

A light blue map of Northeast Asia, showing the Korean Peninsula, Japan, and parts of the Russian Far East, serving as a background for the title text.

Korea–Japan Cooperation for Building a Multilateral Security Cooperation Institution in Northeast Asia

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I INTRODUCTION

The wind of new regionalism in East Asia since the late 1990s which saw the 1997 Asian financial crisis

- ◆ **The meaning of ‘new regionalism’: contrary to the cases of APEC and ARF**
 - emphasizing “Asianization” and “East Asian Community (EAC)”
 - expansion of a concentric circle unfolded around ASEAN with an exception of SCO

Security cooperative framework in East Asia including Northeast Asia

- ◆ **ARF, trans-Pacific security forum**
- ◆ **No formal multilateral security cooperative framework in East Asia and Northeast Asia**
- ◆ **In case of Northeast Asia, the Six Party Talks which is ad hoc multilateral and minilateral mechanism, not comprehensive one which deals with security across the board**

Need for Multilateral Security Cooperation Institution in Northeast Asia

- ◆ **Many security issues to address for a permanent peace and stability of the region such as nontraditional issues as well as traditional issues, aside from the nuclear issue of North Korea.**
- ◆ **It is in the very Northeast Asia that they could be treated and their solutions be found better in a situation that there is no suitable place to concentrate on and discuss them in detail in its own way among countries concerned.**
- ◆ **Agreement with the establishment of the working group for Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism as one of five working group in the Joint Statement in February 13, 2007 of the Six Part Talk**

Need for South Korea-Japan cooperation in building a multilateral security institution in the Region

- ◆ **For a better desirable institution establishment in the long term**
- ◆ **Balancing the rising Chinese power to guide in a direction of producing mutual gains**
- ◆ **Core values such as democracy, human rights, rule of law and free market**
- ◆ **Mutually compatible political and economic system.**

The purpose of Today's lecture

- ◆ To present how to cooperate between Japan and South Korea is more practical and even better in terms of building a multilateral security cooperation with reflection of two countries' interests at the level of both of them being able to accept
- ◆ In addition, to identify obstacles to bilateral cooperation internally and to suggest the practicable ways to be able to remove or overcome them.
- ◆ For achieving the purpose
 - First, to examine positions of major states including U.S. and China as well as Japan and South Korea on building a Northeast Asian security cooperation institution
 - Second, to examine important issues to need to accommodate between Japan and South Korea for pursuing and consolidating bilateral cooperation and to search ways to promote a rational and practicable institution
 - Third, to identify impediments to hinder upgrading of bilateral relations, which is crucial to cooperation for regional security institution building, and also to address approaches to reconciliation over the long term troubles between them
 - Finally, conclusion with some suggestions about things that should be borne in mind for strengthening and consolidating a bilateral desirable relations and for the leadership of Japan for the future of Northeast Asian security institution.

II POSITIONS OF MAJOR STATES

1. Characteristics of Northeast Asian International Relations

- The rise of China and following concerns about the relative decline of U.S. power with damage of the “hub and spoke” system
- Residues of the cold war which are represented by the division of the Korean Peninsula and the China-Taiwan relations.
- Continuous mutual mistrust by historical and territorial issues among countries
- The emergence of new governments in the U.S., Japan, and South Korea
 - ☞ All of these characteristics are being reflected in the positions of the constituent states including Japan and South Korea on the Northeast Asian and East Asian Security cooperation institution building.

2. Positions of major states

The United States

- It prefers more inclusive trans-Pacific multilateralism to the narrower Asian regionalism. And August 20, this year, the ministers of Foreign Affairs of ASEAN decided to admit U.S and Russia into the EAS.
- The existing bilateral alliances should be maintained from the perspective that bilateral alliances and multilateral security cooperation could be mutually supportive, not mutually exclusive.
- An emerging Asian multilateralism has to adopt global norms, especially in the area of counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and the promotion of free and open markets
- It has preferred ad hoc minilateralism aimed a special objective and composed of a “coalition of willing” to institutionalized multilateral mechanism in terms of East Asian level.
- But it does not think in the negative about the development of the Six Party Talks (ad hoc minilateralism) toward an Northeast Asian multilateral security cooperation institution.

