

第2部「アジア地域協力の現状と課題」
Session 2: Asian Regional Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges

発表 4：「パワー、規範とアジア地域の制度構築」
Presentation 4: “Powers, Norms and Regional Institution-Building”

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Power, Norms and Institution-Building in East Asia

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3rd GIARI Symposium**

Premises

- 1) Regional security cooperation in East Asia has not been substantially institutionalised, while institution-building has mainly evolved around policy areas related to economic integration.**
- 2) Summits, the highest level of regional gatherings, have been established in these economic institutions in Asia, serving as confidence-building platforms.**
- 3) Accordingly, security cooperation interests have been embedded in economic integration mechanisms in East Asia; 'economy' acts as a buffer against the intensification of 'security'.**

Question

Why have several regional institutions come to emerge and co-existed in East Asia?


Approach

Examining factors behind the order of the establishments:

Old APEC (1989) → ASEAN+3 (1997) → ASEAN+6 (2005) → new APEC (2006/08)

Old APEC: open regionalism, based on MFN.

New APEC: regional trade bloc, based on discrimination.



Basic hypothesis (modified analytical eclecticism)

Power, interest and norm are all important, but more significance is placed on power; an independent variable against the others.

Powerful states judge that the functions or norms of an existing regional institution do not accord with its own interests, and then commit itself to another institution which would serve its own interests better.

Powers have both materialistic (hard) and ideational (soft) dimensions.

1. Old APEC to ASEAN+3 (powerful states: Japan and China)

*APEC: failing to promote trade/investment liberalisation and cope with the Asian financial crisis, subsequently engaged in security agendas such as counter terrorism after 9/11.

(Japan and China's commitment to helping ASEAN to which US paid little attention in financial crisis).

*ASEAN+3: focus on CMI as a major area of functional cooperation which APEC and ASEAN failed to establish.

(The US: benign neglect attitude)

2. ASEAN+3 to EAS (Japan and the US)

***ASEAN+3 in 2000s: Anxiety about China's growing power that might dominate the agenda-setting process.**

(most of the members were developing countries and tended to support China's viewpoints and agendas).

***EAS in 2005: stressing the importance of 'common values' shared with the US and Japan, such as democracy and human rights**

(Australia, NZ and India as those 'East Asian' states were urged to join in "+3").

3. ASEAN+6 to new APEC (powerful state: the US)

1) Japan proposed the ASEAN+6 integration (CEPEA) in 2006 that excludes the US.

2) China enjoyed the credit through its effort to promote "low quality" FTAs in Southeast Asia.

→ putting US businesses, which would not benefit from the abolition of tariffs, at a disadvantage in relation to East Asian businesses in market competition.

The US has tried to utilize FTAAP to take a symbolic action to change the regional integration discourse, and change the expectation of where the trade politics in East Asia would be headed in the future.

- **The US and TPP**

Given +3 and +6 FTAs are yet to commence, the US interest in FTAAP through TPP as a direct way of the challenge to East Asian integration may make it difficult for Japan to vigorously promote ASEAN+6 FTA, to a lesser extent for China's ASEAN+3 FTA as well.

Key APEC members have developed an interest in participating in TPP (now 9 participants).

***Japan's New Growth Strategy (endorsed by the Cabinet on 18 June 2010): the promotion of FTAAP, but no mention about TPP.**

4. Further Development of ASEAN+3 (China and Japan)

May 2009, ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers' meeting saw the agreement :

- a) to expand the fund of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) to US\$120 billion (China, Japan and Korea: 80% contribution)**
- b) to establish financial surveillance, and monitoring systems (AMRO in S'pore), independent from IMF and ASEAN.**
- c) to multilateralise bilateral swap arrangements (CMIM: one time decision with more substantial funds available).**

5. Further development of ASEAN+6 (the US)

US engagement in East Asia under the Obama administration → sustaining a superficial ‘ASEAN Centrality’ claim.

- a) Singing of ASEAN’s TAC (July.09): meeting three conditions for the EAS participation.**
- b) Obama’s Tokyo (Nov.09) and Clinton’s Honolulu (Jan.10) speeches: declaring its interest in officially engaging in EAS.**
- c) US-ASEAN Summit: first kind of meeting the US President joined, including the first encounter with a Myanmar leader by a US President in 42 years.**

6. Trilateral Cooperation in Northeast Asia

The CJK relations had improved, conducive to the establishment of Trilateral Summit, leading to more functional cooperation including investment treaty and FTA in NEA with the 2011 establishment of the Secretariat in Seoul, representing Korea’s initiative role.

Development of trans-governmental and intra-governmental networks: more ministerial and senior officials’ meetings in finance, foreign affairs, economy and trade, environment, health culture and tourism in Northeast Asia.

7. CJK's analytical implications

- 1) Discontent:** political instability in Southeast Asia, which has hampered the development of East Asian cooperation, is a common concern.
- 2) Norm:** Japan and Korea have a shared interest in a more efficient trade/investment norms and jointly urged China to deal with 'the behind the border' issues due to the growing triangle independence: the ASEAN way's irrelevance.
- 3) Powerfulness:** 80% of the total amount of CMIM (\$12 billion) is provided by CJK, while their combined GDP account for 87% of the total East Asian one: massive power imbalance.

8. Towards a process of "institutional Darwinism"?

● Possible independent variables

- 1) Whether will each powerful initiator, supported by followers, strive to maintain its interest in maintaining APEC, APT, EAS or CJK?**
- 2) How will the China-Japan confrontations affect the leader-follower (mainly Korea and ASEAN) matrix?**
- 3) Whether will the US take an encirclement approach or recreate a Cold-War type of "two plus one" formula, in a battle between the Washington and Beijing consensuses?**

発表 5: 「アイデンティティと安全保障コミュニティ」
Presentation 5: “Cross-National Identity and Security Community”

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“Obstacles to Governance in East Asia: The Case of Security Communities”

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The 4th International Symposium on “Security Cooperation and Regional Integration in Asia”
December 3, 2010

1

The Characteristics of Security Communities

Deutsch et al (1957) — geographical space where states have “dependable expectations of peaceful change”

- unimaginability of violence in resolving disputes
- dyadic or multilateral

Dependable expectations of peaceful change rest on “mutually successful predictions of behavior”

- predictability comes when people “came to feel that they could understand their countrymen in the neighboring political units by expecting them, by and large, to behave as they themselves would behave in a similar fashion”

examples

- North America (the US and Canada),
- in the Southwest Pacific (Australia and New Zealand), in
- Western Europe
- Scandinavia


What about East Asia?

