the necessity of Title I for the issue of CPSC reform to be put on the political agenda, any influence from the news media would have come from the first two segments of coverage, in which the process of manufacturing was overwhelmingly portrayed as the most culpable life stage of the recalled toys. Thus, it is argued here that the CPSC reforms in the CPSIA can be attributed to China being the symbolic actor within this portrayal. This idea is supported by Entman's concept of *spreading activation*, which "underlines the importance of the order in which information is presented. Early stimuli arising from new events and issues generally have primacy, since activation spreads out from the initial idea."[38]

3. Problem Definition in a Debate in the United States House of Representatives

A bill's placement on the political agenda, however, does not guarantee that it will become law. Thus, in order to determine if the media's emphasis on Chinese manufacturing contributed to the CPSIA becoming law, a claim implied by this study's first argument, it is necessary to examine the way problems addressed by the bill were defined by the policymakers debating them. The debate that took place in the House of Representatives on December 19, 2007 is used here rather than the debate that took place on March 3, 2008 because of its chronological proximity to the news media's initial reporting. Thus, it is believed to offer a better environment for studying possible effects of the news media.

Regarding the distinction between individual and impersonal causes being associated with a stated problem, Rochefort and Cobb argue that in the case of complex system failures, "the latter association is more likely to result in stronger standards and regulation because responsibility is not linked to idiosyncratic human performance and capability."[39] Here again, the concepts *individual and human* are relative in that any actor specified as a cause within a system is more individual in nature than the system itself, be that actor a human, a company, or a country. Thus, if the safety control of exports and imports can be considered a complex system, then Rochefort and Cobb's argument would suggest that in the legislative debate the testimonies would favor the mentioning of systemic rather than individual associations to articulate a perceived culprit's connection to the legislation.[40]

Rochefort and Cobb's argument provides a theoretical antithesis to the argument that China, highlighted by the news media as the symbolic actor of the manufacturing of recalled toys, would be articulated in the debate as a major cause of the problems addressed by the CPSIA. If Rochefort and Cobb's argument applies to this case, then any influence of the news media on the content of the debate would be illogical. Thus, a null hypothesis stating that *the news media, and by extension individual causes, had no influence on the content of the debate* can be offered. Therefore, mentioning individual causes during the debate can be attributed to incidental influence from public institutions seeking to increase public awareness on the issue. However, regarding individual causes specifically, it can be hypothesized that *China as a location of manufacture was the most articulated*.

The debate lasted forty-five minutes and consisted of sixteen testimonies given by fifteen different representatives.[41] Each testimony was closely examined with the aim of identifying explicit references to any solution provided by the CPSIA. However, the main objective was to identify causes that may have been attached to these solutions. Thus, a listing of provisions in the CPSIA was not included if the representative did not attribute them to a specific problem addressed by the legislation. Provisions that were attributed to problems without specifically mentioning an actor as a cause were considered expressions of systemic causes. When actors were specifically mentioned as causes, the same method for categorizing news articles according to the product life stage portrayed as culpable for the problem was used.

In the sixteen testimonies, the number of articulations that attributed a problem and solution addressed by the CPSIA to a systemic or individual cause are as follows: systemic causes, 21; Mattel, an actor responsible for designing products, 1; China, an actor responsible for manufacturing products, 4; the CPSC, an actor responsible for a product's safe entry into United States commerce, 3. The statements themselves are provided in Appendix 1 according to these categories, along with the name of the representative that articulated them and the time spent giving the testimony.

The large number of systemic causes articulated confirms Rochefort and Cobb's argument regarding complex system failures. However, the individual causes articulated resemble the emphasis placed on the different product life stages by the news media. Specifically, it was hypothesized that, in tandem with the news coverage, China as the location of manufacture would be the individual cause most articulated. This hypothesis is confirmed by the results. Furthermore, just as the news media had highlighted the symbolic actors Mattel, China, and the CPSC for the different life stages, these were the only actors explicitly identified as individual causes in the debate. Finally, just as the second and third most news articles focused on the culpabilities of the processes of testing and designing products, respectively, such was also the case in the debate and in very similar proportions.

From the analysis, it can be concluded that since the legislative debate did not only focus on systemic causes of the problem of toy recalls, which theoretically would result in stronger standards and regulation, the way the problem was publicly defined before the debate contributed to its definition by policymakers. The elite news media were by no means the only factor involved in this process but were considered a necessary condition in this study because of the way information about recalls is made publicly known. Furthermore, the analysis shows that the way in which individual causes were articulated in the debate was very similar to their treatment in the news articles. Thus, more systematic investigations into the role of the news media, as well as those of other public institutions, in the agenda building process of this issue are warranted.

4. Implications

This study argues that the CPSIA provisions that are international in scope are relevant to Asian regional economic integration for two interrelated reasons: first, the United States is one of three main final destinations of products manufactured in China, comprising the G3 along with the European Union and Japan; second, for many of the 15,000 product categories under the jurisdiction of the CPSC that must adhere to this new legislation, the parts are first imported by China from other Asian countries. This process of production is the result of regional economic interdependence, which has been argued by the Asian Development Bank as one basis for the region's economic integration.[42] Indeed, the Asian Development Bank study argues that "a notable feature of ［intra-Asian］ trade is that it is driven by vertical integration of production chains, whose final output is destined for final demand outside the region."[43] Specifically, the Asian De-

velopment Bank study shows that Asian "intraregional trade dynamics are tightly associated with the US non-oil import cycle"[44] and that since the Asian financial crisis, "movements in the G3 [business] cycle 'Granger-cause' movements in the Asian business cycle at 2 and 3 year lags (but not the other way around)."[45]

Because of this role that the United States plays in the integration of the Asian regional economy, this study argues the relevance of three types of implications regarding the CPSIA: those concerning the potential effects of the actual legislation, those concerning the American perception of China as the largest exporter of consumer products to the United States, and those concerning the role of the elite news media and other public institutions in the construction of this perception and the building of trade related agendas. Regarding the potential effects of the CPSIA, this study listed several provisions from both titles that are international in scope. From Title II these include the possible future inspection of foreign manufacturing plants by CPSC employees, the requirement of foreign manufacturers to consent to the jurisdiction of United States courts with respect to enforcement actions by the CPSC, and the provision that two commissioners can constitute a quorum any time for up to one year as long as they are not from the same political party.

As for the need to consent to the jurisdiction of United States courts, this provision could potentially eliminate the United States market all together as a place to do business for some manufacturers due to a fear of liability issues. According to a news article from Forbes, "foreign producers of craft and small batch toys and clothes, chary of liability under the law, are planning to exit the American market entirely, a step already taken by three German toymakers."[46] A perceived need to exit the United States market by several important Asian manufacturers would drastically alter the impact that United States consumer demand currently has on the integration process in Asia.

The provision that allows only two of the five commissioners to constitute a quorum also applies to foreign manufacturers, as rules regarding product safety standards that require a vote by the commission will now be able to move forward more easily. For products in which the United States is dependent on Asian manufacturing, such as toys and electronics,[47] Asian manufacturers can expect more frequent increases in safety standards. In this vein, the main provision in Title I that impacts foreign manufacturers is the imposition of a gradual tightening of the standard of acceptable lead content. Indeed, despite the CPSIA having become law, it is not yet known if the lead standard it is set to impose is technologically feasible. To improve investigations of dangerous products, foreign manufacturers will also be required to provide information regarding each product's location of manufacture as well as details about each link in its supply chain.

However, despite its various negative implications, provisions in the CPSIA that imply opportunity may lead to a smoother functioning of the complex system of export and import safety control. Namely, the CPSIA requires the CPSC to work more closely with its Chinese counterpart, the General Administration for Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), as well as with Chinese manufacturers. One way this requirement will be executed is through expanding the scope of the CPSC's China Program, which existed before the CPSIA became law. According to the CPSC, "As a result of the trends of increased imports of Chinese manufactured consumer products and the related increase in product recalls, the CPSC developed and adopted the China Program. The Program is to engage officials from China in a cooperative dialogue and...educate Chinese manufacturers and other Chinese trade groups in strategies to improve the safety of Chinese consumer product exports."[48] However, as the supply chain of products manufactured in China is often long and transcendent of international borders, the CPSC would do well to implement programs similar to the China Program with other Asian countries as well.

Regarding the perception of China as the largest exporter of consumer products to the United States, a reasonable argument would suggest that this perception would have some influ-

ence on United States policies related to trade. However, a clear understanding of the full nature of this perception and its impact is not yet available. Yet, if this analysis of the manner in which the CPSIA was debated in the United States Congress is any indication, the presence of China as a symbol of foreign manufacturing may be a factor that elicits protective policies toward United States imports. In this light, a bill similar to the CPSIA called the Food and Drug Administration Globalization Act that is currently being developed, though not yet at the top of the political agenda, may provide a useful case to test this claim in comparison. In this case, a toxic chemical found in pet food, a product under the jurisdiction of the Food and Drug Administration, was the problem. Similar to the recalled toys, the problem definition within the elite news media seems to highlight the fact that China is where this food was produced.

In this way, public institutions such as the news media become vital actors for their ability to define unexpected problems before they reach the forefront of the political agenda. When this agenda building ability influences the way policymakers define problems regarding complex systemic failures, impacts on seemingly unrelated processes may ensue. Clearly, the problems addressed by the CPSIA represent a systemic failure on a global scale. Also, indeed, global actors identified as causes of the problem by the media played major roles in the legislation's placement on the political agenda and its becoming law, the provisions of which, argued here, may impact regional economic integration in Asia. Indeed, commenting on some of the negative implications of the CPSIA, a news article from Forbes suggests that "precious few in the press (which ran countless let's-pass-a-law articles) cared to raise even the most basic questions about what the law was going to require. Yes, something's being exposed as systematically defective here. But it's not the content of our kids' toy chests. It's the way we make public policy."[49]

Appendix 1: Provisions from the CPSIA Attributed to Problems and Causes in a Debate Held by the United States House of Representatives on December 19, 2007[1]

1. Mattel as an Individual Cause

Harman, Jane (D-CA), 14:10:55-14:12:26
"...I watched in horror this summer as millions of toys were pulled off of American store shelves due to lead tainted paint, detached magnets, and other hazards. I was further dismayed because Mattel, one of the companies responsible, is headquartered in my congressional district and employs 2,000 of my constituents to design and market its toys. HR 4040 is a landmark bill. It sets a high bar for toy manufacturers like Mattel, and strengthens government scrutiny of industry."

2. China as an Individual Cause

Stearns, Clifford (R-FL), 13:58:11-14:01:56
"Many of the members on both sides talked about the growing compliance shortfalls with toys that are manufactured outside the United States, particularly in China. Specifically, our attention was focused on the spate of recalls which increased dramatically for toys with lead based paints exceeding the United States limit.... [This bill] provides for new standards regarding lead paint and implements the most stringent standard ever for lead content in children's products."
"Toys have not been the only problem this year as imports of every type of product account

for our supply of goods, particularly from China. As our imports have risen over the years, so have the number of problems that have been associated with these products that come in.... New laboring requirements will help facilitate recalls, and the bill provides greater authority for the Commission to recall harmful products and notify the public of these dangers."

Whitfield, Edward (R-KY), 14:06:18-14:07:29
"Recently, we've read many articles about products coming out of China, whether it be wheat gluten, whether it be contaminated toothpaste, whether it be excessive lead in the paints of toys, and all of us are quite excited about this legislation, HR 4040, for the reformation it makes in the Consumer Product Safety Commission. ...the new standards regarding lead paints implements the most stringent standard ever for lead content in children's products in this legislation."

Murphy, Tim (R-PA), 14:09:23-14:10:45
"This bill will help protect consumers. The real culprits remain, however, the trading partners who refuse to abide by international standards, countries like China and others who have lax oversight, who happen to be the leading countries that are involved with these appalling rates."

3. The CPSC as an Individual Cause

DeGette, Diana (D-CO), 13:55:41-13:57:49
"[This bill] bans industry sponsored travel, which has been a scandal at the Consumer Product Safety Commission."

DeLauro, Rosa (D-CT), 14:02:23-14:05:14
"Today's bill represents...an active response to an agency which has failed to take its regulatory responsibilities seriously for far too long, an agency that does not understand its regulatory function. We are addressing the Consumer Product Safety Commission's mandate, and trying to reform it [by] ...providing the additional resources the CPSC needs to get its act together [and] instituting a ban on industry sponsored travel."

Waxman, Henry (D-CA), 14:18:14-14:20:20
"Every day, Americans rely on the Consumer Product Safety Commission to protect them from dangerous products. To date, frankly, it has not done its job. This bill is the first step in changing direction and in making the CPSC the effective agency the American people expect and deserve."

4. Systemic Causes

Rush, Bobby (D-IL), 13:45:52-13:49:51
"This historic bill authorizes desperately needed resources to the commission and dramatically rewrites the Consumer Product Safety Act.... Title II overhauls the CPSC itself, giving the beleaguered agency much needed resources...."
"After decades of neglect, HR 4040 finally restores the CPSC to its rightful place of prominence and gives it the necessary tools to grapple with the global marketplace and protect America's consumers, particularly our children, from dangerous and defective products.... Title I specifically addresses children's products by establishing the strictest lead standards in the world for children's products and requiring certification and testing."

Barton, Joe（R-TX）, 13:50:10-13:55:24

"This bill will expand the number of commissioners so that we have a full commission again."

"This bill increases the fines that the Consumer Product Safety Commission can levy against recalcitrant companies that sell defective products."

DeGette, Diana（D-CO）, 13:15:41-13:57:49

"This year we have seen the number of children's product and toy recalls rise dramatically. Many of these recalls were because of the excessive amounts of lead....［This bill］bans lead in children's products and toys. It requires independent third party testing."

"This bill takes a number of steps to protect kids under 12. For example, it almost doubles the funding for the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which has been woefully underfunded and staffed."

Stearns, Clifford（R-FL）, 13:58:11-14:01:56

"...we recognized the need to provide the Commission with additional resources.... We authorize significant increases in their budget so that the Commission may fulfill their mission to keep defective products that can cause injury, or worse, out of the stream of commerce....［This bill］provides the Commission with［those］new resources."

"The bill requires testing and certification of children's products before they are ever shipped to store shelves, and provides increased penalties for companies that violate the law."

DeLauro, Rosa（D-CT）, 14:02:23-14:05:14

"I especially want to thank Congresswoman Anna Eshoo who fought to strengthen the mandatory recall provision governing products that pose an imminent hazard. This new authority will allow the CPSC to provide notice and halt distribution without protracted legal proceedings."

"I am pleased that I could...strengthen this bill in other ways as well, requiring tracking labels and product registration cards for durable and nursery products, ...and providing for protections for children under the age of 12.... Government has an obligation to its citizens.... This bill represents a first step forward in meeting that obligation, striving to make sure dangerous toys and products do not slip through the cracks and into our children's hands."

Stupak, Bart（D-MI）, 14:07:40-14:09:08

"After months of recalls of Chinese manufactured toys, it is evident that the Consumer Protection Safety Commission lacks strong authority and needs additional resources to protect the safety of our children and loved ones.... This legislation strengthens the Commission by authorizing significant increases in funding levels over the next 3 years, allowing the Product Safety Commission to hire additional employees, which has been at an all time low since their inception. Furthermore, this legislation provides an additional $20 million to modernize CPSC's testing laboratory to ensure safe products."

"The bill will also require manufacturers to include tracking labels to aid in the event of a recall on all toys intended for children 12 and younger, and mandate third party testing of toys for lead by labs accredited by the CPSC."

Schakowsky, Jan（D-IL）, 14:13:08-14:16:04

"I support this bill because it provides new authority and resources to make products, particularly children's products, safe. There are many important provisions in this bill. It would virtually ban lead in products intended for children age 12 and younger. It will mandate independent third party testing for hazards in children's products and improve the recall process."

"[This bill] includes provisions from legislation I introduced to require long overdue mandatory safety standards for durable infant and toddler products and strengthen recall effectiveness by requiring them to include recall registration cards."

Carney, Christopher（D-PA）, 14:16:25-14:18:03
"This legislation creates the toughest standard in the world for children's products, and I could not be prouder to support it.... We need to know that our children are not playing with hazardous toys. We all know that lead poisoning can be extremely dangerous."

"Requiring mandatory safety standards for nursery products and mandatory third party testing of children's products will help stop the problem of lead toys before they hit the shelf. In addition, this legislation requires tracking labels to aid in recalls."

Waxman, Henry（D-CA）, 14:18:14-14:20:20
"This bill will develop a standard that will protect children from the dangers associated with lead exposure. It will create a national standard that is one of the strongest in the world and ensure that our toys are as safe as possible."

Jackson-Lee, Sheila（D-TX）, 14:20:39-14:23:27
"[This bill] instructs those who are dealing with children that there has to be important oversight.... This kind of oversight is crucial. Lead kills. So many times we have fought against lead in housing.... We have fought against that.... But can you imagine that right under our very noses we had goods and toys that, in fact, our children bought or their family members bought and they played with that would kill?"

Barton, Joe（R-TX）, 14:26:36-14:28:47
"[This bill] has a premarket approval process that is a major reform over the current practice, so that no product will be put into the marketplace until it has been adequately and aggressively tested before it goes to market."

Dingell, John（D-MI）, 14:29:10-14:32:52
"[This bill] shows a real vigorous collaborative effort by all members of the committee to craft a commonsense solution to the consumer safety problems that have received so much public attention in the past year."

"[This is] a bill which represents a comprehensive approach to improving consumer safety. Most importantly, the bill contains a very significant reauthorization, the first in 15 years at CPSC, and it gives that agency remarkably enhanced tools to enforce the compliance of both domestic and imported consumer products with laws and regulations that will enable the CPSC to do a much better job of protecting our nation's people and our children."

Notes

[1] Bruce Mulock, "Consumer Product Safety Commission: Currrent Issues," Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 27, 2008, p.2 http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22821_20080227.pdf（accessed February 7, 2009）.

[2] Products not under the CPSC's jurisdiction include food, drugs, cosmetics, tobacco, alcohol, firearms, automobiles, tires, boats, pesticides, and medical devices.

[3] According to the United States Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics, in 1989, the value of United States imports was $1.1 billion more than its exports; by 2007, the amount had risen to $7.9 billion. "Trade in Goods（Imports, Exports, and Trade Balance）with World（Seasonally Adjusted）," United

States Census Bureau, 2008, *http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c0004.html*（accessed February 7, 2009）.

4 According to data from the United States Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics, in 1989, the percentage of United States imports that came from China was 2.5 percent; by 2007, this had risen to 16.4 percent. These percentages were obtained by dividing *the World*（*Seasonally Adjusted*）values by the values for *China*.“Trade in Goods（Imports, Exports, and Trade Balance）with China,”United States Census Bureau, 2008, *http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html*（accessed February 7, 2009）.

5 Sarah L. Olson and James P. Dorr,“New‘Administrative’Provisions of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 Cause Concern for Manufacturers,”Wildman Harrold, August 21, 2008, http://www.wildman.com/bulletin/08212008/（accessed February 7, 2009）.

6 Agence France-Presse,“Chinese Toy Makers Must Comply on Safety despite Crisis: US Regulator,”*The Age*, January 7, 2009, *http://news.theage.com.au/world/chinese-toy-makers-must-comply-on-safety-despite-crisis-us-regulator-20090107-7bun.html*（accessed February 7, 2009）.

7 David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb,“Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective,”in David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, eds., *The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda*, Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1994, p. 3.

8 Ibid., p. 3.

9 According to a study by the Asian Development Bank,“At the center of MNC's regional supply networks,［the PRC］is important in boosting both intra- and interregional trade. But this nexus role has deepened economic interdependence between the PRC and the rest of Asia as well as between the PRC and G3.”Asian Development Bank,“Uncoupling Asia: Myth and Reality,”in *Asian Development Outlook*, Hong Kong: Asian Development Bank, 2007, p. 67.

10 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones,“Attention, Boundary Effects, and Large-Scale Policy Change in Air Transportation Policy,”in David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, eds., *The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda*, Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1994, p. 65.

11 Another agency that oversees a large amount of imported products from China, for which similar legislation is currently being deliberated, is the Food and Drug Administration.

12 Rochefort and Cobb,“Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective,”p. 15.

13 Ibid., p. 16.

14 Ibid., p. 3.

15 According to Mulock,“Although major consumer groups such as the Consumer Federation of America, Consumer's Union, and the United States Public Interest Research Group had been voicing concern about the CPSC's declining budgets（in real terms）and staffing for decades, and had tried for years to persuade Congress to amend and strengthen the agency's powers, until the recent uproar over dangerous import products, they had made little headway.”Bruce Mulock, Consumer Product Safety Commission: Currrent Issues, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 27, 2008, pp. 4-5 *http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22821_20080227.pdf*（accessed February 7, 2009）.

16 Rochefort and Cobb,“Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective,”p. 17.

17 United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, Import Safety Strategy Washington, DC: United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, July 2008, p. 3, *http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/importsafety.pdf*（accessed February 7, 2009）.

18 This figure is based on data from the Global Trade Analysis Project database. Asian Development Bank,“Uncoupling Asia: Myth and Reality,”in *Asian Development Outlook,* Hong Kong: Asian Development Bank, 2007, p. 69.

19 One Hundred Tenth Congress of the United States of America, Second Session, United States Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, Public Law 110-314 Signed by President August 14, 2008, pp. 29-31.

20 The execution of these two provisions is subject to the research findings of the Comptroller General of the United States on the effectiveness of the CPSIA in its first year after enactment. One Hundred Tenth Congress of the United States of America, Second Session, United States Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, Public Law 110-314 Signed by President August 14, 2008, p. 31.

21 The 1972 Consumer Product Safety Act provides for five commissioners. However, recent funding provided for the agency has only been enough to seat three, which is the minimum required for a quorum. According to the 1972 Act, if one of these seats becomes vacant the remaining two commissioners may

retain their regulatory power for a maximum of six months. If the seat remains vacant longer than six months, the remaining two lose all regulatory power until a quorum is again reached. Ninety-Second Congress of the United States of America, Second Session, United States Consumer Product Safety Act, Public Law 92-573 Signed by President October 27, 1972, p. 9.

22 Olson and Dorr,「New 'Administrative' Provisions.」

23 By 2011, these standards will be the highest in the world. For instance, the current standard imposed under the European Union's Directive on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment limits lead to 1,000 parts per million（ppm）. In February 2009（180 days after the CPSIA's enactment）the United States standard will become 600 ppm; in August 2009, 300 ppm; in August 2011, 100 ppm. One Hundred Tenth Congress of the United States of America, Second Session, United States Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, Public Law 110-314 Signed by President August 14, 2008, pp. 2-3.

24 One Hundred Tenth Congress of the United States of America, Second Session, United States Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, Public Law 110-314 Signed by President August 14, 2008, pp. 16-18.

