

Asian Regional Integration Review



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GIARI

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Contents

Editor's Note	Tsuneo Akaha	<i>i</i>
Contributors		<i>iii</i>
<i>Japan's FTAs as Tools for Achieving Companies' Commercial Interests: Do Japanese Corporations Need a Region-Wide Trade Liberalization Treaty?</i>		
Anna Jerzewska		<i>1</i>
<i>Comparing Regional Integration in East Asia/Southeast Asia and Central Asia</i>		
Chinara Esengul		<i>18</i>
<i>Remembering or Overcoming the Past?: "History Politics," Asian Identity and Visions of an East Asian Community</i>		
Torsten Weber		<i>39</i>
<i>The History of the "History Problem": Historical Recognition between Japan and Neighboring Asian Countries</i>		
Kinuyo Kawaji		<i>56</i>
<i>Human Rights and Culture in the Asian Region</i>		
Elisa Nesossi		<i>76</i>
<i>Lingua Francas in Higher Education in Northeast Asia and ASEAN Countries: Implications for Regional Cooperation on Languages</i>		
Sae Shimauchi		<i>88</i>
Book Review Essays		
<i>Apirat Petchsiri, José Luis de Sales Marques and William Roth, eds., Promoting Human Rights in Asia and Europe: The Role of Regional Integration, Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Publishing House, 2009.</i>		
Miki Honda		<i>103</i>
<i>Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, eds., Non-Western International Relations Theory—Perspectives on and beyond Asia, London and New York: Routledge, 2010.</i>		
Seiko Mimaki		<i>112</i>

Editor's Note

Tsuneo Akaha

As in the previous two issues published in 2009 and 2010, the current issue of *Asian Regional Integration Review* includes research reports by young scholars who have recently received a PhD or are currently pursuing a PhD, all with a focus on topics directly related to Asian regional integration. They all presented earlier versions of the articles included here at the Summer Institute on Regional Integration organized by the Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI), Waseda University in August 2010. The current issue also includes reviews of two recent books on Asian regional integration.

This issue exemplifies the multidisciplinary nature of Asian regional integration studies as an academic field, with the six research reports anchored in economics, political science, history, and education. These articles also represent a diversity of theoretical underpinnings and methodologies. Their topics are of interest to academic circles, policy organizations, and business communities, and address questions about the utility of free trade agreements for Japanese corporations; the relevance of regional integration in East Asia/Southeast Asia for Central Asia; the role of history politics in shaping Japan's relations with China and other neighboring countries; the use of culture-based arguments in the discourse on human rights in Asia; and the role of English versus national languages in promoting the increasingly internationalized higher education system in the region. The two book reviews introduce two anthologies representing empirical research and theoretical discourse by both junior and senior scholars in the field. The first review discusses the pattern of human rights promotion in Asia and Europe, highlighting the implications of the "ASEAN way" for a future human rights regime in Asia and the complex and even conflicted process of human rights regime development in Europe. The second book review critically examines the desirability and feasibility of the development of non-Western International Relations Theory in Asia. If this issue stimulates the reader's interest in exploring new avenues of research and new directions of discourse on regional integration in Asia and beyond, its purpose will have been well served.

As Managing Editor, I extend my gratitude to everyone who was involved in the preparation of this issue for publication, including Sachiko Hirakawa (Associate Editor), Mitsuko Akaha (Editorial Assistant), Shoko Miyano (Editorial Assistant), and Atsuko Tsuriya (GIARI).

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Japan's FTAs as Tools for Achieving Companies' Commercial Interests: Do Japanese Corporations Need a Region-Wide Trade Liberalization Treaty?

Anna Jerzewska

Abstract

Since the 1950s and 60s, Japanese companies have been shifting their manufacturing operations overseas. As the private sector invested more and more abroad and became dependent on the production base in East Asia, it became evident that some sort of formal agreement was needed to stabilize the situation in the FDI-host countries and consolidate the internationalization of production networks. Japanese bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) were utilized for this purpose. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has often stated that FTAs have been developed as a tool for securing firms' commercial interests. They have been a part of a broader policy of supporting rapid industrialization and economic growth since the Yoshida Doctrine. Japan has signed several bilateral FTAs as well as a semi-regional one with ASEAN and is currently participating in three coexisting frameworks with regional economic integration agendas, which include fostering of a region-wide FTA. This study focuses on the use of FTAs by Japanese corporations – FTAs' main clients – to date. It asks, what strategic commercial objectives do different types of existing FTAs (bilateral, semi-regional) fulfill for Japanese corporations, mainly in the electronics and machinery sectors, and how successful are they in performing this role? What additional value-added benefits could the planned region-wide FTA bring? In other words, do Japanese corporations need a region-wide FTA, or do the bilateral agreements and the semi-regional one provide a sufficient response to the firms' foreign commercial goals? I discuss the inter-constitutive nature of the value-added benefits of different levels of Japan's FTAs. Both trade theory and econometric studies of FTAs point to the conclusion that bilateral FTAs are a second-best option to semi-regional agreements, which, in turn, are less welfare enhancing than is regional or global multilateral liberalization. Despite that, this study finds that there is little support among Japanese MNCs in the electronics and machinery sector for a region-wide FTA. Research underpinning this analysis is based on a series of interviews with Japanese MNCs, governmental officials and analysts conducted by the author in Tokyo between 2009 and 2010.

1. Introduction

The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has often stated that free trade agreements (FTAs) have been developed as a tool for securing firms' commercial interests. Japan has signed several bilateral FTAs as well as a semi-regional one with ASEAN and is currently participating in three coexisting frameworks with a regional economic integration agenda, which includes the fostering of a region-wide FTA. The study focuses on the use of free trade agreements by Japanese corporations – FTAs' main clients – to date. It asks, what strategic commercial objectives do different types of existing FTAs fulfill for the Japanese corporations, and how successful are they in performing this role? What additional value-added benefits could the planned region-wide FTA bring? In other words, do Japanese corporations need a region-wide FTA, or

do the bilateral agreements and the semi-regional one provide a sufficient enough response to the firms' foreign commercial goals? Research underpinning this analysis is based on a series of interviews with Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs), government officials and analysts, conducted by the author in Tokyo between 2009 and 2010. It is a part of a broader research project to analyze the complex interaction between various levels of factors influencing the preferences of Japan's main actors regarding a region-wide FTA. The research argues that these main actors' preferences are central to the process of FTA policy formation. Based on Aggarwal's framework¹ it appears that political and diplomatic efforts are required for a country to sign a new FTA or to harmonize the existing ones. There have to be enough aggregated, expected gains from the outcome to provide sufficient incentive for signing of a treaty.² Therefore, the research focuses on the preferences, understood as the optimal, desired outcome, of the main groups of actors. The understanding behind this methodology is that in order for an FTA to be signed, pro-liberalization preferences within the country must exceed anti-liberalization ones. In this study, I focus on one group of actors – the private sector, namely the Japanese MNCs, from the electronics and machinery industries, primarily. This limitation results from the fact that preferences regarding FTAs differ greatly between sectors, making it impossible to define interests of the private sector as a whole. The two selected sectors had vested interests in the formation of an FTA network in East Asia, given the location of their production facilities and the importance of trade in parts and components for their operations.

The present study fits within the 'multilateralizing bilateralism' debate,³ which focuses on the issue of harmonization and consolidation of FTAs; this union would mean a progression from bilateral agreements to a semi-regional one (ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership) and, perhaps, a multilateral, region-wide treaty in the future. To this aim, I establish what the companies' preferences for different types of FTAs were in order to explain Japan's overlapping trade treaties with ASEAN members. Then, I look at current preferences for a region-wide agreement in Asia to assess how much support there is for such a treaty, and to understand why, despite Japan's participation in several regional economic integration schemes, there is little progress in this regard. As Japan's MNCs were often referred to as the main supporters of Japan's FTAs,⁴ their preferences are an important factor that may tip the scale of domestic support.

Trade theory states that the more countries participate in an FTA, the more economic gains it is likely to bring. The gravity model has been used to research the desirability of different variants of an East Asian FTA, such as an ASEAN+3 FTA, an ASEAN+6 FTA and so on. A wider regional agreement would potentially bring higher economic gains for all members. An ASEAN+3 FTA would have a bigger trade creation effect than a similar agreement between Japan, China and South Korea, though it would, in turn, be less profitable than ASEAN+6.⁵ Both trade theory and econometric studies of FTAs conclude that bilateral FTAs are a second-best option to semi-regional agreements, which, in turn, are less welfare enhancing than regional or global multilateral liberalization. The size of benefits from trade treaties for a given economy depends on several factors, out of which the scope and depth of the agreement is not the least important. Even if we assume modest benefits from trade liberalization, according to this reasoning, the private sector should profit from establishing a region-wide FTA in East Asia. Still, this study finds that there is little support among companies in the electronics and machinery sectors for a region-wide FTA. This lack is caused by the type of production organization the Japanese multinational companies use, and by the market-led economic integration in East Asia. This article presents the added benefits of Japan's bilateral FTAs, and those of the agreement with ASEAN, from the private sector's perspective. It explains why the companies are more interested in deepening liberalization under the bilateral treaties than in increasing efforts for a region-wide agreement. Parts two, three and four of this article present the impact of tariff liberalization under FTAs in East Asia on Japanese MNCs. Part five analyzes the current interest in a region-wide agreement.

2. Emergence of Vertically Integrated Production Networks and the Impact of the ASEAN FTA (AFTA)


East Asia has been an increasingly important market for Japanese companies over the last several decades. As Japan is a developed economy with an ageing society, the companies would struggle to survive on the local market alone.⁶ Japanese companies started investing in moving their production networks to other countries in the 1950s and 1960s. The Plaza Accord of September 1985 reinforced this process. It was the turning point for Japan, commencing the shift from a multilateral approach to liberalization, based on the WTO, to a multi-track one in the late 1990s, whereby the country pursued FTAs parallel to the WTO negotiations. After the Plaza Accord and the realignment of Yen to the US dollar, the dollar depreciated against the appreciating Yen, making Japanese products expensive on the US market. Continuing to manufacture all products within Japan was no longer profitable for many, especially labor-intensive industries. Although Japanese companies, even today, prefer to manufacture core parts and components within Japan, they have continued to move production bases outside the country. This shift was first directed to the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) – Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan – and then to the ASEAN countries. A large number of the investing companies were in the electronic and electrical appliance sectors as well as machinery and automobile sectors. Japan's core foreign economic goal, at the time, was to consolidate the situation after the Plaza Accord. As the private sector invested more and more abroad and became dependent on the production base in East Asia, it became evident that some sort of formal agreement was needed to stabilize the situation in the foreign direct investment (FDI)-host countries, and to consolidate the internationalization of the production networks. Such agreement would aim to preserve the *status quo*.

The years 1999 and 2000 brought a change in Japan's policy towards trade agreements, as many countries in the region were starting to think about bilateral FTAs, and China proposed a treaty to ASEAN in 2000. China's FTA proposal to ASEAN was the main trigger for Japan's shift to bilateral FTAs, but because so much of the groundwork had already been done, Japan was able to change its policy quickly.⁷ The Japanese production networks established in the ASEAN countries were then extended to China in the late 1990s. The core of this network shifted to Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore in the following years. This spread further influenced companies' interest in the region. After securing the country's first FTA with Singapore, the Japanese government had a clear idea of what could help MNCs' operations – an agreement with ASEAN countries. As Japan's production network is located in East Asia, an FTA with ASEAN members would help business operations there. Thailand's average MFN tariff was 8.2 percent, which made importing parts and components expensive for Japanese companies.⁸ However, instead of negotiating an FTA with ASEAN as China and Korea did, Japan started by negotiating bilateral agreements with several ASEAN members first. This was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MOFA) preference, as it wanted to use bilateral agreements as a tool for strengthening bilateral relations.⁹ Additionally, this strategy allowed Japan to avoid the situation where ASEAN member countries could block its demands during FTA negotiations; it had more bargaining power in bilateral negotiations.

When Japanese companies shifted their production to East Asia, they established vertically integrated production networks. This phenomenon, also known as internationalization of production, production fragmentation or production sharing, occurs when companies move their labor-intensive stages of production abroad to less developed countries while the capital-intensive stages are carried through at home, where parts or intermediate goods are further processed. Hence, manufacturing stages occur in the most cost-efficient locations. In East Asia, the intra-industry trade in parts and components, related to production fragmentation, has not only increased the

overall volume of intraregional trade, but it has also strengthened regional interdependence. Production sharing spread in the region due to ‘the region’s wide range of development levels, strong intraregional links, and capacity for organizational and technological change.’¹⁰


Figure 1



Source: AJCEP: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, METI, October 23, 2008, http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/081023_AJCEPgaiyo.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2010). (Author’s translation)

Figure 1 presents the situation in East Asia before 1992 from the perspective of Japan’s MNCs with a vertically integrated production network. In the 1990s, a Japanese company operating a parts production facility (D) and an assembly site in ASEAN had to pay tariffs at universal rates (most favorite nation tariff – MFN), while exporting parts and components from Japan to the respective factories. Similarly, MFN tariffs had to be paid when exporting a part from one ASEAN member country to another (D), when obtaining additional parts originating in ASEAN (I), and when exporting the finished good to the ASEAN market (G). In this figure, the dotted line represents parts, components and intermediates. The solid line represents trade in finished goods.

Figure 2



Source: AJCEP: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, METI, October 23, 2008, http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/081023_AJCEPgaiyo.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2010). (Author's translation)

Figure 2 represents how the 1992 signing of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) affected the production networks of Japanese MNCs. AFTA allowed the assembling site to import parts and components from other ASEAN member states (I) without paying tariffs. As the agreement set a 40 percent minimum local content rule of origin (RoO) for the good to be traded under preferential tariffs, any product exceeding this amount was still exported from a parts production facility (D) and assembly site under the MFN tariff.

3. Bilateral Free Trade Agreements

Japanese companies started supporting FTAs due to the increasing competition in the Asian markets. Bilateral FTAs offer Japanese multinational firms many benefits. For instance, they protect companies from the competition of other countries entering the same market. Companies are able to import parts and machinery from Japan to the FTA partner country, where their production facilities are located, under reduced tariffs. This deal is mainly the case for ASEAN members, which provide Japanese MNCs with resources and intermediates. Manger argues that “Japanese firms with vertically integrated operations in the host country emerge as key supporters of FTAs, in particular when their profits are under threat from FTAs signed by other countries.”¹¹ Vertically integrated multinationals have production facilities, as well as parts and components suppliers, in different countries. The removal of tariffs under an FTA facilitates the movement of parts and materials between production and assembling facilities, and also the sale of the final good. Additionally, companies lower their costs and increase returns on investments. Therefore, Japan’s subsidiaries in host countries made their support for bilateral free trade agreements known to the local and Japanese governments. Blechinger and Legewie state that “regional cooperation was mainly promoted by multinational firms interested in building up a horizontal division of labour

with regional production and sales networks to connect their various overseas activities on a more efficient regional scale.”¹² The proliferation of bilateral or preferential trade agreements, worldwide and in the region, is one of the reasons behind Japan’s pursuit of FTAs, as explained by Baldwin’s domino theory and the competitive liberalization theory (Baldwin 2004; Bergsten 1994; Dobson 2001). It implies that the proliferation of FTAs in a region causes other countries to sign further trade agreements to offset the trade diversion effects of those already in existence. In other words: FTAs beget further FTAs. In particular, the agreements signed by the US, China, and recently, Korea, are of great concern to Japan’s private sector. Currently, the FTA between the EU and South Korea worries Japan. The EU tariffs are considerably high, especially on electrical appliances, with a maximum tariff of 14 percent.¹³ On the other hand, the EU is also negotiating an agreement with ASEAN and India. An EU-ASEAN FTA would be good for Japan as the country’s production base is located mainly in the ASEAN region.

The private sector also profits from the type of FTAs Japan is signing. Japan names its FTAs Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), given the inclusion of some elements and various provisions aiming at the harmonization of regulations and economic cooperation. They are, so called, ‘broad band’ agreements. ‘Broad band FTA’ is a generic name for FTAs including comprehensive commitments to liberalization of non-tariff barriers to trade. They can include various provisions ranging from eliminating technical barriers to trade (TBTs) and enforcing rules on intellectual property rights (IPR) and government procurement, to overseeing competition policy and investment measures. They are also concerned with issues such as labor and environment, as well as various forms of further cooperation. Broad band FTAs include ‘deep’ integration measures, meaning that they remove not only border barriers, but also beyond-the-border measures.¹⁴ They can include provisions on: transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, investment, competition policy, cooperation in environmental issues, IT, or labor standards. This type of FTA is directly aimed at certain companies’ interests, particularly in the manufacturing sector. For them, tariff reduction is still important, despite the falling of MFN rates, but a strong focus is also placed on how FTAs can further improve operations of production networks and secure Japanese investments in East Asian markets. Therefore, the country’s FTAs focus on elements that help to achieve that, such as: trade facilitation, investment protection or facilitation, economic cooperation, and international financial policy cooperation. Improving the business environment in partner countries and influencing the East Asian states to introduce necessary reforms is an important motivation for Japan.¹⁵

In many cases, FTAs function as a defensive tool; they are signed as a result of domestic pressure from the private sector, namely by companies in a disadvantaged position due to trade treaties signed by other countries. For example, following the implementation of NAFTA and the signature of the Mexico-EU Free Trade Agreement, Japanese manufacturers found themselves in a disadvantaged position on the Mexican market. They had an incentive to lobby the government to negotiate a similar treaty that would provide them with equal market access. Whereas their American and European counterparts enjoyed preferential access, Japanese MNCs, among the OECD members, were the only ones to pay high customs duties on automobiles in Mexico. At the time, Mexico’s tariffs averaged 16 percent and tariffs on automobiles were 50 percent.¹⁶ NAFTA members exported automobiles to Mexico duty-free, while the EU countries paid 10 percent tariffs. The Japanese automobile sector demonstrated its losses and asked the government to sign an FTA. It was not the only sector that lobbied for the establishment of this treaty. Mexico grants a preferential status in government procurement to its FTA partners. This setup prevented Japanese companies in the electronics sector, among other companies, from selling power generation equipment and hospital-use medical equipment to that country.¹⁷ For example, X-ray medical equipment exported to Mexico was subjected to a 40 percent customs duty.¹⁸


As explained earlier, the companies’ preferences regarding bilateral FTAs differ from sector

to sector. They can also differ substantially within the sectors, depending on how much a given company has invested and operates in the prospective FTA partner country. The 'big three' of Japanese auto companies, Toyota, Nissan and Honda, have already had operations in Mexico and enjoyed a tariff-free quota on imports. This tariff-free quota was available under a Mexican government's provision, whereby it "allowed for duty-free imports of finished vehicles, equivalent to 10 percent of their local production, for foreign assemblers in Mexico."¹⁹ Those companies had an advantage over other Japanese automakers such as Suzuki or Mazda, which had to pay high taxes in order to penetrate the Mexican market and had no export quota. Hence, the 'big three' companies did not strongly support the Japan-Mexico FTA. The preferences of automobile companies differed also in the case of the Japan-Malaysia FTA. Malaysia implemented high tariffs on cars and supported its domestic auto industry with subsidies and a national car policy. One of the two dominant Malaysian producers, Perodua, cooperated with Japanese automobile company Daihatsu Motor in a joint venture.²⁰ Daihatsu provided a substantial amount of technology and sent staff members to cooperate with the national brand. The company enjoyed high tariff protection that gave it an advantage on the Malaysian market. Therefore, it was against the Japan-Malaysia FTA. A similar situation is taking place in India, where Suzuki produces automobiles for the local market through a Maruti Suzuki joint venture; here, Suzuki holds over 50 percent of stakes. As India implements high tariffs on cars, an India-Japan FTA would have a negative impact on Suzuki's operations in the country.