2

Is there an emerging security community?

Frequency of International Crises


(source: International Crisis Behavior dataset)




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Frequency of armed conflicts (starts and ongoing)

(source: Peace Research Institute of Oslo)




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


Crisis management
behavior *during* the
Cold War

Crisis management
behavior *after* the
Cold War




Military spending in East Asia



Percentage of East Asian polities that are liberal democracies


(using the Polity IV dataset criteria)



7

Identity differences


% choosing Asian identity in addition to national identity
(AsiaBarometer 2006-7)



8

Japan's influence


(source: AsiaBarometer)



9

Identity difference: Views of Japan's influence and identification with Asia

(source: AsiaBarometer)



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Unimaginability of violence in East Asia?

% of subregional directed dyads where violence is “imaginable” (excludes US)

- NEA dyads (N=30) ~ 70%
- SEA dyads (N=110) ~ 48%

% of a polity’s dyadic relationships where violence is “imaginable”

- Taiwan ~50%
- Russia ~75%
- Japan ~80%
- ROK ~80%
- PRC ~100%
- DPRK ~100%

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Obstacles to Security community

identity difference: perceptions of difference in the essential traits held by one’s own people and those held by people of other countries in other words, how different is my group from your group?

identity difference predicts to realpolitik practices (e.g. arming, opposition to free trade)

the wider the perceived difference, the more realpolitik one’s foreign policy preferences are (social identity theory)

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What is the relationship between social contact and the importance of territory?

security communities require the resolution of territorial disputes

- violence is very imaginable as long as territorial disputes persist

the persistence of territorial disputes likely enhances perceptions of identity difference

- territory is seen as an indivisible symbol of national difference and uniqueness.
- national identities are framed in the discourses of kinship (the country as motherlands/fatherlands, the people as brothers/sisters/children) and sovereignty.
- kinship and sovereignty are defined, in part, by geographical space.
- powerful source of identity difference is the institutionalization of territorial disputes

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Security communities and identity change

dependable expectations of peaceful change rest on “mutually successful predictions of behavior” (Deutsch et al 1957)

predictability comes when people “*came to feel that they could understand their countrymen in the neighboring political units by expecting them, by and large, to behave as they themselves would behave in a similar fashion*” (Deutsch et al 1957)

predictability comes when people have a sense of shared identity

a security community requires a reduction in perceived differences in ingroup-outgroup identity traits

how do perceived differences in identity traits dissipate?

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Contact theory

personal contact

- provides new information about outgroup
- requires behavioral change toward outgroup
- leads to increased affective relationships
- challenges ingroup stereotypes
- outgroup is eventually salient, even though initial contact is with individual
- actual friendship is possible
- leads to improved moral assessment of the other

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Forms of social contact and identity change

foreign travel

consumption of popular culture

workplace contact

epistemic communities

virtual (online) contact

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Foreign travel and identity change

often tourism is short term and aimed at enjoying what is considered unique about another country.

- brief, organized, sometimes state-controlled tourism can reinforce stereotypes

tourism that allows extended opportunities for empathetic contact may counter stereotyping.


- house-stay tourism, volunteer tourism (working on some social projects in another country), or extended educational tourism in a host country

dramatic increases intra-East Asian tourism

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Travel abroad and effect on identity difference

(N=~900, source: BAS 2007)




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Travel and Chinese perceptions of identity difference with Japanese (BAS 2007)

-----+-----				F(6, 905) = 9.69	
Model	276.980199	6	46.1633665	Prob > F	= 0.0000
Residual	4313.29559	905	4.76607248	R-squared	= 0.0603
-----+-----				Adj R-squared	= 0.0541
Total	4590.27579	911	5.03872205	Root MSE	= 2.1831
-----+-----					
	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----					
gender	-.0940386	.1483218	-0.63	0.526	-.3851332 .1970561
age	.0079024	.0060058	1.32	0.189	-.0038844 .0196893
rural hukou	.7330253	.1852311	3.96	0.000	.3694929 1.096558
log income	-.0037371	.0896853	-0.04	0.967	-.1797525 .1722782
education years	-.047116	.0232167	-2.03	0.043	-.0926809 -.0015512
foreign travel	-.6495433	.253833	-2.56	0.011	-1.147713 -.1513736
_cons	3.403411	.969631	3.51	0.000	1.500424 5.306398
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Travel and Asian identity (AsiaBarometer 2006, Chinese sample)



Popular culture and Identity

cultural consumption creates an “extraordinary mass ceremony”, cuing ingroup identification?


content of products are viewed as cross-national, groups perceive similar shared tastes?

example: “Korean wave” and Taiwanese views of the ROK

selection problem


- people who ‘like’ foreigners are attracted to foreign cultural products?
- likely to be endogenous/interactive process — liking cultural products ↔ liking foreigners

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watching foreign-produced TV and Asian identity
(source: AsiaBarometer 2006)

watching foreign-produced TV and Asian identity
(source: AsiaBarometer 2007)



Workplace contact and identity

globalization in urban centers in Asia has brought people from different countries together in the work place.

- expat populations have grown throughout the region over the last couple of decades.

not all of this expat-local contact is likely to reduce perceptions of identity difference.


- expat enclaves and, in some cases, vastly higher or vastly lower standards of living, political limits etc, all reduce the probability of social contact with locals

survey data is suggestive, however, that workplace contact help ameliorates perceptions of “the other”

- associated with higher levels of amity, lower levels of nationalism ²³


Frequent work contact with Americans and amity toward the US

(source: BAS 2004)




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Relationship between frequent contact with Americans and agreement with the statement that “people should support their government even if it is wrong” (Source: BAS 2004)




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Work-related
Contact with foreigners
(source: AsiaBarometer 2006)

Work-related
Contact with foreigners
(AsiaBarometer 2007)



Epistemic communities and identity change

East Asia has a myriad of cross-national work environments created by dialogues in the fields of economics, environmentalism, and security participants are often

- self-selecting
- committed to multilateralism and cooperation
- sharing similar worldviews

the contact is often sustained, long term, and small group solidarity comes from sharing principles and purposes

- “elite cluster of pan-regional cosmopolitans” (Pempel)

conditions ripe for social influence and persuasion

little research on epistemic communities and regional identity in East Asia

- Middle East track II dialogues allowed people to learn about each other as non-stereotyped members of another group (Dalia Dassa Kaye)


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Virtual contact and identity

the internet can be used to express and reinforce stereotyping, racist sentiments, or ingroup identities among diaspora populations experimental research suggests under certain conditions *imagining* non-hostile contact with out-groups can also reduce perceptions of difference (mainly by inducing thinking about the heterogeneity of the out-group)


online interaction can hide some features of dress, speech, appearance, social statuses that can highlight status differences online interaction also allows ‘contact’ from one’s own private sphere, where there is less peer pressure to conform to in-group norms of stereotyping.