25 Ibid., p. 2-3.

26 Christopher Young, James Rathvon, and George Gigounas,「New Federal Consumer Products Law: Tighter Lead, Phthalate Standards, Stronger CPSC Authority,」 DLA Piper, November 3, 2008, *http://www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/Product_Liability_Alert_Nov08.html*（accessed February 7, 2009）.

27 Debates about negative implications the CPSIA will incur on American small businesses have led to the news media's mentioning of how quickly the law was passed:「Congress Quickly Passed the［CPSIA］Last August, Which Is Designed to Protect Kids.」 Darla Miles,「Resale Store Owners Concerned about Lead Rules,」 WFAA, January 11, 2009, *http://www.wfaa.com/sharedcontent/dws/wfaa/latestnews/stories/wfaa090112_mo_leadtesting.1858f17c.html*（accessed February 7, 2009）.

28 Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones,「Attention, Boundary Effects, and Large-Scale Policy Change in Air Transportation Policy,」 in David A. Rochefort and Roger W. Cobb, eds., *The Politics of Problem Definition: Shaping the Policy Agenda*, Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1994, p. 53.

29 Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang,「Watergate: An Exploration of the Agenda Building Process,」 in David L. Protess and Maxwell McCombs, eds., *Agenda Setting: Readings on Media, Public Opinion, and Policymaking*, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1991, p. 282.

30 Ibid., p. 283.

31 Ibid., p. 282.

32 Ibid., p. 279.

33 Karen S. Johnson-Cartee, *News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 231, citing Doris A. Graber, *Mass Media and American Politics*, 5th ed., Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1996, p. 97.

34 As Graber argues,「Members of the US Congress, particularly those concerned with foreign affairs …feel that elite newspaper reports keep them informed faster and often better than their own official sources.」 Doris A. Graber, *Mass Media and American Politics*, 3rd ed., Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989, p. 329.

35 As the words that are spelled「toy」,「lead」, and「recall」can all have different meanings than those implied in this study, articles that were retrieved but did not contain words with the implied meanings were excluded from the results. Also, since the present study specifically examines the perception of culpability of different actors related to the problem of recalled toys, spinoff stories that only mentioned the recalling of toys in passing were excluded. Finally, since it is argued here that the definition of the problem in the media was relevant for the definition provided by policymakers in the debate – which took place on December 19, 2007 – articles that appeared from December 20, 2007 to December 31, 2007 were excluded.

36 According to the 82 press releases issued by the CPSC for toy hazard recalls in 2007, China was listed as the location of manufacture in 78（95%）.「Toy Hazard Recalls,」 United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, 2009, *http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/category/toy.html*（accessed February 7, 2009）.

37 Mark P. Petracca,「Issue Definitions, Agenda-building, and Policymaking,」 *Policy Currents* Vol. 2, No. 3（August 1992）, p. 1.

38 Robert M. Entman, *Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy*, Chi-

cago: University of Chicago Press, 2004, p. 7.

39 Rochefort and Cobb, "Problem Definition: An Emerging Perspective," p. 15.

40 Logically, this point should only apply to testimonies given in favor of the legislation. However, since the CPSIA passed the House of Representatives unanimously after this debate, it can be assumed that all testimonies were given in favor of the bill.

41 This total does not include instances when speakers only introduced the representative giving a testimony.

42 A study by the Asian Development Bank argues that "production sharing arrangements across Asia have given a strong push to regional economic and trade integration since the 1990s." In their study, the "Asian economy" consists of the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Asian Development Bank, "Uncoupling Asia: Myth and Reality," in *Asian Development Outlook*, Hong Kong: Asian Development Bank, 2007, pp. 67-68.

43 Asian Development Bank, "Uncoupling Asia: Myth and Reality," p. 69.

44 Ibid., p. 70.

45 Ibid., p. 76.

46 Walter Olson, "Scrap the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act," *Forbes*, January 16, 2009, *http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/16/cpsia-safety-toys-oped-cx_wo_0116olson.html* (accessed February 7, 2009).

47 According to the US Census Bureau Foreign Trade Statistics, in 2007, the four product categories in which the US is most dependent on China are toys, shooting and sporting goods, and bicycles (80.3%), computers (56.8%), computer accessories, peripherals, and parts (44.5%), and other (clocks, port typewriters, and other household goods [49.2%]). "US Imports from China from 2003 to 2007: By 5-digit End-Use Code," United States Census Bureau, 2008, *http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/product/enduse/imports/c5700.html* (accessed February 7, 2009).

48 US Consumer Product Safety Commission, 2007 China Program Plan: Strengthening Our Relationship to Make Imported Products Safer for America's Consumers, Washington, DC: US Consumer Product Saftey Commission, 2007, pp. 2-3, *http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/intl/china07.pdf* (accessed February 7, 2009).

49 Walter Olson, "Scrap the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act."

50 C-SPAN, C-SPAN Congressional Chronicle, December 19, 2007, *http://www.c-spanarchives.org/congress/?q=node/77535&id=52853* (accessed February 7, 2009).

EU Attempts to Lift Arms Embargo on China and the Security Balance in East Asia: Implications for East Asian Integration*

Olena Mykal（**Ph.D.**）

Observe coolly; react calmly;
solidify our foothold; never reveal our talents;
strengthen our defense; and never take the lead.
-- Deng Xiaoping

Abstract

This paper examines whether arms embargos are a necessary and effective tool to maintain the balance of power in East Asia. This study argues that despite the fact that the international arms embargo, including that of the EU, on China remains intact, the balance of power in East Asia is already changing in favor of China. First, the paper briefly examines the EU attempts to lift its embargo, describes the current situation, and outlines future prospects. Second, it reviews China's military budget, military capabilities, research and development expenditures, and technology transfer from Europe.

1. Introduction

East Asian integration is an enormous and ambiguous project whose scope and limits can be difficult to determine. Nonetheless, sound Sino-Japanese relations are a keystone to successful implementation of an integration process in the region. Leaving aside economic calculations and discourse on history and how they affect the prospects of integration in this region, this paper delves into the realm of security, specifically into the arms embargo on China imposed by the European Union（EU）, and discusses whether the lifting of the embargo would affect the balance of power in East Asia.

The EU argues that ending the arms embargo would not affect the regional security environment, but the United States and Japan insist that it would cause a shift in the balance of power in East Asia. Beijing has been arguing that the arms embargo is a remnant of the past[1] and that it is used as political leverage against China. From the debate on this issue it is clear that while for Japan and the United States this is a matter of hard security, for the EU it is a matter of trade and concrete steps towards the establishment of a multilateral world.[2]

The EU has not attempted to lift its embargo. On the contrary, it calls on China to improve its human rights conditions in the country, especially after Beijing passed the anti-secession law in March 2005（clearly aimed at Taiwan）and during the escalation of the situation in Tibet and worsening Beijing-Lhasa relations before the Olympic Games in 2008.[3]

This paper examines whether arms embargos are a necessary and effective tool to keep the balance of power in East Asia. It presents a twofold argument:（1）even though the EU arms embargo on China remains intact, the balance of power in East Asia is already changing in favor of China; and（2）East Asian cooperation or integration in political and security terms would be impossible unless and until China's military spending becomes transparent and its military intentions become clear. To support this argument, this paper briefly examines the EU attempts to lift

its embargo, describes the present situation, and outlines some future trends. Secondly, it looks at the trends in China's military budget, military capabilities, research and development expenditures, and technology transfers from Europe.

To address the above issues this paper uses International Relations theory, specifically the Realist and the Constructivist approach. In the author's opinion, Realism is most applicable for this study inasmuch as there are not many liberals or constructivists among the decision-makers in the institutions relevant to this study, such as the European Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Pentagon, etc. In addition, the Constructivist approach makes it possible to interpret security in a wider scope, as an area not strictly limited to considerations of military power and performance.[4] Moreover, through this approach it is possible to point out and analyze some problems in the security dialogue that are not discernible from a strictly Realist vantage point and to suggest some policy measures, keeping in mind that benefits of cooperation are not always material.

In this analysis the author uses a variety of primary documents, interview materials（with Japanese and European officials）, and secondary sources revealing the policy practices of China and the relationship and activities between the EU, China, the United States, and Japan, as well as their individual and joint policy practices. The issue of the EU arms embargo against China was discussed in the works of Nicola Casarini, Marcin Zaborowski, Jonathan Holslag, Ting Wai and others.[5] However, to the author's knowledge, there has not been a paper focused exclusively on this issue from the perspective of integration in East Asia and therefore this article can be regarded as a case study to explore the potential impact of the presence or absence of an embargo on East Asian integration.

In this study, the terms "balance of power in East Asia" and "security balance in East Asia" are used interchangeably. The author deems this appropriate inasmuch as both terms reflect the issue of security in East Asia and how the regional powers（states）change the balance in East Asia.

2. East Asian Regional Integration

One of the most remarkable developments in the second half of the 20th century was the economic transformation that occurred in parts of Asia. In Northeast Asia in particular, a process of industrialization and rapid economic expansion took hold that gradually spread to other parts of the region.[6] However, it is important to emphasize that "Asia" is a strikingly diverse place, and that some parts – the Central and Southern parts, for example – generally have not enjoyed the sort of economic growth rates that have attracted much attention from the scholarly and policy-making communities. As a result, scholars regard East Asia, which includes Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations（ASEAN）as a region for integration for it was here that the conventional wisdom about the possibility of, and the preconditions for, economic development outside the "core" industrialized economies of Western Europe and North America was fundamentally challenged.[7]

Yet, until recently Asian regional cooperation has been much narrower in character and based on largely instrumental considerations, focused on modalities and institutional mechanisms, rather than the issues of identities and interests to be shared by parties to regional cooperation. Consequently, regional cooperation and plans for regional integration are far more fragile in East Asia than in Europe, where to a considerable extent the decision on integration rested on a common sense of identity and shared values. While trade and investment opportunities are the basis for economic integration, all forms of integration needing stronger regional, supranational or intergovernmental institutions are only possible after the development of a strong, regional identity. Such an identity, however, cannot be constructed by state action, but rather has to de-

velop on the basis of shared values and interests.

Economic development everywhere is constrained or encouraged by specific historical factors. Thus, whereas trade and finances seem to be the most successful domains of East Asian integration, political integration in the region has been considerably limited. The emergence of China as a major economic and political force in the region may accelerate regional integration at a number of levels. Yet even if it does, "East Asia" is likely to be characterized by continuing variations in the level of economic development and political influence enjoyed by the very different countries of the region, such that the differences may make political and economic integration more difficult than it has been in other parts of the world.

East Asian governments are keenly sensitive to shifts in the military balance, and are actively engaged in building international institutions in order to improve coordination on issues such as trade and the environment. However, the ways in which Asian nations in the region perceive and respond to these threats and opportunities are strongly conditioned by the manner in which these issues are defined in the context of their domestic political cultures. Moreover, there exist various domestic cleavages in the Asia Pacific region surrounding issues of national identity (e.g., Taiwan and Korea) and historically driven animosities (as between the PRC and Japan, and between Japan and South Korea) that sharply limit the prospects for cooperation and threaten to destabilize regional security. Above and beyond these obstacles, Thomas U. Berger notes, "Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Taiwanese elites come to institutionalize an approach in foreign policy which emphasizes economic over security issues, albeit in each case these approaches were based on very different underlying ideational-cultural understandings and emerged under very different circumstances."[8]

The primary source of tensions that trouble the East Asian region today is rooted not in the geo-strategic environment, level of political and economic development, or the character of international institutions in which regional states are embedded. Rather it is the product of deep-rooted historically based suspicions and animosities, frustrated nationalism and distinct conceptions of national identity, and differing understandings of the national mission in international affairs.[9] As this paper demonstrates, the EU attempts to lift the arms embargo on China as a litmus paper reveal how historical memory, security concerns, and lack of trust between Japan and China hamper East Asian regional integration.

3. The Arms Embargo Issue: History and the Present Situation

The EU imposed an embargo on arms exports to China in 1989 after the Tiananmen Square incident. Then in 2003, when the security issues were either absent or certainly not at the forefront of European considerations, it decided to re-consider this issue due to global changes that had taken place since 1989.[10] In addition, in 2003 the EU and China agreed to form a strategic partnership. Europe saw China as a new potential partner in forging a multilateral world order.[11] The strategic partnership with China and lifting the arms embargo were attempts to counterbalance US unilateral policy especially in the light of the outbreak of war in Iraq. In December 2003, during the Italian Presidency of the European Council, the European Commission and institutions concerned were given a mandate to "re-examine the question of the embargo on the sale of arms to China."[12] Ex-president of France Jacques Chirac and ex-chancellor of Germany Gerhard Schroeder were particularly enthusiastic about lifting the embargo, as it might facilitate arms sales to China, although they argued that they were not going to export high-tech weapons. In June 2004 during the Irish Presidency, the European Council invited "the Council to continue its consideration of the arms embargo in the context of the EU's overall relations with China."[13]

The European plans, however, led to a sharp criticism from Japan and the Unites States.

Australia also opposed the EU decision.[14] Japan strongly opposed this attempt arguing that it would affect the "delicate East Asia security balance.[15] In the United States, both the Republicans and the Democrats argued that the proposal to lift the arms embargo was a cynical ploy to open doors for the European defense industry and that, even if arms sales remained limited, the EU was casting aside more than a decade of human rights concerns for economic gains.[16] The US House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning the EU's moves toward lifting its arms embargo on China. The resolution alleged that lifting the ban could destabilize the Taiwan Strait and put the US Seventh Fleet at risk. Moreover, the US policy-makers adopted a series of initiatives clearly indicating the US opposition to the lifting of the embargo and some of them warned that if the EU ignored US security concerns the United States would place restrictions on technology transfers to EU member states.[17] The US warning was a threat for European defense companies since they were still largely dependent on US defense technologies, not to mention the importance of the US market for them. American retaliation could have taken the form of sanctions targeting specific defense contractors that sold sensitive military-use technology of weapons systems to China. Undoubtedly, the potential for US restrictions on technology transfers to Europe was a serious consequence for the European defense industry.

It could be argued that the main mistake the European Union made was the absence of prior consultations with the United States on the embargo issue. It was only after the public announcement of the European Council on the embargo issue that Annalisa Giannela, Javier's Solana Personal Representative on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, visited the United States, Japan, Australia, and other concerned countries to explain why the Europeans were considering lifting the EU arms ban on China.[18] This attempt to end the embargo weakened relations of the EU with the United States. Moreover, it affected the image of the former as independent and unified in the eyes of China.

To improve the situation the European Council in December 2004 stressed that a revised and stricter Code of Conduct would be put in place. Adopted in 1998, the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports laid down eight criteria against which member states would assess applications to export military equipment. Several of the criteria took into account concerns expressed by some partners of the EU, especially the United States.[19] In October 2005, the EU member states adopted a *User's Guide to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports* designed to help member states （especially export licensing officials） apply the Code of Conduct.[20] Yet, the Code of Conduct was not legally binding and the Council in its Sixth Annual Report of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports declared that a number of EU member states had partially sidestepped the embargo by supplying China with components for military equipment, particularly engines for aircraft, frigates, and submarines. Moreover, the Council's Sixth Annual Report showed that the value of licenses for arms exports to China increased from 54 million euros in 2001 to 210 million euros in 2002 and 416 million euros in 2003. France, Germany, Italy, and the UK accounted for almost all of the sales.[21] Thus, notwithstanding the embargo, some EU governments were able to sell components for arms and the European Parliament urged to make the Code of Conduct legally binding on all EU member states.[22]

Though officially not legally binding, the embargo remained intact and after the 2005 elections in Germany （Angela Merkel became Chancellor）. Attempts to lift European arms embargo on China have actually disappeared from the European agenda. In the meantime, it also became clear that the European and American security perspectives on China are not identical. Indeed they are increasingly divergent. Recently the continuing development of the EU as a global security actor as well as European security interests and the expansion of China's interests overlap in some areas and regions （Africa, Middle East）.[23] As it will be demonstrated below, such overlapping of interests has not brought awareness to the European side that China has become a global power and represents both opportunities and risks inasmuch as European

companies continue exporting technologies to China as they are attracted to Chinese markets.

Being directly involved in the maintenance of balance of power in East Asia, especially with regards to cross-straits relations, the United States and Japan have acted in a much stricter manner towards mainland China to avoid an arms race between Beijing and Taipei.

For the Europeans, the United States remains staunchly opposed to any policy change on the embargo and the EU is concerned about making a move that could undermine the post-Iraq transatlantic *rapprochement*. However, the importance of transatlantic considerations in this decision seems exaggerated if not misjudged, notes Marcin Zaborowski. Zaborowski continues, "After all, America's other close allies Israel and Australia are selling arms to China, which so far has not led to any major friction in Washington's relations with these states.[24]" Yet, according to SIPRI, neither Israel nor Australia sells weapons to China today. Israel made its last transaction in 2001.[25]

With Japan and the United States on one side and Europe on the other, both actors looked differently at the issue of arms embargo against China. While for Europe lifting the arms export ban is connected with human rights and the multilateral world system, for Japan and the United States it is a matter of hard security.[26] When the word "China" is mentioned in Europe, the first reaction that a European would have is "violation of human rights," not "threat to own security." Herein lies the main divergence in the two sides' views on China, its military budget, and capabilities.

In the meantime China presents three risks.[27] The first risk is a threat to China's immediate neighbors, i.e., hard security. The second is the export of Chinese arms models abroad. There are already some precedents such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. On the one hand, China does not interfere into the domestic politics of other countries. On the other hand, it exports its military model ignoring the issue of human rights and democracy. The third risk China presents is environmental and economic. The Europeans are concerned with the second and the third risks inasmuch as they relate to their interests in Africa and around the globe. At the same time, as Japanese diplomats note, Europe does not take seriously the security environment in East Asia.[28] Unfortunately this author has not been able to access any sources that could shed light on the progress of the East Asia Strategic Dialogue between the EU and Japan launched in 2005. For the Europeans it is a forum to exchange opinions and understand each other's positions on security balance in East Asia not necessarily leading to operational conclusions,[29] while the Japanese do not consider this dialogue very effective since everybody holds on to its own position and is not ready to change it.[30]

Moreover, Japan does not believe that there will be transparency in China's military budget.[31] At least it does not expect that it will be achieved in the near future. As such, Japan has made steps towards closer cooperation with China, but China remains a non-transparent country in terms of military spending. In addition, Japan views China as a rising and non-transparent country with a big population, big territory, one-party control, and a strong army.[32] Japan's main concern vis-à-vis China is to know the true intention of the modernization process of China's army.[33]

Europe assumes that economic cooperation will foster convergence on other issues as well. By increasing China's dependence on European capital, consumers, and technologies, Europe wants to achieve a spillover of influence into other domains. This liberalist approach implies that interdependence will make China automatically a responsible stakeholder in world peace and stability. Moreover, developing China as a trading nation is also expected to promote an internal evolution that will help weaken the germs of nationalism and xenophobia. Aside from this rather spontaneous fine-tuning, commercial ties permit active steering as well. As China's development relies increasingly on Europe, economic sanctions and cooperation become more powerful tools for influencing China's transition. Thus, economic, political, and societal ties are sought to smooth differences in other domains, but the growing relationships are also expected to add

to Europe's active-steering capacity.[34]   However, such active entrepreneurial approach of Europe has created a situation where Europe is starting to fear the resurgence of China where it infused substantial investments, aid, political efforts, and patience, but whose military spending remains non-transparent and military ambitions unclear.[35]

Officially the EU embargo remains intact, but there are some cases of weapons sales from EU member states (namely France, Italy, and the UK) to China. We may say that the United States and Japan uphold a realist approach and oppose the lifting of the embargo while the EU advocates a liberal view on relations with China in the military sphere. Now let us examine China's military budget and capabilities.

4. China's Current Trends

China's Military Budget

In 2008 China's defense budget increased by 17.6 percent to $59 billion (Figure 1), which is 1.7 percent of China's GDP, and $45 per capita. Jiang Enzhu, a spokesman for the National People's Congress, said that the 2008 budget would fund only a "moderate increase" in weapons purchases. He noted that most of the additional funds would go toward higher military salaries, rising oil costs, and training programs. He added that the country has a long-standing plan to modernize its forces.[36] From 2003 to 2007, China's national defense spending increased by an annual average of 15.8 percent, while the government revenue increased by an annual average of 22.1 percent.[37] Hence, China argues that its military budget is mainly spent on army modernization and on salaries. However, Beijing does not specify the number and type of People's Liberation Army (PLA) armaments, which causes speculation in other countries, especially in the United States.

Figure 1. Defense Expenditures of China, 1996-2007

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008*, p. 29. The graph depicts China's official defense budget since 1996, and associated Department of Defense estimates of actual defense expenditures. Announced budgets are from State Council announcements during the annual National People's Congress meeting. Department of Defense estimates include projected expenses for strategic forces, foreign acquisitions, military research and development, and paramilitary forces. All figures are in 2007 US dollars.

The United States estimates China's military expenditures for 2008 at $97-$139 billion, where the higher estimate is around 4 percent of China's GDP. Regardless of the exact figure, officials from the Pentagon intelligence service believe that the Chinese defense budget remains the second largest in the world. The Japanese Ministry of Defense shares concerns over the lack of transparency regarding China's military budget. The Pentagon reported that China's near-term focus remains on preparations for potential problems in the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, China's nuclear force modernization, its growing arsenal of advanced missiles, and its development of space and cyberspace technologies are changing the military balance in Asia and beyond.[38] Accordingly, though the arms embargo against China remains intact, the security balance in East Asia is already changing in favor of China.

The US Department of Defense argues that the resources for PLA modernization include domestic defense expenditures, indigenous defense industrial development, dual-use technologies, and foreign technology acquisition – all of which are driven by the performance of the economy.[39] As China's defense industries develop, the PLA is relying on acquisition of foreign weapons and technology, primarily from Russia, to fill near-term capability gaps. China also harvests spin-offs from foreign direct investment and joint ventures in the civilian sector, technical knowledge and expertise of students returning from abroad, as well as state-sponsored industrial espionage to increase the level of technologies available to support military research, development, and acquisition. Beijing's long-term goal is to create a wholly indigenous defense industrial sector able to meet the needs of PLA modernization as well as to compete as a top-tier producer in the global arms trade. China is already competitive in some areas, such as communications with leading international defense firms.[40] I will argue in the following section that the primary goal of China is to develop a domestic space industry that would allow China to achieve hegemony both in civilian and military domains. That being said, the United States regards China's modernized PLA as already a competitor to the US army in communications technologies.

At the same time, a slightly different take comes from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which placed China behind the United States and Britain in total defense spending in 2007, but 2nd to the United States in purchasing power parity at $140 billion to Washington's $547 billion.[41] According to SIPRI estimates, China's military expenditures in 2007 reached $58.3 billion, which is 5 percent of world total military expenditures.