According to Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) statistics, out of all its bilateral FTAs, Japan uses the agreement with Thailand and Malaysia the most.²¹ These countries are hubs for Japanese companies' production in the region. Japan-Thailand and Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreements are followed by AFTA,²² which is heavily utilized by Japanese MNCs for obtaining parts and components as well as selling finished goods to other ASEAN countries. Given the location of those companies' production bases, FTAs between third parties often play a crucial role. This trend is particularly true in case of the electronics sector, in which most products are produced in East Asia, and hence, there are few finished goods to export from Japan. A great majority of the industry's finished goods, still manufactured in Japan, are on the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) product list and are therefore exported duty-free. Thanks to ITA, companies import parts and components to their production sites in ASEAN states without customs duties. With no products to export and no customs duties to pay, the impact of an FTA is limited at best. Industries such as automobile, chemical and apparel still manufacture a part of their goods in Japan and so use Japan's FTAs.²³ A substantial number of companies in the electronics industry use AFTA to obtain parts and sell goods to ASEAN. For example, one of Japan's leading multinational companies in the electronics sector produces many of its goods in Thailand, to which it imports parts from other ASEAN countries under AFTA.²⁴ A few parts are also imported from Japan under the Japan-Thailand FTA (JTEPA), or from China and Korea under their respective FTAs with ASEAN. Finished goods are exported from Thailand to other ASEAN countries under AFTA and to third parties under, for example, the ASEAN-India FTA. Hence, Japanese companies use many FTAs of which Japan is not necessarily a member. Japanese automobile companies manufacture their products for Indian and Australian markets in Thailand. Both of these countries are large and important markets. The increase in the volume of automobile exports from Thailand to Australia is strongly related to sales of cars made in Thailand by Japanese companies, such as Honda and Toyota.²⁵ A substantial amount of Suzuki's production is located in India through Maruti Suzuki. Thailand-Australia and Thailand-India FTAs are heavily utilized by Japanese companies both in the electronics and automobile sectors. For example, representatives of Japan's private sector located in Thailand communicated closely with the Thai government, expressing their preferences regarding a free trade agreement with India.²⁶ As a result, 82 products, selected for the Early Harvest Program between Thailand and India (84 Har-

monized Commodity Description and Coding System subheading categories), included parts for televisions, air conditioners and gear boxes – goods produced by Japanese companies in Thailand.

Figure 3



Source: AJCEP: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, METI, October 23, 2008, http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/081023_AJCEPgaiyo.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2010). (Author's translation)

Figure 3 shows the impact of tariff reductions only. Of course, Japan's bilateral FTAs are comprehensive agreements and the broad band FTA provisions within them are the main source of companies' benefits, as was explained earlier. After signing bilateral agreements with ASEAN members, companies with vertically integrated production networks were able to import parts and intermediates from Japan to the parts factory (D) and the assembling site. However, they still needed to pay the MFN tariff when trading goods exceeding 40 percent local content within ASEAN.

4. ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP)

After the signing of bilateral agreements with ASEAN members, what was the incentive for signing a semi-regional FTA with ASEAN as a group? And why were the bilateral agreements kept after AJCEP was reached? For the countries with which Japan already had a bilateral FTA, companies could choose under which agreement they wanted to trade. An exporter wishing to sell products to Thailand may compare the tariff rates for that good between the MFN tariff, the Japan-Thailand FTA, and the Japan-ASEAN FTA and simply choose the lowest one. Keeping the bilateral FTAs while implementing AJCEP was discussed with members of the private sector, who stated that they were used to utilizing particular provisions of the existing treaties. As companies are used to utilizing particular parts of bilateral treaties and their areas of operation

are quite narrow, the coexistence of the two types of agreements, from their perspective, does not pose a problem.²⁷

The objectives of bilateral and semi-regional agreements are somewhat different. Bilateral FTAs with ASEAN members often offer deeper tariff concessions than AJCEP, as well as some WTO-plus provisions. AJCEP is an agreement on goods only. Additionally, the tariff reduction schedules in AJCEP were incorporated from bilateral agreements with particular countries. This means that AJCEP does not have a common implementation schedule. As the bilateral agreements were signed earlier, their implementation schedules started earlier and hence, the current tariffs are often lower, even if the liberalization schedule is the same for both agreements. If under JTEPA Thailand was allowed to liberalize a tariff for a product over 10 years, under the semi-regional agreement (AJCEPA), the phase-in schedules were, in most cases, set for the same amount of time.²⁸ However, in the case of Malaysia and Singapore, bilateral agreements went into effect in 2006, two years before AJCEPA. For Thailand, this gap is one year. On the other hand, for some goods, such as textiles, AJCEP is more profitable for Japanese companies as it introduces immediate tariff elimination. The treaty also covers all ASEAN countries, including the least developed ones (Myanmar, Brunei and Cambodia). In a way, it could be conceptualized as the lowest common denominator in terms of trade liberalization between Japan and the Association's members. It was politically important to have an agreement with all ASEAN countries.²⁹ An agreement with Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore (the ASEAN 5) and perhaps Vietnam was important for companies in the discussed sectors. The other four countries were attractive FTA partners from the perspective of textile and apparel industries.³⁰


Rules of origin (RoO) determine the origin of a given good, preventing third parties (non-members) from using preferential tariffs. Their existence has a big impact on Japanese MNCs' operations. As one of the non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade, RoO can limit the company's ability to use FTAs. AJCEP simplifies the rules of origin by allowing companies to choose between VC and CTC rules. The VC rule of origin is based on a minimum local value-added content. The change in tariff classification (CTC) rule of origin requires a change of heading level under the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS), an international classification system under World Customs Organization (WCO) that describes goods and products. This type of provision, known as co-equal RoO, is now becoming a standard in the region. According to recent studies, it is the preferred solution for most Japanese companies.³¹ First, Japan introduced such criteria for several product lines in ASEAN-Japan and bilateral FTAs, with those between Japan and Malaysia³² or Thailand as examples. Then, ASEAN-Korea³³ and ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTAs, and even ASEAN itself, adopted that system.³⁴ AANZFTA uses co-equal approach on approximately 83 percent of all tariff sub-headings.³⁵ Extending co-equal rule could offset the negative aspects of overlapping agreements and allow for the harmonization of RoOs in the future. When all FTA members use the same type of rules of origin, diagonal cumulation is possible as it was done in the case of the Pan-European Cumulation System from 1997 (PECS). It allows for cumulation of added value in all member countries when determining the origin of a given product. Materials originating in one member country are treated as local in other countries within the FTA. The product does not change origin once it enters the FTA territory. Diagonal cumulation creates a sort of 'RoO custom union' with common external rules of origin.

Cumulation of rules of origin is one of the most important features of AJCEP. Co-equal rule in the ASEAN-Japan FTA enabled companies to use parts and components of any origin.³⁶ They can now produce in Thailand using Korean parts under the ASEAN-Thailand FTA and export the finished product to other ASEAN countries duty-free under the AJCEPA, even if Korean parts constitute more than 40 percent of the finished good. A multinational company wishing to export parts and components to its subsidy or production site in ASEAN would use a bilateral agreement. AJCEPA, with the CTC rule, is more profitable for exporting the finished good to another

ASEAN member. This change is significant for many industries, especially those where the prices of products are similar and even small changes in tariff rates can decide who has the comparative advantage. For most sectors, the Japan-ASEAN FTA had little meaning in terms of tariff liberalization. Its value added lay in the possibility of cumulation. However, this potential for profit is utilized only by a few Japanese MNCs, who have vertically integrated production networks in ASEAN. Therefore, the private sector, as a whole, did not strongly support AJCEP.³⁷

The electronics sector provides a good example of how an FTA with ASEAN is significant. The production bases of electronics companies are located mostly outside Japan and they often manufacture only a handful of products at home. Japanese TV manufacturers, for example, have production sites in ASEAN member countries.³⁸ A company producing an LCD TV within ASEAN imports the LCD flat panel from, for example, Japan, Korea, Taiwan or China, where they are produced. The panel in itself constitutes almost 60 or 70 percent of the final product's price, and in order to comply with AFTA, to be sold within ASEAN duty-free, the product should have a minimum of 40 percent local content. Japanese companies, though, import panels from outside ASEAN; this fact, given the value of the LCD panels, clearly means that the 40 percent local content requirement was not met. Having only the bilateral agreements with ASEAN members, Japanese companies would have benefited from importing the panel to ASEAN from Japan, Korea or China – which would have been duty-free under the ITA – and then sold the finished good locally under the bilateral FTAs. However, due to AFTA regulations dealing with export to other ASEAN countries, the MFN tariff had to be paid. At the same time, Korea signed an FTA with ASEAN, enabling it to export Korean LCD panels from one ASEAN country to another. Therefore, LCD panels produced in Japan lost their competitive advantage. So, in order to retain competitive advantage of panels and other high value added parts and components, Japanese companies from this sector strongly urged the government to sign a similar agreement.

Figure 4



Source: AJCEP: ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, METI, October 23, 2008, http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/epa/data/081023_AJCEPgaiyo.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2010). (Author's translation)

Figure 4 presents the impact of cumulation of RoO under the AJCEP. The ASEAN-Japan treaty liberalized trade in goods only, and there were no additional broad band provisions. A company with a vertically integrated production network was now able to trade both intermediates and the finished good within ASEAN under no tariffs, even if the finished product fell below 40 percent local ASEAN content.

There are additional reasons for implementing co-equal rule in AJCEP. For industries using a specific production process and technology, such as the chemical industry, CTC rule of origin is often impossible to apply. On the other hand, rules of origin based solely on the VC can be restrictive and difficult to comply with. An automobile is comprised of around 30 thousand parts and components which makes applying the local content rule of origin difficult. Big companies purchase parts from several to several hundreds of vendors and local suppliers, who often have little knowledge of rules of origin requirements. The company, on the other hand, requires a certificate to prove the origin of a given good. If the supplier refuses to issue a certificate, the buyers cannot buy the parts.

In 2010, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) consolidated the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) and ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) provisions, which were in force since 1992. The change, made after the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership was enacted, greatly diminished the benefits of the AJCEP agreement. Many Japanese MNCs, in the discussed sectors, no longer needed AJCEP, as they could profit from cumulation under AFTA. Companies tend to use bilateral FTAs, as they offer deeper concessions for exporting parts, components or finished goods from Japan to facilities in ASEAN countries. In order to further export products to other ASEAN members, they can use either AJCEP or ATIGA. Using ATIGA has an advantage for many companies. Japanese companies have been using the agreement since it went into effect, and hence, they are familiar with its provisions and functioning. The number of companies using AJCEP is very low.³⁹ This statement has been confirmed by the interviewed companies.

5. Region-wide Agreement and the Importance of Trade Facilitation

In December 2004, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) published a document entitled "Basic Policy Towards Further Promotion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)." This document presents Japan's strategy towards FTAs in East Asia: "EPAs contribute to the creation of international environment further beneficial to our country from the politically and diplomatically strategic points through, among others, fostering the establishment of an East Asian community."⁴⁰ A region-wide FTA would be the first and crucial step on this path. Japan stated its support for such initiative on many occasions and is currently participating in three coexisting frameworks with regional economic integration agendas, which include fostering of a regional FTA: ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea (ASEAN+3); ASEAN plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand (ASEAN+6); and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). How do the FTAs' main clients – multinational corporations – see the prospects of a region-wide FTA? Is there a need for a further trade treaty?

The signing of the ASEAN-Japan FTA and the changing of rules under AFTA allowed companies to profit from cumulation between their sales and manufacturing facilities in member countries and headquarters in Japan. Additionally, the expanding FTA network offers them indirect access to other foreign markets. Under the current circumstances, the companies have worked out a way to maximize their profits and avoid paying tariffs where possible. They have found the best localization for their production and assembly facilities. As shown in Figure 4, the

cumulation of RoO under AJCEP, together with comprehensive, broad band provisions under bilateral FTAs, significantly dulled the issue of tariffs in East Asia. Of course, there are other matters of importance for Japanese industry, such as access to the Indian or Australian markets and inclusion of Taiwan in the FTA network. There are also other types of governmental incentive schemes that further complicate the spaghetti bowl effect in East Asia, and also factor into companies' choices of production location. For example, Thailand has introduced the eco-car incentives scheme for companies manufacturing green cars within the country. Under this program, the Thailand Board of Investment offers corporate income tax exemption for 8 years and duty-free importation of machinery for qualifying projects. In addition, the Finance Ministry offers further tax incentives. In order to qualify for the eco-car incentive scheme an auto-maker company needs to meet certain requirements: meet environmental standards, fulfill the minimum investment value, and be able to produce over 100,000 automotive units per year after five years from the beginning of the project. Furthermore, the company should manufacture certain key parts and assemble the car in Thailand. Nissan Motor Corporation was the first company to produce an eco-car under this scheme. Mitsubishi Motor, Toyota Motor and Honda Motor are among other companies interested in producing the eco-car in Thailand. The existence of such government incentive schemes, on top of preferential provisions under various FTAs, further complicates the situation in East Asia. The companies try to choose the best possible location for their production and assembly facilities amid a complex network of tariff reductions and various other regulations.

Keeping all of the above in mind, for the Japanese companies, the issues of investment liberalization and trade facilitation are becoming increasingly significant aspects of regional economic integration. Deep liberalization provisions have the potential to improve Japanese MNCs' operations in East Asia. Japan would like to see further integration with ASEAN, but to the extent that it would exceed tariff reduction and include provisions on trade facilitation.⁴¹ Within existing FTAs, Japan usually sets up a bilateral committee aiming to facilitate development of the business environment and improvement of investment regulations. Its goal is to harmonize procedures as much as possible within the existing treaty. For example, Article 14 of the Japan-Malaysia Economic Partnership Agreement (JMEPA) speaks of establishing a Sub-Committee on Improvement of Business Environment. Companies located in Malaysia can voice their concerns regarding local regulations to liaison offices of the Sub-Committee. The complaints are then passed to the Joint Committee under JMEPA and, if needed, are forwarded to the relevant ministry to ensure better functioning of the agreement.

One element that the Japanese companies would like to see included in prospective free trade agreements is further liberalization of investment.⁴² Apart from agreements with ASEAN and Vietnam, all of Japan's FTAs include an investment chapter; this mainly entails provisions related to investment treatment: national treatment and MFN treatment, as well as performance requirements and state vs. investor dispute settlement provisions. Japanese companies in the discussed sectors have already widely invested in ASEAN countries and would now like to see the removal of remaining barriers to investment. Investment liberalization achieved under an FTA or bilateral investment treaty (BIT) can bring several benefits. However, for many, especially developing countries, investment liberalization is a sensitive area. Given its operations in ASEAN countries, the Japanese private sector would welcome the removal of regulatory hurdles to investment. This means introducing investment liberalization provisions – for example, deregulation or removal of limitations on foreign investment – which may mean prohibiting foreign investors from engaging in a joint venture.⁴³

The simplification of procedures and standards is another important part of trade facilitation provisions. In this respect, the reduction of lead time is deemed most crucial from the private sector's perspective. Lead time is the time from when the decision to start the production is

made, to when the final good is completed and reaches its destination. It includes elements such as ordering of the product, procuring of parts, assembly, transportation, custom clearance, and/or safety checks. Lead time can be measured in days depending on the type of product. In traditional manufacturing networks, Japanese companies had a well-established pyramid structure of suppliers. Each big company had a group of permanent subcontractors who sold them parts and components purchased from the third level of producers, forming vertical distribution networks. As this type of arrangement continued for many years, companies knew what to expect and lead time was short. However, this consistency ended when parts of the production networks were moved to East Asia. Lead time depends on the RoO and regulations of the country from which the parts are procured, and from that where the assembly site is located. Therefore, the MNCs started to pay more attention to the issues of supply chains logistics and efficiency. Procurement of parts is an important factor behind the total lead time. Further, lead time is influenced by tariffs as well as RoOs and regulations between the country that sells and the country that buys a part. For example, an interviewed company manufacturing electronic goods has a lead time of about 88 days in order to produce a certain model for a given market. That means that if it wants to sell the product in December, it needs to start to work in October. If during this time the company or the customer wants to change or cancel their orders, adjustments cannot be made before the 88 days. If the goods are no longer required, they need to be stocked, which implies additional costs. Reducing lead time makes the production process more flexible and adaptable.