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Internet contact and
Asian identity
(source: AsiaBarometer 2006)

Internet contact and
Asian identity
(source: AsiaBarometer 2007)



Conclusion

the impact of social contact on identity differences is tentative

- strong theory
- strong experimental evidence
- weaker evidence from East Asia

need much more extensive cross-national surveys, media content analysis, and elite surveys/interviews, tracked over time

need to examine the roots of cross-national identity difference and stereotyping -- primary education curricula

- this research is essential if the promotion of regional security communities (governance) is to be effective

発表 6：「非伝統的安全保障と ASEAN」
Presentation 6: “ASEAN and Non-Traditional Security”

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ASEAN and Non-Traditional Security

Introduction

The growing salience of non-traditional security (NTS) problems in Southeast Asia has made it increasingly difficult for regional states to insist on strict separation between domestic affairs and regional problems. No regional state can continue to insist that various non-traditional problems within their respective domestic boundaries can be addressed unilaterally through national response by the state concerned. The magnitude of the problems, and their impacts beyond national boundaries, render any national response inadequate. In other words, the nature of non-traditional security problems requires not only national response but also close regional cooperation to address them.

Indeed, what are now regarded as non-traditional security issues have always been on the agenda of cooperation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Since its inception in August 1967, ASEAN has always approached security matters in a comprehensive manner. For Southeast Asian countries, security has always encompassed wide arrays of issues in social, cultural, economic, political, and military fronts. Problems in those areas –especially within the domestic context-- are seen to have the potential to destabilise nation-states and regional peace and security. Based on such conception of security, ASEAN has always distinguished security in terms of what traditional and non-traditional threats. However, until very recently, ASEAN countries tended to see non-traditional security issues primarily as domestic problems of member state which required national solution. It was only after the end of the Cold War, and more so after the 1997 economic crisis, which brought about the growing threats posed by non-traditional security problems, that ASEAN began to intensify inter-state cooperation in dealing with the problems.

The Merits and Limits of ASEAN's Cooperation on NTS

Initially, in resolving regional security issues, both at national and regional levels, ASEAN from the outset undertook two interrelated approaches. First, threats from non-traditional security problems were left to individual member state to resolve, especially through nation-building measures. Second, to enable individual states resolving those problems, regional cooperation is necessary to create a peaceful external environment so that states would not be distracted from domestic priorities. These approaches later evolved into a strategy of building regional resilience, a conception influenced by Indonesia's thinking of *ketahanan nasional* (national resilience). Such thinking postulates that "if each member nation can accomplish an overall national development and overcome internal threats, regional resilience will automatically result much in the same way as a chain derives its overall strength from the strength of its constituent parts".¹ In other words, ASEAN believed that the management of inter-state relations in the region should be founded on the sanctity of national sovereignty of its member states. Regional cooperation was sought in order to reinforce, not erode, that sovereignty.

With the end of the Cold War, however, ASEAN's approach to regional security began to change. ASEAN countries continue to face security challenges in multiple forms, especially in non-traditional forms. For most Southeast Asian countries, the threat of terrorism is but one problem alongside other security problems such as extreme poverty, trans-national crimes, natural disaster, maritime pollution, environmental problems, piracy, human trafficking, and communal violence. ASEAN began to recognise the imperative for cooperation among member states to resolve domestic problems with cross-border effects.

It was the implication of economic crisis of 1997 on human suffering that demonstrated further the significance of non-traditional security problems in the region. In 2003, the health crisis triggered by the problem of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and then the Avian flu, clearly showed how security threats in Southeast Asia has increasingly become trans-national, and therefore blurred the distinction between internal and external security. The SARS epidemic clearly reinforced the permeability of

¹ Jusuf Wanandi, "Security Issues in the ASEAN Region," in Karl D. Jackson and M. Hadi Soesastro, eds., *ASEAN Security and Economic Development*, Research Papers and Policy Studies no. 11 (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1984), p. 305.

state boundaries and highlighted the growing imperative for transnational cooperation. The fact that the spread of SARS could be checked by close regional and international cooperation sent a strong lesson that the containment and resolution to such problems would require close inter-state cooperation. Without a coordinated cooperation, which will be much more effective if it is done within a multilateral institution, this kind of threat could lead to a global catastrophe. Indeed, these problems serve as the latest reminder to all regional states that security interdependence has become an undeniable reality in Southeast Asia.

While the depth and scope of NTS cooperation in ASEAN remain subject to criticism, it does have its merits. For one, the focus of cooperation on non-traditional security issues does provide an additional platform for developing the habit of cooperation among ASEAN states within a formal multilateral setting. Within this setting, states could institutionalise the notion of “security with” rather than “security against” as the dominant paradigm for inter-state relations. As ASEAN’s experience has shown, the process is also important, especially for the institution to mature and induce a level of comfort among the participating states.

Addressing NTS problems, however, still constitutes a formidable challenge for ASEAN for a number of reasons. First, NTS issues do not necessarily mean “non-sensitive” problems. For example, the problem in Burma --which led to the displacement of people and refugees-- has also reinforced the point that human rights is a security issue for the region. The same can also be said regarding the problem of trans-boundary pollution. In other words, NTS problems do relate closely to the issue of national sensitivity. In this regards, the cliché problem of non-interference should not be overlooked.

The second constraint is the continuing problem of limited state capacity to address the NTS challenges. The financial crisis of 1997, for example, clearly reduced the capacity of some states --such as Indonesia-- to push through some policy measures and allocate the needed fund for addressing the problem. As most ASEAN countries are facing multiple NTS problems at the same time, there is a competition for limited state resources, thus making it difficult to prioritise.