The modernization and growth of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) does not raise the same concern in the EU as it does in the United States. The EU recognizes that China's rise must inevitably be reflected in the military and defense spheres. However, while the growth of China's military spending does not alarm the Europeans, Brussels is increasingly concerned about the lack of transparency in this process. In particular, the EU is skeptical about the actual level of the PLA's budget and its military objectives. Consequently, the EU has taken steps to develop its capacity to assess the PLA and China's defense policy.[42] While the US debate remains focused on the rapid growth of China's defense spending, the Europeans point out that even if China spends twice as much as it declares, this is still a small fraction of the Pentagon's nearly $500 billion budget.[43]

Unfortunately, the author has not been able to obtain current information on European assessments of China's military defense budget, but it is clear that the EU does not view China's defense spending with as much sensitivity as the United States. Europeans take the increase of China's military budget as a necessity to modernize the PLA. Contrary to the United States, the Europeans are worried not so much about the increase of expenditures as about the lack of transparency in the military budget. While China explains its increased military budget in terms of rising oil costs and training programs as well as increased military salaries, the United States regards China's domestic defense expenditures, along with indigenous defense industrial development, dual-use technologies, and foreign technology acquisition as the main sources for the

PLA's modernization. This modernization process includes the enabling of China's modernized nuclear force, advanced missiles, and space and cyberspace technologies which have the real potential to contribute to a change in the balance of power in East Asia.

China's Military Capabilities

China's military budget is directly linked with China's military capabilities. Due to the lack of transparency in the military budget it is hard to estimate China's military capabilities. As mentioned above, Beijing declares that China's defense expenditures mainly comprise expenses for personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment. Personnel expenses mainly cover salaries, insurance, food, clothing, and welfare benefits for officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, as well as for civilian employees.[44] Training and maintenance expenses cover troop training, institutional education, construction and maintenance of installations and facilities, and other expenses on routine consumables. The equipment expenses mainly cover research on, experimentation with, and procurement, maintenance, transportation, and storage of weaponry and equipment. The defense expenditures not only cover the active forces but also the militia and reserve forces. Also covered by the defense budget are costs to support part of the retired officers, education of servicemen's children and the national economic development, as well as other social welfare expenses.[45] However, China does not provide specific details on the number and type of PLA armaments and maintenance schedules, nor the alignment of units, troop movements, training records or defense spending.[46]

Beijing realizes that the Chinese army must import advanced weapons and military technology from other countries through "military diplomacy," which envisages military exchange, cooperation with the neighboring countries and regions, and China's involvement in global security to build a stable and favorable international security environment. China feels strongly that it must actively proceed with a "revolution in military affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics." To achieve the RMA, it is faced with the task of the "informationization" of the PLA. However, the "mechanization" of the PLA to strengthen the mobility and protection of PLA units is still less than complete. After witnessing the first Gulf War and the Kosovo War, in which precision guided weapons were extensively employed, China realized that major conflicts in the 21st century would be "information warfare," and that their outcome would be determined by C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities as well as by advanced space technologies.[47] With this in mind, the PLA set the "dual-historical task" of simultaneous mechanization and informationization. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars impressed the leadership of the PLA with the level of informationization involved. It was reflected in the Chinese defense white paper, *China's National Defense in 2006,* which declared, "the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century."[48]

We can conclude that the PLA is pursuing its goal by means of science and technology. It works to accelerate change in the generating mode of war fighting capabilities by drawing on scientific and technological advances. The PLA seeks to raise its capabilities of independent innovation in weaponry and equipment, as well as defense-related science and technology, and strives to make major breakthroughs in some basic, pioneering, and technological fields of strategic importance. It is stepping up its efforts to build a joint operational command system, training system, and support system for fighting informationized wars and enhance the building of systems integration of services and arms.[49]

Taking the above into consideration, we can see that lifting the EU arms embargo on China would potentially allow China access to military and dual-use technologies that would help it improve its current weapons systems. Moreover, due to the fact that certain arms and technologies have been transferred by European countries despite the embargo, China could have started

working on its future advanced weapons systems. Ending the embargo could also remove implicit limits on Chinese military interaction with European militaries, giving China's armed forces broad access to critical military "software" such as management practices, operational doctrine and training, and logistics expertise. Moreover, if the embargo were lifted, China's strategy would likely centre on establishing joint ventures with EU companies to acquire expertise and technology.[50] Nevertheless, in the medium to long term, China is likely to be interested in acquiring advanced space technology, radar systems, early-warning aircraft, submarine technology, and advanced electronic components for precision-guided weapons systems.

Since the 1990s China has been modernizing its conventional weapons arsenal. In 2006-2007 China decreased the import of military weapons by 62 percent.[51] China imported helicopters, radars, airplane engines and missiles, as well as Kilo-type submarines (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Russian Arms Sales to China, 2001-2005

Equipment	Year	Quantity
Su-30MKK aircraft	2001	38
Kilo-class submarines	2002	Up to 8
SOVREMENNYY II-class destroyers	2002	2
S-300PMU-1 surface-to-air missile system	2002	4 battalions
Su-30MK2 aircraft	2003	24
S-300PMU-2 surface-to-air missile system	2004	8 battalions
AL-31F aircraft engines for the F-10 fighter	2004	100
IL-76 transport aircraft	2004	10
RD-93aircraft engines for the JF-17 fighters	2005	100
IL-76 transport aircraft	2005	40
IL-78 tanker aircraft	2005	8

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006,* p. 21. Note: Quantity indicates numbers of units in the purchase agreement. Actual deliveries may be spread across several years.

Simultaneously, China assembled airplanes under Russian license. All in all, China will need Russian military equipment less and less. Meanwhile, according to SIPRI researcher Paul Holtom, "[T]he defense industry of China is developing due to import of license and equipment from Russia, which allows China to increase its own production."[52] At the same time Moscow fears that its military products would be copied by China. For instance, Russia exported Su-27k and China now has a very similar airplane, J11B. In its air force, China possesses more than 150 SU-27s, SU-30s, and possibly SU-33s. In the naval force, China bought Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny II-class destroyers. Thus, first because of copyrights, Russia is not in a hurry to export more weapons to China. Second, China has almost re-modernized its army and therefore it does not need more units of weapons from Russia. Therefore, it can be expected that Russia's exports to China will decrease in the coming years. In addition, to counterbalance China, Russia also sells its weapons to India, which makes China very unhappy.

The most noticeable development in the overall balance of air warfare capabilities in Northeast Asia is China's increased deployment of Su-27 and Su-30 fourth-generation fighters. In sheer numbers of fourth-generation fighters owned, China already rivals Japan and may take the lead in the near future.[53] If that happens, the balance in air power will greatly shift in China's favor, with Japan losing the qualitative superiority it has so far enjoyed. As such, the regional strategic balance is changing, and this is a critical concern for both Japan and the United States.[54]

In addition, Japan and the United States are the only countries that operate full-scale airborne warning and control system (AWACS) capabilities in East Asia, and the qualitative strategic superiority enjoyed by both nations largely derives from those capabilities. However, some security experts hold that it is only a matter of time before China puts full-fledged AWACS capabilities into operation.[55]

Finally, from a global perspective lifting the EU arms embargo could accelerate weapons proliferation to countries that the EU wants to remain isolated. Beijing's track record in transfers of conventional arms and military technologies suggests EU or other third-party sales to China could lead to improvements in the systems that Chinese companies market abroad, including to countries of concern (in the Middle East and Africa). Hence, for the United States and Japan the main concern about China is a discrepancy between what it declares and what is really pursues. The problem of transparency complicates the situation around the PLA's capabilities as well as around the lifting of arms embargo.

From a market viewpoint, lifting the EU embargo would also lead to greater foreign competition to sell arms to the PLA, giving Beijing leverage over Russia. To secure its share on the Chinese defense market, presumably the United States would start selling weapons to China too. As a consequence, China could be very selective in the weapons it could buy to finish re-modernizing its army, and according to strategic developments, it could export arms itself (it may have potential customers in Africa and Central Asia).

As demonstrated above, even despite the embargo remaining intact, the security balance in East Asia is already changing in China's favor especially in communication technologies, and possibly even in air warfare technologies. China's primary goal is acquisition of advanced technologies, including space technologies. Now we will examine what China does in the area of research and development.

China's R&D Expenditures and Research Centers

During the Cultural Revolution scientists and scholars, and science and technology were oppressed. At the 4th National Conference on Science and Technology in 1978, Deng Xiaoping made clear that along with industry, agriculture, and army, science and technology would be the fourth pillar of modernization.[56] Since then, the expenditures on R&D have been gradually increasing (Figure 3). Although not considerable in terms of GDP ratio, we have seen an increase from 0.6 percent in 1995 to 0.8 percent 2006.

Figure 3. China's Government Expenditures for Science and Research, 1978-2006 (100 million yuan)

Source: *China Statistical Yearbook 2007,* http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2007/indexeh.htm.

In 1978 the slogan "Science and Technology is the leading productivity power" emerged.[57] After the announcement of three reforms (state enterprises, financial, and administrative) and in order to expand employment opportunities for China's growing population, an emphasis was placed on the development of private business in the high-tech sector. Later, in addition to traditional high-tech, China set up high-tech companies in information technology, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticals.

In 2006 the State Council of China adopted the Guidelines on National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020), which stated, "[B]y 2020, the progress of science and technology will contribute at least 60 percent to the country's development. Meanwhile, the country's reliance on foreign technology will decline to 30 percent and below."[58] Thus, instead of dependence on imported technologies, China is going to rely increasingly upon its own resources. According to the Guidelines, China will encourage enterprises to spend more on research and development while state financial investment will be used mainly to develop basic research.

The 2006 Guidelines defined the priority sectors for technological development. These key industries were energy, waters resources, mining resources, the environment, agriculture, manufacturing, communications and transport, information industry and modern service industries, population and health, urbanization and urban development, public security, and national defense. With regard to national defense, it is envisaged that "China will reform the current scientific and technological management system and combine and coordinate the military and civilian research organizations."[59] China encourages military organizations to shoulder the tasks of scientific research for civilian use. At the same time, civilian research institutes and enterprises are also allowed to take part in national defense research projects.[60]

China possesses considerable economic and human resources to implement its strategy. It welcomes the establishment of research centers and even provides a favorable tax regime for them. It is also concerned with brain drain and prefers scientists and researchers not to leave the country. As a result, China is creating appropriate conditions and incentives for domestic centered research.[61] In fact, China has no shortage of well-trained scientists, engineers, mathematicians or other technical experts. A considerable number of Chinese scholars educated abroad over the last two decades are working on key research projects in China, applying both knowledge and high technologies to conduct research independently or in cooperation with foreign colleagues. Nowadays China's research and development is especially active in nuclear power energy, space industry, high energy physics, biology, computer science, and electronic communications, where China has attained or is approaching advanced levels. Such tremendous development cannot but worry its foreign counterparts from the viewpoint of competition.

To conclude, China's primary goal in the military area is to have advanced space technologies. China and the EU have agreed to open their research programs to accommodate the increasing number of joint research projects. More and more Chinese have been invited to participate in the EU-funded 7th Framework Program for Research, Technology Development, and Demonstration Activities (RTD) for the period 2007-2013 and China is attracting Europeans into projects under its research programs.

Sustained increases in expenditures for research and development, establishment of research centers, granting of a favorable tax regime to these centers, and joint R&D projects with foreign institutions and states provide a sound basis for China's aspiration to become a major exporter of technologies in the future. Moreover, since Beijing is uniting civil and defense research, it would not be hard for China to produce and export its own advanced weapons. Obviously, the emergence of China as an arms exporter would restructure the world weapons market. In order to achieve its goals as fast as possible, China is active in importing advanced technologies. In the next section we are going to look at European technology transfer to China.

European Technology Transfer to China

It is obvious that in an increasingly globalised economy China is likely to depend on its capacity to maintain and develop its comparative advantages in advanced technology goods. The Chinese government has emphasized the need for FDI to be coupled with the transfer of more advanced foreign technologies to China.[62] In an effort to develop high-tech industries, Chinese policies on import of foreign technologies have become increasingly selective and restrictive in the type of imports and investments that are allowed or officially encouraged. In particular, there has been an increasing emphasis on industry-specific investment and high-technology imports. As a result, China has become the world's first exporter of information technology products, although, as discussed earlier, the large proportion of these exports come from foreign companies established in China that import research-intensive, high value-added components.

Innovative technologies are tools to implement successful strategies to stay competitive on the world market. In 2006 the European Parliament acknowledged, "China has tripled its expenditure on research and development in the past five years... Europe must rise to this challenge in order to continue to benefit from world trade in future"[63] (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. R&D Expenditures in GDP in China, Japan, EU, and USA

Source: MEXT, *Indicators of Science and Technology 2005*.

As demonstrated herein, research and development is relevant not only to trade and competitiveness in the world but also to security, i.e., sophisticated weapons, social expenditures, and the competitiveness in many areas, not exclusively trade.

All in all, access to China's attractive market is often used as a leverage to get foreign partners in larger joint ventures to provide their technology on terms that most Western companies would not be ready to accept anywhere else.[64] By purchasing high-tech goods off the shelf, China does not have to pass through the development process itself. However, the government is also more actively promoting technological development and knowledge.[65] Thus, in its EU Policy Paper, Beijing appeals to Europe to ease restrictions on high-tech exports, and vows to tap the enormous potential of technological cooperation.[66] The Chinese side would like to see EU participation in IT promotion. Space technology, high energy physics, polar exploration and development, the life sciences, biotechnology, bio-diversity, resources, environment, and human health are other major areas of interest to China. China has succeeded in plugging into European expertise in several of these fields. In terms of technology transfer, EU countries already are China's biggest supplier of technologies and equipment.[67] By the end of September 2004, China had introduced 18,363 technologies from the EU with a contract value of $79.4 billion.[68]

Let us now turn to a brief review of how actively China and Europe cooperate in science and technology. To start with, in September 2003 China joined the European satellite navigation project Galileo contributing 230 million euros. As a natural consequence, this led to technology

sharing between Europe and China, which allows China to develop satellite guided navigation technology by Chinese domestic industry. Moreover, China's goal is to obtain military superiority in space, which is a key element to achieving operational objectives of the PLA. Although most of China's space programs have mainly commercial and scientific purposes, improved space technology has the potential to significantly improve Chinese military capabilities.[69] The European side rejects American worries that China could gain a military advantage from Galileo. The European Commission argues that the Public Regulated Service (PRS) would be withheld from China and any other non-EU participants in the system. The PRS is an encrypted signal, meant to guarantee continuous signal access in the event of threats or crisis. Unlike other Galileo signals, the PRS will be accessible even when the other services are not available, making it suitable for security- and military-related uses.[70] Yet, as Nicola Casarini acknowledges, "there is still a fair amount of unpredictability as to what China will be able to use – or not to use – in the end. However, in any case research work on Galileo will assist China in fostering the development of its own, independent satellite navigation system. In fact, as already happened in the past, China will almost certainly be able to use foreign technology to upgrade its indigenous space capabilities."[71]

Secondly, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom lobbied hard to convince Beijing to purchase Airbus aircraft instead of its American rival Boeing to secure the share of China's rising defense budget.[72] The partnership of Airbus, whose corporate parent is European Aeronautic Defense and Space, with China dates to 2005, when the company opened a design center in Beijing. In June 2006, Airbus agreed to set up an A320 assembly line in Tianjin. That line, which is still under construction, is expected to make about four planes a month by 2011. In November 2007 Airbus received orders from Chinese airlines for 160 passenger planes worth about $14.8 billion. In return, Airbus promised "to award to Chinese companies at least 5 percent of the supply contracts for its next-generation widebody jet, the A350-XWB."[73] Outside of the Euro-zone, such a jet was only offered to Russia.[74] Airbus said it would involve its Chinese partners in the development of the 300-seat A350 plane in Harbin, where the site is expected to be ready in 2009. Airbus said that its initial guarantee of 5 percent of the work "may be enlarged based on the future business plan." In addition, Airbus signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Development Reform Commission that granted risk-sharing supply contracts to Chinese manufacturers for many of the A350's moving parts, including wing flaps and tail rudders. Hence, Airbus has increasingly offered China projects that over time will make Chinese producers critical suppliers of components and sub-assemblies for some of the most important Airbus products.[75]

Thirdly, French nuclear company Areva won an $11.9 billion agreement to build nuclear reactors as well as to supply technology and uranium to China in an attempt to reduce its dependence on coal. Areva is expected to build two third-generation reactors at Taishan in the southern Chinese province of Guangdong under a contract with China Guangdong Nuclear Power. In response, the Chinese company agreed to buy 35 percent of the production of Areva's uranium-mining subsidiary, UraMin, which plans to obtain nuclear fuel from its three mines in Africa. In addition, Europe and China could become long-term partners in nuclear fuel processing after Areva signed a separate deal with the China National Nuclear Corporation to study whether to build a reprocessing plant for spent fuel.

Finally, the telecommunications equipment maker Alcatel-Lucent, the engineering group Alstom and the utility groups Suez and Électricité de France also have large contracts in China. Alcatel-Lucent, the world's biggest maker of telecommunications gear, received orders worth 750 million euros to expand the networks of China's two largest cell phone carriers. The French utility Suez signed agreements with two cities, Chongqing and Tianjin, for water and waste management services, while the engineering group of Alstom received a contract worth 43 million euros to supply electronic equipment for the subway system of Shanghai. Eurocopter, a division of

EADS, was expected to sign a contract with China's military for 10 helicopters worth 80 million euros.

The above-mentioned cases confirm the value of China as a market for European technology despite tensions over human rights, trade, and the environment. To generalize, the accumulation of the transferred technologies and their application in domestic research (without investing heavily in research previously done by Europeans, Americans or Japanese) means that little by little China is becoming or has already become a leader in R&D. As Nicola Casarini notes, "Europe has become over the years a source for advanced technology that would otherwise be more difficult (if not impossible) to obtain from the US or Japan."[76] Access to advanced technology not only ensures competitiveness over a medium to longer term, but it is also a prerequisite for the modernization of Chinese industry and by default army. Therefore, given the pattern of technology transfer between Europe and China, the practical impact of the embargo is highly questionable. Moreover, though Europeans want to establish a system where China depends on Europe, there is the other side of the "coin": Europe becomes increasingly dependent on China.

5. Conclusion

The EU attempts to lift arms embargo on China have a direct influence on the future of East Asian integration and limited impact on the security balance in the region inasmuch as it is already changing in favor of China. Firstly, in spite of the embargo some EU member states sell weapons to China. Secondly, unlike the United States and Japan, Europe does not consider increases in China's military expenditures as an alarming sign of its militarization. Therefore, it is quite skeptical about China's actual military expenditures and argues that still they are far from almost $500 billion Pentagon budget. Thirdly, in the US (and possibly European) estimations China's modernized nuclear force, advanced missiles, communication, space, and cyberspace technologies are changing the security balance in East Asia. Fourthly, China and the EU are actively involved in joint research projects, where Galileo is a most illustrative case. Constant increases of expenditures on research and development, establishment of research centers, and granting of a favorable tax regime to these centers provide a sound basis for China's aspiration to become a producer and exporter of both civilian and military technologies in the future. Finally, though being aware that R&D is closely connected with dual-use technologies and advanced weapons, Europe actively transfers production together with technologies to China as in the case of Airbus.

Given the scope of cooperation between Europe and China, the practical impact of the embargo on the balance of power in East Asia is doubtful. It should also be stressed that while the United States and Japan uphold a unipolar world led by the former, the EU attempts to counterbalance it by *inter alia* attracting China into the construction of a multilateral world order. However, the emergence of China as a global player with unclear intentions presents risks due to the lack of transparency related to military expenditures, changing military balance in East Asia, and the hasty and selective technology import.

The arms embargo is not the most effective tool to contain China and motivate it to improve the domestic human rights situation due to the extensive relations that exist between Europe and China and the other ways in which European technologies are introduced in China's defense area. The EU arms embargo on China is a litmus test on how the United States and Japan on one side and Europe on the other view China's military capabilities. Hence, until China's military spending becomes transparent and military intentions become clear, East Asian integration in political and security terms would be hardly realistic.

Moreover, despite the obvious economic interdependence and shared interest in prosperity

between Japan and China, historical memory, security concerns and, lack of trust between them hamper regional integration that would require the development of a regional identity based on mutual trust and transparency, and shared interests and values. Unless properly nurtured and further developed in a constructive and mutually positive way, contemporary Sino-Japanese relations would continue to be locked in the pattern of interdependence in economy and rivalry in politics and security, leaving no opportunity for ambitious integration plans in East Asia.

Notes

[1] Ting Wai, "EU-China Relations: Economic, Political, and Social Aspects," paper-delivered at the Third European Union Studies Association Asia-Pacific Conference, Keio University, Tokyo, December 8-10, 2005, p. 21.

[2] Personal consultations with Japanese and European Commission officials, Brussels, September 2008. Europeans favor multilateralism which refers to the rule of international law while "multi-polarity" refers to the rule of a few big, powerful states, as well as instability.

[3] *European Parliament resolution of 10 April 2008 on Tibet* (No. P6_TA(2008)0119); *European Parliament resolution of 10 July 2008 on the situation in China after the earthquake and before the Olympic Games* (P6_TA-PROV [2008]0362).

[4] For details, see: Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis,* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

[5] For example: Marcin Zaborowski, *EU-China Security Relations,* Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, February 2008; Jonathan Holslag, "The European Union and China: The Great Disillusion," *European Foreign Affairs Review,* No. 11 (2006), pp. 555-580; Ting Wai, "EU-China Relations"; Nicola Casarini, "The Evolution of the EU-China Relationship: From Constructive Engagement to Strategic Partnership," *Occasional Paper,* No. 64, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006.

[6] World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

[7] There are various works on Asian integration. See, for instance: Mark Beeson, "Political and Economic Integration in East Asia,"
<http://asianintegration.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=33&Itemid=26> (accessed December 14, 2008).

[8] Thomas U. Berger, "Power and Purpose in Pacific East Asia: A Constructivist Interpretation," in John G. Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific,* New York: Columbia University Press, p. 408.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Marcin Zaborowski, *EU-China Security Relations,* Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, February 2008, p. 1.

[11] Holslag, "The European Union and China," p. 569.

[12] European Council, *Brussels European Council, Presidency Conclusions, No. 5381/04, Brussels, December 12-13, 2003*, p. 19.

13 European Council, *Brussels European Council, No. 10679/2/04 REV2, June 17-18, 2004*, p.16, item 77.

14 Interview, Delegation of the European Commission in Japan, June 26, 2007.

15 "Japan-France Summit Meeting and Dinner Hosted by Prime Minister Koizumi," March 27, 2005, *http://www.infojapan.org/region/europe/france/summit0503.html*（accessed December 12, 2008）; "Japan Lodges Fresh Protest to EU Plan to Lift China Arms Embargo," September 16, 2005, *EU business website,* http://www.eubusiness.com//Trade/050916160630.2zdp4yfa（accessed November 1, 2008）.