China


- It had been cautious to take part in APEC and ARF but it changed its position to embrace multilateralism as part of its new strategy after the end of the Asian Financial Crisis.
- It is willing to take part in trans-Pacific forums, but strong preference for narrower geographic definitions of Asia that could increase China's relative weight and influence.
- The regional mechanism has to emphasize participatory countries' sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs as a norm.
- It does not raise objection to the existence U.S. alliance system as part of the multilateral security arrangements in East Asia, at least for the foreseeable future.
- Therefore, it supports transparent and open East Asian cooperation and inclusive, (not exclusive) officially, but it has also supports the APT as a vehicle for building the EAC
- It seems that China's own plan does not command a fine prospect, considering the decision of ASEAN to promote U.S. and Russia as members of the EAS.

Japan



- **The bilateral alliance with U.S. is the most important basis of security of Japan**
- **The regional architecture must allow both bilateralism and multilateralism.**
- **U.S. should take comfort in its effort to promote regional integration; it promotes to expand the membership of democratic states in East Asian multilateralism, while it makes efforts to balance the increase of Chinese influence.**
- **It prefers EAS to APT as a vehicle of the EAC.**
- **It makes efforts to balance Chinese influence in East Asian multilateralism by expanding the membership of democratic states.**
- **It has emphasized functional cooperation first, and then nontraditional security second, and traditional security last.**
- **East Asian regionalism integration should reflect a respect and realization of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as well as open and free market rather than exceptionalism**

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- **On traditional security, the majority view is that it must rely on the bilateral alliance with U.S.**
 - **The future regionalism should be not only open and inclusive but also outward-looking, not anti-Americanism or anti-West.**
 - **In approaching regionalism in Asia, the prevailing consensus in Japan is that de facto regionalization should take precedence over institutionalization. An Asian community will not necessarily be the same as the European community. (Akiko Fukushima)**
 - **It seems that Japan will not hasten to establish even the economic regional integration like EAFTA, to say nothing of security cooperation institution, unless the conditions they argue are accepted.**



❖ **International regime complexity contributes to international law fragmentation and rule ambiguity. Where state preferences are similar, states will coordinate to create a clear set of rules. Where preferences diverge, ambiguity will persist, allowing countries to select their preferred interpretation. The prospect of the EAC is similar to such a situation.**

● **As for Northeast Asian multilateral security cooperation institution, it has been passive, reflecting on its position on East Asian multilateralism. It would likely continue to remain passive without solving the North Korea's nuclear issue and Japanese abductees' problem.**

● **After the incident of sinking of a Korean naval patrol ship in the Yellow Sea, it seems that Japan's attitude to Northeast Asian multilateral security cooperation has gone back to the more negative atmosphere and its attitude seems to continue for the time being.**

South Korea



- **Preoccupied with South-North relations and the unification, it thinks the alliance with U.S. as the most important mechanism for the national defense.**
- **Both bilateralism and multilateralism could run in parallel like Japan.**
- **However it needs cooperation of China which is deemed to control North Korea to some degree. China is the largest trading partner of Korea since 2004. However in a view of South Korea, China is still difficult to trust particularly in security sector. In fact, it could have not thrown suspicion to China away because of some affairs such as the Research Project of Northeast China and an attitude, sometimes, just to balance relations between the two Korea.**
- **It had preferred APT to EAS in former two administrations but now gives a feeling of turning to the EAS format.**
- **It supports universal norms as a principle of multilateral mechanism like Japan, but the strength is weaker than Japan; functional cooperation and security cooperation could be proceeded simultaneously, which is close to neo-functionalism.**



- Regular dialogue and institutionalization is important and could promote the advancement of security cooperation

- As for Northeast Asian security multilateralism, it had tried to develop a multilateral security mechanism in Northeast Asia through the Six Party Talks as soon as possible, which, Korean government thinks, is helpful to the unification of the Korean Peninsula and the prosperity and stability as well as the solution of North Korea's problem

- However, it seems that the position of South Korean government has been changed gradually. Current government does not emphasize "Northeast Asia" more than the former governments.

- The **KIM Dae-jung government** had highlighted East Asian regionalism revolved around APT and the **Noh Moo-hyun government** had stressed Northeast multilateralism, making full use of the Six Party Talks. But it seems that **the Lee Myung-Bak government** which has made use of a so-called 'squeeze strategy to North Korea sympathizes with the positions of Japan and United States, underscoring Korea-U.S. alliance and Asian diplomacy including India, New Zealand, and Australia..