The third constraint comes from ASEAN’s internal working mechanism. Despite recent institutional adjustments after the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, ASEAN still lacks a mechanism to enforce compliance. The trans-national nature of the problem clearly requires a collective effort among affected states to address and resolve the problems. It is precisely on this imperative that ASEAN has been weak.

The fourth constraint comes from the fact that ASEAN remains an inter-governmental form of regional cooperation. Despite its declaration to become a people-oriented or people-centred, some governments in the region remain suspicious of the civil society organisations (CSOs) and reluctant to work them. Meanwhile, most NTS problems need a strong state-CSOs partnership in addressing them.

Concluding Notes

ASEAN, however, has begun to consolidate its efforts in addressing the NTS problems through a number of initiative. Two most important steps towards this direction have been the adoption of the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) in October 2003 and the APSC Blueprint in 2004. Indeed, greater cooperation has been evident with regards to the management of the problem of terrorism, natural disasters, and maritime safety. While the extent of the implementation of these measures remain unclear, ASEAN does have a platform through which NTS cooperation could be intensified.

Regarding the principle of non-interference, ASEAN should continue to adhere to this principle. However, this principle should not become an obstacle to greater cooperation in addressing NTS. The principle of non-interference needs to be employed in a flexible way so that it would allow ASEAN to cooperate on trans-boundaries issues, internal problems with clear regional implications, and issues with identifiable humanitarian dimension such as gross violation of human rights, natural disasters, humanitarian crisis, internally displaced persons (IDP) and other human security problems. In other words, ASEAN needs to employ the principle of non-interference within the context of interdependence among states.

Despite the growing recognition on the importance of NTS, however, the place of NTS in security discourse and policy in the region should not be taken for granted. East Asia is at the most important juncture of great

strategic transformation. While the existing regional security architecture is better equipped to tackle NTS challenges, it is not so in managing “traditional” or “hard” security problems. Questions are being asked regarding the viability of the current regional architecture in coping with strategic challenges resulting from the changing dynamics and power relations among major powers in the Asia-Pacific region. Changes and strategic re-alignments in the relationship among the major powers, as a result of global transformation and regional power shift, have begun to galvanise the discourse and studies on the adequacy of the existing architecture. By nature, this debate brings back the attention to the “traditional” or “hard” security issues.

Indeed, as the discourse on the need for a new regional security architecture intensifies, traditional security concerns may once again overshadow the attention and preoccupation with NTS issues. Governments could be easily distracted by the imperative of addressing traditional security problems. In East Asia, there is no shortage of such problems. In addition to the problem of major power relations and regional security architecture, there are also unresolved territorial disputes, bilateral tensions, the implications of military build-up, and nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula. Government officials and traditional security analysts might find these issues more “sexy”. The concerns for protecting human beings from sources of threats no less deadly than wars could be easily lost within the overriding concerns over traditional security concerns. These traditional security concerns are important, but they should not be allowed to dominate security discourse and practices in Asia.

Discussant 3

Thank you. Five minutes is very short, so I'll ask just a couple of questions even though it's difficult after such excellent presentations to come up with some. First, some questions for the first presentation: One of the points that you mentioned was the lack of powers' sustained interests in keeping these multi-lateral security institutions, their willingness to jump ship and support other institutions if they no longer see their interests fit in the current institution. It seems to me that one of the problems, from this rather non-committal behavior, is that they don't fear or assess any severe consequences of leaving the institution. So the question for me would be, can the Asia-Pacific region develop multi-lateral security institutions that would over time make it difficult for major powers to leave without really suffering negative consequences? Or do we have to live with the fact that they will pick and choose as they see fit? The second question is related: what could be the negative consequences for Asian regional integration from this institutional Darwinism? Could that in the long run undermine the willingness of Asia-Pacific countries to engage in these efforts?

Three short questions for the second presentation. I was thrilled to hear that we need more money for these kinds of projects. I would also suggest that we need more money for projects looking at how Australia could fit into the security community, but that relates already to my first question, namely whether, in the face of a rising China that will challenge fundamentally the order in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific in general, does it make sense for us only to look at East Asian security communities, or don't we have to broaden the focus here and also look on the prospective for an Asia-Pacific security community, which of course would complicate the whole endeavour by an order of magnitude.

For the second question, regarding security communities, you've mostly focused on interstate relations. What do you see in terms of the effect of security communities on intrastate affairs in the Asia-Pacific region? Would development of a security community also affect the way these states would perceive the violence acceptable in their domestic affairs? This relates to my third question: how should we talk about the development of an Asia-Pacific or East Asia security community without discussing the nature of the political system at the same time? Does it make a difference in talking about security communities whether we have a homogeneous system of countries such as in Europe, or as in the East Asian theater, we have democratic states working side by side with non-democratic states? Does that make a difference?

Finally, I have one question for the third presentation on a very concrete non-traditional security challenge that you didn't mention in your talk: cyber-security. I think this is a topic that is not only very sexy, but it also has a high potential of becoming not only a non-traditional security issue, but also a non-traditional threat issue. How does ASEAN look at cyber-security, and what do you assess are the abilities of ASEAN to deal effectively with it? Quite clearly, it does affect the national security of each individual country to a very significant degree. Thank you.

Discussant 4

討論者 4

素晴らしいプレゼンテーションで、非常に勉強になりました。このセッションにおいてアジア地域の安全保障を考える上で、3つの重要な要因が提起されました。その一つは経済統合の問題で、もう一つは共通のアイデンティティの問題、そして最後の一つは非伝統的安全保障の問題です。私

² Editorial note: the Chatham House rule was applied to this session, and thus the names of the participants are not printed here. 編集メモ ——実名での引用をしないという了解のもとでシンポジウムを開催したため、この議事録には参加者の名前は記されていません。

はそれぞれの先生方に質問を提起するという形ではなく、アジア地域におけるより広い意味での安全保障問題、あるいはこの3つの要素がアジア地域の安全保障に与える影響について、それぞれ考えていただきたいと思います。