Table 1: Lead Time

Total Lead Time	Planning and Ordering	Parts Procurement	Checks	Transport to the Assembly Site	Manufacturing
Existing: 88	20	30-60	2	1	5
Desired: 46.5	10	30	0.5	1	5

Source: Research interview with business representative, MNC in electric and electronic sector, May 2010, Tokyo.

In this example, production takes only five out of 88 days. The procurement of parts is the longest stage. The company has little control over this process as it includes transport and border clearance. If a company is procuring parts from different countries, their delivery times usually differ. The final lead time depends on the last delivery date. Transportation and custom clearance stages cannot be accurately calculated beforehand as it depends greatly on the customs officer and other external conditions. Traffic in the port might hold up the vessel for a number of days. If the customs officer is not sure whether the exported parts require duties, or the description of the shipped product is unclear, the border clearance procedure may easily be extended several days.⁴⁴ The producer might need to provide additional, detailed information. Alternatively, the customs officer may wish to conduct random openings and checks of the cargo. In such a case, the company may provide a bank guarantee to pay duties for one to three months; this means that the company authorizes the bank to set aside the amount of money that may be required if the product is taxable, and further, it aids in the answering of questions posed by the customs officers in exchange for the immediate release of held goods. This, however, is not a real solution to the problem. Moreover, in case of large investments, setting aside such funds is problematic for the company. According to one of Japan's top MNCs, from the heavy industry and machinery sector, in terms of medium technology products (like parts and components, for example), even the

naming of the product in the invoice and packing list may change the duration of customs procedures.⁴⁵ If a part is called, for instance, “steam turbine component” it will most likely pass the border quicker. On the other hand, if it is called “piping” or “tubing,” the insufficient information might cause additional inquiry.

Apart from customs clearance, the transportation of parts is another stage of parts procurement, during which process a region-wide FTA could help reduce lead time. Under existing FTAs in East Asia, spare parts can be imported duty free if they are shipped on the same vessel as the finished good.⁴⁶ If shipped separately, every part requires a certificate of origin. This regulation was formed because the business of spare parts is very profitable and importers wish to control their trade. Therefore, they lobby the government to introduce appropriate provisions. If spare parts are sold by an authorized service parts distributor or service point, the profit is kept within the same company. Unaffiliated parts vendors reduce companies’ profit. On the other hand, such procedures lengthen lead time. Therefore, some big companies oppose this rule. One of the interviewed MNCs claimed that even if parts are sold by an authorized service center, the company uses mainly local, small service points, and therefore does not make profit from selling spare parts. It would like to be able to make a list of parts registered in advance to export freely, even if they are to be sold separately. At the moment, the CTC rule of origin is applied to spare parts. The companies would prefer either 40 percent VC or elimination of duties for parts. As those external factors are not directly related to the quality of the finished good, MNCs would prefer to reduce this stage. Others, such as safety checks or testing, cannot be shortened. Companies’ main preference, and a possible incentive for a wider and bigger FTA, would be an opportunity to procure parts more quickly and with no cost. The current FTA network allows companies to lower the costs relating to tariffs. Over time, however, FTAs’ ability to reduce lead time has become the key interest of many companies.

6. Conclusion

Japanese companies established extensive production networks in East Asia long before the country signed its first FTA with Singapore in 2002. They paid MFN import duties, or in some cases, enjoyed special investment incentive schemes offered by ASEAN governments. When AFTA was signed, companies could trade under reduced tariffs within ASEAN, but imports from Japan were still subject to the MFN rate. Bilateral FTAs allowed MNCs located in ASEAN to import semi-finished products from Japan, but the finished goods could not move freely within AFTA. The ASEAN-Japan FTA allowed for cumulation to be applied between Japan and ASEAN. What Japanese companies expect from further trade liberalization in the region is not primarily reduction of tariffs, but improvement of business environment, trade facilitation and services liberalization. While existing FTAs are important for procuring parts without duties, provisions enhancing the business environment would further improve MNCs’ operations in East Asia. An ideal solution, although inconceivable in the short term, would be a one-market scenario with no duty and no customs clearance. For Japanese companies, whether improvement of the business environment will take place under the existing FTAs, a region-wide one with Japan’s participation, under third party FTAs, or under the WTO’s negotiations, there is little difference.

Trade theory states that the bigger the FTA, the more economic gains it brings. Hence, putting aside political considerations, a wider FTA should bring bigger economic results. In *Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific*, Aggarwal writes:

Each of these agreement types derives its advantages and disadvantages from tradeoffs between political and economic efficiency. For example, agreements among few states develop

*easily, but implicitly involve welfare losses due to trade diversion and marginalization of weaker countries. Conversely, larger agreements maximize economies of scale by expanding markets, promoting broad-based trade liberalization, and enabling global integration, but demand more political effort to negotiate.*⁴⁷

While negotiating a multilateral FTA, even one that does not include deeper liberalization issues, a state has little control over the negotiation process. Negotiating and finding a compromise among several members is an additional difficulty. The higher the number of members of an FTA, and the more difficult it is to reach a compromise on conflicting issues, the more political effort is required on the side of each negotiating state. Additionally, differences of development need to be considered. Taking an example from Japan's FTAs, it can easily be seen that the bilateral FTAs offer much deeper liberalization and are a 'broad band' type of treaties. The AJCEP, on the other hand, includes all members of the Association, but is limited to liberalization of goods only. There is a clear difference in terms of the scope of liberalization between the two types of agreements. For Japanese companies, it is that difference that causes them to be cautious about a region-wide FTA. The Deputy Director of the International Economic Research Division at JETRO confirms that companies would prefer to see an improvement of the existing agreements to an establishment of a region-wide one.⁴⁸ This preference is due to the expectation that such an FTA will be difficult to negotiate, and a high number of members may cause it to be the "lowest common denominator" FTA. Such agreement would not improve the business environment in the region and would not include provisions leading to the reduction of lead time. Therefore, for Japanese companies in the discussed sectors, there is little value added in a region-wide FTA. There is also no common preference regarding which of the three coexisting schemes would be the best option. Having no particular direct interest in such a treaty, the MNCs are cautious in expressing their interest and do not lobby the government to increase efforts in this respect. Instead, there is a preference for strengthening the deep liberalization provisions and enhancing the implementation of the existing agreements. Given the internationalization of Japanese production networks and the level of regional interdependence, it is not the size of the agreement that companies are concerned about, but the scope and depth of liberalization.

Analyzing the business sector's preferences for FTAs can provide useful conclusions regarding the benefits and options for further regional economic integration. Furthermore, it can help determine which regional framework would be a suitable base for a prospective wider trade liberalization treaty. This study reflects on the interest of Japanese companies in different levels of FTAs, based on research done within the electronics and machinery industries. Both of those sectors are among those with the highest share of value of exports to East Asian states. Still, as companies' interest in trade treaties depends greatly on production and trade patterns, further research is needed within other sectors of the manufacturing industry. For example, the chemical or textile industry's products are subject to different production processes and rules of origin than electronic equipment or vehicles (i.e., two step-rules of origin for textile industry).

Notes

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Comparing Regional Integration in East Asia/Southeast Asia and Central Asia

Chinara Esengul

“Cognition comes through comparison.”

A Russian proverb

Abstract

Central Asia?! For many scholars, policy-makers and the general public in different parts of the world, Central Asia remains an unknown region. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Central Asia emerged as a separate region comprising five newly independent states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.¹ This study aims to present regional integration efforts in Central Asia by comparing them with integration processes and schemes in East Asia and Southeast Asia. Such a comparative analysis allows for insightful reflections on the cases of Asian regional integration, and shows there is much to learn about and from regional integration experiences in Asia. The first part of the paper compares regional trends and features and the second part discusses key factors to explain differences and similarities between the regions and their regional integration efforts. The study is a descriptive analysis comparing the internal dynamics and external forces that drive the integrative realities and potentials in these two regions.

1. Introduction

There are many academic works on trends and characteristics of regionalism and various aspects of regional integration efforts in different parts of the world. After the successful European integration, regionalism has become an important topic of discussion among academics and policy-makers around the world. Regional processes and projects in Europe, the Americas, Africa and Asia are widely discussed and comprehensively analyzed. The topic of Central Asian regionalism emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Yet, regional processes and integration efforts in this part of the world remain under-researched, especially when compared with other regions of the world.²

Central Asia presents many challenging questions and issues for integration studies. For instance, as far as the identity dimension of regional integration is concerned, there are such questions as: where does Central Asia belong? Is it part of Asia? If yes, what are the indicators? Generally, what can we call Asia? Where does it start and where does it end? Some believe that norms, values and politics—not geography—differentiate West from East, Europe from Asia. “The West is about values and politics, not about geography.”³ At the same time, most Central Asians look like typical Asians. Does that imply that the commonality of appearance is a result of the common historical and geographical realities and challenges? Perhaps appearance may be misleading, and the historical experience of being a part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union has impacted Central Asia in a very unique and profound way.

This paper does not attempt to engage in the identity or history discourse; the preceding

lines are included only to highlight the importance of identity, i.e., to have a clear picture of the criteria which define the borders between Asia and non-Asia, especially when it comes to models of regionalism.

Central Asia needs to develop a model of regional integration. At the global level, European integration is perceived to be *the* model. However, the regional integration practices in East Asia and Southeast Asia have presented a different form of regional integration. The East Asian/Southeast Asian experience and practices could be instructive for Central Asia. This is not to say that Central Asia is a part of Asia and has to orient itself eastwards, nor is it to imply that “asianization of Central Asia” is taking place or should take place. However, there are no reasons to deny that possibility, either.

The purpose of the present study is to identify differences and similarities in the variety of patterns of regionalism in Central, East, and Southeast Asia. The European integration scheme is often called “institution-driven,” while East Asian regionalism is generally described as “market-driven.” Regionalism in Southeast Asia and East Asia shows that “it is possible to have high levels of cooperation with low levels of institutionalization.”⁴ There are some other significant features of Asian regionalism which make it different from other cases of regionalism.

Within this paper regional cooperation, regional integration and regionalism are used as interchangeable concepts,⁵ defined generally as a “set of policies whereby state and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategies within a given region.”⁶ As for the concept of “regionalization,” this analysis employs the definition given by Paul Evans as an “expression of increased commercial and human transactions in a defined geographical space.”⁷ The concept of “region” is also a very loose notion. This study takes the view that regions can be constructed and reconstructed. The notion of “region” is meant to outline a certain group of countries which are united by common interests, threats or vision. The fundamental point to note about regions is the logic of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. That is, the concept of “region” creates “outsiders” and “insiders,” and as such, it may not be helpful or “suitable as dominant membership criterion”⁸ for a regional institution. Today, the geographical understanding of regions does not necessarily correspond with their political margins; certain political and economic considerations may draw up different memberships irrespective of geographical borders.

The present study is organized around two case studies: Central Asia and the broader post-Soviet space, and East Asia including the sub-region of Southeast Asia. The case selection for a comparison is based on several important assumptions. First, the regions under consideration are regions from a geographic viewpoint but also enjoy a considerable degree of socio-cultural, economic and political cohesion. Secondly, all regions in one way or another face common challenges, parallel issues and similar problems, although they find themselves in different stages of state and market development. Moreover, the Central Asian and the East Asian cases examined here are both about “Asian” regional integration.

Obviously, Central Asian regional integration can be compared with what has been taking place in other parts of the world. A comparison could be made with the regionalism experience in the Americas, Africa, Middle East, South Asia, Europe, East Asia, or any other region. The primary difference of Central Asian states and the region as such is that Central Asia finds itself in its early formative years, unlike most of the other regions. Having said this, it is important to note that this comparative study will have meaning when it is possible to disregard, to a certain extent, the time factor, and look at the contextual factors and realities of the regions in order to identify differences and similarities. It should not be forgotten that this paper does not aim to compare parallel processes in the two regions.

More specifically, the present study will examine the Southeast Asian regional integration experience and integration processes in the broader region of East Asia and compare it with the emerging efforts at integration in Central Asia. For this purpose, available official, academic and

scholarly materials were reviewed. Several insightful interviews with leading experts and scholars on regional integration were conducted; interviews on East Asian and Southeast Asian regionalism were conducted among scholars residing in Japan, and interviews relating to Central Asian regionalism were conducted among scholars residing in Kyrgyzstan.

Theoretically, the study is conducted within the framework of the dominant approaches in International Relations: realist, liberalist, constructivist and “domestic structure” (domestic power relationships and state-society relations). It shares the view presented by proponents of analytical eclecticism that there is a “need to build bridges between multiple analytical perspectives.”⁹ The complexity of the post-Soviet realities of Central Asia and the need to understand and explain these realities in the most efficient way does not allow presuming the superiority of one particular theoretical tradition. Central Asian countries at the same time need to focus on building their nation-states and have to find their niche in the rapidly regionalizing and globalizing neoliberal world. Moreover, it is important for them to improve their governance system and state-society relations, especially taking into account that these new, smaller countries of Central Asia had never experienced independent nationhood and statehood before. They need to construct their nation-states, to engage in social engineering to certain extent. These imperatives and the developments resulting from them in this region lend themselves to an analytical framework that is flexible enough to incorporate both state- and civil society-oriented factors, both traditional national security and nontraditional security interests and concerns, and both domestically and externally driven processes; hence the eclectic approach of this analysis. The primary levels of analysis are sub-regional and regional; national and global levels are employed throughout the discussion of external and internal factors affecting regionalism. The paper consists of two parts. In the first and principal part of the paper, regional trends and features will be outlined and compared, and the second part will discuss key factors to explain the differences and similarities between the regions and their regional integration efforts.

2. Locating and Defining Regions

(1) Post-Soviet Space/Central Asia

The post-Soviet space or region refers to the 15 former Soviet republics. Generally, the space can be divided into five groupings. Each grouping is characterized by the commonality of geographical, socio-cultural and historical factors and specific relations with Russia. They include:

- Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania);
- Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine);
- Transcaucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia);
- Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan);
- Eurasia (Russia).

This structuring of the post-Soviet space is helpful for analysis of post-Soviet regional cooperation and integration processes; however, interestingly enough, there is not even one regional organization which strictly corresponds to the groupings' makeup as such.

Central Asia is located in the heart of the Eurasian continent, and is widely recognized as a region at the crossroads of civilizations (Western/Christian, Islamic, Chinese, etc.). As mentioned above, since 1993, Central Asia has been defined as a group of five states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Previously, during the Soviet period, the region was called Middle Asia and Kazakhstan (*Srednaya Azia i Kazakhstan*). Some basic information about the five states is provided in Table 1 of Appendix I.

(2) East Asia/Southeast Asia

East Asia is a vast region, and when it comes to analyzing regional cooperation in East Asia, it is necessary to differentiate between such areas as Northeast Asia (China, Japan, the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, Mongolia and the Russian Far East), Southeast Asia (the ten ASEAN member-states), and East Asia (ASEAN+3 and some countries of Northeast Asia or Asia Pacific).¹⁰

The combination of political and geographical definitions of Southeast Asia results in a total of 11 states, 10 of which are member-states of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). The eleven states are Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and East Timor (not a member of ASEAN). Basic information on East Asian and Southeast Asian states is provided in Table 2 of Appendix II.

3. Overview of Regional Integration in East Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia

(1) A Success Story

Southeast Asian regionalism is a case of sub-regionalism in relation to East Asian regionalism. The role of Northeast Asian states—especially Japan in the early stages of cooperation and China later on—has been critical to the development of Southeast Asian regionalism. The regional processes in Southeast Asia and generally in East Asia are closely interrelated. Nowadays, when East Asian regionalism concentrates on the ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit (ASEAN+6) formats, the role of ASEAN seems to be as one of the decisive factors shaping East Asian cooperation.

ASEAN was established in 1967, when five of the pro-western states in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) decided to create an intergovernmental organization. Back then, they did not have much in common beyond problems and threats. Similar to the current states of Central Asia, the founding states of ASEAN “disputed territorial and ethnic issues with each other, and there were no common factors promoting regional cooperation, other than their mutually shared anti-communist stance.”¹¹ In this view, two important features of ASEAN must be highlighted: the principle of non-intervention, and the arrangement for a dialogue with any and all external powers. Mutual respect of each other’s sovereignty and the ability to create a dialogue platform with external powers have made it possible to talk about the success of regional cooperation efforts in Southeast Asia. “As ASEAN developed a habit of dialogue that led to an evolution of healthy intra-regional diplomatic ties in the next stage of development, ASEAN also started to strengthen ties by establishing regular dialogues with external partners such as the US, the EEC, Japan, etc.”¹² It is conceivable that the latecomers to ASEAN would not have joined the grouping, and the number of ASEAN states would not have reached ten in 1999 if it had not been for the first-order criterion providing for the non-intervention into the internal affairs of each other.¹³ The second condition was also critical for the success of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The “ASEAN way” is often mentioned as a ready answer for explaining ASEAN achievements. Relevant to the context of Central Asia, the magic of the “ASEAN way” appears to be in the ability of ASEAN states to take “a collective negotiation approach aligning member states’ requirements.”¹⁴ The result of the dialogue platform and ASEAN conferences is evident in the proliferation of regional integration organizations with ASEAN as the *core actor*. These organizations include the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC, established in 1989), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM, 1996), ASEAN+3 (1997) and the East Asia Summit (EAS, 2005). Figure 1 lists the ASEAN States and Dialogue Partners, and displays the scheme of regional integration frameworks in East Asia (see Appendix III).

(2) Not Yet a Success Story

With the collapse of the Soviet state, a number of regional organizations have emerged in the post-Soviet space aimed at providing different formats for inter-state cooperation, which are quite compelling for the land-locked countries of Central Asia. The first organization was the Commonwealth of Independent States established in 1991, which signified above all the collapse of the Soviet Union and the need for facilitating the disintegration of the former Soviet republics and their re-integration into newly defined bases. The case of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) clearly shows the post-Soviet realities—the parallel processes of disintegration and integration. This reshaping is a fundamental, specific characteristic of the post-Soviet regional process.