III CONSONANCE AND DISSONANCE

The need to pursuit of multilateral regionalism (whatever it covers Asia-Pacific or just East Asia area)

- Both are eager to be identified with the emerging multilateral institutions and Asian community.
- However they expose some different view how to approach to built a more beneficial framework.
- Distinction between consonance and dissonance is not easy because Japan and Korea often reveal the delicate difference when one gets in depth review, though they are appeared to have the same insistence on a certain issue at a glance.

Consonance

- **The role of U.S. in the promotion of multilateral security cooperation.**
 - ✓ Both of them recognize well the importance of the alliance with U.S. for their security and insist to have to go abreast bilateral alliance and multilateralism.
- **Membership in Northeast Multilateral security cooperation**
 - ✓ In case of East Asia, it seems to converge to the Japanese position in Korean current government

Dissonance


➤ Norms and Values

- ✓ The start of building a multilateral security mechanism occurs gradually, which enables the parties in question to adjust their statecraft and domestic foundations accordingly.
- ✓ The lessons for today are very clear --- less may be more when it comes to preserving and expanding stable peace.
- ✓ If cooperative security architecture is to emerge in Northeast Asia, it is likely also to be based on the informality of the “ASEAN WAY.” (Kupchan)



ASEAN Way according to Lee Kuan Yew;


“So long as members who are not ready yet to participate are not damaged by non-participation, nor exclude from future participation, the power of veto need not be exercised.... when four agree and one does not object this can still be considered a consensus, and the four should proceed with a new regional scheme.”



✓ Liberal democracy, although it is a facilitating factor, is not a necessary condition for enemies to become friends. In case of ASEAN, village-based social norms that emphasized consultation and deliberation provided an important basis for restraint and consensual decision making at the interstate level, laying a foundation for the establishment of security community.

✓ A concert of the great powers is a far better investment in the spread of peace than a concert of democracies. Moreover, pressing major powers to quicken their pace of democratization may do more harm than good in promoting great-power peace.

✓ In addition, even though states did not exercise political restraint at home like authoritarian states, they could practice strategic restraint in their external relations.



✓ If U.S. predicates partnership with China and Russia on their willingness to democratize, threaten elite groupings may well react by seeking to block strategic cooperation.

✓ It might be seen unenthusiastic about security cooperation to argue universal norms like democracy and human rights as prerequisite even before starting to negotiate for multilateral security cooperation.

✓ Moreover, Economic liberalization may well induce political liberalization over time, but it would be a mistake to precondition cooperation and the practice of reciprocal restraint with Russia and China on their embrace of liberal democracy.

✓ In history, the Concert of Europe succeeded in preserving great-power cooperation among diverse regimes in no small part because its members did not seek to interfere in each other's domestic affairs.


❖ If you want to promote the multilateral security cooperation institution, do not press your partner to accept the norms you prefer as a prerequisite from the beginning of negotiation.

➤ **Proper timing and modalities to pursuit a multilateral security mechanism**
(including Order of priority between security and functional approaches)

✓ The causal insignificance of economic integration during the early phase of stable peace. ⇒ In many case in history, there is no causal linkage between commercial ties and the initial steps toward stable peace. Unilateral accommodation and the practice of reciprocal restraint preceded economic integration. Moreover, the advance of reconciliation was driven primarily by geopolitical considerations, not economic incentive.

✓ Economic integration does advance stable peace during later phases, when societal linkages serve to consolidate reconciliation and promote cooperation and trust.

✓ Some Japanese scholar refer like Akiko Fukushima that “in approaching regionalism in Asia, the prevailing consensus in Japan is that de facto regionalization should take precedence over institutionalization, (and in addition,) an Asian community will not necessarily be the same as the European community.” ⇒ In fact, it seems that Japan does not need to hasten to push forward the institutionalization or integration.



✓ However, when addressing long-standing rivalries, governments, international institutions, and the private sectors should no longer labor under the illusion that the advance of economic interdependence will on its own lead to political reconciliation.

✓ Trade between China and Japan may mount in the years ahead, but such flows will have little impact on their bilateral relationship unless they are accompanied by accommodation and reciprocal restraint on matters of geopolitics.