まず一番目の問題は、今日の午前のセッションにおいて伝統的な安全保障問題を議論しましたが、午後のこのセッションは非伝統的安全保障を取り上げています。最初の発表は、経済的安全保障が安保の緩衝材になることについて言及しましたが、二番目の発表は、ソーシャル・コンタクト、つまり社会の接触・コミュニケーションが安全保障とコミュニティの形成を促進する上で重要な役割を果たしうると論じました。ここ十年来東アジアにおいては経済・文化を含め多くの分野において地域協力が進んでいますが、我々から見ると、むしろ政治的な不信あるいは対立によってこういった経済や文化の交流が中断されるケースが非常に多く見受けられます。そこで質問として提起させていただきたいのは、要するに経済・社会の交流、あるいはASEANの非伝統的安全保障のための協力の中で、こういった協力が伝統的な安全保障分野における対立を回避させるようなケースが、具体例として何かありますか。もしあれば、こういった条件でそういった対立を回避させる役割を果たしうるのかを、まず一番目の質問として提起させていただきたいと思います。

二番目は、東アジアを国際システムの構造から考えたときに、日本と中国とアメリカそれぞれの大国の役割について、問題提起をさせていただきたいと思います。例えば、三番目の発表では、ASEAN諸国の非伝統的な分野における協力について詳しく説明していただきましたけれども、私が知っている限り、例えば中国もASEAN諸国と非伝統的な安全保障分野における協力を非常に積極的に推し進めていますし、日本も同じ活動を行っています。こういった日本と中国、もしくはアメリカの関与が、結果としてASEAN諸国間の非安全保障分野における協力にいかなる変化をもたらしているのかを、お教えいただきたいと思います。

三番目の質問は、このセッションの中心テーマとも関連しますが、これについては3人の先生方の意見をそれぞれお伺いしたいと思います。三番目の発表では、アジア地域の安全保障における協力について、*security communication of nations* や内政不干渉といった特徴が挙げられました。こういった特徴は、EUの統合と比較して、アジア地域の統合あるいは協力の特徴であるといえるのでしょうか。EUの地域統合の特徴とは異なるアジア地域統合の特徴について、他に何かあれば教えていただきたいと思います。

最後に、もしも私の理解が正しければ、最初の発表では、次のような趣旨のお話をされたと思います。すなわち、日中間の競争あるいは競合によって、アジアでは多層的・重複的な協力関係、あるいは協力のメカニズムが生み出されている、ということです。そこで今のアジアの現状を鑑みたとき、この多層的・重複的な協力関係が今後このまま続き、そういった協力関係はアジアの地域統合の一つの特徴となっていくのでしょうか。それとも、これは二番目の質問とも関連しているのですが、例えば中国とアメリカの競合関係等によって、将来いかなる変化が生じると考えられるのかについて、教えていただきたいと思います。

MC

司会

ありがとうございました。それでは、それぞれの先生方から質問のお答えをいただきたいと思います。お願いします。

Presenter 4

Thank you very much, I think the first discussant raises two very interesting and very difficult questions. One concerns the consequences of different institutions' existences supported by different superpowers. I think this question is quite similar to what the second discussant also raised just now. The second question seems to be related to some negative impact arising from institutional Darwinism. Let me touch on the second issue first. First of all, as I mentioned in my presentation, I don't support institutional Darwinism. Also, I think the two questions are related, so I won't necessarily answer each of them. Rather, my comments are

generally based on the two questions.

It's a future-oriented question, so therefore difficult to answer. However, at the moment, different leaders from powerful nations have different interests, especially in terms of regional integration frameworks. The classical example is the TPP—Trans Pacific Partnership. According to APEC Yokohama declarations, FTAP—Free Trade in the Asia Pacific—can be pursued by developing three different frameworks, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the TPP, but the TPP currently has nine member countries, but only a couple of ASEAN member states. FTAP is based on APEC, but doesn't include Myanmar, Laos, or Cambodia as official members. This is why ASEAN is not happy with the APEC-wide FTA and has prioritized including these three Indo-China nations into APEC.

If the United States continues to promote the TPP to achieve FTAP, that would be a big concern to ASEAN, and the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 frameworks. Also, some nations, like Japan, which are putting a priority on these frameworks to achieve regional integration, would be faced with very difficult policy questions. For example, if Japan tries to pursue the TPP or FTAP, how can Japan pursue its policy of ASEAN and Mekong River development when ASEAN member countries would be quite disappointed?

This is just one example of how different institutions supported by different countries are actually developing. These complex regional politics will probably continue, and from the Japanese viewpoint this is a big concern because China might be able to take advantage of its most favorable frameworks, ASEAN+3 and the Mekong River development. This is something that Japan would like to avoid in the future. Again, I don't know how these different institutions' problems can be solved, particularly since Japan has decided to join the TPP next year.

I think the second discussant also asked about some of the examples of economic cooperation that are keeping tensions from escalating. There is a lot of historical and territorial tension in this region: between Japan and China, between Japan and Korea, and even between Korea and China. South East Asian countries still have some territory disputes. However, economic integration has continued despite these disputes. The question is whether integration could have proceeded faster without these disputes. In other words, are territorial disputes or bilateral tensions acting as a hindrance to regional integration? My observation is no. The causation is very difficult to demonstrate, but as I mentioned in my presentation, we have a huge territorial dispute between Japan and China. However, talks among China, Japan, and Korea are going on this week. They don't mention anything about the Senkaku or Diaoyu problems. They simply focus on regional integration. How can we explain that if hindrance exists? Why would the Chinese trade official say that the CJKFTA could be commenced in 2012? I think that's probably enough. Thank you so much.

Presenter 5

The advantage of having a short amount of time to answer lots of questions is that I can pick the easy question to answer. They're all hard, but I'm going to pick the easiest of the hard. That is, the impact of security community building on intrastate affairs rather than interstate affairs. I was thinking it's a really important question because what it underscores is a fundamental tension between building a security community and maintaining domestic legitimacy. For a lot of countries the maintenance of domestic legitimacy requires accentuating differences between self and other, accentuating and stressing the uniqueness of your own cultural ethnocentric traits, and characteristics precisely opposite, which you need to see for the construction of an interstate security community.

For example, American exceptionalism, Chinese exceptionalism, Japanese exceptionalism, French exceptionalism, all these exceptionalisms emphasize the value superiority of their traits and characteristics. Americans believe they're the most democratic country in the world, the Chinese believe they're the most peaceful people in the world, and the construction of a security community requires actually deemphasizing uniqueness and emphasizing similarities or traits or characteristics that are shared across boundaries. This raises a problem for states that worry about their legitimacy because emphasizing your uniqueness through

nationalism is an important source of legitimacy for regimes that worry about support from their population. It may be that the implication here is that building a cross-national security community necessarily requires challenging the uniqueness of national identities, and this is difficult particularly for authoritarian regimes, whose legitimacy does not rest on electoral processes, and it's particularly difficult for nationalist democracies, such as the United States. Interstate security community construction may require democratization, or at least regimes whose legitimacy does not rest on emphasizing the uniqueness of their own traits and characteristics, which is a much more pessimistic conclusion about security communities than I thought I would arrive at.