Another important point to make about regionalism in Central Asia is the absence of a regional institution that unites only the Central Asian states. There have been several attempts to create a Central Asian Union or Central Asian Cooperation Organization, but one has yet to be successful. If we follow the logic that “the first reaction usually appears to be the right one,” Central Asian states reacted naturally (in terms of identity and survival) in the very beginning—immediately after the collapse of the USSR—when on December 8, 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved and the Commonwealth of Independent States was established by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus with the signing of the Belavezha Accords. The five leaders of the Central Asian states met in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, on December 13, 1991, and discussed the new political situation and their collective approach to the newly created CIS. The decision was to create an ad hoc Central Asian Commonwealth and negotiate with the Slavic states of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus on behalf of the Central Asian states to join CIS as equal and founding member states. Later, Central Asian regional cooperation continued as a series of summits in the early to mid-1990s. “These included the January 1993 Tashkent Summit with a Protocol of Five Central Asian States on a Common Market, in which the decision was made on naming the region as Central Asia; the January 1994 Tashkent Summit, with the creation of the Central Asian Common Economic Space (CES); the April 1994 Cholpon-Ata summit, with agreements on cooperation in various fields; the July 1994 Almaty meeting aimed at building a comprehensive economic and defense union; the creation of a Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development (CABCD) in Bishkek in August 1994; and the approval of a five-year integration plan during the April 1995 Bishkek summit.”¹⁵

When Tajikistan re-joined the Central Asian Economic Union in 1998,¹⁶ the “Central Asian Union” was renamed “Central Asian Economic Cooperation” as it recognized the inability to reach the ambitious goal of a Union. In 2002, the organization was renamed once again the “Central Asian Cooperation Organization” (CACO). In 2004 Russia decided to join CACO, and in 2005 CACO merged with the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), signifying the suspension of the Central Asian integration idea. After that, President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan tried to revive the idea of re-establishing the Central Asian Union in April 2007, but only Kyrgyzstan expressed its support while the other states of Central Asia remained skeptical. How can we understand such skepticism? Some scholars argue that this skepticism is a result of these factors:

- Escalating intra-regional disputes over non-demarcated inter-state borders and transnational water resources management;
- Ethnic tensions rooted in pre-Soviet and Soviet periods, such as those that led to the violent clash between Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010;
- The disruptive geopolitical impact of major external powers such as Russia, China and the USA;
- The inability to share a common history, as in the case of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in its dispute over the Samarkand and Bukhara, and the absence of direct flights between Tash-

- kent and Dushanbe;
- Regional leadership competition between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan;
- Perhaps the most important limiting factor, the divergent political-economic paths and strategies adopted by each of the regional states, leading them into different directions and destinations.¹⁷

Kazakhstan is becoming positively different from the other Central Asian states in terms of its economic performance. In Table 1, the GDP per capita of Kazakhstan is at least 5-6 times higher than that of the other Central Asian states. The large territory of Kazakhstan enjoys a vast store of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, is effectively managed by proper internal economic reforms, and within the past decade, balanced foreign economic policies have resulted in obvious economic success. The country's outstanding economic performance has led them into the position of regional leader in Central Asia, and most of the external powers recognize Kazakhstan's leading role. Evidence of this acknowledgment is shown in Kazakhstan's ascendancy to chairmanship in Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010.

Uzbekistan perceives all integration initiatives with suspicion even though it realizes economic benefits and gains that cooperation bring. Without Uzbekistan all regional projects fail since Uzbekistan's location is strategic and central to the region. It seems that Uzbekistan is not yet ready to accept Kazakhstan's regional leadership role, although it is becoming an objective reality.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have similar economic problems and resources. Both countries are upstream countries and share a similar position on the regional water resources management question. Tajikistan has experienced civil war, while Kyrgyzstan has experienced two political upheavals during the last 10 years. In terms of foreign policy—especially concerning integration—Kyrgyzstan has always been supportive and pro-integrationist. Tajikistan wishes to integrate more with Iran and Afghanistan as it is the only Persian speaking nation in Central Asia.

Turkmenistan is a self-sufficient state economically, and has been acting in accordance with the declared 'positive neutrality',¹⁸ which "prevented any meaningful cooperation by Turkmenistan within regional and supra-regional arrangements."¹⁹

Thus, the situation in Central Asia is quite complicated. Central Asian regionalism is underdeveloped to the extent that it is not realistic to talk about the existence of regionalism; there are only the efforts to create regionalism. Yet, one has to avoid an oversimplification of the regional integration processes in Central Asia that simply states that regionalism in Central Asia has failed. Regionalism is not only about regional politics and policies but also about internal and external dynamics which evolve and change.

4. The Role of External Powers

(1) Story of a Not-Yet Benign External Power

A prominent feature of post-Soviet integration is the issue of regional leadership or hegemony by Russia. Due to the historical domination of Russia over Central Asian lands for more than a century (since the middle of the 19th century until 1991) and the civilizational importance of the Russians and the Russian language in the development of Central Asian societies and states, the interrelationship of Russia and the Central Asian states is extraordinarily important and complicated. Russia still feels responsible for the region, especially in view of the numerous ethnic Russians living in the region. Russia's leading role in such regional organizations as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) and even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),

where Russia's leadership is balanced with China, is unquestionable.

The post-Soviet states, which were not happy with Russia's politics and policies within the post-Soviet realities, considered them "neo-imperialistic" when they established the regional organization GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova) in 1997. The reasons behind the establishment of GUAM involved the territorial and economic disputes with Russia, and allegedly the unofficial support of the United States in establishing an anti-Russian regional institution.²⁰ Uzbekistan, noticeably the most "nationalistic" state in Central Asia, which had a special and close relationship with the United States until the tragic Andijan event in May 2005, also joined GUAM in the period of 1999-2005, renaming it GUUAM. Uzbekistan's anti-Russian sentiment was evident throughout its history at both the elite and public levels. Independent Uzbekistan was straightforward in its interest in "pushing Russia out of the region" and President Karimov of Uzbekistan accused his Central Asian colleagues (except Niyazov of Turkmenistan) of being unjustifiably close to Russia.²¹ At the same time, the smaller states of Central Asia such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan consider the partnership with Russia as strategic and primary, especially in security issues. The April 2010 political overthrow of the Bakiev regime in Kyrgyzstan and the resulting political and social instability in the country showed the dependence of Kyrgyzstan on Russia both in terms of its mental orientation and for material support. Some claim that Russia played a role in the April events in Kyrgyzstan.²² The bloody ethnic conflict in June 2010 in the south of the country resulting from the extremely unstable and uncertain political situation pushed the interim government of Kyrgyzstan to seek Russia's military assistance for the management of its conflict in the south.²³ Finally, Russia decided to act through CSTO by providing technical assistance but offered neither military involvement with the CSTO peacekeeping troops nor a supply of weapons, since according to the CSTO statute it has no right to be involved in the internal conflicts of the member states.²⁴

The above cases show that Russia is viewed by some Central Asian states as the only "security manager" in the region, and Russia in turn gives strong incentives to be viewed as such. The positive and negative meanings of Russia's being the "security manager" in the region have certain implications for regional cooperation in Central Asia and its impact will depend on the leaders and leadership policies of Russia. As rightly argued by Robert Keohane, "hegemony is less important for the continuation of cooperation, once begun, than for its creation."²⁵ The scheme of multilayered structures within the regional institutions of the post-Soviet arena shown in Appendix IV indicates that Russia is present in all regional organizations, along with the participation of the Central Asian states, excepting the Economic Cooperation Organization. If scholars and politicians state that regional cooperation in Central Asia is unsuccessful and underdeveloped, it has something to do not only with the limited political will and capacity for cooperation of the regional states but also with the leading actor's political will (or lack thereof) to push for meaningful cooperation.

(2) Story of a Benign External Power

Japan is perceived very differently in Southeast Asia and East Asia. From one side, Japan's role in the economic success of most Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian states is undeniable. The Japanese origin of MNCs' (multinational corporations) activities as well as FDI (foreign direct investment), and ODA (official development assistance), as well as the technology transfer to these regions were crucial for the development of Southeast Asia and East Asia.²⁶ At the same time, the historical memories of the militarist Japan are still alive in China, in the Korean peninsula and in some countries of Southeast Asia. These memories add "complexity to the discussion of Japan as a future initiator of policy change and as a dominant actor in its regional organization."²⁷

When discussing the regional leadership role of Japan in East Asia, one also has to consider

the politics and policies of the United States, the super power with long-lasting interests and leverage in the region. The close security, political and economic relations between Japan and the United States created conditions for effective regional cooperation. On the other hand, as Katzenstein argues, the attitude of the United States towards regional integration in Asia was not supportive of multilateralism. "After 1945 the United States enshrined the principle of bilateralism in its dealings with Japan and other Asian states."²⁸ At the same time, this firmly established bilateral approach with regard to the security alliance between the United States and Japan allowed Tokyo to concentrate on economic development rather than worry about its security.²⁹

Normative and institutional approaches indicate the leading contribution of Japan to East Asian regionalism. Terada convincingly argues that Japan is "responsible for three normative transformations"³⁰ in the process of evolution of Asian regionalism. First, the gradual involvement of the Japanese government with regard to the bottom-up logic of regional economic cooperation in East Asia makes it different from regionalism in Europe, North America, Latin America, Africa and even Southeast Asia. The governmental institutions were not involved in the initial stages of establishing regional economic institutions. The non-governmental approach through activities of PAFTAD (Pacific Trade and Development) and PBEC (Pacific Basin Economic Council) and then of PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, a quasi-governmental regional institution), worked well enough "in building the sense of shared interests and mutual trust necessary for establishing an intergovernmental regional body such as APEC."³¹ Thus, one can observe a different-Asian-approach in preparing a regional institution (APEC) that later functioned in a non-binding manner, unlike typical western regional institutions. The interests of ASEAN and other Asian states and of the developed member states of APEC were properly facilitated by Japan.

Second, there was a gradual shift of purpose from economic cooperation to trade liberalization, in which Japan played an important, if not always a leading role. More developed members of APEC were pushing forward trade liberalization initiatives, while ASEAN countries were interested in developing cooperation. Here, the broadminded and progressive position of Japan was significant. APEC was able to follow its non-discriminatory approach in trading as desired by most of the ASEAN and APEC countries. Japan shifted its approach toward establishing a multilayered trade policy through FTAs in a timely and balanced manner, which resulted in the ASEAN+3 becoming the primary format for advancing Japan-ASEAN and East Asian FTAs and encouraging competition in FTA strategies between Japan and China.

Third, open membership was then considered. After the Asian financial crisis, Japan re-evaluated its position towards East Asian cooperation. When Japan proposed in 1997 to establish an Asian Monetary Fund, the United States vigorously opposed this initiative since it was clearly downplaying the role of the IMF. The skillful policies of Japan developed to balance the interests of the United States through APEC and at the same time to advance East Asian regionalism through the visions of the East Asia Summit and East Asian Community are worthy of admiration.

Japan was able to make all of these transformations not only owing to its progressive leaders' ability to suggest non-governmental and governmental approaches as needed in order to encourage proper focus on 'regionalization,' but also because of Japan's recognition and accommodation of the unmistakable influence of the United States. The United States wanted to see China's growing power in Asia adequately balanced by strong Japanese leadership in both Southeast Asia and East Asia, while observing that ASEAN leaders make right conclusions/preferences when the timing was right.³² Japan shared the concern over China's growing power and influence in regional political and economic affairs. Japan's adept approach to regional affairs is also evident in its promotion of ASEAN+6, which includes the ASEAN+3 countries and India, Australia and New Zealand, which would have the effect of defusing China's influence in these regional

frameworks. Most recently, Tokyo has expressed its interest in joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).³³

5. Key Factors Accounting for Regional Similarities and Differences

This part of the paper identifies factors which explain the differences and similarities in the regional cooperation/integration patterns in East Asia/Southeast Asia and Central Asia. It is an absolute truism that these regions are different; clearly there is no need to compare identical entities. The question to start with is then: why should we compare these regions? What good reasons exist for these comparisons? First of all, there are claims by Asian leaders, in referring to the regionalism in Southeast Asia and the wider region of Asia-Pacific, that they have developed a distinctive model of cooperation that is different from the European model.³⁴ In this view, it would be instructive to see whether there are practices and policies in East Asian/Southeast Asian regionalism schemes that can be emulated in Central Asia. Another reason for regional comparison is to see whether there are objective historical and civilizational grounds to adapt certain features of the Asian regionalism model to the case of Central Asian regionalism.

(1) Differences: Contextual Conditions

The geographic location and the demographic potential of the regions are different. Central Asia is a landlocked region, while most of the Southeast Asian states have access to the sea. The scale of population and hence capacities of each state and their markets are also different.

Another visible factor for the difference between the regions is historical, that is, their “pre-independence experiences.” For Central Asia, their pre-independence experience is the “Soviet experience”; for East Asia, the experience is of being on the periphery of a capitalistic world. Central Asia was an integral part of the Soviet Union— “the great integration project”—that eventually failed. Central Asia was integrated into the USSR by force and was finally disintegrated by “chance” (meaning that Central Asia did not fight for its independence and independence came to them unexpectedly). Hence, the logic of the relationship in post-Soviet Central Asia is as follows: integration during Soviet times and disintegration/re-integration within post-Soviet times. East Asian nations, on the other hand, never experienced integration within a joint state and started building their nations and states in the post-colonial context. The post-Soviet reality is partially post-colonial at least from the perspectives of Central Asia since it contained the center-periphery relations. But it also concerned the collapse of the single state—the Soviet Union—while most other colonizing countries such as Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands continued to exist. Japan, too, was a colonizer and an imperial power before and during the Second World War vis-à-vis its Asian neighbors, but it never absorbed them into one state system, nor did it collapse as a state after its defeat in the war.

Another obvious difference is the extent of marketization in the two regions. East Asian countries developed in the context of colonial capitalism and a post-colonial capitalist economy, while Central Asian countries started discovering the market economy and democracy only after 1991. In addition, not all of the Central Asian countries quickly embraced the opportunities of the newly discovered liberal political economy. They continued and still continue to live under the deep ideological and structural effects of communism and the planned economy system forced upon them during the Soviet period. The point here is not so much a time factor but the structural and contextual conditions that existed when the marketization process began in these two regions.

(2) Differences: Geopolitics

The geopolitics of regionalism is an external factor, i.e., an independent variable in the formulation of regionalism, and cannot be shaped by the will and capacity of the regional states. The geopolitical situations in these regions show significant differences.

First, Russian-US relations in Central Asia are dramatically different from Japanese-US relations in East Asia. In contrast to the robust and evolving Japan-US alliance, the long-lasting antagonism between Russia and the United States has become a kind of political truism. Nowadays, it is hopeless to wait for a partnership between Russia and the United States which would encourage development and prosperity in the Central Asian region, taking into account disagreements between these states that exist at the global level in all possible aspects, political, economic, military, energy, etc. In the long run, the substance and logic of US-Russian relations may change because of the radical changes we see in the positions of the Islamic world and the rapidly developing China.

Second, the United States does not really support regionalism in Central Asia since almost all of the regional institutions operating in the post-Soviet space (except perhaps the Economic Cooperation Organization and OSCE) have either an alleged pro-Russian or anti-American character, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In the beginning of the post-Cold War era, the United States knew very little about Central Asia even to have a position towards emerging regional integration initiatives. In the early stages of discovering Central Asia, the United States preferred a bilateral approach. Later in 2005-2006, Washington proposed the idea of a "Greater Central Asia,"³⁵ which was associated with another project initiated in 2004 by the United States—the "Greater Middle East" project. The idea was to provide an alternative to Central Asian states and turn their foreign policy vectors towards the southern horizon by considering the five Central Asian states and Afghanistan as one political/military and economic region.

Third, China identifies itself as a clearly East Asian nation and state, although theoretical and conceptual speculation abounds that China has ambitions to serve as a bridge between Southeast Asia/East Asia and Central Asia. This bridge would act to propagate Asian regionalism at the continental level where China would play a central role. At present, however, the role and place of China in Southeast Asia/East Asia and Central Asia seems to be different. In East and Southeast Asia, China has been competing with Japan for regional leadership. China is considered an internal regional state in East Asia, while for Central Asians China remains an alien and unknown power that is gradually engaging itself into the region—most notably in economic terms. China and Russia, through activities within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, pursue their regional and global interests in the post-Soviet space, which in most parts appear to be anti-Western or anti-American. At the same time, China's power in Southeast Asia and East Asia is being counterbalanced by the individual or concerted actions of Japan and the United States.

Fourth, as mentioned above, the role of major external powers and their intentions towards a region are critical to encourage or limit regionalism in the region. Japan's decision to cooperate with ASEAN with huge economic resources was a very important factor for the success of ASEAN. Japan was genuinely interested in Southeast Asia for diplomatic and economic reasons. Southeast Asian countries needed Japan's economic assistance. In Manila in 1977 Prime Minister of Japan Fukuda announced that "Japan was ready to help promote peaceful coexistence of the ASEAN and Indochinese countries, and Official Development Assistance (ODA) money would be used to induce cooperation."³⁶ The same kind of positive initiative could be proposed by Russia in Central Asia, since there are similar kinds of preconditions and expectations. In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia was weak while undergoing difficulties and challenges of the Soviet disintegration similar to other former Soviet republics. Within the last decade Russia has been gaining its economic and political strength, and today Russia positions itself as one of the major powers not only in the post-Soviet region but worldwide. Mos-

cow's July 2008 Foreign Policy Concept resounds with Russia's perceived resurgence in both global aspirations and responsibilities near and abroad. The FPC asserts a "real capacity to play a well-deserved role globally" as one of the "influential centers in the modern world." One of Russia's chief foreign policy objectives, per the FPC, is "to promote good neighborly relations with bordering States, to assist in eliminating the existing hotbeds of tension and conflicts in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation . . . and to prevent emergence of the new ones."³⁷ At the same time, for Russia the former Soviet Union's space is much more important than other world regions, not only because there is a growing interest and presence of other major powers in the region, but because, first and foremost, Russia shares many historical, security, economic and social ties with Central Asian countries and societies. These ties can be a good ground for the mutual development and cooperation on projects with the leading role of Russia manifested through bilateral relations, as well as multilateralism of existing regional institutions. Moscow's will and ability is yet to be tested.