✓ In addition, regional states in Northeast Asia might combine political and security cooperation or its institutionalization efforts with economic institutionalization. We have already lesson about the relations of security and economic cooperation from the EU that means that security cooperation is necessary for and facilitates completing integration, and therefore we could promote faster and efficiently with reducing trials and errors, using a strategy of going side by side. An Asian community will not necessarily be the same as the European community.

✓ The imperative to cooperate for resolving nontraditional issues in the global age promotes to combine economic cooperation with security. Some nontraditional issues can be solved more efficiently by regional cooperation.

IV OBSTACLES AND RECONCILIATION

1. Major Obstacles

- ◆ Historical Issue
- ◆ Territorial issue

2. How both sides to achieve reconciliation



In *How to make enemies become friends* by Charles A. Kupchan,

◆ Four phases to the pathway to stable peace

➤ Unilateral accommodation to befriend an adversary

- ✓ Stable peace requires mutual reassurance and respect, not mutual suspicion and resentment.
- ✓ Zones of peace form around cores of strength, but only when those cores withhold their power and demonstrate benign intent through the exercise of restraints.
- ✓ Structure matters, but so does statecraft.
- ✓ In most case, stable peace is promoted when stronger states make concession.
- ✓ Costly and unambiguous concessions need to clear the way for reconciliation and starting the sequential process that leads to stable peace.
- ✓ Major concessions, not just token gestures, are essential they are necessary indicators of benign intent.

■ Implication:

It is natural that Japan as a stronger state has more benign attitude than Korea for reconciliation.

➤ Institutionalized reciprocal restraint for regular cooperation which is connected to dampen rivalry


- ✓ If states abandon the practice of strategic restraint, they no longer appear as benign polities to their partner.
- ✓ Behavior can change perception of intent and motivation even as regime type remains constant.

■ Implication:

- # Both should avoid behaviors to stimulate each other with strategic calculation for acquiring the gains from cooperation in explicit or implicit agreement.
- # Japanese say that “we apologized for the past regrettable history many times and how many times we should do it?” But some Japanese politicians intermittently show inconsistent behaviors with their words such as speaking to glorify Japan’s past history or the visit to Yasukuni Shrine. 📖 defection from the path of strategic restraint
- # Such behaviors make the neighboring states doubt the intent and motivation of Japan again, which let the neighboring states come back to before previous apologies.



Consistency of speech and action is important.



➤ Social integration through building personal and institutional linkages between the partner states

➤ The generation of new narratives of amity and the consolidation of compatible, shared, or common identities

- ✓ The causal importance of political discourse should be recognized seriously among elites of would-be partner states.
- ✓ Words and symbols matter, especially when those wield instrumentally by government officials and opinion makers.
- ✓ As political leaders, economic interest groups, and media and cultural outlets generate new narratives of partner states with big influence, they have the ability to alter the deeply held identities that society hold of each other.
- ✓ For example, “shared Anglo-Saxon race,” and “Special relations” between Britain and U.S., and “a single entity” and “Christian brotherhood” among the states of the EU helped consolidate a shared identity.
- ✓ Changes in discourse have also as much potential to be destructive as constructive.
- ✓ Therefore, Today’s political leaders and opinion makers should take matters of discourse and identity more seriously than they often do.



■ Implication:

Especially politicians and media in the two countries should avoid narratives to stimulate each other if they think strategically that bilateral cooperation need to be cultivated carefully.

When can we find a shared identity at present? The Chinese letters using world? Confucius cultural world? We could or might find it by highly increasing cultural and economic exchanges with creating good narratives.

Regional rivalries would similarly benefit from efforts to alter antagonistic discourses. In East Asia, for example, the continuing controversy over whether Japan has accepted sufficient responsibility for its behavior during the Second World War and revised its history textbooks accordingly has more than symbolic importance. By maintaining oppositional narratives among Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese, these issues represent a significant impediment to rapprochement in Northeast Asia.