Presenter 6

Thank you for all the questions. Let me begin by answering the questions from the first discussant. I actually don't really know what ASEAN is doing on cyber-security, but to the best of my knowledge they are beginning to address the issue within the transnational crimes network of the ASEAN police.

Let me turn to the three points that have been raised specifically on the ASEAN experience by the second discussant. Number one, what is needed to avoid tension? Institutionally speaking, there are a number of mechanisms within ASEAN, such as the high council provisions within the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the ARF Chair, which can be utilized when tensions arise. But so far, we have never used these mechanisms. Instead, ASEAN continues to rely on the personal ties of leaders, which of course has begun to change. Because of the regular exchanges among the leaders of the ASEAN member states, and also because of their close personal relationships, they actually talk directly to each other either in an informal or formal setting, whenever tensions arise. I can tell you that when Indonesia had a problem with Malaysia it was easy for both leaders to come together and talk about it in order to diffuse tension, especially on the streets in Jakarta. As we have become a democracy, foreign policy issues are no longer a monopoly of government officials, and NGOs and NPs take part in the process, but that's often the first channel we use.

Another mechanism is what I call the restraining effects of institutions, in which by simply invoking the fact that we are members of ASEAN, that actually helps conflicting countries who are having a dispute to think twice before they actually escalate tensions.

The second question is on the impact of the involvement of China, the US, and Japan on non-traditional security cooperation within ASEAN. In general, I can say that ASEAN, through its various institutions, especially the ASEAN Regional Forum, provides an institutional framework, even though it's not perfect, for the three major powers to cooperate under the ASEAN umbrella on those issues. But unfortunately the activities have been confined to workshops, study groups, and desktop exercises that are more bilateral: China-ASEAN, ASEAN-Japan, and ASEAN-US.

In fact, different bilateral exercises on NTS serve different purposes. With China, for example, ASEAN, by bringing in NTS issues as an agenda of cooperation between ASEAN and China, expects to integrate China further into the web of cooperation, not only with ASEAN, but also with other East Asian countries. It really helps to achieve the purpose of CBM, and also to strengthen mutual trust between ASEAN and China.

With the US, I think it would be fair to say that bringing in NTS issues, and also expecting a US role in this area, will help maintain US engagement in the region. With Japan, basically we want Japan's support to ensure the success of ASEAN community building, and this is quite evident from the last 20 years of ASEAN-Japan cooperation.

The third question is regarding any difference between the so-called ASEAN security community and the EU? When we came up with the idea of the ASEAN security community, it was not actually a Deutch security community that we had in mind. It's basically an ASEAN security community, so ASEAN serves an objective basically. With the expansion of ASEAN from six to eight and then to ten members, we worried that with the emergence of new security problems, and also because of the surge of territorial

disputes among members, that the use of force could actually return to the ASEAN context. In that context, we were quite modest even though the original proposal from Indonesia for the ASEAN security community really envisions a full security community. We also brought in the imperative of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, and the free movement of people so that we could have a shared regional identity.

The agreement in 2003 to make war, or the use of force, impossible between member states, is the basic characteristic of the ASEAN security community. In that context, it's odd to call this kind of undertaking a security community, especially if you bring in the literature on security communities, because it deviated from the general understanding of what security communities are. But we hope that as countries begin to implement those policy measures that can create the conditions where the use of force, or even war, become impossible among the member states, then in the next step after 2015, we can move in order to address other requirements before ASEAN can become a real security community.

MC

司会

どうもありがとうございました。それでは、集めさせていただいた質問票の中から、発表者の方々に質問させていただきたいと思います。そこでご了承いただきたいのですが、いくつか質問の類似や重複もありましたので、時間の関係上まとめさせていただきます。質問は一つずつお名前を紹介するよりも、いくつかのテーマに分けて行いたいと思います。

MC

I'd like to ask the third presenter first and go in reverse order and ask two questions.

MC

司会

三番目の発表については、二つの質問があります。一つは *ASEAN Way* と *non-traditional security* との関係です。もう一つは、新しく ASEAN に入ろうとしている国に対する他の国々の反応です。

MC

The first question to you is, does the ASEAN Way challenge non-traditional security cooperation? The second question is about new countries that want to join ASEAN, for example, East Timor. What are the responses from the current member states? It could be that it's too early for some countries and there are some arguments that ASEAN started out being very open and is now becoming more closed.

MC

司会

二番目の発表については、三つ質問させていただきたいと思います。一つはナショナル・アイデンティティの問題、二つ目はアイデンティティと地域アイデンティティとの関係、そして三つ目は体制の問題についてです。

MC

The first question is about the relations between national identity and regional identity. Many people raised the question that national identity might be a hindrance to close regional identity assimilation, and several people raised historical issues and reconciliation issues. Would national identity be an impediment to a greater regional identity? Some of the questions raised the fact that although there is a regional identity in Europe it does not mean that German identity, French identity, or British identity have disappeared as a result.

MC

司会

あともう一つ質問があります。アジア地域には、民主主義の国もあれば社会主義一党独裁の国もあります。このような体制の違いというのは、セキュリティ・コミュニティの形成に何らかの影響を与えるのでしょうか。また与えるとしたら、どのような影響なのでしょう。あとは *regional identity* の中身についての質問も、いくつかいただいております。

MC

What kind of East Asian regional identity should we discuss? In the age of globalization maybe there could be a regional identity that is different from that in Europe, meaning different from ones based on democracy, human rights, etc.

MC

司会

最初の発表については、2つ質問があります。様々な分野で様々な交流が進んでいると、ご自身も何度も書かれておりますが、そこで「アジア」という概念は一体何なのかを教えて欲しいということが第一点です。それと、経済、政治、安全保障の各分野で討議してきましたけれども、そのそれぞれに関連しているアイデンティティあるいは利益というものに優先順位、あるいはヒエラルキーというものがあるのか、またはないのかということが、二点目の質問です。それでは、スクマ先生からお願いします。

Presenter 6

Let me answer the second question first, on the prospect of East Timor becoming the eleventh member of ASEAN. Yes, two or three days ago Ramos-Horta gave a speech in Singapore and said that he expected next year that East Timor could officially become a member of ASEAN. For symbolic reasons because Indonesia is going to chair ASEAN next year, if East Timor becomes a member when Indonesia is the chair, that could provide a good image of ASEAN as a whole and also for Indonesia's and East Timor's relationship.