(3) A Puzzling Factor

The main difference between Central Asia and Southeast Asia is the existence of ASEAN in Southeast Asia and the absence of such a purely regional organization in Central Asia. There is no regional institution which includes only Central Asian states even though there have been attempts to create one. Such attempts have not been successful, nor are they likely to be successful in the foreseeable future, mainly because of the difficulties between the states, accompanied by disruptive external impacts. In other words, Central Asia does not act as a distinct actor in the world and in the region's international relations, while Southeast Asia through ASEAN enjoys just such a representation. There is a view that the current Central Asian region is an object of world politics, rather than a subject. The lack of success despite efforts made to create a purely Central Asian regional cooperation framework is truly a puzzling reality.

There are challenges, risks, and problems in the region which have a transnational character, and it requires a consolidated regional approach to address them. On April 9, 2007, in his attempt to revive the idea of Central Asian integration, President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan stated that "he fails to understand why there is no Central Asian Union, because it is beneficial not only in terms of economic benefits but first of all in terms of providing security."³⁸ Indeed, it is puzzling why a territory of 60 million people, with complementary economies, a common language, a reasonably efficient transport and transit infrastructure, sufficient energy resources, and common historical and cultural traits cannot integrate within a single regional framework.

(4) Further Differences: Institutionalization

The number and the nature of existing regional institutions in the post-Soviet space result mainly from the European model-oriented regional processes. The logic is top-down, where governments play the leading role. In Southeast and East Asia, as argued earlier, regionalism has been primarily market-driven. The government policies that created favorable conditions for the development of intraregional economic trade and cooperation have been a necessary but not sufficient action in the development of regionalism in Southeast and East Asia. The Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan which began functioning in January 2010 definitely can be considered a step towards Eurasian Economic Community integration. It signifies a European type of economic cooperation rather than an Asian type; the latter relies mainly on bilateral and multilateral FTAs. At the same time, the establishment of the Customs Union which is designed to integrate the most developed economies in the post-Soviet space clearly shows the tendency to under-appreciate the interests of the less-developed states in the region. In the case of ASEAN, the principle to proceed at the pace of the slowest of its members has been an effective instrument in the region-building process. At that, it should not be forgotten that ASEAN has suc-

ceeded economically, but politically remains weak in terms of institutionalization and normative formal integration.

It is fair to argue that everything has an opposite, i.e., the other side of the coin. The key factors identified above which explain existing differences between the two regional cases at the same time allow for contrasting conclusions. The remaining sections help to explain the existing similarities in the logic and trends of the two regional cases.

(5) Similarities: Nation-Building Rather than Region-Building

The important similarity which is rooted in the context of regional integration processes is the pre-occupation with nation-building processes rather than region-building, unlike the case of Europe in the early stages of its regionalism. As noted by Yeo Lay Hwee, “sovereignty in several of these Southeast Asian states was hard-earned and the internal diversities within each of the member states made nation-building and not region-building the most important task for the post-colonial leaders.”³⁹ Similar processes have been taking place in Central Asia. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly created states of Central Asia have started exploring independence in the post-Soviet realities, and have been preoccupied with the state and nation building process. As known from the theory and practice of nation-building and state-building, these processes are highly influenced and constrained by the ethnic diversity of a state.⁴⁰ All Central Asian countries have been ethnically heterogeneous for centuries—a factor which was largely irrelevant during the Soviet Union but has grown in significance in the post-Soviet period. As rightly summarized by John Glenn, “nation-building during the soviet era can be characterized by the following concepts ‘flourishing (*ratsvet*), coming together (*sbliizhenie*) and final fusion (*sliyanie*) of the nations into a new historical community of Soviet people (*Sovetskii narod*)’ along with the idea of building a single soviet socialist state.”⁴¹ Such social engineering projects were supposed to be accomplished through the realization of “national delimitation” policy in the mid-1930s and resulted in the “creation of titular ethno-national republics with their ‘artificial’ borders including nontitular minority peoples.”⁴² Thus, the issue of ethnic minorities emerged in Central Asia and remained a latent social problem with a high conflict potential. The latent inter-ethnic tensions have become acute and visible already, as in the conflict in Osh of Kyrgyzstan in 1990, and manifested again in the bloody June 2010 event in the south of Kyrgyzstan.

A similar ethnically diverse situation was present in Southeast Asia since independence and even during the period of ASEAN formation through today. In the earlier years, “the newly independent member states were new political entities with ‘weak’ state structures” that lacked a close congruence between ethnic groups and territorial boundaries, and sustained, also, “an equally problematic lack of strong regime legitimacy.”⁴³

(6) Similarities: Authoritarian Regimes

As the ‘puzzling factor’ mentioned above suggests, the absence of an ASEAN type organization for Central Asia and the nature of regimes in both regions are similar at least in their early stages of regionalism development. As Amitav Acharya suggests, “ASEAN’s primary concern has been with regime survival,”⁴⁴ and ASEAN continues to play a role in maintaining “strong authoritarian states.”⁴⁵ This similarity is indicated not to suggest that Central Asian leaders must develop a genuine Central Asian regional institution for protecting their own regimes, but to stress that the impetus for integration should come from within the country, and the motivation of leaders is decisive especially within the realities of their authoritarian states. The Akaev and Bakiev regimes of Kyrgyzstan showed that leaders might pursue regime or personal interests that support neither national nor regional interests.

(7) Similarities: The Multilayered Structure of Regional Institutions

Another similarity between the two regions as shown in the appendices is the existence of a multilayered structure of regional institutions. This similarity is important as an indicator of the tendency to have a variety of regional organizations for accommodating differences in the priorities and interests of the regional states and external powers. The study conducted by the Asian Development Bank on Asian regionalism finds that “cooperation is likely to evolve gradually, with different groups of countries progressing at varying speeds, using several frameworks and forums to address subsets of policy interests.”⁴⁶ Indeed, the emergence of some regional institutions in the post-Soviet space is explained by the necessity to have a narrow group of countries which are interested in stronger security or economic cooperation. Evidence to this is the appearance of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) out of the member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Those countries interested in closer security cooperation joined the CSTO while those interested in closer economic relations became members of the EEC. However, the absence of an exclusively regional organization in Central Asia, similar to ASEAN in Southeast Asia, downplays the importance of the multilayered structure in the post-Soviet space for Central Asian states, since they remain vulnerable “to internal threats aggravated by external predators taking advantage of a conflict-ridden regional environment.”⁴⁷ There is a strong and urgent need for Central Asian countries to negotiate between each other and adopt and specify a set of norms for intra-regional relations.

(8) Similarities: Strategic Imperatives vis-à-vis External Powers

There are some parallels in the historical evolution of Southeast Asia and Central Asia. By the 19th century, the Western colonial powers had come to dominate Southeast Asia and their influence became a barrier to the development of any kind of regional identification or sentiment. The Russian Empire came to Central Asia in the mid-19th century to dominate the region, important for its strategic location and available resources in the context of the “Great Game” between the British and Russian Empires. During the Cold War period, after gaining independence, Southeast Asia remained an unstable and volatile region in the context of rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union “as well as a battlefield in the conflict between China and the Soviet Union.”⁴⁸ The lessons from colonial oppression informed the way Southeast Asian states viewed the regional environment and so they decided to form a united front against external forces politically and ideologically. As Narine argues, the suspicions of the Southeast Asian states in the field of international relations, as well as the perception of external threat, have played a critical role in the shaping of regionalism in Southeast Asia since the colonial period.⁴⁹ Similar to the case of Southeast Asian countries, which succeeded in managing their relations with the United States, Japan and China, Central Asian countries need to learn how to negotiate their relations with the major external powers such as China, the United States and Russia.

6. Conclusion: Lessons for Central Asian Regionalism

Briefly summarizing the above discussion, one can say that the comparison between the two regions has highlighted some commonalities and differences. Some observable commonalities relate to common challenges, while differences relate to how these challenges are being addressed, irrespective of the objective, especially given the differences in geography and demography.

The preliminary findings of the study imply that the experience of Southeast Asian regionalism can have relevance to the emerging Central Asian regionalism. It could be instructive in developing a Central Asian model of integration especially taking into account the common grounds in the starting conditions—the priority of nation-building over region-building, the au-

thoritarian nature of the regimes in question, and the availability of various regional institutions for negotiating relations with external powers.

One of the important virtues that can be learned from Southeast Asian regionalism is a kind of “pragmatism in the ASEAN way.” It is the ability to be practical and functional, even though not always in a formal and institutionalized way, and remaining so even when displeased with others. It is very important to be aware of and to visualize the necessity to cooperate, and to realize the benefits such cooperation can bring. Early in Southeast Asia’s development, as well as later in Central Asia, the sovereignty issue was fundamental; both regions had been preoccupied by the task of nation-building and were often led by authoritarian leaders. But authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia were able to arrive at a common ground and find ways for cooperation for the sake of remaining in the office and maintaining legitimacy by means of good governance targeted at economic development. Most of the Central Asian regimes are willing to retain power at the expense of creating a “client” society and a corrupt system of governance, both of which seriously hinder the development of each and all member states in the region.

In East Asia and in the post-Soviet arena, multilayered structures of regional integration have already been constructed: in East Asia these are the Mekong Delta, ASEAN, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, the East Asia Summit, and APEC; and in Central Asia, the Eurasian Economic Community-Customs Union, CSTO, OEC, SCO and CIS. To make the regional architecture work in Southeast Asia and East Asia, the role of Japan was essential; for the integration projects in the post-Soviet arena, a leadership role is yet to be played by Russia.

During the Soviet Union era, Central Asia was oriented towards the north and the west while the southern and eastern directions remained closed. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the new states of Central Asia have received a historical chance to reach independence, to define their future with regard to international relations, and to exercise their own sovereignty. Today, there is no ‘iron wall,’ and no Cold War; the world of today is one of globalization and open borders, including the formerly closed areas to the east (China and East Asia) and south (South Asia). New options are now open, and new dimensions for cooperation are available. But included in these options is the possibility that without strong cooperation among the Central Asian states, the formerly closed countries of China and India may wish to force their ways into this new Central Asian region. Central Asia has been given an opportunity to return to itself and act according to its nature, if done with a sense of urgency. But, in order to do this, it must unite, for only through regional cooperation can Central Asia finalize the post-Soviet disintegration and further advance its regional re-integration. Petty differences need to be set aside, for small, independent countries with valuable resources but too little security will likely not last long in the neighboring yards of increasingly powerful, heavily populated countries looking for space.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I:

Table 1: Basic Information on Central Asian States

Country	Territory (sq km)	Population (July 2010 est.)	Government type	GDP per capita (2009 est, in US dollars)
Kazakhstan	2,724,900	15,460,484	Authoritarian presidential rule	11,800
Kyrgyzstan	199,951	5,508,626	Fledgling parliamentary republic	2,100
Uzbekistan	447,400	27,865,738	Authoritarian presidential rule	2,800
Tajikistan	143,100	7,487,489	Republic	1,800
Turkmenistan	488,100	4,940,916	Authoritarian presidential rule	6,900
Total	2,935,637	61,263,253	Authoritarian presidential rule	Average GDP per capita: 5,080

Source: CIA Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> (accessed July 12, 2010)


Appendix II:

Table 2: Basic Information on Southeast Asian and East Asian States

Country	Territory (sq km)	Population (July 2010 est.)	Government type	GDP per capita (2009 est, in US dollars)
ASEAN states				
Thailand	513,120	66,404,688	Constitutional monarchy	8,100
Burma	676,578	53,414,374	Military regime	1,100
Brunei	5,765	395,027	Constitutional sultanate	50,100
Cambodia	181,035	14,753,320	Multiparty democracy under a constitutional monarchy	1,900
Indonesia	1,904,569	242,968,342	Republic	4,000
Laos	236,800	6,993,767	Communist state	2,100
Malaysia	329,847	26,160,256	Constitutional monarchy	14,800
Philippines	300,000	99,900,177	Republic	3,300
Singapore	697	4,701,069	Parliamentary republic	50,300
Vietnam	331,210	89,571,130	Communist state	2,900
Sub-total for ASEAN	4,479,621	605,262,150		Average: 13,860
East Asian States				
Japan	377,915	126,804,433	Parliamentary government with a constitutional monarchy	32,600
South Korea	99,720	48,636,068	Republic	28,000
China	9,596,961	1,330,141,295	Communist state	6,600
Sub-total:	10,074,596	1,505,581,796		Average: 22,400
Total for APT	14,554,217	2,110,843,946		Average: 18,130

Source: CIA Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> (accessed July 12, 2010)

Appendix III: ASEAN States and Dialogue Partners




Source: Koichi Sato, "The ASEAN Regime: Its Implications for East Asia Cooperation—A Japanese View," in Tamio Nakamura, ed., *The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective*, Institute of Social Science Research Series, No. 24, University of Tokyo, 2007, p. 22. (Reproduced by permission of Dr. Koichi Sato)

Updates to Figure 1 as of November 1, 2010:

- ASEM includes Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, Mongolia, India, Pakistan, ASEAN Secretariat, Australia, New Zealand and Russia.
- EAS expects Russia and the United States to become regular members in 2011 (decided at the Summit held in Hanoi on October 30, 2010).
- ARF includes Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Appendix IV: The Multilayered Structure of Regional Institutions in the Post-Soviet Space



Note: Uzbekistan suspended its membership at the Eurasian Economic Community in November 2008.

Source: Author

Notes

- ¹ The term “Central Asia” was introduced into the political discourse in 1993 at the Tashkent Summit of five states.
- ² Only few academic works are dedicated to the issue of Central Asian regionalism. These are Marta Brill Olcott, Anders Aslund and Sherman W. Garnett, *Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999; Robert M. Cutler, “Integration within and without the CIS,” *Association for the Study of Nationalities Monthly. Analysis of Current Events*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1997); Irina Kobrinskaya, “The CIS in Russian Foreign Policy: Causes and Effects,” in Hanna Smith, ed., *Russia and Its Foreign Policy Influences, Interests and Issues*, Helsinki: Alexantri Institute Helsinki, 2005; Mark Webber, *CIS Integration Trends: Russia and the Former Soviet South*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997; and Mark Webber and Richard Sakwa, “The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: Stagnation and Survival,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (1999), pp. 379-415.
- ³ Henry Plater-Zyber (CSRC, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom), “How the So Called West Sees So Called Central Asia,” in Alexandr Knyazev, ed., *Cooperation and Integration Projects for Central Asia: Comparative Analysis, Opportunities and Prospects*, Conference Materials of June 26-28, 2007 Khudjand, Bishkek: Printhouse, 2007, pp. 69-73.
- ⁴ Paul Evans, “Between Regionalism and Regionalization: Policy Networks and the Nascent East Asian Institutional Identity,” in T.J. Pempel, ed., *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 195-215.
- ⁵ While acknowledging the differences between these concepts, this paper emphasizes the common root of regional cooperation and integration as parts of regionalism where the most important points are the cooperation and integration spirit, trends, acts and vision, i.e., the cooperative and integrative nature of regional processes irrespective of the extent of their development.
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- ⁷ Evans, p. 196.
- ⁸ Takashi Terada, “Japan and the Evolution of Asian Regionalism: Responsible for Three Normative Transformations,” *GIARI Working Paper*, December 2007, p. 4.
- ⁹ Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02), p. 183.
- ¹⁰ Keiichi Tsunekawa, “Why So Many Maps There? Japan and Regional Cooperation,” in Pempel, ed., p. 103.
- ¹¹ Koichi Sato, “The ASEAN Regime: Its Implications for East Asia Cooperation: A Japanese View,” in Tamio Nakamura, ed., *The Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective*, Institute of Social Science Research Series, No. 24, University of Tokyo, 2007, p. 21.
- ¹² Yeo Lay Hwee, “The Everlasting Love for Comparison: Reflections on EU’s and ASEAN’s Integration,” *Working Papers of EU Centre in Singapore*, <http://www.eucentre.sg/articles/37/downloads/WorkingPaper-EUAsiaIntegration-2009-08-01.pdf> (accessed September 26, 2010).
- ¹³ Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 1976, Article 2.
- ¹⁴ Sato, p. 21.
- ¹⁵ Timur Dadabaev, “Central Asian Regional Integration: Between Reality and Myth,” *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst*, May 2, 2007, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4604> (accessed July 10, 2010).
- ¹⁶ Starting 1994 Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were not members of Central Asian Union.
- ¹⁷ Stina Torjesen, *Understanding Regional Cooperation in Central Asia, 1991–2004*, University of Oxford Department of Politics and International Relations, July 2007; available at <http://english.nupi.no/Publications/Books-and-reports/2008/Understanding-regional-co-operation-in-Central-Asia-1991-2004> (accessed May 25, 2010).
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- 30 Terada, p. 4.
- 31 Ibid., pp. 9-14.
- 32 For more about the US role in managing the regional leadership issue in East Asia, see Tsunekawa, pp. 107-115.
- 33 Japan Times online, January 15, 2011, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20110115a1.html> (accessed January 16, 2011). The agreement began as a free-trade agreement among Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, but the United States, Australia, and other countries expressed interest in joining the framework. The pact requires the elimination of all tariffs, including on agricultural products. With the United States expected to join the TPPA in November 2011, Japan was under tremendous pressure to join it as well, although agricultural producers and their political supporters were mounting fierce opposition. Japan Times online, January 16, 2011, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110116x1.html> (accessed January 16, 2011).
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⁴⁶ Chapter 1 of the ADB study “Why Asian Regionalism?” p. 19, http://aric.adb.org/emergingasianregionalism/pdfs/Final_ear_chapters/chapter%201.pdf (accessed October 1, 2010).

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⁴⁸ Shaun Narine, *Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 9-10.