16 Ellen Bork, *Human Rights and the EU Arms Embargo,* Memorandum of Opinion Leaders, Washington, Project for the New American Century（PNAC）, March 22, 2005, cited in Nicola Casarini, "The Evolution of the EU-China Relationship, " p. 35.

17 United States Senate, Republican Policy Committee（John Kyl, Chairman）, *US Generosity Leads the World: The Truth about US Foreign Assistance,* February 22, 2005, cited in Nicola Casarini, "The Evolution of the EU-China Relationship," p. 35.

18 Interview, Delegation of the European Commission in Japan, June 26, 2007.

19 Council of the European Union, *EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports,* Brussels, June 8, 1998.

20 Council of the European Union, *User's Guide to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports,* 13296/05, PESC 853, COARM 43, Brussels, October 14, 2005.

21 Council of the European Union, Sixth Annual Report of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, Brussels, November 2004; see also: SIPRI, *TIV of arms imports to China, 1993-2006*（available at *http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/output_types_TIV.html*）. France, Germany, Italy, and the UK sell arms to China.

22 European Parliament, *European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2008 on the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports – failure of the Council to adopt the Common Position and transform the Code into a legally binding instrument,* Strasbourg, P6_TA（2008）0101.

23 Zaborowski, *EU-China Security Relations,* p. 1.

24 Ibid., p. 4.

25 SIPRI, *TIV of arms imports to China, 1993-2006*（available at *http://www.sipri.org/contents/armstrad/output_types_TIV.html*）.

26 Interview, Delegation of Japan to the European Commission, September 2008.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Interview, Delegation of European Commission to Japan, June 26, 2007.

30 Interview, National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense of Japan, September 27, 2007.

31 Personal consultations with Japan's high-ranking military officer, Tokyo, August 27, 2008.

32 Ibid.

33 Interview, National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense of Japan, September 27, 2007.

34 Holslag, "The European Union and China," p. 567.

35 Ibid., p. 578.

36 "China's Official Military Budget to Grow by 17.6% in 2008," *Defense Industry Daily,* March 6, 2008.

37 Ibid.

38 Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008,* p. 29.

39 Ibid., p. 31.

40 Ibid.

41 SIPRI, "The 15 Major Spender Countries in 2007," *Military Expenditure: SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament*（online edition）, *http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf*（accessed January 25, 2008）.

42 Zaborowski, *EU-China Security Relations,* p. 4.

43 Ibid.

44 "Chapter 9. Defense Expenditure," *China's National Defense in 2006,* Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2006.

45 Ibid.

46 National Institute of Defense Studies of Japan, *East Asian Strategic Review 2007,* Tokyo: National Institute of Defense Studies of Japan, 2007, p. 126.

47 Interview, National Institute of Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense of Japan, September 27, 2007.

48 "Chapter 2. National Defense Policy," *China's National Defense in 2006*, Beijing: Information Office

of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, 2006.

49 Ibid.

50 *Annual Reports to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006,* Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2006, pp. 22-23.

51 Andrey Terekhov and Viktor Myasnikov, "China Transfers to Self-sufficiency in Russian Weapons" 〔Kitay perehodit na samoobespecheniye Rossiyskimi vooruzheniyami〕, *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye,* April 4, 2008,
http://nvo.ng.ru/notes/2008-04-04/8_china.html（accessed September 13, 2008）.

52 Ibid.

53 National Institute of Defense Studies of Japan, *East Asian Strategic Review 2008,* Tokyo: National Institute of Defense Studies of Japan, 2007, p. 214.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., p. 213.

56 National Institute of Science and Technology Policy（NISTEP）, MEXT, *Shuyona Kuni ni Okeru Shisaku Doko Chosa Oyobi Tassei Koka ni Kakawarru Kokusai Hikaku Bunseki*〔*Comparative Analysis on S&T Policies and Their Achievements in Major Countries*〕*,* NISTEP Report No. 81（May 2004）, p. 284.

57 Ibid., pp. 284-319.

58 "China Issues Science and Development Guidelines," February 9, 2006, Chinese Government's Official Web Portal: http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-02/09/content_183426.htm（accessed March 23, 2006）.

59 "China Issues Guidelines on Science and Technology Development Programme," February 9, 2006, Chinese Government's Official Web Portal: http://www.gov.cn/english/2006-02/09/content_184426.htm （accessed March 23, 2006）.

60 Ibid.

61 Interview, Research Centre for Advanced Science and Technology（RCAST）, University of Tokyo, April 27, 2006.

62 For details see: Olena Mykal, "China within Global Technology Transfer Policy of Japan: Implications for Europe," *Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies,* Vol. 4. No. 2（2006）, pp. 137-166.

63 European Parliament resolution on prospects for trade relations between the EU and China（2005/2015 （INI）, *Official Journal of the European Union*, 28.9.2006, C 233 pp. 103-111, item M.

64 Casarini, "The Evolution of the EU-China Relationship," p. 30.

65 Holslag, "The European Union and China," p. 573.

66 State Council, *China's EU Policy Paper*, Bejing, State Council, 2005, section II.1.

67 Holslag, "The European Union and China," p. 562.

68 Huang Qing, "China-EU Relations: More Vigorous. More Mature," *People's Daily*, December 16, 2005. *http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/16/eng20051216_228613.html*（accessed August 23, 2008）.

69 William S. Murray III and Robert Antonellis, "China's Space Program: The Dragon Eyes the Moon（and Us）," *Orbis,* Autumn 2003, pp. 645-52, cited in Nicola Casarini, "The Evolution of the EU-China Relationship," p. 29.

70 Gustav Lindstrom and Giovanni Gasparini, "The Galileo Satellite System and Its Security Implications," *Occasional Paper*, No. 44, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2003, p. 19.

71 Casarini, "The Evolution of the EU-China Relationship," p. 29.

72 Holslag, "The European Union and China," p. 570.

73 Nicola Clark and David Laguea, "Airbus Part of $30 Billion in Contracts with China," *The New York Times*（electronic edition）, November 27, 2007, *http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/business/ worldbusiness/27trade.html?em&ex=1196312400&en=6f3fa1010bb7bfb1&ei=5087*（accessed November 30, 2007）.

74 European Aeronautic Defense and Space（EADS）, corporate parent of Airbus, in March 2007 agreed to give 5 percent of the work on the A350 to Russian companies as part of a $4.4 billion deal that committed the Russian carrier Aeroflot to buying 22 planes. See: Ibid.

75 Claud Fouquet, "*La France engrange 9 milliards d'euros de contracts avec la Chine,*" *Les Echos*, December 6, 2005, p. 6, cited in Nicola Casarini, "The Evolution of the EU-China Relationship," p. 30.

76 Casarini, "The Evolution of the EU-China Relationship," p. 29.

The Role of Regional Organizations in East Asian Regional Cooperation and Integration in the Field of Higher Education

Anh Thuy Nguyen

Abstract

   This paper analyzes the role of regional higher education organizations in promoting co-operation and integration in the field of education in East Asia. More specifically, this paper examines whether there are differences in the approaches that these organizations are taking in comparison with other regions and discusses the implications of this study's findings. First, this paper looks at the ongoing processes in other parts of the world. Second, it discusses the context of East Asia, in which regional cooperation and integration in higher education needs to be promoted. The third section of this paper analyzes the activities, programs, and strategies being implemented by three regional organizations, namely the University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific（UMAP）, the ASEAN University Network（AUN）, and the SEAMEO Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development（RIHED）. The paper offers some recommendations for these regional organizations for the purpose of accelerating East Asian higher education cooperation and integration.

1. Introduction

   Since the 1980s, globalization has become irreversible and one of the most influential processes that is "increasing the flow of people, culture, ideas, values, knowledge, technology, and economy across borders resulting in a more interconnected and interdependent world."[1] Globalization can open up both opportunities and challenges for each country, depending on the nation's specific circumstances. Nowadays, globalization takes place in almost all fields of human life including political, economic, environmental, cultural, and social issues, and undoubtedly education is also one of the impacted sectors.

   While globalization is seen as an objective and unalterable process,[2] internationalization is considered to be a response of countries and institutions of higher education all over the world to this process. Internationalization of higher education can be an aim in itself wherein an international, intercultural, or global dimension is incorporated into the purpose, functions or delivery of postsecondary education, as defined by Knight.[3] Internationalization is also seen as a means to achieve wider goals, or in other words, it is "an important resource in the development of higher education towards, first of all, a system in line with international standards; secondly, one open and responsive to its global environment."[4]

   Together with internationalization, regional cooperation and integration in higher education have become an emerging trend in many parts of the world. Regional cooperation and integration can also be considered as a response to globalization. Under the impacts of globalization such as the massification, commercialization, decentralization, and marketization of higher education, countries in many regions of the world, especially developing countries are faced with the same issues of access, equity, broadened participation, and quality in higher education,[5] issues that go beyond the border of one individual nation or institution and therefore require the concerted efforts of the whole region. Moreover, the need to enhance the economic and educational com-

petitiveness of one region as a whole and member nations and institutions in particular is another strong motivation to enhance regional cooperation and integration in different parts of the world today. Nations and institutions that are seeking to expand the education markets and attract an increasing number of international students into the domestic education systems also advocate this process. From the political, cultural, and social points of view, higher education regional cooperation and integration is considered to be one of the important methods for peace building and mutual understanding within one region.

It can be stated that both internationalization and regional integration of higher education are responses to globalization. However, internationalization of higher education concerns individual nations and institutions independently, whereas regional cooperation and integration require not only efforts of these two actors separately but also nations and institutions in the same region to come together in a concerted endeavor to reach the same targets. Moreover, nations and institutions are the main subjects of internationalization of higher education, whereas in the process of regional cooperation and integration, these two actors are not the only key tiers; regional organizations also need to play their important role in promoting and leading this process. These organizations can provide a platform or set up initiatives, programs, activities, and networks that bring together regional countries, institutions, and individuals in a collective effort of harmonization and integration in the field of higher education.

The past ten years have witnessed increasing interdependence among East Asian countries, as seen, for example, in the ASEAN + 3 process, especially in economic integration and policy collaboration. However, in the field of higher education, compared to other regions of the world, East Asia is lagging behind in creating and promoting the basic level of regional integration and policy harmonization to achieve common objectives and interests.[6]

This paper will analyze the role of existing regional higher education organizations in promoting cooperation and integration in this sector in East Asia. More specifically, this paper will try to find out whether there are differences in the approaches that these organizations are taking in comparison with other regions and discuss the implications of this study's findings. Questions to be asked are: What roles are these organizations playing in promoting East Asian cooperation and integration in higher education and how? What are the strengths and the weaknesses of their approaches? What more needs to be done to accelerate East Asian cooperation and integration in higher education? This paper will first look at the ongoing processes in other parts of the world. Second, it will then discuss the context of East Asia, in which regional cooperation and integration in higher education needs to be promoted. Third, this paper will focus on the activities, programs, and strategies being implemented by three regional organizations, namely the University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific（UMAP）, the ASEAN University Network（AUN）, and the SEAMEO Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development（RIHED）. Fourth and lastly, the balance of the paper will discuss the findings and then offer some recommendations for these regional organizations for the purpose of accelerating East Asian higher education cooperation and integration.

2. Higher Education Cooperation and Integration in Other Parts of the World

The process of regional cooperation and integration in higher education is underway in different parts of the world, but at different paces and in various forms. Here, we will take a brief look at the main developments around the world.

Europe
To date, the effort of European countries to promote higher education policy harmonization

and integration has been the most comprehensive and systematic in the world. At the core of this endeavor is the Bologna Process, a voluntary undertaking with clear objectives and timeline for implementation initiated by the first 29 signatory countries of Europe. The Bologna Process aims to create the "European Higher Education Area(EHEA) by 2010 alongside the Lisbon Strategy which focuses on the link between education, job market, and economic growth in Europe."[7] By harmonizing or increasing the compatibility, comparability, and flexibility of the education systems in the region, the Bologna Process will help accommodate and accelerate free flows of student/staff mobility, education services, and research collaboration. This process will also contribute to the establishment of the so-called "Europe of Knowledge, capable of giving its citizens the necessary competences to face the challenges of the new millennium, together with an awareness of shared values and belonging to a common social and cultural space."[8] The Bologna Process also aims to enhance the global competitiveness of European higher education institutions.

Since 2003, the Bologna Process has been joined by 40 European countries and gradually added key action lines through several meetings. The priority areas now include the following key aspects:

1) A system of easily readable and comparable degrees, using the Diploma Supplement;
2) A three-cycle degree system(Undergraduate of at least three years full-time; Masters(1-2 years); and Doctoral);
3) A system of credits(based on the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System(ECTS);
4) Promotion of mobility of students and staff (through removal of obstacles);
5) Promotion of cooperation in quality assurance;
6) Promotion of the European dimension in higher education(through curriculum development, institutional cooperation, and integrated programs of study and research);
7) Promotion of lifelong learning;
8) Inclusion of higher institutions and students;
9) Promotion of the attractiveness of the EHEA; and,
10) Focus on doctoral studies and the synergy between EHEA and the European Research Area(ERA).[9]

Besides the Bologna Process that encompasses the majority of 40 out of 45 European countries, there are several other higher education collaboration initiatives within the European Union consisting of 27 nations. "These schemes originally focused on the mobility of students and, more recently, paid greater attention to the "Europeanization of courses and their content."[10] The first comprehensive action focusing on the promotion of inter-university linkages for student and staff mobility is the European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (Erasmus), which was established in 1987. Socrates is another broader program that has continued and extended the Erasmus action in higher education. Socrates has also promoted a thorough comparative analysis of education systems and policies, exchange of information, experience, and good practices among EU countries to help formulate and implement educational policies across the region.[11] Besides these programs, there are several other initiatives focusing on different issues in educational cooperation in EU, such as Lingua(language learning) and Minerva (open and distance learning and the use of info-communications technologies).

Latin America
This region is also promoting regional integration in higher education through a number of

initiatives. Some of them are being implemented with the support of UNESCO, for instance, *Instituto International para la Educacion Superior en America Latina y El Caribe*,（IESALC）, or *Organizació́n de Estados Iberoamericanos para la Educació́n, la Ciencia y la Cultura*（OEI）. The precursors of these organizations can be traced back to earlier networks such as *Unió́n de Universidades de Amé́rical Latina* established in 1949, or subregional bodies, especially *Convenio André́s Bello*, which was created in 1970 to promote cultural, educational, and scientific collaboration among the Andean Countries, as well as the association of autonomous public universities, *Grupo Montevideo* in Mercosur, founded in 1991.[12]

Besides these initiatives, one notable action taken by Latin America and the Caribbean countries is the promotion of the inter-regional integration in higher education with the European Union. In June 1999, the participating countries agreed that a common space of higher education should be created for Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean nations by 2015.[13] The steering committee now consists of five countries, Spain, France, Brazil, Mexico, and St. Kitts. These countries have met periodically during the past years and have decided upon the following key areas of cooperation between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean:

1）　Dissemination of academic collaboration and experience;
2）　Comparability of study programs;
3）　Mobility of students and staff;
4）　Joint degrees;
5）　Identification of financing sources and mechanisms; and,
6）　Quality assurance.[14]

In addition to the endeavor to establish a common space in higher education, Latin American countries are also expediting area-based and discipline-based regional cooperation and integration. Quality assurance（QA）is one of the areas that are making good progress in this region. QA systems have been established and strengthened in many countries. Moreover, a regional network of QA, the Central American Council on Accreditation（CCA）, was established and began its operation in 2004 as a regional second-level accreditation organization. As for the discipline-based cooperation, regional accreditation agencies are available in engineering（REDICA）, in agriculture and resource management（ACEAS）, and in medicine（ACAFEM-RECAEM）.[15]

Africa

The Southern Africa Development Community（SADC）, created in 1992 to advance economic, political, and social issues, signed in 1997 a Protocol on Education and Training with the purpose to promote regional cooperation and integration in the education sector, including higher education and research and development.

Another important initiative proposed by the Association of African Universities（AAU）is the creation of the ＂African Higher Education Area＂（AHEA）, which is now under discussion at both inter-governmental and institutional levels. The key objectives of the AHEA are to promote the following areas:

1）　An African quality culture;
2）　Curricular reforms that address the priorities of both national and regional labor markets;
3）　Academic mobility to improve circulation in the region;
4）　Harmonization of regulatory framework and higher education policies;
5）　Collective response and strategies towards GATS and other elements of globalization;

6) Pool of resources for graduate studies and research on African studies and in Africa; and,

7) The attractiveness and competitiveness of African higher education institutions for migratory African students.[16]

Besides these initiatives, the African Development Fund（ADF）has proposed and conducted a study project which focuses on identifying structural problems of higher education systems in countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union（WAEMU）as a whole. This will help to implement reforms to improve higher education systems in these countries as well as to promote regional integration in this field. Priority areas identified by the governments of WAEMU include:

1) The increase of students and staff mobility between WAEMU member countries;

2) The system of mutual recognition of degree titles; and,

3) The revised curricula in common fields of specialization among universities in member countries.[17]

As shown in the above examples, countries and institutions around the world have increasingly recognized the benefits and rationales for promoting regional cooperation and integration in higher education and have undertaken various initiatives. So far, the Bologna Process and other programs implemented by the European countries are the most comprehensive and systematic. The process in Europe is said to serve as a model for other regions to follow. The following section will explore what regional organizations in East Asia are doing to promote regional cooperation and integration in higher education and what approaches they are taking in the specific context of the region.

3. Role of Regional Organizations in Promoting Higher Education Regional Cooperation and Integration in East Asia

The Context of Higher Education in East Asia

East Asia is a vast and diverse region in terms of ethnicity, culture, language, religion, political regime, socioeconomic development, and topography. In the field of higher education, varieties in East Asian countries are also remarkable. These higher educational systems have different historical backgrounds, possess different characteristics, and are now standing at different stages of development. The diversity in higher education quality exists between countries and among institutions in the region as well as within each nation. However, despite these diversities and varieties, higher educational systems in East Asia, especially those in developing countries, are also facing similar problems and challenges, such as exploding demands, budget constrains, quality assurance, and the internationalization of higher education. As a consequence, it is important to build up closer constructive and effective cooperation within the region in order for these countries to develop mutual understanding, share lessons of experience, as well as to support countries in need to solve persistent problems and overcome obstacles to develop their higher education systems.

Recent years have witnessed a remarkable growth in student mobility among East Asian countries and an increase in the number of inter-university linkages within the region. Many regional countries have become destinations for overseas study and are having national and institutional plans and strategies to attract more and more international students into the respective higher education systems. According to statistics from the Japanese Ministry of Education, Cul-

ture, Sports, Science and Technology（MEXT）, in 2005, the number of international students in Japan reached 94,521, of whom 91.8 percent are from Asian countries. Korea is experiencing a similar situation where in 2006, 89.6 percent of the nearly 30,000 international students studying there are from other Asian countries.[18] Comparable figures are also growing rapidly in other East Asian countries, including China, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.

Japan is now implementing its second plan to recruit 300,000 international students by 2020, most of whom are expected to come from within East Asia. Malaysia and Singapore have declared themselves to be educational hubs and are competing with each other to attract Asian and other international students into joint educational programs and offshore campuses of prestigious universities from around the world which are now operating within these two countries. Most of the countries in East Asia are now in the process of internationalization of higher education with an increasing presence of international dimensions in their development programs and strategies, a growing number of international cooperation activities with foreign countries and institutions, and greater mobility of staff and students. The thirteen nations of East Asia are now aiming to establish an East Asian Community in which society and culture, including higher education, is one of the three pillars of cooperation. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit emphasizes the role of integration in higher education for peace and mutual understanding, promoting interaction between students, researchers, and academics among East Asian countries. Other initiatives and efforts have been made by countries and regional organizations to promote cooperation, integration, and harmonization in higher education in the region. However, East Asia is lagging far behind other regions of the world in promoting even a basic level of policy harmonization to achieve common objectives and interests in the area of higher education.[19]

To accelerate this process, apart from the necessity of having the commitment and involvement of individual nations and institutions, it is also very important for regional organizations to actively play their role in promoting regional integration in higher education. Currently, there are a number of regional organizations dealing with higher education in East Asia, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Institutions of Higher Learning（ASAIHL）, the Asia and Pacific Regional Bureau for Education, which belongs to UNESCO Bangkok, the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organization（SEAMEO）, the Regional Institute of Higher Education and Development（RIHED）, the University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific（UMAP）, and the ASEAN University Network（AUN）. In the following pages, we will examine the case of three regional organizations that are actively promoting higher education regional cooperation and integration in the region, namely UMAP, AUN, and RIHED.

The University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific（UMAP）

During the 1990s, East Asian countries developed links to the United States and Europe to explore further liberalization.[20] The University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific（UMAP）plan was proposed in 1991 by Australia. It was then conceived in 1993 as a voluntary association of government and non-government representatives of the higher education sector in the region. By 2008, 34 eligible countries and territories had joined UMAP, with more than 356 participating universities. The overall aim of UMAP is to enhance international understanding among countries and territories of the Asia and Pacific region in terms of cultural, economic, and social issues through cooperation between higher education institutions and increased mobility of students and staff. To achieve this broad goal, UMAP established a number of specific objectives to identify and overcome impediments to student mobility, to move beyond bilateral to multilateral arrangements, and to develop and maintain a system for granting and recognizing academic credits earned by exchanged students. To provide a greater number of students an opportunity to study abroad, UMAP concentrates on short-term exchange programs in which participating students spend a minimum of one semester and a maximum of two semesters in a host foreign university.

The credits for study undertaken while on exchange are to be transferred to and accepted by the participating students' home university. Given the fact that different institutions in the region have different types of credit systems and different ways of evaluating the study performance of students, UMAP has developed and put into use the so-called UMAP Credit Transfer Scheme (UCTS). This system is expected to help increase student mobility by overcoming impediments to credit transfers and ensuring that the study achievement of exchanged students is recognized by sending universities by providing a common scale to convert credit points and grades.

Although UMAP has been in existence for fifteen years and has been promoted in 34 countries, the popularity of UMAP among universities and students in the region is still very limited and its credit transfer scheme has not been utilized by a majority of institutions to facilitate student/staff mobility. According to the "Report of UMAP survey on student exchanges in Japan" (2005), from 2000 to 2005, the number of incoming and outgoing students in Japan who participated in exchange programs resulting in credit transfers was 7,336 and 8,573, respectively. However, only 6 percent of the 171 Japanese institutions responding to the survey were participating in UMAP and another 8 percent (13 institutions) knew about UMAP well. Meanwhile, 12 percent (21 institutions) did not know about UMAP at all. The remaining 74 percent (126 institutions) indicated a limited amount of familiarity with UMAP. As for the importance of the credit transfer scheme UCTS, the survey results indicate that 42 percent (71 of 168 responding institutions) recognized its necessity in promoting student exchanges, while 53 percent (89 institutions) did not perceive UCTS to be necessary and another 5 percent were even opposed to the use of credit transfer schemes. In fact, only a small number – 19 out of the 171 institutions that responded – were actually using UCTS in their student exchanges. The biggest reason cited for not using UCTS was that these institutions had their own scheme to transfer foreign credits into their credit systems. Two other reasons given by the institutions in the survey, which were considered by UMAP to be problematic to its activities, were the lack of knowledge in implementing UCTS and the complications in using this scheme.