➤ Other considerations

◆ Establishing common vision for prosperity and stability in the region

- ✓ If Japan and South Korea forge an agreed common vision for East Asia as well as Northeast Asia in mutual trust, it will be easier to cooperate closely and productively for the region and both countries.
- ✓ There is no better partner than each other in Northeast Asia considering shared values and compatible economic and political systems. Only for two countries to rely on U.S. has a limit geopolitically and globally and close cooperation between two (with a good relationship with U.S.) in right direction will amplify the synergy effect to two countries.
- ✓ So, two countries have to make an effort to forge a common vision in the long-term by various ways including establishing a committee or common research institute at a governmental level and an academic circle at a private level.



◆ Avoiding conflictual issues consciously under an implicit agreement each other

✓ In case of the territorial issue, Dokdo island (Dakeshima), it would be better to refrain strategically from making mention of it not to stimulate each other, especially among elites of both sides including political leaders in particular.

✓ In case of the historical textbook issue, Japanese government should expand no more of the problem with self-restriction.

✓ If the relationship becomes bad because a Japanese political leader makes a comment on Dokdo and stimulates Koreans again or Japan government does not demonstrate its self-restraint, how can we, Japanese and Koreans who want to reconcile each other on a strategic thinking, do?

■ There will be no way without just waiting a longer time to return to a good relationship again like a rollercoaster. But to increase exchanges, making a thick reconciliation, can reduce the time to come back a good relationship and also the number of roller coasting times



◆ Increasing exchanges

- According to Croker, reconciliation can be divided into “thin” and “thick.”
- Thin reconciliation means that formerly hostile parties continue to coexist without taking active revenge. Diplomatic normalization is important part of reconciliation but it is only a thin one because reconciliation was purely a state-to-state affair. In roller coasting relations, the relations between Japan and Korea stay still in a thin reconciliation.
- Thick reconciliation which entails forgiveness, mercy, a shared comprehensive vision, mutual healing, or harmony. For cultivating a thick reconciliation, to increase exchanges is a very good method. But we have to consider that some exchanges should be designed carefully. For example, media should make an effort to convey good images of its partner state rather than bad to their people as far as possible. It would be good idea to increase exchanging social science scholars of both sides strategically, enabling to study bilateral reconciliation and cooperation jointly in a joint support of governments.
- Exchanges of Pop culture, animation industry, and drama, joint production for movie or music album, exchange of youth, establishing a jointly participating organization such as the Peace Corps for community service in developing countries, etc. are further encouraged by active support of the governments.

IV CONCLUSION

1. Broader sight and a long-term vision

- ❑ We had better have a broader perspective on the global world, not just only focusing on a narrow East Asia or Northeast Asia.
- ❑ We could find many areas to cooperate closely each other with a whole world.
- ❑ It would be better to keep conflictual issues inside its wardrobe deeply for a strategic cooperation.
- ❑ To build a long-term vision for prosperity and peace in East Asia and Northeast Asia would be helpful to cooperating each other.
- ❑ All of them would eventually contribute to build a preferable multilateral security regime in the region through a closed cooperation between two countries.


2. Finally, for Leadership of Japan

□ Japan is the second largest economy in the world and has a democratic and stable political system and liberal market system which the many neighboring states want to follow.

□ It is still difficult to trust China as a benign state from a perspective of the neighboring states, rather it is a worrisome partner, to a degree which China does not accept universal values actively and sometimes shows an aggressive behaviors with closed nationalism.

□ Though China is emerging power in no small part because it has a very big scale of economy and the biggest population in the world, it is difficult to predict to go beyond Japan and become a hegemonic power in region in the short and mid-term. It has not only domestic affairs to mitigate such as the intensified gap between the rich and poor and almost daily happening of demonstration in its west region but also GDP per capita is considerably low.

□ Therefore Japan has more resources for the leadership any other countries in the region. And its leadership needs to balance and guide China in a right way, as well.



❑ However, Japan has not been recognized yet as the most prospective leader, in no small part because it does not often show consistency between speech and action in terms of apology to the unfortunate history in the past including the historical textbook issue and there are still longstanding territorial disputes with the neighboring states.

❑ That is connected to an image of benign hegemony or leadership. If Japan continues to maintain and repeat the aforementioned behaviors, it will be difficult to get recognition as a leader from countries in East Asia.

❑ Japan ought to accommodate more with the neighboring states and to act more strategically for emerging a regional leader as a benign hegemony.

❑ If then, Japan could receive much more support from the many neighboring states including South Korea and reborn as a global as well as regional leader.