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Remembering or Overcoming the Past?: “History Politics,” Asian Identity and Visions of an East Asian Community

Torsten Weber

Abstract

The East Asian region is at the center of debates on Asian integration. It is often viewed as the core and engine for further political integration. It also serves as the main potential source of an Asian identity. In fact, many political and research initiatives by governments (East Asia Vision Group, East Asia Study Group), as well as non-governmental organizations (Korean East Asia Foundation, Chinese-led Network of East Asian Think Tanks, Japanese Council on East Asian Community, etc.), have focused on this region, with attention awarded mainly to Japan, China, and South Korea in Northeast Asia and, to a lesser degree, the Southeast Asian countries of ASEAN. Yet, East Asia is also a region of fierce competition for regional leadership, particularly between China and Japan, and continuing nationalist ambitions impede the formation of an integrated political body and a shared Asian identity. History, or more precisely, the political usage of history, has been identified as a major limitation to these integrative and formative processes. “History politics” appear to obstruct the creation of a transnational consciousness which is deemed necessary to strengthen Asia, both vis-à-vis other world regions, and against rivaling nationalisms within Asia.

Against this background, this article examines the current state of “history politics” through an analysis of the activities and publications of government representatives (“track 1 diplomacy”) and foreign policy related think tanks (“track 2 diplomacy”) from Japan, China, and South Korea that exert a major influence on public debate and political decision-making domestically and across Asia. A particular focus is placed on how the past is employed as “political currency” (Heisler) in the triangular relationship between history, integration, and identity. The article thereby addresses the wider, and potentially positive, implications of East Asia’s contested past for the debate on further political integration in Asia and the formation of an Asian identity.

1. Introduction

Any observer of East Asian politics and society will be aware of the role history plays in any aspect of the contemporary bi- and multi-lateral relations as well as in the respective domestic political spheres in that region. Both in the context of actual history-related topics, such as war guilt and compensation, textbook controversies, or territorial disputes, and with regard to less directly history-related issues, such as economic or strategic cooperation, history has become an omnipresent parameter in contemporary discourse and practice that has prominently surfaced on numerous occasions in the past decade. In some aspects historical arguments have become so central and forceful that the disputes between and among various state and civil society actors in China, Japan, and South Korea—and sometimes other countries, such as Russia and the USA—have come to be called as “East Asian ‘history wars’.”¹ Particularly between China and Japan, the intensifying political, economic, and strategic rivalry, together with the unresolved historical legacy, continues to overshadow the relations between both countries and peoples.

This contemporary rivalry and historical legacy has been identified as a main obstacle in

the various processes of regional integration. Fierce competition for regional leadership and continuing nationalist ambitions impede the formation of an integrated political body and a shared Asian identity.² The creation of a transnational consciousness, however, is deemed necessary to strengthen Asia both vis-à-vis other world regions and against rivaling nationalisms within.³ Regional identity formation therefore constitutes a vital and essential part of the process of regional integration while both are conditioned by the way the past is remembered or forgotten in these processes.⁴

2. National Precedent, European Precedent: History, Integration and Identity

In his famous essay on the nation and national identity, Ernest Renan (1823-1892) identified two fundamental principles constituting the nation: (1) “the possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances,” and (2) “the actual consent, the desire to live together.”⁵ While the latter represents the essence of Renan’s well-known voluntaristic conception of the nation (“an everyday plebiscite”), the former stresses the role of history in the processes of national integration and identity formation. In fact, Renan puts great emphasis on the role of the past, which he views as a positive model for the present and future will of the community “to continue to value the heritage which all hold in common.” He evokes the “common glories in the past,” “a heritage of glory,” and “heroic past” as the historical basis for the unity of one people, but also concedes that “common suffering” is a greater force of integration and identity than shared happiness. Importantly, he refers to “*common* suffering” and “having suffered *together*” (my emphasis).

If we transfer Renan’s analysis of the 19th century’s *nation* to the 20th and 21st centuries’ *region*,⁶ we could probably agree with his present- and future-oriented voluntaristic conception of communal life. Without the will to implement regional integration (regional institutions, etc.) on the level of political decision-making, and without the will to identify, to at least some degree, with this regional framework on the popular level—that is, in Renan’s words, without the “desire” (from above) and the “approval” (from below)—neither integration nor identity formation may work. The role of the past, however, appears to be strikingly different in the case of the region when compared to the nation. Neither in the European nor in the Asian case can regional identity convincingly resort to “common glories in the past” or to having “accomplished great things together.” On the contrary, if the nation’s experience was “having suffered *together*,” the region’s experience may more appropriately be defined as having suffered *at the hands of one another*. Regional identity formation, therefore, appears a much more complicated process than national identity formation because the positive role of the past as one “essential condition for being a nation” (Renan) cannot easily be invoked in the case of the region. The historical dimension in the essential condition for being a region is not that of remembrances of the glorious past but the overcoming of past enmities and divisions.

In 1973, the then nine member states of the European Community formulated a *Declaration on European Identity* which explicitly addressed this historical dimension of the European project of regional integration. In addition to listing “common values and principles” (representative democracy, rule of law, social justice, human rights) as “fundamental elements of the European identity,” it stated:

*The Nine European States might have been pushed towards disunity by their history and by selfishly defending misjudged interests. But they have overcome their past enmities and have decided that unity is a basic European necessity to ensure the survival of the civilization which they have in common.*⁷


This declaration openly acknowledges that a European identity cannot resort to “common glories of the past” but, on the contrary, gains its historical essence from having *overcome* previous divisions and past enmities. Still, in 2004, in the preamble of the EU Constitution, the appeal to unity in the present and to a “common destiny” was complemented by an explicit reference to enmities of the past:

*While remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their ancient divisions, and, united in an ever closer fashion, to forge a common destiny.*⁸

As Fabrice Larat has demonstrated, these references are representative of numerous attempts “to root European integration in the fertile, yet contaminated soil of European history.”⁹ Indeed, history portrayed as an anti-regional force that had unnaturally pushed the Europeans apart (the “misjudged interests” appear to be a consequence rather than a reason) constitutes a vital part in the attempt at creating and propagating a regional, European identity. It serves as an important pillar in the justification of the present project of regional integration and as a source of regional identity formation.

How can we make sense of the way history is used or abused in official political discourse on regional integration? And how does the instrumentalization of history as a political tool work? Within the framework of “the politics of history,” Martin O. Heisler has introduced the metaphor of “the political currency of the past” in order to analyze “the present uses of the past for political ends,” as in the above-quoted official EU or EC declarations.¹⁰ By ‘the currency of the past,’ Heisler refers (1) to the omnipresence of the past, “its pervasiveness and intrusiveness,” in the sense that “it is current,” and (2) to history as a medium of exchange that, like real money, may be converted into different forms of capital, mostly moral capital, but also with economic and financial benefits (reparation payments, development aid, creation of foundations, etc). In order to profit most from the political currency of the past, attempts must be made to “control its framing, storytelling, and interpretations, and to shape public or collective memories for current partisan, factional, national, or ideological advantage.”¹¹ For the Sino-Japanese context, Yinan He has demonstrated that “ruling elites” are particularly influential in “the intentional manipulation of history..., or national mythmaking, for instrumental purposes.”¹² This “elite mythmaking,” she argues, involves “distorting of historical facts” but also includes the intentional—and often only temporary—neglecting of controversial historical issues. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1
History as a Parameter in the Processes of (Regional) Integration and (Regional) Identity Formation



The significance of this instrumentalization of the past in projects for regionalism has thus far been studied best in the European context. While proponents of forging a European identity have emphasized the role of the past in the promotion of permanent peace, stabilization, and reconciliation in a previously war-torn conglomerate of nations and peoples, critics have deconstructed official, top-down European discourse as “a political idea and mobilizing metaphor,” or even “an ideology,” with “subtexts of racial and cultural chauvinism.”¹³ As with all collective

identities, regional identities combine *eclectic* and *relational* elements. But due to the great diversity of possible sources of identity in the case of the supranational region, the degree of eclecticism exceeds that of national identities to a considerable extent. As Aleida Assmann has pointed out, the problem with eclectic identity formation in Europe is that “we emphasize humanistic values but when thinking of Europe we must not forget Auschwitz and Bosnia.”¹⁴ No less problematic is the process of relational identity formation which usually relies on “xenostereotypes” derived from “autostereotypes” (or vice versa) in order to “other” other parts and regions of the world.¹⁵ This “othering” rarely takes the form of an encounter of difference driven by neutrality or curiosity; more often, at least implicitly, it appears as a process of self-ascribed superiority and relegated inferiority.

3. The Politics of History in the Discourse on East Asian Integration

The above-outlined considerations regarding the role of history as a source and means of legitimization (and critique) of regional integration and identity can be well observed in contemporary discourse on Asian integration in general, and on the creation of an East Asian Community (EAC), in particular.

In the past decade, particularly after the first ASEAN+3 summit in 1997 and the subsequent establishment of the East Asia Vision Group (1997) and East Asia Study Group (2001), discourse on Asian integration has been thriving. While the Southeast Asian countries of ASEAN constitute an important part of many conceptions of Asian integration, they are clearly dwarfed by the role of “the Northeast Asian Three,” comprised of the People’s Republic of China, South Korea, and Japan. There is wide agreement among scholars and politicians alike that without the joint support of the political and economic powerhouses of China and Japan, the process of political integration will be abortive.¹⁶ Yet, as briefly outlined above, the mutual relations between the three countries—and between China and Japan in particular—are tense, and sparking nationalisms continue to fuel the immense rivalry in this region.¹⁷ Most conflicts have historical roots (territorial disputes, naming) or concern the treatment of history in contemporary society (textbook problems, apology policy). These debates have taken a central place in political discourse and diplomacy over the past decade and reached their peak in the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in spring 2005, triggered by Chinese protests against Japanese history textbooks, and further fuelled by the visits of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirô and his cabinet members to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine.

Partly in reaction to the escalation of Sino-Japanese history disputes, various private and semi-official initiatives were founded to deal with the so-called history problem. Scholars from China, Korea, and Japan, many of them historians, worked on bilateral or trilateral history research groups, engaged in history dialogues with their Asian counterparts. They produced reports, articles, and a popular tri-national history textbook.¹⁸ In this context, the past—problematized as history and memory—attained a larger presence in public consciousness than it had previously; its presence has become more prominent in daily life.

Most, if not all, of these private projects and civil society initiatives bear a clear political dimension, too. They have a political agenda and their occupation with history can be characterized, at least partly, as “partisanship.”¹⁹ However, with regard to their status, their limited means of implementation and influence, as well as the depth of analysis they reach, show that they clearly differ from official and semi-official participants in this discourse. Therefore, it has been suggested to subsume such activities more appropriately under the category of “memory culture” (*Erinnerungskultur*) which denotes the bottom-up cultivation, led by civil society actors, of history and historical knowledge for the wider public.²⁰ “History politics,” on the other hand, denotes

the top-down and politically intended homogenization of history and memory to forge a collective identity based on a homogeneous historical consciousness. The dividing lines between both may sometimes be blurred and not even the best-intended projects of cultivation of “memory culture” can ever be objective. In general, however, most bottom-up initiatives lack the background and means to disseminate their work to the degree of their top-down counterparts.

Following this distinction, roughly three levels of actors or “tracks” can be distinguished in this discourse, namely (1) political decision-makers (government representatives and leading officials) as so-called track 1 diplomacy; (2) private initiatives with none or no notable financial or political links to government authorities (track 3); and (3) think tanks on the in-between level (track 2). Due to their personal and financial links, as well as their realm of influence, the latter is normally more closely linked to official discourse than to private initiatives. The following case studies will focus on contributions to this discourse by political decision-makers and think tanks, i.e., roughly, the scope of actors that Yanan He refers to as “ruling elites” (though I propose a wider understanding of “ruling elites” in the sense that they also include “oppositional elites”), in consideration of their impact on (oppositional) published opinion.

4. “History Politics” in Official Discourse on Asian Integration and Identity in China and Japan

(1) Hatoyama’s Advocacy of an East Asian Community

In Japan, public political discourse on Asian integration in its affirmative has taken on a new dynamic after the end of Koizumi’s premiership in 2006, and in particular, after the election of the new DPJ-led coalition government in 2009. In fact, the creation of an East Asian Community (*Higashi Ajia Kyôdôtai no kôchiku*) was a central item on the political agenda of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio and it was also an explicit part of the DPJ’s election manifesto in 2009.²¹ After his election, Hatoyama even proposed East Asian regional integration as one of the core themes of his “political philosophy.”²²

In his elaborations on a future EAC, Hatoyama indirectly likened himself to Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the Pan-European movement in the 1920s.²³ At the high time of nationalism, Italian fascism, and Soviet communism, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s proposal of European unity, of course, was rather illusionary. Despite the existence of some other inter-war proposals for European collaboration and integration, such as the Briand Plan of 1929/1930, notable regional integration in Europe only started in the 1950s, after the horrendous experience of the Second World War. Hatoyama’s references to Coudenhove-Kalergi are twofold. First, they link his “political philosophy” to his grandfather, Hatoyama Ichirô, himself a Japanese prime minister in the 1950s and translator of one of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s books. Following Hatoyama (senior), Hatoyama (junior) redefines one of Coudenhove-Kalergi’s political key concepts, “fraternity” (*yûai*), as “the principle of independence and coexistence.” Second and interlinked, Hatoyama’s references to Coudenhove-Kalergi allow him to discuss the project of regional integration, namely that of East Asia, in relation to that of Europe and as the realization of his conception of “fraternity.” As Hatoyama puts it,

another national goal that emerges from the concept of fraternity (yûai) is the creation of an East Asian community (Higashi Ajia Kyôdôtai). [...] Unquestionably, the Japan-US relationship is an important pillar of our diplomacy. However, at the same time, we must not forget our identity as a nation located in Asia. I believe that the East Asian region, which is showing increasing vitality in its economic growth and even closer mutual ties, must be recognized as Japan's basic sphere of being (waga kuni ga ikite iku kihon tekina seikatsu

kūkan).²⁴

Here, Hatoyama portrays East Asian regional integration as an instance of the realization of fraternity, the assumed underlying principle of European integration. In addition, he explicitly links regional integration to the question of the formation of an Asian identity, by calling attention to the further development of Japan's traditionally neglected consciousness of being a part of Asia. Hatoyama's conception of an Asian identity will be addressed in more detail below.

The creation of an East Asian Community in 2010 may not be quite as utopian or illusionary as the pan-European project in the 1920s. After all, a number of steps into the direction of regional integration in East Asia have already been taken, most notably, on the political level, the establishment of ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit. Also, Hatoyama's call for "the creation of an East Asian Community" is not the first such proposal from a leading politician in East Asia. Since the 1990s and increasingly after 2000, politicians as Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir (East Asian Economic Group, East Asian Economic Caucus), Korean President Kim Dae-jung and even Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, have made official affirmative statements. Recognizing, however, that (too) little has been achieved since then, Hatoyama referred to the combined argument of history and the European model to appeal to the Japanese and other Asians to realize the "utopian dream" of regional integration.

*I would like to conclude by quoting the words of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, the father of the EU, written 85 years ago, when he published Pan-Europa: 'All great historical ideas started as a utopian dream and ended with reality.' And, 'whether a particular idea remains as a utopian dream or it can become reality depends on the number of people who believe in the ideal and their ability to act upon it.'*²⁵

In the conclusion offered by Hatoyama, he once again portrays the history of European integration as a model for Asian integration. Interestingly, he employs this spatial rather than temporal analogy to push the general public and political decision-makers towards a pro-East Asian stance. By doing so, he avoids having to address the negative legacies of concepts of Asian integration—negative legacies, at least for the Japanese audience, because they would either refer to the traditional Sinocentric tributary order in Asia or to Japan's own imperialist project of regional order in the first half of the 20th century ("Greater East Asian Co-Prosperty Sphere"). In addition to his neglect of historical conceptions of Asian regionalism and regional identity, Hatoyama also ignores the historical development of the European integration process between Codenhove-Kalergi's pan-European movement of the 1920s and the start of the actual integration process in the 1950s. The instigation of the latter was not aided by the former, but happened, rather, despite it; it was completely independent from Codenhove-Kalergi's visions of European unity.²⁶ In other words, Hatoyama implies a possible historical analogy between the processes of European and Asian integration on grounds of historical actors and ideas that were largely irrelevant to the formation of a united Europe.

Avoidance of the Asian historical context and elevating the European idea to the ranks of a model for Asian integration, however, are two strategies that cannot be transferred to the framework of Asian identity formation. Not surprisingly, history and "the West" therefore take on quite a different role in Hatoyama's conception of an Asian identity. In one of his last speeches as Prime Minister, Hatoyama addressed issues of East Asian characteristics and identity which revealed a number of inconsistencies compared to his previous elaboration on political integration.²⁷

First, although he had portrayed the history of European integration positively, he now criticizes the "Western dualism" of perceiving the world in a self-other, dichotomous manner. Obvi-

ously, this statement is contradictory in itself, as Hatoyama himself, as an Asian who assumedly does not share this “Western” trait, employs a dualistic distinction between people from the West and Asians. As Assmann had noted, these relational factors, such as the Europe-Asia or West-East distinction, inform attempts at regional identity formation to a large extent. More generally, such dualistic thinking is prone to oversimplifications on both the side of the “Self” (autostereotypes) and the “Other” (xenostereotypes), as in Hatoyama’s statement on the assumed difference between the culturally and religiously diverse East Asia, on the one side, and an assumedly homogenous Europe on the other side.

Second, Hatoyama’s historical rationale for shaping a common East Asian identity is much more Asia-centric than his previous appeals to the project of Asian integration. Similarly to the passages from the EU Constitution and the EC Declaration of the European Identity, Hatoyama concedes the negative dimension of Asian history:

*I firmly believe that we must not repeat the unfortunate history of the past hundred years (hyaku nen no fukô na rekishi) in which the seas of East Asia were made into seas of conflict.*²⁸

and

*I believe now is the time to overcome the past that turned our seas into seas of dispute and to set off on a voyage to weave a history of prosperity in which we coexist in a sea of fertile abundance and a sea of fraternity.*²⁹

Hatoyama, however, does not limit his excursus of the modern period of Asian history to “the unfortunate history” that must be “overcome.” Instead, as Renan had postulated for the nation, Hatoyama manages to identify a historical period that may indeed serve as Asia’s own “heroic past.”