In its strategic plan for the period 2006-2010, UMAP defined its vision as being recognized as the quality leader in higher education mobility within Asia and the Pacific. UMAP has the potential to realize its goal since it has wide regional networks in Asia-Pacific countries, both under the APEC umbrella and beyond. The diverse cultures of the UMAP members are also an attractive point which offers students and faculty opportunities to enrich their learning and intercultural experiences as well. However, UMAP has to deal with the issue of identity, i.e., the need to differentiate itself and its programs from other exchange activities and arrangements that universities could undertake and implement independently. Additionally, one of the impediments to the promotion of student/staff mobility within the UMAP framework is the lack of sufficient financial support to offer scholarships to students. Currently UMAP does not have funds to assist individual exchanges, and funding arrangements for exchanges are made between the home and host universities. Host institutions are expected to waive tuition fees for UMAP students on exchange and assist them in obtaining accommodation at a reasonable cost. However, students and staff have to pay for other living expenses from their own budgets. This is one of the most significant limiting factors for many students and staff, especially when they are from developing countries, and it prevents them from participating in the exchange programs. The lack of effective communication tools to provide data and information to member countries, institutions, students/staff, and other interested individuals is another challenge for UMAP. The problem may be compounded by the low commitment and inactiveness of participating universities and the contact persons in charge of disseminating information related to UMAP's activities and the organization itself. Moreover, the fact that government policies in each member country are not responsive to UMAP exchanges as well as the differences and diversity in education systems among the members is also a hindrance for UMAP's activities.

UMAP is now making much effort to promote student/staff mobility within the region through exchange programs and the use of the UCTS credit transfer scheme. However, in order for this process to be accelerated, it is vital to increase the commitment and active involvement of member countries and institutions.

The ASEAN University Network（AUN）

As mentioned above, East Asia in general and ASEAN in particular are diverse regions in many aspects. In the field of higher education, differences between countries are also remarkable. Diversity in higher education quality and institutional development exists not only between institutions of different countries but also among universities in each country. This situation makes it difficult to promote cooperation and integration among all universities in the whole region. They have different abilities and capacities to follow common plans and activities, they may also have different targets to reach and not the same priority areas of development, let alone the tendency of good universities to prefer to collaborate with other institutions of similar or higher quality. I argue that it is meaningful for the ASEAN sub-region to promote cooperation and integration among leading universities first and then create an impetus and basis to extend the network and integrate other universities into the regional process. One of the approaches that ASEAN is now taking to promote regional integration in higher education is the "elite approach," which is most clearly manifested in the ASEAN University Network（AUN）.

At the Fourth ASEAN Summit in 1992, the ASEAN leaders decided that cooperation in the field of higher education and human resource development should be strengthened and promoted. Particularly, the leaders emphasized, ASEAN should consider ways to further develop the existing network of leading regional higher education institutions. The idea was eventually realized with the establishment of the ASEAN University Network（AUN）in 1995, when the heads of eleven countries signed the organization's charter and representatives from participating universities signed related agreements. The main objective of the AUN is to strengthen the existing network of cooperation among leading universities in ASEAN by promoting cooperation and solidarity among ASEAN scholars and academicians, developing academic and professional human resources, and promoting information dissemination among the ASEAN academic community. As of June 2007, the AUN had become a network of 21 members, with a minimum of one and a maximum of three key universities from each of the ten ASEAN countries.

Currently, the AUN is undertaking more than 20 collaborative projects within ASEAN and with its dialogue partners such as China, the European Union, Japan, and Korea. These activities can be divided into three main categories. The first category includes programs that aim to foster the sense of ASEAN-ness, raise the profile of ASEAN among the region's next generation of leaders, deepen and develop knowledge and understanding of the diverse educational, social, cultural, and geo-political environment among ASEAN youths and students in particular and the ASEAN people in general. These activities consist of the AUN Educational Forum and Young Speakers Contest, the AUN Youth Cultural Forum, and the ASEAN Youth Summit. The "elite approach" is also applied to these activities in the sense that they are open to only a small number of bright representatives from each member university who are expected to become the leading people playing important roles at institutional, national, and inter-governmental levels in the near future and contribute extensively and intensively to the promotion of regional cooperation and integration.

Another main group of activities focuses on promoting student and staff mobility among member universities, enhancing collaboration in academic research, and sharing of information. These programs include the ASEAN Studies Program, the Student and Faculty Exchange Program, the AUN Distinguished Scholars Program, the Collaborative Research, the Information Networking, the ASEAN Graduate Business and Economics Program（AGBEP）Network, the

AUN-Southeast Asia Engineering Education Development Network（AUN/SEED-Net）, and the AUN Intellectual Property（AUNIP）Network. These programs encompass both discipline-based or functional and general collaborative initiatives.

With the aim to enhance the overall academic standards of member universities and consequently lead to mutual recognition in the ASEAN region, the AUN has developed an AUN-Quality Assurance network, which is the first of its kind in trying to establish a sub-regional networking on QA in ASEAN.[21] The AUN Secretariat has published the first manual for the implementation of internal quality assurance, not only for its member universities but also for other universities in ASEAN if they are interested in using these guidelines and applying for the AUN-QA label. The Initiative for ASEAN Integration（IAI）is a project whose core objective is to narrow the gap between the original six founding members of ASEAN and the newly joining CLMV countries（Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam）. This initiative focuses on assisting the CLMV countries in four strategic sectors, namely, infrastructure, human resource development, information and communication technology, and infrastructure development.

On a broader scope, the AUN has extended its collaborative activities with ASEAN dialogue partners in an effort to enhance cooperation and integration in the field of higher education throughout the whole East Asia. The establishment of the ASEAN-China Academic Exchange Program helps to further people-to-people contacts and exchanges between ASEAN and China in higher education. The AUN/SEED-Net mentioned earlier is an autonomous sub-network of the AUN and comprises 19 engineering higher education institutions in ten ASEAN countries receiving support of eleven leading Japanese Supporting Universities. The Republic of Korea is also a close partner of the AUN and is developing cooperation through a number of programs: the ASEAN-Korea Academic Exchange Program（KASEAS）, the International College Student Exchange Program, the Promotion of ASEAN and Korean Studies, and the AUN-GIST（ASEAN University Network-Gwangju Institute of Technology, Korea）Scholarship on Science and Technology.

With the variety of activities and endeavors mentioned here, the AUN has actively contributed to the build-up of a robust and renowned ASEAN community in higher education. The AUN is expected to play a major role in broadening the integration of the ten member countries into one cohesive ASEAN Community and narrowing the development gap among them.

SEAMEO Regional Centre for Higher Education and Development（RIHED）

UNESCO and the International Association of Universities（IAU）in collaboration with the Ford Foundation jointly conceived the Regional Institute of Higher Education and Development（RIHED）in 1959. It was then formally materialized in Singapore in July with seven member states, namely Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. In 1992, after a period of inactivity, RIHED was reconstituted under the umbrella of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization（SEAMEO）and hosted by the Thai Government. Unlike the AUN, which deals with higher education cooperation at an institutional level, SEAMEO RIHED works with member states at a ministerial level. The main objectives of the organization are to "assist the Member States in fostering efficiency and effectiveness of their higher education, with a focus on policy and planning processes, administrative and management systems."[22] RIHED also aims at serving as "the regional centre and clearing-house for higher education information and documentation, promoting the exchange and dissemination of information and research findings on higher education planning and management, both within and outside the region."[23] The organization's goal in promoting collaboration among its member states is to establish institutional linkages and assist these countries in the strengthening of institution building and development. The Second Five-Year Development Plan of SEAMEO RIHED has identified the following seven priority areas for its programs and activities:

1） Management and Administration;
2） Quality Assurance and Benchmarking;
3） Applications of Information and Communication Technology;
4） Effective Learning-Teaching Methodology;
5） Building up Research Capabilities;
6） Promoting Collaboration with Private Sector and Industry; and,
7） Involvement in Regional Groupings.[24]

During the recent years, SEAMEO RIHED has been very active in promoting regional co-operation and integration in the field of higher education with a special focus on policy harmonization among member countries. In February 2008, RIHED issued the first lecture series, titled "Harmonization of Higher Education: Lessons Learned from the Bologna Process." This publication can be seen as a guideline and framework for closer harmonization in higher education in Asia. The book states: "Given the inherent constraints of regional diversity and disparity in higher education systems, the safest line in promoting regional higher education integration and harmonization might be through small mechanisms, such as the QA and comparable and readable degree systems." These lines of actions might be chosen as an alternative to the overarching regional framework, which usually invites doubts and a suspicion among Asian countries."[25]

This perspective presents the "step-by-step" approach that is being used by this regional organization. In the first place, it is necessary to develop concrete mechanisms in certain aspects of higher education activities which are interrelated, such as mobility, recognition, credit transfer, and quality assurance. These activities will gradually familiarize countries and institutions in the region with regional cooperation and integration, raising the awareness among them of the necessity and significance of this process and helping to overcome the perception that regional diversity is an obstacle to the harmonization process. The region will then consider the possibility of having a more comprehensive and systematic framework for regional integration in higher education as was discussed in the "International Conference Series on Raising Awareness: Exploring the Ideas of Creating Higher Education Common Space in Southeast Asia," held by RIHED in November, 2008.[26]

As proposed by RIHED, the priority areas for closer harmonization in higher education in the region should be a System of Quality Assurance and a System of Readable and Comparable Degrees. Regarding the harmonization in quality assurance, RIHED strongly advocates the promotion of a common understanding of QA systems in the region and especially the establishment of internal QA and external QA sub-networks in order to increase the sharing of information and best practices among the regional countries and institutions.[27]

Together with the reliable and accountable QA system, a readable and comparable degree is also an important area to be promoted in the region in order to encourage collaboration among higher education institutions in the region, increase the attractiveness of regional higher education, and accommodate freer flows and more sustainable mobility among students, researchers, and graduates. This system of readable and comparable degrees can be promoted through the development of a regional credit transfer system（UCTS）, a regional and national qualification framework, and a degree supplement mechanism.

Another approach to promote regional integration and harmonization in East Asia being employed by RIHED is the "pilot-project approach." As identified in the publication "Harmonization of Higher Education: Lessons Learned from the Bologna Process," the level of disparity of higher education institutions and QA development in the region is significantly high. While a number of East Asian countries such as Japan, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines have established national QA mechanisms, others are still in the process of developing quality assurance infrastructure. Singapore is an exceptional case where the government utilizes external QA

systems from developed countries.[28] Facing the various stages of QA system development in the region, RIHED has begun to undertake a pilot study project in which it selects only five out of ten ASEAN countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, to come together to deal with QA issues in the region. The organization disseminates questionnaires to all stakeholders related to higher education in these countries, such as ministries of education, universities, the civil service sector, the industry sector, and foreign affairs departments to collect their opinions and perspectives on regional harmonization in this area. RIHED also successfully holds the ASEAN Quality Assurance Agencies Roundtable workshops in each participating country in order for the five countries to share experiences, good practices by showing "who is doing what" in QA, and express their desire to have QA harmonization in the region. The organization is now also aiming at setting up a Human Network of QA Agencies People to further strengthen the regional collaboration and coordination in this field.

4. Conclusion and Suggestions for Promoting East Asian Cooperation and Integration in Higher Education

Regional organizations have been actively playing their role in promoting higher education regional cooperation and integration in East Asia through a variety of programs, projects, activities, and initiatives. Policy harmonization, particularly in such areas as mobility, recognition, credit transfer, and quality assurance, is considered essential to build up and prepare the "infrastructure" for further regional cooperation and integration in higher education and is one of the main targets of these organizations. Despite significant endeavors made by these organizations, results achieved so far are not as satisfactory as expected. Among the impediments to this process are the diversity and disparity of countries and higher education systems in the region, the variety of languages, the differences in credit, curriculum, and grading systems, and the disparity in education quality and recognition of higher education institutions in the region. Other obstacles include the lack of sufficient financial resources, the capacity and ability of regional organizations, national bodies and higher education institutions in promoting cooperation and integration, and the lack of commitment at both national and institutional levels in many regional countries.

Given the specific context of countries in East Asia and its higher education institutions, regional organizations have taken a number of various approaches to promote regional integration and harmonization in higher education. East Asia has a network of leading universities working together to achieve mutual goals with a view to spreading the benefits of collaboration and serving as a basis for gradual integration of other universities in the region into the process. At the same time the ASEAN sub-region has an organization dealing with higher education at the national or ministerial level and includes the majority of universities in the area which belong to their national ministries of education. These arrangements may better tackle the problem of disparity among universities in the region and help speed up the integration process. However, one question that has been raised concerning this "elite approach" is whether there will actually be an effective spill over effect in the future. That is, could the AUN "play a major role in broadening the integration of the ten member countries into one cohesive ASEAN Community and narrowing the development gap among them,"[29] as stated in the objectives of the organization? Another issue is how to increase the awareness of ASEAN-ness and achieve mutual understanding not only among the bright representatives participating in these activities but also among the broader ASEAN community. There should be mechanisms for these participants to play their role in realizing the spillover effect in their community upon returning from the cooperative events. Definitely, the activities and initiatives to increase the awareness among the "already-aware" is not enough

to promote further regional integration.

Regional organizations also have activities and programs that target various groups of countries at certain points in time, as in the case of the "pilot-project approach" and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration that focuses on the CLMV. As for the "pilot-project approach," at the end of the day, the problem is whether other countries and institutions currently excluded will be able or eager to join their cooperative efforts after a period of time for undertaking a consensus effort and sharing in a mechanism for the whole region. The "step-by-step approach" is another significant point in the approaches taken by East Asian regional organizations. This can be an alternative to an overarching regional framework, which tends to invite doubts and suspicion among Asian countries.[30] However, an important question regarding this approach is how to mobilize concerted efforts among countries and institutions without a long-term overall strategy for the whole region that sets specific targets, a concrete schedule, and timelines for implementation? Moreover, it is important to have an overarching regional framework so that participating countries and institutions can take into account and integrate these regional plans and settings into their own development strategies and reforms.

In order to promote regional cooperation and integration in higher education, it is important for regional organizations to have continuous campaigns and activities to raise awareness of the significance of this process among the countries and institutions in the region. These key actors should fully recognize and understand the rationales behind the cooperative schemes and their objectives and the benefits they can gain from further regional higher education integration. Once the participants take the necessity of regional cooperation and integration into serious consideration and incorporate them into their strategic development plans, they can gradually and more effectively tackle other problems. Although regional organizations play a very important role in promoting higher education regional integration, it is the nations, the institutions, and the individuals who are the deciding actors who will determine the success of this process.

References

Altbach, M., and P. Altback（1993）*Higher Education in International Perspective: Toward the 21st Century*. New York: UNESCO.

Altbach, P.G.（1988）"Academic Freedom in Asia." *Far Eastern Economic Review,* June 16, 24-25.

Altbach, P.G., and Patti M. Peterson, eds.（1999）*Higher Education in the 21st Century: Global Challenge and National Response*. Institute of International Education Research Report, No. 29.

Altbach, P.G., and Toru Umakoshi, eds.（2004）*Asian Universities: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Challenges*. Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Altbach, P.G.（2004）"Globalization and the University: Myths and Realities in an Unequal World." *Tertiary Education and Management,* No. 1.

Asian Development Bank（2008）*Emerging Asian Regionalism: A Partnership for Shared Prosperity*. Manila: ADB.

Knight, J.（2002）*Trade in Higher Education Services: The Implications of GATS.*London: The Observatory on Borderless Higher Education. Available at: *http://www.unesco.org/education/studyingabroad/highlights/global_forum/gats_he/jk_trade_he_gats_implications.pdf*（accessed January 29, 2009）.

Knight, J.（2006）*Internationalization of Higher Education: New Directions, New Challenges*. The 2005 Internationalization Survey Preliminary Findings Report, Paris: International Association of Universities. Available at: *http://www.unesco.org/iau/internationalization/pdf/internationalization_2005.pdf*（accessed January 29, 2009）.

Mittelman, J.H., ed.（1996）*Globalization: Critical Reflections*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Murphy, M.（2007）"Experiences in the Internationalization of Education: Strategies to Promote Equality of Opportunity at Monterrey Tech." *Higher Education* 53, 167-208.

Nelson, The Hon B.（2002）*Higher Education at the Crossroads: An Overview Paper*. Canberra: AusInfo.

Ninnes, Peter, and Meeri Hellstén, eds.（2005）*Internationalizing Higher Education: Critical Explorations of Pedagogy and Policy*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Robertson, S.（2007）"Regionalism 'Europe/Asia' and Higher Education." *Higher Education,* January.

Singh, P.（2004）"Globalization and Education." *Educational Theory* 54:1, 103-115.

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization（2003）*Higher Education in Asia and the Pacific: 1988-2003*. Paris: UNESCO.

University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific（2007）*UMAP Strategic Plan（2006-2010）*. Bangkok: UMAP.

University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific（UMAP）, website http://www.umap.org/.

Yang, R., and Welch, A.（2001）"Internationalizing Chinese Universities: A Study of Guangzhou." *World Studies in Education,* 2:1, 21-51.

Acknowledgment

Notes

1   J. Knight and H. de Wit, eds., *Internationalization of Higher Education in Asia Pacific Countries*, Amsterdam: European Association for International Education, 1997, p. 6; quoted in Knight, 2004 "Internationalization Remodeled: Definition, Approaches, and Rationales," *Journal of Studies in International Education,* Vol. 8, No. 5（2004）, p. 8.

2   P.G. Altbach and Jane Knight, "The Internationalization of Higher Education: Motivations and Realities," *Journal of Studies in International Education*, Vol. 11, No. 3/4（Fall/Winter, 2007）, p. 291.

3   J. Knight, "Updating the Definition of Internationalization," *International Higher Education,* No. 33（Fall 2003）, pp. 2-3.

4   Zha Qiang, "Internationalization of Higher Education: Towards a Conceptual Framework," *Policy Futures in Education*, Vol. 1, No. 2（2003）, p. 250.

5   Regional Center for Higher Education and Development（SEAMEO RIHED）, *Harmonization of Higher Education: Lessons Learned from the Bologna Process*, Bangkok: SEAMEO RIHED, Lecture Series, No. 1（February 2008）, pp. 23-24.

6   Ibid., p.95.

7   Ibid., p.37.

8   P. McKenzie, R. Horne, A. Dowling, and A. Beavis, *Harnessing Educational Cooperation in the EAS for Regional Competitiveness and Community Building*, Report to the ASEAN Secretariat, Regional Economic Policy Support Framework II Project 07/006, Melbourne: Australian Council for Educational Research, 2008.

9   Regional Center for Higher Education and Development（SEAMEO RIHED）.

10   César de Prado Yepes, "World Regionalization of Higher Education: Policy Proposals for International

Organizations," *Higher Education Policy*, 19（2006）, p. 114.

11 Ibid., p. 114.
12 Ibid., p. 121.
13 Regional Center for Higher Education and Development（SEAMEO RIHED）, p. 29.
14 Ibid., p. 30.
15 Ibid., p. 31.
16 Ibid., p. 32.
17 Ibid., p. 33.
18 The South Korean Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development（MEHRD）, Seoul, 2006.
19 Regional Center for Higher Education and Development（SEAMEO RIHED）, p. 95.
20 de Prado Yepes, "World Regionalization of Higher Education," p. 117.
21 Regional Center for Higher Education and Development（SEAMEO RIHED）, p. 83.
22 SEAMEO RIHED homepage:
   http://www.rihed.seameo.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=40&Itemid=48（accessed January 28, 2009）.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Regional Center for Higher Education and Development（SEAMEO RIHED）, p. 82.
26 SEAMEO RIHED homepage:
   http://www.rihed.seameo.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=101&Itemid=44（accessed January 28, 2008）.
27 Regional Center for Higher Education and Development（SEAMEO RIHED）.
28 Ibid.
29 ASEAN University Network homepage: *http://www.aun-sec.org/*（accessed on January 29, 2009）.
30 Ibid.

From Intellectual Cooperation to International Cultural Exchange:
Japan and China in the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation

Takashi Saikawa

Abstract

This article explores the paradigm shift in the idea of international cultural exchange in the interwar period, mainly focusing on the discourse in the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations. It shows that the ICIC, initially established as a universal community of intellectuals sharing values of Western civilization, confronted challenges from Japan and China emphasizing the role of governments and the significance of national cultures. As a result, the ICIC moved away from the universalism of Western civilization and came to seek a close cooperation with governments and to underscore the particularity of national cultures in its ideas and programs. The article argues that this paradigm shift from universality to particularity of culture, from intellectual cooperation to international cultural exchange, was brought about by Asian countries such as Japan and China, and accordingly that the idea of international cultural exchange can be regarded as a globalized and transcultural product which emerged from the web of interactions between the ICIC on one hand and Japan and China on the other, as well as between Europe and Asia.

1. Introduction

The purpose of this essay is to explore the globalized and trans-cultural flow of ideas related to international cultural exchange between Europe and Asia during the interwar period. The main focus of this essay is on the ideas and activities of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation（ICIC）,[1] that was established in 1922 as a technical organization of the League of Nations aiming to facilitate international understanding. It can be assumed that the ICIC, called the "League of Cultures," functioned as the global basis of the foundation of national organizations for international cultural exchange in major countries such as Germany（the Goethe Institute in 1933）, Great Britain（the British Council in 1934）, and Japan（The Center for International Cultural Relations in 1934）.[2] Starting with the question of why these national organizations for international cultural exchange came simultaneously into existence, this essay examines the transformation of the discourse on international cultural exchange in the ICIC. In particular, it shows empirically that the fundamental principles of the ICIC which were initially based on monism of Western civilization, underwent a gradual transformation into cultural relativism based on the particularity of national cultures.

At the same time, this essay examines the role of China and Japan in this paradigm shift in the ICIC discourse. Both Asian countries revolted against the Euro-centric view of connecting the idea of civilization with nationalism.[3] Transcending the Euro-centric view of international cultural exchange, which pervaded the literature on the topic during that period,[4] this study analyzes the resistance to and adoption of cultural practices of the ICIC from the non-Western nations in East Asia. China and Japan were not only the most ardent advocates for the ICIC in the non-Western world but also the most outspoken critics of the Euro-centrism of allegedly universal organizations such as the League of Nations, which was in truth the embodiment of a diffuse

internationalism of Western civilization.[5] Refuting this monism, both China and Japan asserted the plurality of world civilizations, while paradoxically arguing for the centrality of Asian civilization. These two Asian countries underscored the representativeness and the respective superiority of their national cultures within Asian civilization. As a result, this symbiosis of civilization with nationalism contributed to the formation of the modern conception of international cultural exchange, based on the particularity of national culture, implemented by nation states and aimed at fostering national interests. Thus, this essay demonstrates that the idea of international cultural exchange itself can be regarded as a globalized and trans-cultural product which emerged from the web of interactions between the ICIC on one hand and Japan and China on the other, as well as between Europe and Asia.