But my own guess is that it would not easy for East Timor to become a member next year for a number of reasons. First, even though East Timor applied a couple of years ago, we have not been able to reduce the demand of being a member of ASEAN. We still have 617 meetings a year, and there are questions about the capability and capacity of East Timor to commit is. Also, I don't think we have reached a consensus within ASEAN on when East Timor will be admitted as a full member because there are still some countries that may be more suitable or more appropriate for the expansion of ASEAN because at the moment the main focus of ASEAN is to consolidate itself and try to implement the ASEAN community blue print. This is supposed to be completed by 2015.

On the ASEAN Way and non-traditional security challenges, let me first rehearse what the ASEAN Way means. I think it usually denotes notions of informality in ASEAN countries dealing with each other, especially in resolving conflict. It also relates to the question of sovereignty and non-interference as cardinal principles of interstate relations in South East Asia. Finally, it refers to the primacy of consensus in policy-making mechanisms.

The need to address non-traditional security issues, I think, erodes the ASEAN Way. If you continue to invoke these three elements of the ASEAN Way, I don't think we could go very far in cooperating and addressing NTS problems. For very obvious reasons, because when you talk about NTS problems, especially those problems that originate from a domestic domain of a member state but with trans-boundary implications, you have to compromise about the strict distinction between internal and external environments, and you have to compromise on the sanctity of the principle of non-interference. In fact, if you look at ASEAN cooperation in this area over the last ten years, there have been some changes and

a degree of flexibility when it comes to the invocations of the principle of the ASEAN Way. It's not that the ASEAN Way makes it difficult for the non-traditional security cooperation, but I think the imperative of working together to address NTS actually erodes and also changes the way the ASEAN Way is being implemented within ASEAN. But of course there is still tension, especially between old members and new members, with regard to how flexible you can be in order to allow greater cooperation on non-traditional security issues.

Presenter 5

Thank you very much for the questions. To some degree the questions actually lead me to comments similar to those I gave earlier. The first question, is national identity a hindrance to the emergence of regional identity? As I said, in principle, as is evident from the surveys we've been doing in Beijing, what matters is the sense of uniqueness. In other words, when you ask Chinese people to place Chinese people, Japanese people, and American people, where do they think Chinese people, Japanese people, and American people lie on scales of peaceful to warlike? Overwhelmingly, Chinese people think that Chinese people are down at the peaceful end, Americans are somewhere in the middle, and Japanese are down at the warlike end. There's obviously a variation across individuals, but the averages work out that way.

What's interesting is, people who believe that they are peaceful but believe that they are uniquely peaceful, in other words different from Japanese or Americans, are people who also have strong realpolitik preferences. In other words, they see their relationship with people who are different from them in a competitive, potentially conflicting way, even though they see themselves as being peaceful. What's crucial here is they see themselves as being unique and different, so even if the content of the identity or the uniqueness emphasizes their peacefulness, the fact is that what overwhelms that is the sense of differentness which then leads to a set of specific preferences such as increasing military spending, being more mercantilist in terms of free trade, that in a sense belie or undermine this notion that you're peaceful.

Now, unfortunately in the surveys we've been doing we have not asked a question about attitudes toward territory, but my guess is that people who believe they are uniquely different from Japanese and Americans and believe they are uniquely peaceful as Chinese people, are more likely to believe that territory matters and are more likely to see high salience in preserving territory. I'm almost certain that's what you would find.

So there's a relationship between the territorial issue and the historical issue, and that is the more that you believe you are different the more that you are likely to view this as an important, salient issue in your relationship with other countries. Apropos of European identity, I think it's absolutely true that the data on European identity show that people can hold both a national identity and a regional identity at the same time, but what appears to have occurred in Europe is that the definition of German-ness, French-ness, or British-ness has changed such that to be German is also to be European, and so the question is, could you see in East Asia the emergence of a definition of Chinese identity or of Japanese identity where to be Chinese is to be Asian, to be Japanese is to be Asian, where the definition Asian-ness is shared?

The second question was about regime type and obstacles to security dilemmas. As in my earlier answer, it may be that democratization is a requirement for the emergence of a security community based on shared identity. ASEAN may be an exception because ASEAN clearly has a mixture of regimes, and the presenter's very important work that he himself has done and others working with him have done to promote an ASEAN security community seems to be actually quite positive in the direction it's moving. But note that it was a democratic Indonesia that promoted the idea of a security community in the region; it was not a non-democratic regime in ASEAN. Not all democracies are probably suited for or interested in promoting security communities, and the obstacle that will run interference here is the degree to which the legitimacy of that democracy rests on this notion of a unique, different, superior national identity.

The third question, what kind of regional identity can emerge in East Asia, and how different might

this be from Europe? Again, I want to come back to the first point that I made, that in some sense the content of the identity traits that the people believe they share with others is irrelevant; what's key is the degree of shared-ness, the degree to which they believe these traits are shared by others. As I mentioned, in these surveys done in Beijing, people who believed that Chinese people were the most peaceful people in the world were people who actually tended to have realpolitik preferences and see the world as a threatening and dangerous place, precisely because they saw themselves as different and others as, in a sense, holding inferior values.

Basically, when you have an identity relationship where somebody believes that they are uniquely peaceful and they believe the other group is uniquely warlike, the chances of community for that person are very, very low compared to the chances of a community between people who see themselves as moderately peaceful. Namely, what matters there is that they see themselves as having relatively shared traits or values. Whether shared East Asian traits and an emerging security community is based on a notion of East Asian values or a notion of democratization—shared democratic values—or shared Confucian values may not matter as long as these values are perceived to be shared.