*If we trace history back still further in units of several hundreds or thousands of years, we see that these seas have also yielded prolific rewards, transmitting knowledge and skills and fostering the development of rich cultures in East Asia by facilitating human exchanges. The sea did not create differences in language or antagonism among religions; instead it blended such differences and served as the foundation for mutual development. Had this not been so, we would not have so many people living in this region with an awareness of themselves as Asians (Ajiain toshite no jikaku) [...] Whether viewed from the history of Japan at the far eastern edge of Asia or from the other countries of East Asia, East Asia is a fusion of cultures (bunka teki yûgôtai).*³⁰

By evoking an assumed golden age of peaceful coexistence and exchange in the distant past, Hatoyama manages to put the modern period of nationalist antagonism, conflict, and war into perspective. This implies that Asian history itself can serve as a model for the projects of further regional integration and regional identity formation. However, the shortcomings of such explanations are blatant: neither did people living in Asia possess an awareness of being Asian before the modern period introduced and spread the concept of “Asia” in the region, nor was pre-modern Asian history free of violent antagonisms and rivalries, major disputes and wars. Only the above-quoted simplifications allow for a portrayal of the past as a history of fortune rather than of suffering and misfortune. The past of the supranational region, more frequently employed as *negative* political currency, in Hatoyama’s conception, is designed to serve as a *positive* political currency which may be converted into public pro-Asian sentiments and agreement to the project

of building an East Asian Community, the ultimate aim of Hatoyama's political vision.

(2) Chinese Affirmations of New East Asian Regionalism

Interestingly, a comparable review of history has recently been employed in a similar context in official Chinese political discourse. Previously dismissed as the re-enactment of Japanese imperialist policy, Asian integration and discourse on regional identity has gained more importance in China during the past decade. With its increasing weight on the stage of world economy and politics, China has not only become more pro-active in these projects but also explicitly self-assertive. A leading official voice in this debate is the diplomat Wang Yi, the current director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the PRC's State Council and a former vice foreign minister (2001-2004) and Chinese ambassador to Japan (2004-2007).³¹ On frequent occasions, Wang has affirmed his positive stance towards Asian integration and Asian identity and—importantly—has not only done so towards foreign, in particular Japanese, audiences; he also acts as the Chinese mastermind of pro-Asianist thought at home.³²

While Wang has refrained from formulating a concrete aim in regards to the creation of an EAC, his affirmation of the project of developing a “collective Asian consciousness” and of further cooperation and interaction in Asia is beyond doubt. In Wang's conception of Asian integration, history takes an even more prominent position than in Hatoyama's, but their rationales are quite similar. Like Hatoyama, Wang refers to an assumed golden age of Asia as the historical fundament of recent trends of integration and collective identity formation.

For a long period, Asia stood at the forefront of history and made some distinguished contributions to the human race. Among the four great ancient civilizations of the world, three are in Asia: China, India, and old Babylon. The three great religions of the world, Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam, all have their origins in Asia. Asia's classical Eastern philosophy continues to inspire human thought, and a number of outstanding inventions by Asians have influenced the progress of global civilization. Also, for a long time Asia was leading the world economy. [...] At the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in the West, Asia accounted for two thirds of the world's GDP.³³

As Hatoyama, Wang employs the terms “Asia” and “Asians” without consideration of their anachronistic nature. How could “Asia” have led human or world history if there were neither Asian institutions nor any consciousness of being “Asian” or being part of a region that would, only in the distant future, be called “Asia”? As Larat has criticized in the context of similar narratives of Europe's past, the existence and unity of the region here are presupposed as a “natural entity.”³⁴

Following this golden age, Wang attributes Asia's decline to its self-seclusion and the subsequent invasion by the Western powers as well as to internal dispute. With Japan's expansion into Asia from the late 19th century onwards, the Asianist project began to lose credibility as it served the “invasion and monopolization of Asia” at the hands of the Japanese. Assuming a “learning from past mistakes” manner, Wang scrutinizes the reasons for the failure of both pre- and post-war Asianist projects to suggest how Asian integration should be pursued in the 21st century. As prerequisites and methods, Wang proposes: an economically and politically strong China; a carefully considered master plan; gradual implementation without haste; stable environment and material base throughout Asia; proper coordination between the major players; a leading force. The result of this development would be, according to Wang, open regionalism (*kaifang de diquzhuyi*) based on cooperation (*hezuo*) and harmony (*hexie*).

Interestingly, Wang's “new Asianist” perspective on Asian integration is shared by many historians in China who have labeled the renaissance of Asian regionalist plans “New Classical

Asianism” (Wang Ping)³⁵ or “New East Asian Regionalism” (Zhang Yunling).³⁶ In these narratives, the historical precedents of Japan-driven Asianism are partially reevaluated and rehabilitated, but the re-invention of Asian history as an object of study in general and the positive evaluation of Asian regional integration in particular is mainly centered on Chinese historical conceptions of Asian unity, such as Li Dazhao’s, Sun Yatsen’s, Mao Zedong’s or Zhou Enlai’s.³⁷ Although recent Chinese scholarship and public discourse on Asian history has become more nuanced, a strict dividing line between China’s assumed positive contributions and Japan’s assumed negative contributions regarding Asia’s modern history—together with the respective implications for the contemporary project of Asian integration and identity formation—still prevail. This explicit national compartmentalization of an assumedly *regional* history constitutes a notable difference from the mainstream of discourse on European integration in Europe.

Similar to Hatoyama’s analysis on an Asian identity, Chinese top-down discourse on regional integration also emphasizes (1) the significance of identity formation for the progress of economic and political integration and (2) relational arguments in the construction of such an identity. In this context, Wu Jianmin, President of China Foreign Affairs University and Vice President of the Committee for Foreign Affairs under the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, has rejected the often assumed lack of a common basis for an East Asian identity because of “too extreme differences regarding Asian cultures (*Yazhou wenhua chayi taida*)” and different stages of economic development.³⁸ According to Wu, the degree of difference regarding common values and identity does not differ from that within the European Union. As a specific and unique Asian characteristic—that to some degree resembles Hatoyama “holism” (as opposed to “Western dualism”)—Wu proposes “communal comfort” (*shushi du*, literally “degree of feeling comfortable”). By this, Wu means that in situations that make other people or countries feel uncomfortable, decisions will be postponed until everyone reaches the degree of feeling comfortable with the result or new situation; in this way tough decisions that split groups or lead to confrontations within one group would be avoided. “In my work of many years at the United Nations, in Europe, and in America,” Wu explains, “I have learnt that in the Western world (*Xifang shijie*) there is no such thing as ‘communal comfort.’” In a nutshell Wu presents the common rationale of referencing the EU or “the West” in discourse on East Asian integration and Asian identity formation. Regarding integration, East Asia may achieve what the EU has achieved because the criteria for successful integration are not dissimilar; regarding identity, however, both “entities” are mutually so heterogeneous that shared values can easily be derived for both the Self and the Other.

5. “History Politics” in Semi-official Discourse on Asian Integration and Identity in Korea and Japan

The reluctance of some historians to engage in the field of contemporary history may in part be due to the opinion that speeches and publications by politicians and officials still in office or seeking offices are irrelevant. While contemporary historians certainly have to engage with these materials with all due care, one should not underestimate the richness and influence of many of these sources. This stature is partly due to the speakers’ close linkages with political think tanks that work at the hinge of scholarship and journalism on the one side and government and administration on the other. Similar to industry lobbyists, think tanks aim at influencing political decision-makers at all levels and, in the context of history issues, they often serve as a filter of scholarly output for informing and influencing politicians and bureaucrats.³⁹

With the increasing activities in matters of Asian integration since the beginning of the new millennium, think tanks in different countries that explicitly deal with the project of East Asian

integration have started to emerge. These include the Japanese Council on East Asian Community (2004), the Korean East Asia Foundation (2005) and the North East Asia History Foundation (2006).

(1) The Korean North East Asia History Foundation (NEAH)

As the name suggests, the Korean North East Asia History Foundation (NEAH) most explicitly deals with history problems in the region. The NEAH was founded in 2006 “with the goal of establishing a basis for peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia by confronting distortions of history that have caused considerable anguish in this region.”⁴⁰ It was initially headed by Kim Yong-deok and is now led by Chung Jae-jeong, both professors of Korean history. Apart from a general research department, it has established a separate research institute dedicated to research on the island of Dokdo (called “Takeshima” in Japan), whose territorial possession is disputed between Japan and Korea. Despite its naming as a research institute, its political character is more than obvious as it predefines its aim as “enhancing Korea’s territorial rights to Dokdo.” In its own words, NEAH seeks to promote “the correct understanding of history” through research projects and the publication of research results. Explicitly it also links the necessity of possessing a “correct” and “shared understanding of history” to the political project of integration and identity formation.

*As regionalism intensifies across the globe, the importance of exchange and cooperation is also growing for Northeast Asian nations. Nevertheless, unresolved historical and territorial issues are obstacles to the region’s trust-building efforts. The Foundation strives to diagnose the precise causes of the region’s historical and territorial disputes and prescribe appropriate responses and strategies. We are steadfast in our efforts to expand historical dialogues to foster mutual understanding and growth in Northeast Asia. The Foundation will continue to spare no effort to protect historical and territorial sovereignty, advance a shared understanding of history for mutual development, and build a Northeast Asian regional community that pursues peace and prosperity.*⁴¹

Obviously, one of the foundation’s aims is to provide rhetoric and political ammunition to representatives of Korean national interests in the various bilateral history disputes as well as in the discourse on regional integration and identity formation. Interestingly, the topics chosen for research and debate by the foundation are those that have been at the center of the “East Asian ‘History Wars’,” such as the Dokdo/Takeshima territorial dispute, the status of Yasukuni Shrine, the naming of the East Sea, and the postwar reparation system. They are rather unlikely to be resolved in the near future and because they are less concerned with history, these political disputes can hardly serve as examples of creating “correct” and “shared” understandings of history. Also, in the larger picture of Asian history as portrayed, for example, by Wang Yi, these issues are relatively marginal. Consequently, the foundation’s focus on history and the use of history appear a rather strategic focus that—in view of Korea’s historical victimization at the hands of both Japan and China—guarantees a constant surplus of morale capital through the political currency of history. The general stance of NEAH therefore is one that stresses “Korean pride,”⁴² a form of Korean nationalism that enables Korea to emerge and act from a position of national strength in the international arena and that, consequently, takes a negative view towards the creation of an EAC. The “history research” undertaken by the foundation is more likely to provide Korean critics of regional integration with political currency than it will recruit proponents of Asian integration through the creation of a common historical consciousness. On the contrary, the NEAH facilitates the increasing influence of negative “history politics” in the discourse on the EAC throughout the region.

(2) The Korean East Asia Foundation (KEAF)

The Korean East Asia Foundation, founded in Seoul in 2005, takes a more de-nationalized stance and sees itself as “a truly trans-regional organization.”⁴³ Through its activities and publications, it functions more as a platform “playing a midwifery role of shaping collective wisdom,” in its own words, than an institutionalized think tank. Its role therefore is similar to that of the Australian East Asia Forum (AEAF),⁴⁴ which also serves as a platform or forum for researchers, politicians, and other think tanks to articulate and discuss opinions and policies pertaining to East Asia as a region in general, and regional integration in particular. Nevertheless, the studies produced, published, and sponsored by the KEAF or through KEAF-affiliation are as much Korea-centered as the AEAF’s focus lies on Australia’s links and role in the process of East Asian integration and identity formation. In addition, through the KEAF-sponsored Council on East Asian Affairs (CEAA), “devoted to common causes in East Asia,” the foundation transcends the mere function of providing a forum for debate but possesses its own think tank as an instrument of agenda-setting.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, the KEAF takes a much more constructive stance towards regional integration and the formation of a regional identity than the NEAH. Among its aims it lists “contributing to the formation of an East Asian community by enhancing mutual understanding and trust among countries and peoples in the region” (KEAF), and contributing to a “common regional identity in East Asia” (CEAA). One important tool for the promotion of these goals is the English-language journal *Global Asia* published as a quarterly since 2006. It is no coincidence that its first issue chose “the future of East Asian regionalism” as its cover story, which, among others, featured articles by the former Korean President Kim Dae-jung, the former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, and the former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. In his essay, Kim himself unmasked the political usage of history in contemporary discourse and practice of regional integration in East Asia. He criticized that “the complicated and often tense relationships between Korea, China and Japan over historical issues have combined with domestic political interests to stir up nationalism, undermining the atmosphere of cooperation in the region.”⁴⁶

In the following issue, *Global Asia* even took up history and “history politics” as the topic of its cover story (“Barbs of Nationalism: How Asia Can Reconcile its History”), and its editor-in-chief, Chung-in Moon (together with Suh Seung-won) contributed an extensive article on the “Burdens of the Past: Overcoming History, the Politics of Identity and Nationalism in Asia.”⁴⁷ Moon and Suh argue that “building a collective identity” constitutes an important element in “shaping and sustaining a regional order.” As collective identity draws much on collective memory, however, overcoming “the fractured pain of the past” must be seen as a prerequisite to regional integration.⁴⁸ While Moon and Suh criticize the usage of history by some politicians—“to pursue parochial nationalism at the expense of regional cooperation”—as “a Faustian bargain with the forces of the past,” they, too, readily employ mainly negative references to the modern past to justify their pro-integrative stance. In their analysis, the historical existence of “Northeast Asia” as an entity of some sort is presumed since the 7th century. Although they admit that regional order underwent major transformations in the following 14 centuries—from China-centered hegemony, Japanese imperial order, the Cold War bipolar system to the post-Cold War era—East Asia’s presumed natural entity is never questioned. Rather, they argue that the concrete realization of regional order was flawed in all of these four historical regimes because of their domination by “great power politics.” Therefore, while the meta-narrative of historical unity remains unchallenged, on the micro-level, history serves as a negative example; it is the burden that needs to be shouldered and the past that needs to be overcome in order to achieve “transnational solidarity” and “a new regional identity of co-existence, harmony, and cooperation.”⁴⁹ The narrative of regional integration, therefore, becomes as teleological as previous narratives of national integra-

tion, national identity formation, and the state building process. Moon and Suh finally prescribe,

[D]espite bitter historical memories of domination and subjugation, Northeast Asia shares a common cultural and historical heritage that should be emphasized more than contentious past insults.⁵⁰

As opposed to the NEAH, the KEAF appears to be less interested in explicit debates about the sufferings of the past and the creation and preservation of a collective memory based on conflict and negative perceptions of other Asians. The KEAF's political currency of the past is not the rivalry of the more recent past but the assumed commonality of Asians in the pre-modern era.

(3) The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC)

The most prominent Japanese think tank on Asian integration, the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC), takes a rather unique position in this discourse. While the CEAC acknowledges the importance of regional integration, particularly in the economic sphere, it explicitly rejects the aim of promoting an East Asian Community. Its self-declared aim is "not to promote, but to study the concept of an East Asian Community" and "to pursue what the strategic response of Japan should be."⁵¹ The Council was inaugurated in 2004 as "an all-Japan intellectual platform covering business, government, and academic leaders," and is as Japan-centered as the NEAH is Korea-centered. It is led by its president Itô Kenichi, a professor of International Politics and former director at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The CEAC's focus on Japan also determines its temporal and spatial historical consciousness vis-à-vis the issues of regional integration and identity formation. Rather than Japan-in-Asia and macro-historical approaches, the CEAC prefers to discuss Japan's role in "the international community" in the post-WWII context. It sees the most appropriate historical model in Japan's economic success in the 1960s and 1970s when "Japan began to assume its status as leader in the global community." As Japan's strategies in this context are summarized as having "generally achieved success," with the attitude that "with few exceptions, the Japanese are liked and admired worldwide," attempts at revising this order are viewed skeptically.⁵² This critical view, on the other hand, facilitates a discussion of the existence, definition, and demarcations of Asia which most other contributors to this debate fail to address.

In fact, it is rather difficult to consider 'East Asia' as a regional concept. At any rate, it is a fact that there is not even an agreement on 'Asia' as a geographical division. When it comes to considering a common 'Asia' within the framework that includes identity, such as 'cultural bloc,' 'religious bloc' or 'political bloc' the concept becomes even more ambiguous.⁵³

Instead of presupposing a historical entity called Asia, the CEAC emphasizes the diversity of geographical conceptions within Asia and Asia's cultural and religious diversity. Consequently, it dismisses attempts at defining an East Asian identity prematurely. If regionalism in East Asia is to include the United States and/or Australia, neither Wang's Confucianism nor Hatoyama's dichotomous approach (Western dualism, Asian holism) may work as a fundament for an Asian identity. And if concepts of a unified "Asian" history or "Asian" culture are de-emphasized for the sake of diversity, any attempts at defining an "Asian" identity that embraces, in the literal meaning of the term, sameness, are deemed to fail. As the CEAC prefers to perceive Asia or East Asia historically as not having constituted an entity, references to an assumed glorious past or golden age are neither necessary nor possible. Instead, even the more distant past serves as proof of Asia's diversity, not unity. According to the CEAC, two fundamentally different cultures together with corresponding political and social orders co-existed in pre-modern Asia, namely East

Asian ancestor worship societies and Southeast Asian transmigration societies.⁵⁴ In the modern period, the differing degrees of modernization and Westernization at different times throughout Asia further aggravated the cultural, political, and economic gap between the countries in the region before the Cold War further diversified East Asia by its strict ideological divide between East and West, socialism and capitalism. In short, according to the CEAC, history may serve to explain why the region is as diverse as it is, but it certainly will not serve well as an argument for East Asia as a natural entity, or for the eventual aims of integration and unity of the East Asian region.