2. Establishment of the ICIC

It was in 1922 that the Council of the League of Nations founded the ICIC as its consultative organization. At the first plenary session of the ICIC in August 1922, Nitobe Inazo, Undersecretary General in charge of intellectual cooperation,[6] made an opening address, in which he defined the characteristics of the ICIC.

> *The members of the Committee were all personalities eminent in the various branches of human knowledge, and their relations with their respective Governments, which they in no ways represented, were those of complete independence.*
> *The work of the Committee, the scope of which had not been strictly defined, either by the Council or by the Assembly, was to submit to the Assembly a report on the step to be taken by the League to facilitate intellectual relations between peoples, particularly in respect of the communication of scientific information.*[7]

According to Nitobe, at least two characteristics of the ICIC can be identified. The first one is "non-governmentality". In principle, the members of the ICIC should be elected not as a government representative but as a representative of various academic fields. In other words, the important thing for the members is not their nationality but their academic achievements. In this way, the ICIC laid great stress on the role of individuals, while the League of Nations itself was an intergovernmental organization. The second characteristic is its emphasis on "universality" of culture. Whereas Nitobe stressed the communication of scientific information, fundamental principles of the early ICIC were based on "universal culture" shared by all intellectuals such as "science" and "objectivity".[8] Thus, it can be said that the "intellectual cooperation" in the early ICIC meant the intercourse and solidarity among intellectuals based on the universality of culture. In fact, just as nationality was ignored in the election of the members, the ICIC in the early years gave little consideration to the particularity of national cultures.

However, Nitobe as the chief secretary of the ICIC was fully aware that a number of governments were attempting to influence this new project called "intellectual cooperation" in different ways, and that it was hard to ignore problems concerning nationality. After the first plenary session of the ICIC, Nitobe submitted a report on the establishment of the ICIC, in which he mentioned this problem.

> *In the nomination of the members, nationality was to be ignored in principle, and only the personal merits of individual candidates were to count. Such an ideal principle of appointment was hard to follow. Practically all the nationalities composing the Council were represented in the Committee, except Japan and China. Why these exceptions?*

As to China, because her universities are yet so little developed; as to Japan, it was first planned（in my private discussion with M. Lafontaine and Professor Gilbert Murray who took the most active part in the question in the Assembly）to make the Committee as small as possible - five or seven members - and it was thought that the presence of a Japanese（myself）in the capacity of secretary, would actually though not officially represent the Far East; but finally the full member of twelve was appointed, and I thought that Asia should have a better representation.[9]

Here Nitobe admitted that intense pressure from governments made the ICIC unable to carry out the principle of ignorance of nationality. Nonetheless, as he reported, Japan and China were not represented as members of the ICIC.[10] Like Nitobe, both the Japanese and Chinese governments intensified the feeling that "Asia" should be represented in the ICIC since the "universality" of the ICIC was based on the Euro-centric view on culture. Thus, both governments started to get involved in the ICIC, revolting against its "universalism".

3. Challenges from Asia: China[11]

China was the first challenger to the universalism of the ICIC. China's commitment to the ICIC coincided with its active campaign for a non-permanent seat of the Council. Although China, the Beiyang Government of the Republic of China at that time, successfully gained the non-permanent seat at the election in the first assembly of the League in 1920, its position was in flux, since non-permanent members were supposed to be replaced every few years. In order to perpetuate China's position as a non-permanent member, the Chinese delegates led by Wellington Koo were incessantly engaged in an exploitation campaign on the occasion of the election.[12] In this campaign, China asserted Fenzhou Zhuyi, a principle that the non-permanent seats of the Council of the League of Nations should be distributed according to cultural diversity as well as geographic location.[13] Emphasizing the geographical and cultural importance of Asia in the world, China asked for the distribution of non-permanent seats on the basis of a sort of "cultural relativism." However, it must be noted that China implied behind this logic of "cultural relativism" its consciousness of great nation, its national identity as a representative of Asia.[14]

In the same way, China had shown its keen interest in the ICIC since the early stage of the establishment of the ICIC. For example, at the 4th Assembly of the League of Nations in 1923, China with confidence insisted on the importance of Asia in the project of the ICIC, calling for the nomination of a Chinese intellectual as a member of the ICIC.

［T］he intellectual movement in the Far East was not adequately represented on the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation. The culture of China was one of the oldest, and...it would be advisable for the Committee to include a specialist on Far-Eastern questions. The exchange of professors and students between the West and the Far East should certainly become more frequent. Intellectual exchange would bring about a better understanding between nations.[15]

China subsequently proposed a draft resolution that the membership of the ICIC should be extended to cover the field of the ancient studies in Asiatic countries.[16] Though China herewith aimed to achieve the nomination of a Chinese member in the ICIC, it eventually failed to obtain broad support from other countries.[17]

A Chinese delegate bitterly complained about the lack of a Chinese member in the composition of the ICIC, criticizing India that already had a membership in the ICIC.[18] In short, from the

standpoint of China, Asia was not appreciated until China occupied a position of a member in the ICIC. Insisting on the cultural importance of Asia, China proposed a sort of international "cultural relativism," which forced the ICIC to modify the idea of intellectual cooperation based on the universality of culture.

4. Challenges from Asia: Japan[19]

To be sure, the Japanese government sent Nitobe to the ICIC virtually as the Japanese representative. However, this is not to say that Japan had been actively involved in the programs of the ICIC. In fact, the Japanese government paid little attention to the ICIC in its early years. It was at the time of Nitobe's resignation from the League in 1926 that the Japanese government launched cooperation with the ICIC.

In 1926, Gakugei Kyōryoku Iinkai (the National Committee of Japan on Intellectual Cooperation) was established.[20] Although this committee was established as a private organization, the Japanese government, in particular the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had continually taken the initiative in the process of its formation. This involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was evident not only in the constitution of the Japanese national committee but also in the financial sources of the committee. In fact, because the committee was funded by the ministry, all members were selected by the ministry during the funding period. Consequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a great influence on the Japanese national committee in terms of both the process of its formation and the financial resources. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the committee was eventually inaugurated not as a subordinate organ of the ministry but as a private organization belonging to the Japan Association for the League of Nations.[21] For this reason, the committee was called a "bastard child of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."[22]

This national committee implemented various cultural exchange programs, such as the translation of Japanese commercial law and civil law into English, the publication of the yearbook of Japanese art, and the introduction of Japanese literary classics. To be sure, the committee was originally established as a national organization of the ICIC, but in the process of its formation, its main purpose came to be defined not as one of corresponding and cooperating with the ICIC but as one of introducing Japanese culture to the West. To illustrate, a pamphlet prepared by the national committee, its main aim was stated as follows:

> *The primary purpose of our committee is to introduce Japanese culture. In terms of international cooperation, it must be an urgent task to show the true nature of Oriental culture to Western people who often know very little about it.[23]*

With this in mind, the most crucial task of the committee was to introduce Japanese culture overseas, especially to Western countries.[24] As with China, it can be argued that by Japan identifying herself as a representative of Asia, she challenged the universalism espoused by the Eurocentric members of the ICIC by emphasizing the particularity of national cultures. It should be noted that there were incompatible views between China and Japan on the status of the representative of Asia. Notwithstanding, China and Japan worked in concert to revolt against the universalistic nature of the ICIC. In fact, Japan consistently advocated the "cultural relativism" asserted by China in the League, and vice versa.[25]

5. ICIC toward Asia

As a consequence of the above-mentioned challenges from China and Japan, the idea of the ICIC eventually shifted from universality to particularity. At the same time, the involvement of governments, which was prudently excluded at first, came to be embraced by the ICIC. The changes that occurred in the ICIC can be demonstrated by two projects: the Mission of Educational Experts to China and the Japanese Collection.

The project of the Mission of Educational Experts to China was initiated at the request of the Nationalist Chinese Government in Nanjing to cooperate with the League of Nations on April 25, 1931. The Nationalist Government, inheriting the basic understanding on the ICIC from the Beiyang Government, not only succeeded in the nomination of Wu Zhi-Hui as a first Chinese member of the ICIC[26] but also aimed to promote further cooperation with the League of Nations. This request was part of the "Technical Cooperation" implemented between China and the League in the 1930s and meant that the Chinese commission of the ICIC was to investigate the situation of education in China and submit the report on the reform of Chinese educational system. Soon after receiving the request, the ICIC organized and dispatched the mission to China in September 1931.[27] This project was the first experience for the ICIC to assist a particular government.[28] Hitherto, the ICIC's fundamental principle was defined in non-governmental terms in its early years; however it came to develop cooperative relations with governments.

In 1932 the mission published its report in which the intention of the ICIC to cooperate with China was manifested as follows:

> *The educational system of a country is one of the strongest bounds of national unity. In China this fact has always been acknowledged, but the recent development under a variety of foreign influences has severely endangered the unity of the national culture. The starting-point of our proposal is the desire to re-establish this unity under the altered conditions of modern China, and to emphasise the national and social character of her educational system.*[29]

Here, it can be found that the ICIC had an intense interest in the national unity of China, especially Chinese national culture. In this respect, the ICIC suggested that China under the influence of foreign cultures should reconstruct and preserve the national genius of China and the particularity of its national culture. Thus, the ICIC intended to engage in the construction of national values as well as lay emphasis on the particularity of national culture. In other words, the Mission of Educational Experts to China can be regarded as the ICIC's attempt to construct China's national culture from the outside.

Adopting the similar approach toward Japan, the ICIC started the publication of the Japanese Collection in 1935. This project, originally advocated by the Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai (The Center for International Cultural Relation of Japan), was approved at the plenary session of the ICIC in 1935.[30] With financial support by the Japanese government, the ICIC intended to introduce Japanese culture to Western countries by translating Japanese classics into French. The Japanese Collection had two primary objectives, first, "to make a civilization better known in its past, and also in its more recent developments," and second, "to render accessible to a wide public the masterpieces of Japanese thought, notably those which have contributed most largely to the molding of the national mentality and which are a characteristic expression of the culture of a people."[31] Based on these principles, the ICIC published three volumes as the Japan Collection.[32]

The most significant aspect about the Japanese Collection is that the ICIC started the pro-

gram to introduce Japanese culture to Western countries, which was initially implemented by the National Committee of Japan. In so doing, the ICIC underscored the significance of the particularity of national culture, such as "the moulding of national mentality" and "a characteristic expression of the culture," and subsequently this attitude was expanded to the general pattern of the ICIC with respect to national cultures.[33] It can be said that the ICIC purposefully facilitated the construction of Japanese national culture from the outside, as with the case of the Mission of Educational Experts to China regarding Chinese national culture. The reason for these efforts is that the ICIC at this point thought of mutual understanding and exchange of "particular" national cultures as the essence of intellectual cooperation.

6. Conclusion

The idea of intellectual cooperation in the ICIC was dramatically transformed through the confrontational commitment of China and Japan. Two main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of these two Asian countries' stance.

First, though the ICIC paid little attention to the roles of governments and the values of national cultures in its early years, in accordance with the challenges of China and Japan, it came to seek a close partnership with governments, supporting the construction of their national cultures from the outside. Again, the idea of intellectual cooperation shifted from universality to particularity of culture. For instance, at the 20th plenary session of the ICIC in 1938, G. de Reynold, who had been a member of the ICIC since its establishment, summarized the principles of intellectual cooperation.

（1）Our organization has been established to serve intellectual life.
（2）Establishment of our organization on solid national basis.
（3）To respect the diversity and originality of all forms of culture and all aspects of civilizations.
（4）Universality.[34]

Compared with the statement by Nitobe in 1922, it can be argued that the ICIC moved away from the universality of culture that emphasized roles of individual intellectuals and was finally settled into particularity of culture based on national cultures. The ICIC was no longer a universal intellectual community but a "League of Cultures," an organization among national cultures. In this sense, the ICIC as a "League of Cultures" provided the international basis of national organizations for international cultural organization, which were simultaneously founded in various countries in the 1930s.

Second, this paradigm shift of the ICIC resulted from the challenges of Japan and China. As previously stated, both of the governments revolted against the universalism of the ICIC with great emphasis on the particularity of each national culture. This antagonism should be regarded as a stinging criticism against the Euro-centric view on which the universalism of the ICIC was based. It can be concluded that China and Japan contributed to the shift of the idea of intellectual cooperation in the interwar period, and to the formation of the idea on international cultural exchange, one that international cultural exchange should be implemented by nation-states and primarily based on the idea of national culture.

Notes

1 The ICIC, boasting famous intellectuals such as Henri Bergson, Marie Curie, Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, and Paul Valéry, was the most representative international organization for international cultural exchange in the interwar years. In the postwar period, most of those ideas and programs have been taken over by UNESCO. On overview of the history of the ICIC, see : Jean-Jacques Renoliet, *L'UNESCO oubliée: La Société des Nations et la coopération intellectuelle*（*1919-1946*）(UNESCO Forgetten: The League of Nations and intellectual cooperation［1919-1946］), Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999; Pham-Thi-Tu, *La coopération intellectuelle sous la Société des Nations*,（Intellectual cooperation under the League of Nations）, Paris: Librairie Minard, 1960; Jan Kolasa, "A League of Minds: The International Intellectual Cooperation Organization of the League of Nations" Ph. D. Thesis, Princeton University, 1960.

2 In the sense that nation states came to play a predominant role in the realm of cultural exchange, Kenichiro Hirano characterizes this period as an era of cultural exchange implemented by nation states. Kenichiro Hirano, "Kokusai Kankei ni okeru Bunka Kōryū: Shiteki Kōsatsu"（Cultural exchange in international relations: A historical overview）, in Makoto Saito et al., *Kokusai Kankei ni okeru Bunka Kōryū*（Cultural exchange in international relations）, Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1984, pp.10-17.

3 On the close relationship between the idea of civilization and nationalism in interwar Asia, see Prasenjit Duara, "The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism," *Journal of World History,* Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 99-130; Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern,* New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004, pp. 89-129. In addition, persuasive research has recently been done on the conceptual change of civilization. See Bruce Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Content,* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.

4 In general, international cultural exchange is perceived as an inherently positive ideology. For example, see Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997. Iriye argues the significance of international cultural exchange from the point view of international peace, and calls the idea and implementation of international cultural exchange as "cultural internationalism." According to Iriye, although "cultural internationalism" was defeated by fascism in the 1930s, it survived and flourished after World War II. However, if international cultural exchange has shared the same ideological background with nationalism, it cannot be assumed that the idea of international cultural exchange such as "cultural internationalism" was in direct opposition to fascism, which is, needless to say, closely related with nationalism. It seems that this problem in Iriye's argument results from his Euro-centric view on international cultural exchange.

5 Despite the significance of their roles, remarkably little historical research has been conducted on Japan and China in the ICIC. Nonetheless, some studies on Japanese and Chinese diplomatic histories have given suggestive explanations for this. As for Japan, see: Thomas W. Burkman, *Japan and the League of Nations: Empire and World Order, 1914-1938*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007; Yoshiro Unno, *Kokusai Renmei to Nihon*（The League of Nations and Japan）, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1972; Naotake Sato, ed., *Kokusai Renmei ni okeru Nihon*（Japan in the League of Nations）, Tokyo: Kajima Heiwa Kenkyūjo, 1972. As for China, see: Chi-Hua Tang, *Beijing Zhengfu yu Guoji Lianmeng*（*1919-1928*）(The Beijing Government and the League of Nations, 1919-1928）, Taipei: Dongda Tushu, 1998; Li Zhang, *Guoji Hezuo zai Zhongguo: Guoji Lianmeng Jiaose de Kaocha, 1919-1946*（International cooperation in China, with special consideration to its relation with the League of Nations）, Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1999; Lau-King Quan, *China's Relations with the League of Nations, 1919-1936*, Hong Kong: the Asiatic Litho. Printing Press, 1939.

6 On Nitobe's key role in the foundation of the ICIC, see Izumi Hirobe, "Kokusai Renmei Chiteki Kyōryoku Iinkai no Sōsetsu to Nitobe Inazo"（The formation of the League of Nations International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation and Nitobe Inazo）, *Hokkaido Daigaku Bungaku Kenkyūka Kiyō*（The Annual Report on Cultural Science）, Vol. 121（2007）, pp. 1-20.

7 League of Nations, Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, *Minutes of the First Session, Geneva, August 1st-5th, 1922,* Geneva, 1922, p. 3.

8 For this reason, programs of the early ICIC were mainly focusing on natural science.

9 Inazo Nitobe, "Observation of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation," Geneva, August 18, 1922.

10 League of Nations, "Nomination of a Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, Memorandum by the Secretary-General," Geneva, March 16, 1922. Though two Japanese intellectuals, Sakurai Joji and Tanakadate Aikitsu, were considered as candidates for ICIC membership, neither of them could be appointed. No Chinese name was listed even as a candidate.

11 For details, see Takashi Saikawa, "Kokusai Renmei Chiteki Kyōryoku Kokusai Iinkai to Chūgoku" （China's challenge to the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation: Transformation of the idea of international culture in the interwar period）, *Waseda Seiji Kōhō Kenkyū* （The Waseda Study of Politics and Public Law）, No. 85 （2007）, pp. 211-245.

12 As a result, the Beijyang Government of China had successfully occupied the non-permanent seat from 1920 to 1923 and from 1926 to 1928. On China's campaign for a non-permanent seat in the Council of the League of Nations, see Chi-hua Tang, *Beijing Zhengfu yu Guoji Lianmeng,* Ch.3.

13 It was at the 3rd Assembly of the League of Nations in 1922 that Chinese delegates first suggested this principle. League of Nations, *Records of the Third Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Vol. 1, Text of the Debates （Meeting held from September 4th to 30th, 1922）,* Geneva, 1922, pp. 345-346.

14 According to Shin Kawashima, China has consistently sought to enhance its international status on its diplomacy since the 2nd Hague Peace conference in 1907, emphasizing its self-image as a great nation. See Shin Kawashima, "Chūgoku Gaikō ni okeru Shōchō toshiteno Kokusaiteki Chii" （The long-term target on Chinese diplomatic history to enhance its international status on the Hague Peace Conference, the League of Nations, and the United Nations）, *Kokusai Seiji* （International Relations）, Vol. 145 （2006）, pp. 17-35.

15 League of Nations, *Records of the Fourth Assembly, Text of the Debates*, Geneva, 1923, p. 24.

16 Ibid., p. 34.

17 Gilbert Murray, the vice-chairman of the ICIC and a delegate of South Africa at the same time, was also reluctant to approve the Chinese resolution, while acknowledging the significance of Chinese culture. According to Murray, in order to reflect various national cultures, the ICIC would have to appoint as many members as the Assembly, which was impossible （Ibid., p. 34）.

18 League of Nations, *Records of the Fourth Assembly, Meeting of the Committees, Minutes of the Fourth Committee （Social and General Questions）,* Geneva, 1923, p. 56.

19 For details, see Takashi Saikawa, "Kokusai Bunka Kōryū no Nashonarizumu" （Nationalism of international cultural exchange: the case of Japan's intellectual cooperation with the League of Nations）, *Jisedai Ajia Ronshū* （Journal of next generation Asia forum）, No. 1 （2008）, pp. 11-30.

20 The committee members included: Yamada Saburo （Chairman）, Anesaki Masaharu, Miyajima Mikinosuke, Komura Kinichi, Nagaoka Harukazu, and Awaya Ken.

21 More precisely, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs transferred the Japanese national committee to the Japan Association of the League of Nations in 1927. It is still a moot point whether or not the ministry intended to hide its strong influence on the national committee. At the same time, it can be argued that the ministry took careful note of the nature of the ICIC, "non-governmentality". On the Japan Association of the League of Nations, see Iwamoto Shōkō, "Nihon Kokusai Renmei Kyōkai: 30 nendai ni okeru Kokusai Kyōchō Shugi no Tenkai" （Japan Association for the League of Nations: The development of internationalism in the 1930s）, *Ritsumeikan Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo Kiyō* （Memoirs of Institute of Humanities, Human and Social Sciences, Ritsumeikan University）, No. 85 （2005）, pp. 115-147; Ikei Masaru, "Nihon Kokusai Renmei Kyōkai: Sono Seiritsu to Henshitsu" （Japan Association for the League of Nations: Its development and change）, *Hōgaku Kenkyū* （Journal of law, politics, and sociology）, Vol. 68, No. 2 （1995）, pp. 23-48.

22 "Gakugei Kyōryoku Iinkai Setsuritsu Jijō" （On the establishment of the National Committee of Japan on Intellectual Cooperation）, no date, the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Archives, "Kokusai Renmei Gakugei Kyōryoku Kokusai Iinkai oyobi Kokusai Gakuin Kankei Ikken" （On the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations, and International Institute on Intellectual Cooperation at Paris）, Vol. 3.

23 The National Committee of Japan on Intellectual Cooperation, ed., *Gakugei no Kokusai Kyōryoku* （International intellectual cooperation）, Tokyo: Japanese Association of the League of Nations, 1928, pp. 18-19.

24 Likewise, Yamada Saburo, chairman of the national committee, asserted that "the purpose of our committee is not only to cooperate with the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, but also to introduce our culture to Western people." Yamada Saburo, "Gakugei Kyōryoku Kokunai Iinkai

Daihyōsha Kaigi no Gaikyō" （Report on the Convention of National Committees）, *Kokusai Chishiki* （International understanding）, Vol. 9, No. 11 （1929）, p.61.

25 For example, Japan, at least officially, always advocated the Chinese campaign for the non-permanent seat of the Council and the member of the ICIC.

26 Since Wu Zhi-Hui never appeared in Geneva during his term （1930-1939）, some Chinese intellectuals attended the meetings of the ICIC in his place: Lin Yu-Tang （1931）, Chen He-Xi （1932）, Hu Tian-Shi （1933-1935）, Cheng Qi-Bao （1936）, Li Shi-Zeng （1937-1939）.

27 The mission was composed of Carl H. Becker （Professor of the University of Berlin, formerly Prussian Minister of Public Education）, M. Falski （Director of Primary Education at the Polish Ministry of Public Education）, P. Langevin （Professor of the Collège de France）, R. H. Tawney （Professor of the London School of Economics and Political Science）, Frank P. Walters （Head of the Secretary General's Office, the League of Nations）. The mission was later joined in China by A. Sardi （Representative of the International Institute of Educational Cinematography） and Henri Bonnet （Director of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation）.