Presenter 4

報告者 4

どうもありがとうございました。最初の質問は少し忘れてしまいましたので、二番目の質問から先にお答えしたいと思います。アイデンティティあるいは地域制度の利益、プライオリティは何かという質問だったと思います。少なくとも拙論では、ASEAN+3、+6 それから APEC、それから日中韓、CJK を扱ったわけですが、この 4 つに共通した機能、協力があります。それは地域統合です。いずれも FTA、すなわち差別的な関税撤廃を行うという動きはこの 4 つ全てで行われる予定です。ただし、実際交渉が始まっているのは TPP のみです。ということは+3 も+6 も、それから APEC 大の FTAP も、CJK も、どこを取りどこを譲るかについての政府間交渉というのは、実はまだ起こっていません。ただアジェンダとしては、少なくともこれが一番重要であろうと考えられています。

先ほどプレゼンテーションで申し上げましたように、+3 は、その発生の大きな要因をアジア通貨危機に負っているように、やはり金融協力の問題を非常に重視している。特に、グローバルな危機、いわゆるリーマン・ショックがあり、それを受けた形で CMI が M になる、すなわち *multilateralization* になります。チェンマイ・イニシアティブというのは、二カ国間のお金の融通をやるネットワークだったのですが、これを一つにプールすることによって、規模が拡大します。しかも *decision*、どこにどのお金を出すかの決定は一回で済むわけです。ですので、CMI を M にする、*multilateralize* するというのは非常に大きな課題でありました。97 年のとき、日本の大蔵省のこういった試みはアメリカの反対意見で潰れたのですが、今回のグローバルな危機はアメリカ発だということで、アメリカからのそういう意見はありませんでした。

このようにグローバルな危機を受けて、+3 は、かつて最初にやろうとしたアジアでの通貨基金を、再度作ろうとする動きになっております。グローバルな機関である IMF で融資を受けるとき、100 借りる内 8 割は IMF のお金にならないといけない。すなわち IMF は、例えば金融引き締めや、負債を抱える銀行の整理といった、様々な条件をつけますが、それに実をつけなくてはなりません。実はこれが、アジア諸国がなかなか CMI というものを使うことができなかった理由なのですが、2009 年、ASEAN+3 の財務相会談で、この比率を下げると宣言されました。したがって、今後恐らく+3 は、この方向に進み、通貨協力が重要課題になってくるでしょう。

あと簡単に、EAS、+6 について述べたいと思いますが、これに来年からアメリカ及びロシアの大統領が参加することになります。では、アメリカ、ロシアが+6 の FTA に入るのかというと、これは入りません。ただし、オバマ大統領がそこでの議題から領土問題を外さないとおっしゃったので、アメリカとロシアが来る中で、中国はあまりやりたがらない、領土問題を話さなければいけない可能性が、来年あたりに出てくるはずです。そこで、もう少し広い、*confidence building* とまでは言え

ませんけれども、EAS は政治的な問題も扱っていくのではないかと思います。APEC は経済協力のためのものなのですが、残念ながら貿易の問題ばかりに焦点あてており、本来の目的であった経済協力、例えば技術協力、人材育成、中小企業支援といったものが少しなおざりにされ、FTA だけが前面に出ている状況になっております。今後これがどうなるのかも見所です。しかし来年は、アメリカが TPP を前面に押し出していくのではないかと思います。

CJK も、詳細はよく分からないのですが、ただ、10 個くらいの *ministerial meeting* (閣僚級会議) をすでに作っております。例えば、僕が面白いと思ったのは、7 月か 8 月に観光大臣会合というのがあった時のことです。当時は日本では前原氏が国交大臣として出席したのですが、そのとき日本の大手の旅行代理店が中国に来、また実験的にではあるが、中国が日本に来る旅行代理店を直接扱うことを認めました。そこでさらに CJK、韓国、日本、中国の間で、どのようにして観光客を増やすかについての話し合いもされました。

あまり大した話ではないかもしれませんが、少なくともこの三国の間で人の行き来を増やそうという話し合いが行われ、それが具体的な策となり、中国が実際にアクションを起こしたということを考えれば、非常に具体的な形で経済協力が進められて行くのではないかと考えられます。うまく答えられてはいないかもしれませんが、少なくともそれぞれの地域枠組みにはそれぞれの特徴があるということに関しては、ご理解いただけたのではないかと思います。

最後に、「アジア」とは何ぞやという質問につきまして、僕が聞きたいくらいなんです、しかしこの問いから逃げると早稲田大学の教員は一体何を勉強しているんだといわれることになりすので、あくまでも表層的な答えということでお聞きいただきたいと思います。研究者的に言うと、例えば、先ほどジョンストン先生の話から「アジアの価値は」というお話がありましたけれども、そういったように文化的にみる方法があります。あるいはまた経済的に見ることもできます。例えば我々日本企業は、非常に活発にアジアに出ていき、投資や貿易を行い、また工場を敷設する等して、最適化を図っている。そのやりとりの中に、経済的な空間というのが実際できあがってきます。アジアの統合というのは、実は多国籍の企業が先に作ったのだという意見もあるほどです。これを地域化と呼びますが、そういった動きも実は「アジア」というのを作っています。政治的な見方につきましては、先ほど我々が申し上げた「制度」というものがあります。例えば、東アジアと言いましても、アメリカやソ連が入っても東アジアであるのか、あるいはオーストラリア、ニュージーランドが入っても東アジアであるのか、ということに関しては、実にいろいろな議論がありました。しかし政治的に考えれば、そういった「アジア」という概念もあるのだろうと思います。現実にはそういう形で動いています。

最後に、一番簡単な、地理的概念があります。我々が地図帳を開いてそこに書いてある名前が「中央アジア」だったり、「東南アジア」だったしますが、そういった地理的区分によって、簡単に「アジア」というものをアイデンティファイすることもできる。このように、どの分野の見方によるかで、我々が思い浮かぶ「アジア」の印象というのは、違ってくるのです。そこで私が何を申し上げたいかという、少なくともヨーロッパのように統一的なものとして EU があり、そのメンバーに入れば全てヨーロッパになるというような簡単な状況は、アジアにはあまりない。それが実際に、今回私が取り上げた制度である APEC、東アジア、拡大東アジア、北東アジア、東南アジアといった様々な場所で地域の協力枠組みができることによって、行動を共にしようとする機運が作られているのではないかといえるのです。それが政治的なものか、経済的なものか、文化的なものかどうかは分かりません。しかし恐らく、それぞれフォーカスしているものが違うのではないかと思います。最初の質問でプライオリティということを聞かれましたけれども、結局そのことが、経済協力、機能協力のどこにプライオリティを置いているのかという問題にも関連してくるのではないかと考えられます。この辺は未研究のため明確に答えることはできませんが、今ご質問を受けてお答えできるのは、以上のことです。

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(アルファベット順；敬称略)