28 League of Nations, International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, *Report of the Committee on the Works of Its Fourteenth Plenary Session submitted to the Council and to the Assembly,* Geneva: League of Nations, 1932, p. 19.

29 The League of Nations' Mission of Experts, *The Reorganization of Education in China,* Paris: League of Nations' Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, 1932, p. 197.

30 League of Nations, International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, "Report of the Committee on the Work of Its Seventeenth Plenary Session," Geneva, 1935, pp. 7-8.

31 League of Nations, International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, "Report of the Committee on the Work of Its Eighteenth Plenary Session," Geneva, 1936, p. 64.

32 Illustrated by Foujita, translated by Kuni Matsuo and Steinilber-Oberlin, *Les Haïkaï de Bashô et de ses disciples* （The Haiku of Basho and his disciples）, Paris: Institute internationale de coopération intellectuelle, 1936; Masaharu Anesaki, *L' Art, la vie et la nature au Japon* （Art, life and nature in Japan）, Paris: Institute internationale de coopération intellectuelle, 1938; Natsume Sôseki, translated by Horiguchi Daigaku and Georges Bonneau, *Kokoro* （*Le pauvre cœur des hommes*） （The wretched heart of men）, Paris: Institute internationale de coopération intellectuelle, 1939.

33 It eventually led to the "International Act concerning Intellectual Cooperation," which was prepared by the ICIC with the help of the French government and ratified by 45 countries in 1938. This act stated that the program of the ICIC should be implemented on the basis of national committees and national cultures. "International Act concerning Intellectual Cooperation. Communication from the French government," December 26, 1938.

34 League of Nations, International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, "Report by Professor G. de Reynold （Rapporteur） on the Work of the Twentieth Plenary Session of the Committee," Geneva, August 10, 1938.

Ideologies of Integration Past:
Universality, Revolution-phobia, and Integration

Tomonori Sano

Abstract

It is often stated that regional integration in contemporary Asia is totally different from past integration attempts in the region, that Imperial Japan's invasion of Asia was a violent integration scheme drafted out of insane ideologies but contemporary integration efforts are peaceful as they are products of democratic processes. This paper analyzes the forms of Shintō discourse under Imperial Japan which was considered the ideological source of Japan's long-held aggressive ambition. This study shows that the complicated forms of Shintō discourses were a symptom of the Shintō universalism against the fear of revolution potentially caused by the impending integration in that period. While it is clear that we must oppose the ideologies of integration past, this paper suggests, we have the urgent task of re-examining those ideologies, or they might sneak up again behind the contemporary integration processes.

1. Introduction

This paper[1] examines various discourses germane to Shintō in relation to and within the context of the Asia Pacific War（1931-1945）in order to elucidate Imperial Japan's ideologies of regional integration. The purveyors of these ideologies themselves often declared proudly that Shintō should be the basis of their national essence［国体 , *Kokutai*］, and these ideologies have been blamed as the source of imperialistic expansionism for some time. However, I offer a different interpretation in this paper insisting that Japan's imperialist regional integration was the source or basis of these ideologies. It may implicate the revivability of such haunted ideologies.

Why is it important for our present understanding of regional integration to study the Shintō discourses in question? How does the study contribute to our efforts to direct and shape our future? Because the discourses and practices of wartime Shintō thinkers can be mystic and unapproachable, often because they are expressed in an unreasonable form of thought with illogical logics, progressive scholars have tended to avoid them. What could even the most severe scrutiny of such dogmas produce, other than to reinforce our sense of the iniquity of Japan's military aggression? Further, as doctrines they are long dead and gone, and there is no realistic chance of their revival. It is easy to dismiss Japan's imperialist regional integration project as a form of mad and violent aggression against Asia—something caused by the arrogance of modern Japan, the mental defectiveness of Japanese, or the fanatical Shintō ideology. Nonetheless, in dismissing the value of such "mad" ideologies as wartime Shintō fanaticism, we are denying the possibility that they contain anything universal. This seems like a safe assumption. Or is it?

It is my view that it is now vital that we examine the ideologies of Japan's imperialist regional integration vision. We cannot afford to ignore these ideologies—to put them out of sight and out of mind. Rather, we need to engage and communicate with them, however one-sided the historiographical approach may inevitably make this "communication". Following Karl Marx's precept that "human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape," we need to appreciate that the anatomy of present-day efforts toward regional integration contains a key to the anatomy

of integration past. The narrowness of the opinion which forces the past into exile denies the repeatability of these imperialistic ideologies, by ascribing this negation to their unreason and irrationality. From this standpoint, there is no need to discuss the unreasonable insanity of these Shintō discourses. If these ideologies are indeed dead and gone, and have no hope of a renaissance, this paper will only have meaning as a kind of antique appraisal. If the exile were perfect, we might never trouble ourselves with past specters of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere［GEACPS, 大東亜共栄圏］when discussing current efforts toward Asian integration. If younger generations of Asians outside of Japan did not have memories or did not share in the historical memory of GEACPS, we could be liberated from such specters. Why are we still afraid of them? Why do we continue to try to forget them even now? I believe this is because these specters are not resident simply in our minds—the product of some special state or some miserable era. Rather, they live in the Nation-State system itself. It is for this reason that part of the agenda of this paper is to disclose these seemingly irrational and irrelevant discourses.

How then can we analyze the ideologies of integration past? The first necessity for research is to sketch in outline conventional interpretations. "Know Your Enemy"（1945）, the famous American propaganda movie from the World War II era, offers valuable documentation of this interpretation. The ultimate purpose of the movie was to explain to the people of the United Nations why they needed to fight against the enemy, Imperial Japan. Introducing fragmented scenes from Japanese movies, documentaries, and photos, it reconstructed the history of Japan. The history shown was of the narrative of the unnatural and exaggeratedly speedy modernization of Japan's irrational and backward culture—resulting in a distorted and deformed modern state. Through the process of forced modernization, Japanese reaped the harvest of industrialization, strong army, and economic growth, but without political liberty, a narrow democracy tied with Emperorism and an utterly despotic government. These distortions of modernity nurtured the freakish inflation of self-image and produced expansionism that had ravaged Asia, and was bent on world domination. Consequently, the United Nations（the Allies）had no choice but to beat "the Jap" and repudiate his "fanatical belief that the Japanese are descendants of gods and destined to rule the earth and all who live on it."[2]

The type of interpretation, which explains aggressive expansionism in terms of the distorted modernity of Japan, maintains its currency even today. One outcome of this interpretation is the idea that, in order to reform Japan, it is necessary to correct the distortions in its "modernity", and this was in fact at the heart of the program of reforms executed by GHQ/SCAP in occupied Japan. It is not my intention here to seek out the flaws in the modernization theory itself. Rather, I will confine myself to noting the similarities between the interpretive framework set out in "Know Your Enemy" to the ideas and worldview of Shintō thinkers. This assertion may sound odd in light of the obvious fact that Shintō ideologues never imagined the ruin of their Empire. They did, however, conclusively grasp the "distorted modernity" of Japan. More precisely, their discourses sought to suture the wounds caused by this distortion while at the same time seeking to consecrate a mixture of the modernity and the tradition, which was regarded as the imperative to "overcome modernity"［近代の超克, *kindai no chôkoku*］. On both poles, Japanese Shintō ideologues and the American propaganda movie, there is a shared discourse that regarded Shintō as the supreme source of Japanese wartime activities. The only difference was the adjectives that were attached to Shintō: "prominent" in wartime Japan and "insane" in America（as well as post-war Japan）. The former sought to nurture these prominent ideas while the latter sought to abolish their insanity. The former explained their prominence through myths, and the latter explained their insanity through the distorted development of Japan's modernization process, and so on. Still they are on the same position: their ideas or ideologies drifted Japan.

These discourses share the following problem: They both treat Japan as a state having a special status. The prominence or insaneness they deal with is enclosed and their experiences sealed

into a single race, which is identified by the special characteristics of something called "Shintō".

"Know Your Enemy" is marked by an exquisite incoherence. And it is this that provides the key of my analysis. There is a shade of nuance that is apparent in certain of the adjectives used in the movie. This ambiguous region lies between the two words, ambition and insanity. We can say clearly that ambition is a concept that exists within the realm of reason (whether the reason of the acquisitive individual or the "reason of state"); in contrast, insanity by definition lies outside the realm of reason. How should we grasp this shading? Is it negligible and meaningless? Perhaps it is not. By this I mean that "insanity" is the distorted form of the ambitious dream, and ambition thus forms the essential core of insanity.[3] It is not, however, sufficient to point out the reasonable meaning of the insane dream. What we have to examine is the form of the discourse. We have to ask why such a primitive ambition can take the form of such a chimerical cosmology. What is the dream-work between the imperialistic desire and these discourses? To this end we need to anatomize the Shintō discourses themselves, however difficult they may be to interpret. The key to the anatomy of these discourses is found in the concept of regional integration.

Another significant point as part of this paper reverses the often-assumed relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Here it is assumed that ideology follows and is subject to the real. The independent variable is the idea of integration that underlies the Shintō discourses, while the Shintō discourses themselves are analyzed as the dependent variable. Shintō discourses, self-identified as the independent variable, sometimes asserted that Shintō ideals lead the process of integration. Such assertions obscure the discordance between these discourses and the actual practice of military invasion. In order to make this discordance explicit we should not base our readings on the kind of idealistic attitude that claims that the idea precedes and shapes the real. In other words, if we are able to understand Shintō discourses as a dependent variable of past attempts at regional integration, we have to acknowledge that this type of discourse is not nation-specific. Rather hegemonic dreams of regional integration are integral to the nation state and will remain so as long as the system of such states persists.

2. Shintō Discourses

The Concept of State Shintō
This section analyzes Shintō discourses using the keyword "integration".

The first question we may ask is: what is Shintō? That question is the most difficult one for Shintō itself, the question pursued by Shintō thinkers, politicians, intellectuals for whom it was an overriding concern for years; the attempt to articulate Shintō determined their position in modern Japan. As is commonly known, the concept of "State Shintō," which is still used by some researchers on Shintō issues, was born within GHQ/SCAP's democratization policies. To quote Sakamoto Koremaru:

> *In the narrow sense, kokka Shintō refers to shrine Shintō as supervised until 1945 by the state and as administered separately in law from other forms of Shintō. In the wider sense, it has been conceptualized as the state religion manifest in the merging of the Shintō of the imperial court and shrine Shintō. Again, others have defined it as "the religion that provided the basis for Japanese state ideology from the Meiji restoration of 1868 until Japan's defeat in World War Two in 1945. To all intents and purposes it was the state religion of Japan." In brief, there is little consistency in the conceptualization of State Shintō among scholars. Historically, the term acquired common cur-*

rency only with the Shintō Directive [神道指令 , *Shintō shirei*] *of December 15, 1945. State Shintō is clearly defined therein as* "*the branch of Shintō distinguished in state law from* ʻ*sect Shintō.*ʼ " *This conceptualization or definition of State Shintō accords with understandings in pre-war Japan.*[4]

The argumentation of Shintō's ideological position in modern Japan has been supplanted by the argument about how to think about State Shintō. While researchers have not yet reached a consensus regarding the degree of actual influence it had on the various other domains of society, some of them assert that the framework of State Shintō is useful for describing the close relationships between the state and Shintō from ancient times to the present. Shimazono Susumu, for example, maintains as follows:

> *I think that after the Meiji restoration the* "*Rites of the Emperor*" *and the system of* "*the civilization by the worship for the Emperor*" *such as Imperial Rescript on Education* [教育勅語 , *Kyōiku Chokugo*] *was formed binding the adoration of nation-wide powerful Jinja, and the modern State Shintō was constructed. ... Through the building up of the nation state, Shintō played a part of the consecration of the nation, which the Emperor initiated, and penetrated the national life in such a new aspect. So it is proper to call such a new aspect of Shintō* "*State Shintō.*"[5]

Shimazono questions such arguments as that State Shintō dominated people ideologically, but insists on refining the idea of State Shintō in order to understand historically the deification of the Emperor in the 1930's, a process he refers to as "Emperor-messianism". The advantage of this work of refining can be summarized into three points: (1) to bridge the accomplishment between historical studies and religious studies; (2) to rethink the relationships between Shintō, the state, and people comprehensively from the ancient to contemporary times; and (3) to analyze Shintō practices and discourses by reasoned deduction, not to dismiss them as unreasonable.

To some extent, I support these outcomes. It is, for example, certain that Shintō has a special relationship with the nation of Japan. The use of the term "State Shintō," however, risks obscuring the important specificity of Shintō discourses. That specificity is aspirations to universality through regional integration. The State Shintō analytical framework cannot explain the universality/universalist aspirations of Shintō discourses during this period. The framework of State Shintō is suitable for the nation state of Japan, but not for Imperial Japan during the period of regional integration through the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Further, the framework of State Shintō might erase the complexities of Shintō discourses in order to exile them in the name of human reason.

What were the Shintō discourses during the Asia-Pacific War? The following section introduces two Shintō doctrines, that of Imaizumi Sadasuke (1863-1944) and that of Hoshino Teruoki (1882-1957). There are several reasons why I have chosen to examine these thinkers. The first is that their respective discourses exerted important influences over the world of thought in intellectual circles in Imperial Japan; they are, however, largely forgotten today.[6] The basis of their doctrines was clearly traditional Shintō documents/texts and practices, but they both went beyond these sources and explored the universality of Shintō. Finally, and most crucially, in 1942, the ideas of these two influential thinkers, who knew each other personally, came into an unintended conflict. The following dissection of these two Shintō thinkers will show how their doctrines expanded earlier forms of Shintō into a form compatible with modern thought, as well as the subtle signs that sustained all the logic of their doctrines.

Imaizumi Sadasuke and His Doctrine of Kōdō ［皇道］

Imaizumi Sadasuke（1863 - 1944）was a Shintō philosopher and activist. In 1921, he assumed the presidency of the Jingū Service Foundation ［神宮奉斎会 , *Jingū Hōsaikai*］. He was also the chairman of Kōdō-sha ［皇道社 ; Imperial Way Association］, which published monthly magazine *Kōdō-Hatsuyō* ［皇道発揚 ; Enhancing the Imperial Way］. He became the adviser of Jingi-in[7] ［神祇院］ in 1941. Imaizumi lectured on his Kōdō ［Imperial Way］ theory to leaders of political circles, military, activist groups and educators, and in December 1941 he gave a lecture to the then Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki on this subject.

Central to Imaizumi's thinking is the concept of Kōdō, which he claimed contains the consistent homology of all laws—from those of nature to those governing the operation of the human heart and mind. Everything—ethnic cosmology, national polity, social systems, household, and people themselves—operate in accordance with Kōdō. It is the perfect truth and the root of all the sciences and philosophy. Potentially it contains all the knowledge, everything in the universe, from social sciences to quantum theory. However each element in our universe is not necessarily equal; the root existence is the Trinity composed of the deities Amenominakanushi, Amaterasu, and the Emperor. Amenominakanushi was given special emphasis because of its vague and malleable character as an unidentifiable deity in the myth tradition. Imaizumi's doctrine paid special attention to this mysterious Kami（deity）in order to extend the Shintō theory, and gave the transcendental position to Amenominakanushi as the embodiment of the universe itself.

Imaizumi clarifies the unique and extraordinary position and character of Japan with a doctrine that indentifies Japan with the universal truth of Kōdō as embodied in successive Emperors. Because Japan is the sole "root" of all things, other nations are merely branches and ramifications of Japan. And because Japan, as the root of all things, is the perfect nation, the war—an exercise in imperial expansion—functions to evangelize the Kōdō, the Universal Truth.

Imaizumi's Kōdō theory explains the war and its mission, and defines the relationship between the metropole and various cultures/religions within Japanese-occupied territory. Imaizumi wrote the short paper named "Answering Doubts regarding the National Essence" in the style of a dialogue with leftist students.

> *Question No. 8: We Japanese people forced the governor-general on the Korean people. At the same time, we educate them on the Japanese National Essence. Are we not engaged in a contradictory practice?*
> ［*Answer*］ *It is not a contradiction at all to teach the Japanese National Essence to Koreans. To declare our National Essence to the world will in the end be the salvation of the earth. Thus it is never a contradiction teaching it to Koreans as well as other peoples. ... Emperor Meiji sanctioned annexing Korea in order of course to improve the welfare of both Japanese and Koreans. However I sometimes wonder whether the policy of government-general improves this or not, and I am afraid it swerves from the wishes of the Emperor.*[8]

Imaizumi's Kōdō theory projected itself as a universal truth or principle. In this aspect, it supported the universality of an integrated Empire. On the other hand, however, as the final quoted sentence of this response demonstrates, it could be the basis of criticizing the administrative practices associated with the implementation of these principles. In this respect, Imaizumi's doctrine could play a role of dissatisfaction absorber, in the sense that Kōdō discourse could be interpreted in ways with a critical political potential.

Kōdō theory blessed Japan and its expansionism, while at the same time it sought to eliminate the potential for total reformation, or revolution. In Imaizumi's doctrine, because Japan as the root is the perfect nation, revolutions have never occurred, and will never occur in Japan.

This self-evident truth is seen in the fact that Japan had an unbroken line of emperors. Other nations, as branches and ramifications, function under the theory of historical materialism as defined in the Marxist tradition.[9] We may find it surprising that Imaizumi's doctrine accepted the validity of Marxism in a manner. He was able to do this because his theory confined Marxism to the outer-Kōdō world, to the imperfect branch and ramification nations. In such countries, class struggles and regime changes continue without cease, and the Royal dynasty is often displaced; these fundamentally unstable societies might find themselves ruled by democracy, fascism or communism.[10]

Imaizumi's Kōdō doctrine was the hybrid integration of Shintō and scientific knowledge with some philosophical flavor. This hybridization gave the theory transcendent universality that could interpret the meanings of the war for the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Moreover, the new order for the world manifested the evolving and providential processes of the perfect truth of Kōdō, a concept so fluid that it could be used to explain the attack on Pearl Harbor and render acceptable in principle even Japan's unconditional surrender. The universalization of the Shintō theory propelled by regional integration released the theory itself from the yoke of the Empire into higher reaches of advanced abstraction.

Hoshino Teruoki and His Doctrine of Riteology

Hoshino Teruoki（1882 - 1957）was a Shōten［掌典 ; an assistant in the conducting of ceremonies］and a bureaucrat within the Imperial Household Ministry. Although most Shōten came from the peerage, Hoshino did not. Hoshino published a number of articles on the essence of Imperial rites; thus his doctrine was based on knowledge of the secret ceremonies of the Imperial Court. He carefully kept away from political discourse, but often criticized intellectuals and Shintō philosophers for their absurd interpretation of the Court rites; he typically did so without naming any particular individuals.[11]

The central idea of Hoshino's doctrine is the rites［祭祀 , *saishi*］. In almost all his works, he described Shintō rites and he developed his theory on the basis of them. His doctrine asserts that all human practices are some sort of ritual. So he proposed the study of ritual practices, or the "Riteology"［祭祀学 , *saishigaku*］in order to interpret them hermeneutically. For Hoshino, the sole ultimate message of ritual practice is to spur humans into making the greatest possible effort, a message he was confident was acceptable to all people, including materialists. All rites conducted or presided over by Emperors represent this essential message. Only the Japanese courtesy ceremonies represent the most essential form of ritual practice, because they have been transmitted from the imperial ancestress Amaterasu to present time through the pure medium of the Emperors' unbroken succession. The Emperor in this sense is the monarch of encouragement to ceaseless endeavor.

In this scheme, Jinja shrines exist to refresh human beings' determination toward all the efforts and endeavors of everyday life. The ultimate purpose of the rites is thus to improve the everydayness of humankind. Hoshino named this aspect the eternal returning to and renewal of daily life（everydayness）［復常の生活 , *fukujō no seikatsu*].[12] For Hoshino the meaning of the war was that of an effort of great creation; this was ideally the creation of Earthly Completion and Perfection［地上完成 , *chijō kansei*］; in practical terms, it was the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. In Hoshino's doctrine, however, the success or failure of this effort depended on the effort of the Japanese people, not providence or miracles.

Myths are the process of discovery and revelation of the ethnic philosophy. According to the classical Japanese mythology, Amaterasu took refuge in the cave（*Amano-iwato gakure*）as a result of the fundamental treason of Susano'o and Takamimusuhi. According to Hoshino, it was the successful attempt to lure her out of the cave using various popular inducements that resulted in the establishment of Amaterasu as the supreme divinity. This established the foundation for an

ethnic philosophy and revolution-free, immortal dynasty. However, if we neglect doing our own efforts and/or the people who did their efforts, the possibility of revolution would again arise. We therefore must respect—worship—the people who work hard to build the nation, in other words, the Deities（fallen soldiers）enshrined at Yasukuni shrine and Kenkoku shrine in Manchuria. Hoshino wrote:

> *I insisted we should define the subject of the providence that the Emperor of Manchuria followed this time. A man came to me. I asked,* "*Do you have any idea?*" *and he said no.* ［*I said*］ "*Ok, I have an idea. The content of providence is the Imperial Edict of Foundation and the one of visiting to Japan. Unless you restrict it to these, revolution will occur again. ... Such a thing* ［*eclectic interpretation of Providence*］ *occurred not only in China or in Manchuria. But in Japan, we have to be cautious about the same types of ideology spreading to the state deeply, which profess themselves to be* "*Japanese Idealism.*"[13]

As mentioned, Hoshino's doctrine of Riteology was the hermeneutics of ritual practices for human beings. This type of universality was not eclecticism but the common denominator of all the people on the earth. It was the universality which, sifting out impurities, purified itself.

In Hoshino's doctrine, text is the production of human practices and the opaque medium that records the processes of practices, but does not have any other authority over the world. It is the practice of people—their efforts and endeavors—that prevents revolution, never the miracles of deities or the grace of sacred texts. To depend on deities and, as a result, failing to make efforts is a grave error; the Japanese deity is the helper, not the savior nor the giver. Japanese deities desire that humankind make themselves thrive and achieve the completion of Earthly Completion and Perfection. "The deity never asks too much of us. ... It is the only wish of deity that we work hard to the best of our ability and skill."[14] The final conclusion of Hoshino's quest was that of a deity that never performed miracles. What he saw in this was the ethics of capitalism, a process of infinite endeavor threatened at all times with depravity and decay.

On his sickbed, one day after defeat, Hoshino told a disciple, "Under the new Constitution of Japan, we Japanese renounce war forever. I hope it is followed by every country on the earth."[15] The unconditional surrender did not make clear the defects of his doctrines. Rather, it was his doctrine that made clear the faults of the war.

3. Universality

Here it is necessary to compare the respective doctrines of Imaizumi and Hoshino. Both men were proponents of the reformation of Shintō doctrines in order to accommodate the reality of expansion and regional integration. Both tried to discover a certain universality within the teachings of Shintō. Each of them attached universality to the earlier forms of Shintō, so that the actualities of regional integration might be seen as catching up with this inherent universality. I will call these aspects of Shintō "Universal Shintō." During the wartime period of regional integration, Shintō could be said to have met the world. This encounter was not spontaneous but had been forced by the historical contexts. The doctrines of Shintō expanded in response to the pressures and demands of this integration. So, we can understand the universal Shintō theories as the product of wartime regional integration, as eccentric as this may seem to us.

However, the types of universality sought by Imaizumi and Hoshino differed greatly; their Shintō theories were opposed on all fronts. Although both doctrines expanded the theoretical application of Shintō beyond the framework of Japan, their theoretical subject is the cosmos or uni-

verse in Imaizumi's doctrine, and humankind, *Dasein*, for Hoshino.[16]

The following are examples of the discourses on truth by Imaizumi. The article titled "10. The principle of the new world order of Chapter 5 The essence of Kōdō and its enhancement" from *Kōdō ronso*, shows the characteristics of his doctrine on universality.

1. *Definitely it is the final idea and the honest hope that we live in peace*[17] *with all the people in the world. However, when we trace the terrible conflicts and struggles in world history, some people wonder what type of order could guarantee eternal peace, but they might be defeated in the end by their own cleverness. ...*
2. *Scholars today despise some ideas such as "the truth of the universe" as a stargazing idealism that cannot be proved, but this attitude is too irresponsible for a scholar. Without the dedication for proving the truth, the authority of science must be suspect. ...*
3. *... The concept of justice in foreign nations, which was based on faked-truths, has had to change its contents because of revolution and invasion. In comparison to that, the Japanese never changed their contents of the concept of justice; they have aimed at uniting with the truth of the universe as their justice. After the national founding, for thousands or tens of thousands of years, the [Japanese] justice has been to unite with the Emperors who are as one with Amaterasu in state of tenjō-mukyū [天壤無窮 ; the infinite progression of the homeland].*
4. *... It is hardly possible that all of humankind accords with the direction of tengyō-yokusan [天業翼賛 ; to support the Emperor's holy governance]. The arbitrary directions of peoples cause conflicts with each other. In contrast, peace will come by itself if we all go to the center. The Japanese potentially have this essential attitude so their Kōdō [皇道 ; the imperial way] never be exploded by revolution or invasion, like the truth that can never be destroyed by human practices. Only our nation has the [Japanese] national essence which embodies the universal truth directly, and our Emperor has the essence of bansei-ikkei [万世一系 ; the unbroken succession of Emperors] and tenjō-mukyū [天壤無窮] only for the realization of hakko-ichiu [八紘一宇 ; make the world into one family], so we must entirely dash forward toward the realization of tengyō-yokusan [天業翼賛] believing the ineluctable coming of the new order of the Kōdō-world [皇道世界].*[18]

In contrast with Imaizumi, Hoshino's article "The holy command of Kōso [皇祖 ; the Emperor's progenitor] and the order of Ten [天]" shows a diametrically opposed opinion on the question of universality.

This is my memory of Mr. Sugiura Shigetaka [杉浦重剛 ; 1855-1924, an educator of Prince Hirohito], whose opinion I cannot agree with, but whom I admire on two points. Here I introduce one of them. ... He said to us:
In my youth, I had been to Great Britain for three years to study engineering. What afflicted me there was the problem of whether the cusp of the straight line in the geometric context is real or not. I extended that problem a long way, but I could not answer it even after three years. That is the accomplishment of my three-year study abroad.
Involuntarily I [Hoshino] take off my hat to him. We are never able to know whether the cusp is real or not. We human beings cannot know such a small thing. How then can we know the truth of the universe? If we could know all about the others who like us form humankind, could we know their psychology as if seeing it in the mirror? Do

you know how deeply the cosmic science goes today? Many scientists argue about cosmic rays in different ways. Then, can we say that the universe loves humankind? Some scientific theory insists that cosmic ray damages our health even if we take shelter in the basement. In that case, can we insist that the universe is the truth or the substance, without any reason? The tradition of our nation never had such a fantasy. Sometimes in China, the sage who does not have power and developed only his ideas daydreamed such a fantasy in order to expand the scope of his power and influence, I think.

A good statesperson may conform himself to Ten［天 ; above, heaven, tian］as the order and support his king in the name of Ten, but a sly-old-fox politician often pursues his own interests. All through the history, under the banner of Ten, Chinese revolutionists came. Considering them, we need to investigate carefully the concept of the order of Ten.[19]

It is clear that both Imaizumi's article and Hoshino's focused on the same concept: that is, the truth of the universe. Imaizumi insisted on the necessity of this concept and asserted that failure to explore it adequately was what caused the corruption of the intelligentsia. In his doctrine, what was then called "the new world order［世界新秩序 , *sekai shinchitsujo*］" meant rejoining the order of the root, or the National Essence of Japan. In contrast, Hoshino insisted on the more limited knowledge of human beings, separated the truth from the universe or cosmic science, and sought to pursue political objectives on the basis of scientific or philosophical knowledge. He insisted the ressentiment of the intelligentsia caused the confusion of the concepts.

This is the dilemma of exploring universality. It is certain that Imaizumi and Hoshino shared the concern for universality, but they could not achieve unanimity. However, there is one more concern that they shared. It is the negative of universality, revolution-phobia.

4. Revolution-phobia

These universal Shintō doctrines also shared a theoretical fear. Universal Shintō was required to produce two universalities. One was the spatial universality, in other words, global or international extensiveness, and another one was temporal universality, or historical purity. This is an *aporia*: ideological extensiveness always threatens historical purity; in more concrete terms: the pursuit of regional integration undermined the purity of the national essence.

So, what did they name their terror? Both doctrines called it "revolution". The quoted articles above by Imaizumi and Hoshino treat the concept of revolution as something to be denied from the past to the future. The theoretical principle of Universal Shintō is the absolute negation of the possibility of revolution. In reality, they had a hard time to exorcise revolution from their ideologies, and from their integrated Empire. We might call this symptom "revolution-phobia", which was an *aporia* of the universal Shintō. More correctly, a revolution-phobia is an integration-phobia, because their integration had a power to damage Japan's national essence. The ideal of regional integration pursued to its logical conclusion would mean the dissolution of the nation of Japan; but they could not stop the forward momentum of imperial integration. For example, in introducing a modest outline of the relativity principle, Imaizumi concluded, "It shows that science arrived at the right universal-holism［宇宙万有観 , *uchūbanyūkan*］which is almost identical to our ideas of spirits［霊魂観 , *reikonkan*］at last, after the thousand years of efforts in experiments and theories."[20] This farfetched discourse seems to be a hallucinated thought, but it was a strategic one.

The idea that time-space is absolute controlled the thought of human beings for a long time, together with the idea that mass is absolute. Rather, even today such ideas are ruling the thought of many. For instance, three-dimensional Euclidean space and one-dimensional time are believed to be absolute and the principle even in Anti-Dühring by Engels, Materialism and the criticism of imperialism by Lenin and so on, all works considered to be masterpieces of radical materialism. But if we consider them profoundly, we will find soon that their ideas are shallow arguments. So it may be enough to introduce the theory of relativity for this consideration.[21]

Certainly, the theoretical target of this discourse is Marxism. Imaizumi's doctrine combined Shintō myths with Einstein's theory of relativity in order to overcome Marxian social science that predicted theoretically the doom of capitalism.

By using the concepts of universality/revolution-phobia, Shintō discourses may be understood more accessibly than ever, in particular in their relation to imperial integration. The mysterious figure of their doctrine was formed—or distorted—by their integration. The positive symptom of Shintō universalism is the desire for the integration, and the negative one is fear of revolution. Both amplified the traditional Shintō theories out of their league in order to assure their integration and Shintō itself. Both of them shut their potential revolutions away overseas or in gray past by acknowledging Marxism itself.

Both doctrines examined here built what they hoped would be a universal principle of integration without revolutions. But this was not to be. Although Universal Shintō had to be one and only literally, they proposed very different universalities. This inevitably generated the strife. So we should examine the curious incidents that occurred in 1942. The first attack occurred on March 4, when the censors banned the article[22] written by Imaizumi named "The Development of the Imperial History [*Kōdō shikan no tenkai*]."[23] Imaizumi did not blame the authorities for the press ban but his supporters planned a counterattack against that prohibition. Their strategy against the government was brilliant: to undermine the authorities by the deployment of undeniable universal principles.

The supporters lodged some inquiry to the Jingi-in, Dai-Nippon Jingikai [The Great Japan Association for the Worship of the Deities] and Kōten kōkyūjo [Imperial Classics Research Institution] in the spring of 1947. They asked these questions:

1. *Is the Kojiki the Holy Classics of Japan, or a violator of Japanese national essence [Kokutai], because it contains some flavor of Chinese ideas?*
2. *Is the genesis at the beginning of the Kojiki a Japanese-ethnic idea, or a Chinese one?*
3. *Do theories that undervalue or deny Amenominakanushi profane the Holy Classics, and should they be eliminated?*
4. *Is the faith affirmed or not, that Amaterasu is the supreme Deity not only of Japan and the Japanese people but also of all of humankind and the whole universe?*
5. *Is the faith affirmed or not, that the Emperor is not only the leading figure of Japan and Japanese but of the earth, humankind, and the whole universe?*

What did this questionnaire mean? They did not blame the government directly, but proposed in effect a loyalty test to be used against the government authorities. The inquiry gave rise to the possibility of frictions among the authorities. This inquiry simplified both the theories of Imaizumi and Hoshino. It focused on only two topics, Kojiki's infallibility and the limit of the Emperor's reign. In addition, it pressed the government for an answer about which theory they should give approval to. For instance, the Imaizumi doctrine might say: Kojiki is the Holy Clas-

sic and the essence of the Japanese ideas, so Amenominakanushi and its spiritual successor Amaterasu shall reign over the whole universe, and the Emperor has the authority to govern all over the world. Against that, the Hoshino doctrine might say: Kojiki was edited under the powerful influence of Chinese ideas, so the idea of Amenominakanushi is a smuggled idea of the Tian〔天〕 of the Chinese mythological system. Therefore, we have to say that the Emperor's authority only comes from the divinity of Amaterasu, never from Amenominakanushi. Furthermore, Japanese Deities never bring miracles; Japan's development and flourishing always hinge only on the efforts of its people. So, the limit of the Emperor's reign is determined by the people's effort dynamically, not by the Holy Classics statically.

The directors of Dai-Nippon Jingikai and Kōten kōkyūjo gave their approval to Imaizumi's doctrine while Jingi-in answered, "We have no reason to give you an answer." Receiving this reply, the supporters of Imaizumi might consider that the Government affirmed the Hoshino doctrine negatively and tried to suppress the Imaizumi doctrine with the power of censorship. Then the supporters started some campaigns to denounce the Hoshino doctrine and his factual work *Prolegomenon of the Japanese Ethnic Philosophy* for failure to respect the Emperor, or lése májesty. The book *Prolegomenon*, based on the Hoshino doctrine, was published on November 25, 1941, and credited the son of Hoshino as the author. Some activists among Imaizumi's supporters accused Hoshino and his works of liberalism and historical materialism: Hoshino's doctrine was regarded as an invitation to revolution. They all feared revolution—revolution-phobia—and each of them found the sign of revolution in their enemy—the other type of universality for their integration.

It is most likely the Government feared the spread of this conflict and campaign to the radical nationalists. The authorities struggled to find a solution and conducted discussions among the Ministry of Education (responsible for religious organizations), the Imperial Home Ministry (for police and censorship), the Imperial Household Ministry, and Jingi-in.[24] Jingi-in, which was the nominal top administrative institution for Jinja and Shintō issues, was not able to approve the Imaizumi doctrine, because his doctrine overstepped the consensus of modern academic Shintō studies. On the other hand, Jingi-in was not capable to give full support to the Hoshino doctrine, because the Kojiki had already become popular as the Holy Classic and the Jinja that deified Amenominakanushi was very popular and it was too difficult to eliminate them. Such an ambiguous attribute delayed Jingi-in's response, and created the space for political intervention into the Shintō issues.

These incidents needed to be resolved from the perspective of political cost-management, not as a theological controversy. What was important for the authorities was not the theoretical potential but the political potential; the strength of Imaizumi supporters. On August 4, 1942, Imaizumi was invited to the Executive Mansion of Prime Minister Tōjō, and the same day Hoshino retired from the Imperial Household Ministry. On August 7, the censorship authority banned the *Prolegomenon* and two other books written by Hoshino. Here is a quotation from the secret censorship journal.[25]

> *Prolegomenon of the Japanese Ethnic Philosophy by Hoshino Kōichi. ... Published November 15, 16th year of Shōwa. Banned October 7〔17th year of Shōwa〕.*
> *This book intended to illuminate the Cardinal Principles of the National Body with the knowledge of the Kojiki and the Nihon-shoki, and the Courtesy Ceremony. However, it contains some factors to obscure the national flavor of the Imperial Household and National Essence, because its terms and style are improper. So it must be banned.*

Hoshino was expelled from the Imperial Household Ministry with a national decoration, and this ressurected Imaizumi's honor. Newspaper and other opinions referring to this solution were

also censored. Therefore, the campaign ended, the police report said. However, what does "the end" mean? After handing in his resignation, Hoshino composed some Tanka:[26]

> *Following the legend of the cave;*
> *Still I confine myself to a library.*

At present, it has not been possible to find the documents on the censorship code for religious issues and the connection between censorship authorities and Hoshino Teruoki. A reconstruction of the censorship code for religious issues with the *Journal of Censorship Policing*［出版警察報, *Shuppan keisatsuhō*］shows that the censorship code seemed to catch two kinds of discourses:

> 1）*Discourses violating the absolute holiness of Amaterasu. For example:*
> *a. The article referring to the dualism of Amaterasu and her brother Susano'o, or Amaterasu and Kunitokotachi.*
> *b. The article referring to the Trinity of Amenominakanushi, Amaterasu, and Emperor.*
> *c. The article regarding Amaterasu as the divine of the Sun, or Amenominakanushi as the supreme ruler of the universe.*
> 2）*Discourses containing the phrase like "Emperor shall reign all over the world." This idea is based on a stretching of the meaning of the Holy Classics, their mythology and authority of Deities.*

Why were those discourses prohibited? Censorship judgment says that the reason was that those descriptions might work to dissolve the Japanese National Essence. Nevertheless, there may be another reason why the Emperor's sovereignty for the world was denied by the censors. Some powerful popular religions utilized an over-reading of the Holy Classics. For example, the Kōdō Ōmoto sect embraced the idea of the dualism, the Hitonomichi-kyodan sect regarded Amaterasu as the Sun, and the Amatsu-kyō sect integrated Japanese classical myths to other classics like Egyptian myths, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, and so on. They were all cracked down on, from 1920, and had been dragged into court cases. It can be supposed that the Hoshino doctrine was the basic resource of the censorship code to some extent, and the main target of that code was so-called pseudo-religions［類似宗教, *ruiji shūkyō*］. Under this code the description of the Trinity might apply to Imaizumi's article. Though it is not at all clear whether Hoshino wanted to provide the theoretical/theological basis for censorship and thus spark the suppression of the Imaizumi doctrine, it is supposed, judging from its form, that the censorship code for Shintō and religious issues was based on the Hoshino doctrine.

5. Conclusion

The foregoing analysis shows that the complexity of Shintō discourses was a product of the past processes of integration. When we approach them from the concept of integration, we can understand the basic structure of their discourses without labeling them insane or aberrant. It is certain that Shintō discourses may be very complicated and confused, but they cannot be dismissed as the intoxicated fantasies of hidebound nationalists. They are better understood as a form of modern thought that attempted to supplant the possibility of revolution by a different solution; theological-theoretical integration.

This integration gave rise to both universal theory and revolution-phobia. The *aporia* is that

they should realize integration while avoiding revolutions, but integration itself invited revolutionary changes. The signs of revolution-phobia are never concealed in their discourses. It is always evident. The will toward universality fragmented the discourses. This powerful intention fogs their revolution-phobia.

However, revolution-phobia is as old as the nation-state, which in the case of Japan was born of the revolution called the Meiji Restoration. We could say that the revolution is the mother of every modern nation, but revolution must not come again in the future for the lifetime of the nation. In this reading the objects that had been oppressed and concealed were the impossibility of connecting the origins of the nation with its legitimacy. To say more historically, revolution-phobia was the phobia for the coming crunch of their imperial integration.

Then, we have to ask again: why is the study of Shintō discourses important for our integration? Does it contribute to our ability to control our future?

Shintō discourses show the symptom, universality with revolution-phobia, or revolution-phobia with universality. This symptom is embedded in the system of the modern nation, and becomes evident when the system seeks to transcend itself. The implication of this analysis is that our present-day integration may also produce such a symptom. That means the necessity of analyzing quasi-insane discourses distributed in Asia today, even if their figuration appears incomprehensible and their message appears too simplistic.

Notes

1 This paper is a rewritten and improved version of the author's presentation at the Summer Institute on Regional Integration at Waseda 2008, and is partially based on the author's paper, "Designs of Universal Shintō: the Heritage of Their Empire," Li Narangoa, ed., *New Research in Japanese Studies: Proceedings of Asia Pacific Week 2007*, Faculty of Asian Studies, The Australian National University.

2 Film & Sound Online - Know Your Enemy - Japan Part 1, http://www.filmandsound.ac.uk/collections/records/0023-0000-1487-0000-0-0000-0000-0.html（accessed November 2008）.

3 My investigation in this paper was inspired by the works of Slavoj Žižek. See Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, London: Verso, 1989.

4 Sakamoto Koremaru, *Encyclopedia of Shinto - Home: Modern and Contemporary: State Shinto*, http://eos.kokugakuin.ac.jp/modules/xwords/entry.php?entryID=1096（accessed November 2008）.

5 Shimazono Susumu, "Kokka Shinto to Messianism," *Iwanami Kōza Tennō to Ōken wo Kangaeru: Cosmology to Shintai*, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2002, p. 102.

6 The mechanism of oblivion must be a part of the postwar history, but there is no space to analyze it in this paper.

7 Jingi-in was established in 1940 to be the national authority of Shintō and Jinja administrations, and is often considered as the ultimate embodiment of State Shintō.

8 Quote from: Imaizumi Sadasuke, *Kokutai ni taisuru Gimon ni Kotau, Imaizumi Sadasuke-sensei Kenkyū Zenshū,* Vol. 3, Tokyo: Nihon University Imaizumi Institute, 1969, p. 235. *Kokutai ni taisuru Gimon ni Kotau* was originally published in 1934 and distributed in the army.

9 Imaizumi Sadasuke, *Kōdō Ronsō*, Tokyo: Kōdō-sha, 1942, *Imaizumi Sadasuke-sensei Kenkyū Zenshū*, Vol. 2, Tokyo: Nihon University Imaizumi Institute, 1969, pp. 250-251. *Kōdō Ronsō* was originally written in November 1939.

10 Imaizumi Sadasuke, *Kōdō Ronsō*, Tokyo: Kōdō-sha, 1942, *Imaizumi Sadasuke-sensei Kenkyū Zenshū,* Vol. 2, Tokyo: Nihon University Imaizumi Institute, 1969, p. 315.

11 Hoshino Teruoki, "Mazu Gojin no Mō wo," *Jinja Kyōkai Zasshi,* No. 4 of the 37th Year（April 1938）, p. 30.

12 Hoshino Teruoki, *Fukujō no Seikatsu, Nihon no Saishi: Hoshino Teruoki Sensei Chosakushu*, Tokyo: Hoshino Teruoki Sensei Icho Kankō Kai, 1968. *Fukujō no Seikatsu* was originally published in July 1935.

13 Hoshino Teruoki, *Kokutai no Konki*, Tokyo: Dainippon Seinendan Honbu, 1940, p. 6.

14 Hoshino Teruoki, ＂Shushi wo Maki Tagayasu Kokoro＂（The mind of seeding and cultivating）, *Ie no Hikari*, Vol. 18, No. 5（May 1942）, p. 31.

15 Kawade Kiyohiko, ＂Sensei wo Aogu＂（Admiring our master）, *Nihon no Saishi: Hoshino Teruoki sensei Chosakushū*, Tokyo: Hoshino Teruoki Sensei Icho Kankō Kai, 1968, p. 404.

16 I suppose that some motive from Nietzsche's works and Heidegger's infected Hoshino's and slightly Imaizumi's, but this is still my inference, not a demonstrated contention. However, if we extend this supposition, it can be said that Hoshino's doctrine found the problems on *Dasein* into the ritual practices.

17 ＂Yasukuni-to tairake-ki naka＂ is the phrase from Ōharae［大祓］.

18 Imaizumi Sadasuke, *Kōdō Ronsō*, Tokyo: Kōdō-sha, 1942, *Imaizumi Sadasuke-sensei Kenkyu Zenshu*, Vol. 2, Tokyo: Nihon University Imaizumi Institute, 1969, pp. 498-503.

19 Hoshino Teruoki, *Kokutai no Konki*（The foundation of the national essence）, Tokyo: Dainippon Seinendan Honbu, 1940, pp. 4-6.

20 Imaizumi Sadasuke, *Principle of the National Isomorphology*（Kokutai genri）, Kyoto: Ritsumeikan Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1935. From: *Imaizumi Sadasuke-sensei Kenkyū Zenshū*, Vol. 3, Tokyo: Nihon University Imaizumi Institute, 1969, p. 394.

21 Imaizumi Sadasuke, *Principle of the National Isomorphology*（Kokutai genri）, Kyoto: Ritsumeikan Daigaku Shuppanbu, 1935. From: *Imaizumi Sadasuke-sensei Kenkyū Zenshū*, Vol. 3, Tokyo: Nihon University Imaizumi Institute, 1969, p. 391.

22 Jōhōkyoku（Intelligence Agency）1st Section of 4th Department and the Censorship Section of the Keihō-kyoku Bureau of the Imperial Home Ministry, *Shuppan Keisatsuhō 142*, 1942, p. 155.

23 In the article named ＂The Development of the Imperial History,＂ Imaizumi insisted the trilogy of Amenominakanushi, Amaterasu, and the Emperor. This description was the direct cause of banning, but this idea did not seem to be the main topic of the article. I think that the purpose of this text was to overcome the western philosophy, especially the ontology of Heidegger.

24 Okino Iwasaburō, *Nippon Jinja kō*（New edition）, Tokyo: Kōsei-sha Kōsei-kaku, 1952, pp. 256-259.

25 Jōhōkyoku（Intelligence Agency）1st Section of 4th Department and the Censorship Section of the Keihō-kyoku Bureau of the Imperial Home Ministry, *Shuppan Keisatsuhō 144,* 1942.

26 Hoshino Teruoki, *Kabunshū, Nihon no Saishi: Hoshino Teruoki Sensei Chosakushū*, Tokyo: Hoshino Teruoki Sensei Icho Kankō Kai, 1968, p. 372.