6. Conclusion


Focusing on the recent political discourse on East Asian regional integration and the formation of a regional identity in East Asia, this article has examined how and why history is employed in justification or rejection of certain conceptions of regional integration and identity formation. Taking the examples of leading politicians and officials from Japan and China, and think tanks from Korea and Japan, this paper has demonstrated the special relevance of historical arguments in contemporary discourse on regional integration in East Asia, a region that is characterized by notable political, economic, cultural, and social differences and imbalances.

Following European scholarship on the role of history in the process of European integration, this paper has suggested we define the employment of historical references for political ends and the construction of assumed historical analogies together as “history politics.” Within this framework, it has adopted Heisler’s metaphor of “the political currency of the past” to analyze the context and intentions that inform the respective historical references.

As the main and recurrent referential points in history, this paper has identified: the negative portrayal of the more recent past which must be sought to overcome; a golden age of Asian co-prosperity in the pre-modern era; the positive model of European integration; and the presupposition of the existence of “Asia.” In general, the distant past or pre-modern history as pre-national history portrays Asia, however defined, as a natural, given entity; modern history as national history, by contrast, is viewed as a history of conflict, dispute, unnatural separations, divisions; future history is envisioned as regional history (or a return to the assumed natural unity). But history not only works as a means of justification and/or rejection of political integration and identity formation. It also serves as the rationale for prescriptions for the present according to which the common glories of the Golden Age ought to be remembered while the enmities of the past must be overcome or de-emphasized.

The past, as a consequence, is omnipresent in today’s discourse, and it is often present as “political currency.” This depiction is quite similar to the way the nation was historically constructed, invented and imagined, and also to how the region is constructed, invented, imagined, and frequently portrayed as the *telos* of historical development. In this process, Europe can both serve as a model (namely for integration) and as the “Other” (namely with regard to identity formation). (See figure 2)

Figure 2: Towards a Systematization of “History Politics” in Track I and II Affirmative Discourse on East Asian Integration and Asian Identity Formation



It is not the aim of this paper to simply uncover and deplore the often inaccurate usage of history for political ends. Rather, it seeks to call attention to the fact that history is instrumentalized in contemporary discourse on East Asian regional integration and Asian identity formation. In particular, it has sought to examine the ways history is employed in political discourse and for which political ends. It has also revealed some similarities between the way history has been used in the past as justification for nationalism and the contemporary usage for the promotion of various conceptions of regionalist projects. I contend that an awareness of the political usage of history for the goals of regional integration and identity formation is important in order to be able to question the rationale of both affirmative and dismissive argumentation that informs this political discourse.

If nations have relied on “invented traditions” (Hobsbawm/Ranger) and “imagined communities” (Anderson) in their processes of regional integration and identity formation, it shall be no surprise that on an even more abstract level, like that of supranational regions, encounters with history take place in the constant presence of imaginations and inventions. This caveat does not mean to imply that the project of regional integration should be abandoned. On the contrary, any analysis of the usage of historical concepts of commonality for the political end of integration in previously war-torn regions must acknowledge the potentially positive effect of such discourse and activities. But if we can indeed learn from history we may be well advised to consider learning some lessons for the future of regionalism from the history of nationalism. While idealism to some extent may be necessary to achieve long-term political goals, a pragmatic attitude towards such goals may help to prevent the abuse of political ideas for ideological purposes. As Ernest Renan had prophesied more than one hundred years ago:

*Nations are not something eternal. They have begun, they will end. They will be replaced, in all probability, by a European confederation.*⁵⁵

What Renan predicted for Europe may become real also for Asia, and what applies to the fate of nations may also be true for the future of regions.

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The History of the “History Problem”: Historical Recognition between Japan and Neighboring Asian Countries

Kinuyo Kawaji

Abstract

Today’s simultaneous trends of “globalization” and “regionalization” paradoxically intensify nationalistic conflict in Northeast Asia, especially over history issues. After the division of the region into nation-states under the Cold War system, each nation developed its own version of national history. In the context of globalization, information flows between these nations with ever-greater speed, which gives rise to the possibility of both dialogue and controversy. The issue of history is a factor of instability in Northeast Asia, especially between Japan, Korea and China. Mutual distrust is deeply rooted in memories of war and imperialism. This paper takes up the “history problem” in contemporary Northeast Asia. It does not try to set straight “what actually happened” in the past, but considers why this history problem remains unresolved, and why it appears as a clash between nationalisms.

The memories of the past war constitute contemporary national identities, but the treatment of these memories has a specific history. The article considers how in the immediate postwar global order, defined by the Cold War, Japan substituted war reparations with alternative forms of economic assistance that avoided a resolution of the history issue with Korea and China, and how that frozen set of relations in Asia thawed as the global order shifted again after 1989. While inter-government talks have sought to construct friendly relationships with future-oriented strategies, some conservative politicians – particularly in Japan – have tried to increase national integration by emphasizing patriotic school curricula. This tendency has resulted in history textbook controversies within Japan and between Japan and its neighbors, which also give rise to the need for transnational dialogue. The controversies, through reflecting on knowledge of the past – or pasts –, hint at the future actions that must be taken to commence historical reconciliation and community building in Northeast Asia.

1. Introduction

Since the 1990s, relations between Northeast Asian countries have been deepening rapidly, while nationalistic clashes between them have also intensified. In particular, the “history problem” related to the region’s tumultuous twentieth century has become one of the most serious obstacles to the building of intimate diplomatic ties between Japan, South Korea and China. Although some dismiss the past as meaningless or harmful for the future of an Asian community, without addressing the causes of deeply rooted mutual distrust the formation of a regional community remains difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, how and what kind of past is recognized determines what kind of future will be constructed. Northeast Asian countries have a history characterized not only by conflicts, but also by interdependence. The history of the Second World War in Asia is often projected onto the present and the problems of the present are often projected onto the past. Understanding the differences and controversies of historical recognition helps us to understand the problems of contemporary politics and to envisage a better future that would

overcome past conflicts.

The purpose of this article is not only to reveal the conflicting issues and differences in historical recognition, which might merely reproduce racial prejudice as well as mutual distrust, but also to examine the background in which clashing nationalisms originated. This background includes the rise of the modern nation-state, the history of Japanese imperialism, the postwar Cold War system and its collapse, as well as subsequent processes of regionalization under the influence of globalization. The memories of physical and mental pain must be remembered so they will not be reproduced. Postwar compensation cannot heal this pain, but it could contribute to the building of justice of rule in the public sphere, and to learning from past crimes. The answer to the question of the history problem requires a stop to the chain of hatred that stems from historical conflicts, and depends upon constructive approaches to reconciliation. In addition, this article suggests that the historical controversies can lead to a mutual understanding of differences and ultimately a more open public arena in which more people may have the freedom to participate.

Therefore, this article provides an overview of the differences in historical recognition in the region in order to more clearly consider the factors underlying the controversies and the issues to address. It will discuss the differences among nations using the opinions of intellectuals and the public found in recent survey data. First, it will put the contemporary history problem in the historical context of Northeast Asia and review the way in which the Japanese government dealt with war reparation under the Cold War system. It will then show how this relates to the general view of history in postwar Japan, and consider the influence of history education on public opinions in reference to the history textbook controversies between Japan and its neighbors. After discussing the differences and controversies in historiography which led to clashing nationalisms as well as attempts at dialogue among Northeast Asian countries, the study will explore the possibility of historical reconciliation and community building in Northeast Asia.

Modern Northeast Asia was shaped by the expansion of empire, colonization, aggressive war, and the resistance against it. "Northeast Asia" in this study includes the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), and Japan. Because the information on Taiwan and North Korea is limited in Japan, and because China, South Korea, and Japan are most involved in the problem arising from conflicting national histories, this analysis will focus on Japanese attitudes toward the history problem and on interactions between Japan and China, and Japan and South Korea, using joint opinion polls such as the Asia-Vision Survey on college students' attitudes conducted by the Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) of the Waseda University Global COE Program in 2009, the joint opinion polls involving China, South Korea and Japan conducted by Asahi Shimbun in 2005, and the Japan-China joint opinion polls conducted by the Genron NPO during the years 2005-2007.

The subject of the history problem is the nation. This study uses the definition of the nation as outlined by Ernest Renan, the famous nationalist and philosopher. In the late nineteenth century, he described the nation as a modern project based on a select memory of the past. He belonged to the first generation of the nation-state system, and explored the emergence of the early nation-state in France. He answered the question "What is a Nation?" in his lecture at the Sorbonne in 1882 as follows:

*A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life.*¹

According to Renan, a nation is built of the solidarity between a group of people who con-

sent to forget past conflicts within the nation in-group and share a sense of mutual past suffering, a desire for present lives lived in common, and for a common future destiny. A nation is based on a “daily plebiscite.”

Northeast Asian people now share the past within the units of separate nations, which makes the present history problem appear as a clash between nationalisms. The past that forms their common identity is constructed and reconstructed for a future, large-scale solidarity. If the past could be shared among Northeast Asian people, on an even larger scale, it would then be possible to envision constructing a greater regional community.

2. The “History Problem”

As transnational relations have developed with the expansion of the global market since the collapse of the Cold War system, conflicts between nations have intensified. The influence of the processes of “globalization,” economic openness, and cultural exchange has gradually increased among Northeast Asian countries, and the history problem has also become an important issue and factor of instability in the region. Of course, history problems are universal issues, rooted in struggles for human rights against violence and discrimination, originating in state power especially during times of war. Today’s accusations of the Japanese state, attributing to it various war crimes, such as the exploitation of “[war] comfort women”² and forced labor during the Second World War, are also based on universal ideas of “crime against peace” and “crime against humanity.” This humanitarian movement is a consequence of democratization in Northeast Asian countries.

At the same time, the reason why the contemporary history problem in Northeast Asia appears as a clash of nationalisms is that this region has long been divided. First, nations in the region were separated into empires and colonies, and later into nation-states under the postwar East-West division of the world. These divisions have inhibited reconciliation up to the present day.


After the end of Japanese colonial rule and war of aggression, both Korea and China, as countries emerging from a colonial past, adopted an orthodox ideology of national history based on their peoples’ resistance to Japanese imperialism and the subsequent achievement of independence through these struggles. Japan had indoctrinated its imperial subjects in the period leading up to and during the war with imperial history centered on the ancient myth of the Emperor, which justified Japanese imperial rule as the extension of the Emperor system. In the postwar period, national history was reconstructed to be consistent with universal values of modernity, democracy, and pacifism. This reshaping was an attempt to reject what was seen as the premodern, underdeveloped social structure of Japan that had led to militarism.³ The typical case of this national postwar pacifism is the remembrance of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, in which Japanese citizens suffered as victims. The postwar goal of pacifism was achieved by stressing defeat, and was politically secured by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan under the Cold War system. Under this treaty the American military presence both protected Japan and controlled Japanese military activity, functioning as a stabilizer in the region. Japanese people memorialized their sufferings, as well as the wartime poverty and the pervasive culture of violence perpetrated in Japan, through individual Japanese citizens who were seen as “unpatriotic” (非国民), members of the military, local communities, and schools. The postwar emphasis on their own experience inside Japan effaced any consciousness of the aggression other Asian countries had experienced at the hand of Japan.

Hence many Japanese people cannot understand why neighboring countries still actively blame Japan, even after agreements on war reparation were concluded and feelings of remorse

were expressed several times at the government level. Some people simplistically ascribe anti-Japan movements in Korea and China to excessive “national sentiments” (民族感情), which would be ingrained by dictatorships through state-imposed curricula of self-centered national history.

For example, according to the Asia-Vision Survey,⁴ 20% of Japanese college students think “the biggest obstacles to the development of Asian countries’ relationships” is “differences of historical recognition,” and 19% think it is “national sentiments,” rather than economic, social, or cultural differences (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Views on Obstacles to the Development of Asian Countries’ Relationships



Source: Asia-Vision Survey, 2009.

To counter this trend in popular sentiment, Japan-China and Japan-South Korea joint history research groups have been trying to find the objective “facts” in order to make up for the discrepancies in historical recognition and to promote reconciliation through “sober” intellectual dialogue.⁵ For example, the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee was launched after anti-Japan demonstrations occurred in China in 2005, and an agreement on joint history research by both Japanese and Chinese intellectuals was reached at the subsequent Japan-China Summit Meeting in 2006.

The chairman of the Japanese side of the Committee, Shin’ichi Kitaoka, on the mission of

the research, said, “The history problem must be separated from politics. If the history problem arises, its discussion should be left to scholars while political economic partnerships shouldn’t retrograde.”⁶ Kitaoka is also a policy member of the Japan-ROK (South Korea) Joint History Research Committee.

In spite of this goal of “mitigating conflicting sentiments over the history problem, and the attempts at increasing exchange and peaceful partnership between the two countries by revealing historical facts and interchanging opinions on the historical recognitions through researchers’ sober studies,”⁷ the 2010 report of the Japan-China Joint History Research resulted not in a joint statement but in a disjointed report. Unable to agree on the number of victims in the Nanking Massacre, for example, the report recorded both Chinese estimates (more than 300,000) and those of the Japanese (20,000-200,000), even though the Japanese side acknowledged that Japan was responsible for this atrocity. This lingering discrepancy in the area of quantitative knowledge is a reminder that “facts” are not neutral.

Of course historical records have their limitations. At the end of the war, many official documents were burned. Oral history is also limited, since few people concerned are still alive today. In the contemporary situation, the issue is no longer that the generation with wartime experience won’t speak out, but that those with no personal experience are grappling with historical recognition. Apart from non-political, pure “objective” matters of historiography, another factor of cognitive differences relating to politics should be considered here. Immanuel Wallerstein explains politics of “pastness” as follows:

*Pastness is a mode by which persons are persuaded to act in the present in ways they might not otherwise act. Pastness is a tool persons use against each other. Pastness is a central element in the establishment of or challenge to social legitimation. Pastness therefore is pre-eminently a moral phenomenon, therefore a political phenomenon, always a contemporary phenomenon...Since the real world is constantly changing...Ergo, the content of pastness necessarily constantly changes.*⁸

In postwar Northeast Asia, authoritarian governments, including the Japanese government under the LDP’s dominance,⁹ were also seen as a kind of authoritarianism—exploited memories of the dark past to legitimate their own rule. These governments, under the auspices of the Cold War policies of the United States, promised their citizens modernization, focusing on economic growth rather than on democratic participation. Real democratic participation was replaced by economic nationalism, which boasted economic growth and granted the people economic income and social welfare in exchange for a voice in policy.

3. The Process of War Reparation

Japan’s approach to war reparation from immediately postwar until recently was strongly determined by the Cold War system under which the history problem was frozen. With the collapse of the bipolar system, this problem began to thaw, resulting in the current conflicts. Under the Cold War, open dialogue between Japan and its neighboring countries was not permitted, but post-1989, dialogue has been possible and has led to both conflict and the possibility of reconciliation. Understanding this postwar political situation helps us understand the persistence of the wartime history problem.

The outbreak of the Korean War just five years after the conclusion of WWII turned the Cold War in East Asia into hot war. In the context of United States strategy at the time, Japan needed to be the “bulwark against communism” in the region. Allied Forces occupying Japan

in the immediate postwar years shifted from an emphasis on democratization to a policy of rearmament and economic independence. This “reverse course” resulted in a Japanese version of McCarthyism—a “red purge” of Communist Party officials from public office—and the release of previously purged war criminals, militarists, and ultra-nationalists. To facilitate the incorporation of Japan into the Western Bloc, the priority of Western countries—led by the U.S.—was Japan’s economic recovery, at the expense of working through war reparations.¹⁰

The Japanese government led by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida dismissed demands from those on the Left to sign an overall peace treaty with all of the countries in Asia, including Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The terms of the treaty would have given Japan sovereignty, “territorial integrity” and reduced its responsibility for making war reparations to facilitate Japan’s economic recovery. Instead Yoshida favored a treaty of mutual cooperation between the U.S. and Japan, which guaranteed a significant American military presence in Japan, and therefore in East Asia. This military presence, together with the subsequently established Japanese Self-Defense Forces, was ostensibly to safeguard Japan’s “unarmed peace,” and placed Japan firmly in the Western Bloc.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Japan were signed by 48 nations in 1951, and American Cold War strategy exempted Japan from most reparation responsibilities. Allied countries that had been attacked or occupied by Japan—Laos, Cambodia, Australia, the Netherlands (the metropole of Indonesia), the U.K. (Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia), and the U.S. (the mandatory of Micronesia)—renounced the right to claim war reparations. However, some Asian governments that had been colonial subjects and former colonies of Imperial Japan—North Korea, South Korea and the Republic of China (the present Taiwan)—were excluded from these discussions. The People’s Republic of China, India, Burma (the present Myanmar), Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (the present Czech Republic and Slovakia) were also absent. After this, however, India, the Republic of China, and the People’s Republic of China renounced their claim for war reparations by signing bilateral treaties with Japan in 1952. The Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China was also subsequently signed in 1972, invalidating the former Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. Instead of war reparations, Japan extended Chinese support for economic development. The Official Development Assistance (ODA) was a form of reparations from Japan to China, but Japan did not compensate for the suffering of war victims in China.

Japan compensated through bilateral agreements based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty in the case of the Philippines, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, Burma, and Indonesia. For countries that had renounced any claim for reparation—Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Singapore, Malaysia and Micronesia—Japan also concluded a bilateral treaty of economic cooperation. The grants and soft loans Japan provided to honor these treaties went under the name of economic assistance rather than war reparation. With regards to Thailand, Mongolia and European countries, Japan concluded agreements addressing rights to claim war reparation and provided economic assistance as postwar compensation.

All of these promises to Japan’s neighbors were made in the Cold War atmosphere that descended upon East Asia at the conclusion of WWII. In this global situation, the Allied Powers were particularly concerned with reinvigorating Japan’s economic standing to create a solid capitalist ally in East Asia. Most of the reparations, then, became conditional loans, which functioned to assist Japan’s economic advancement. The expansion of Japan’s economy into South-east Asia evoked the spread of prewar and wartime Japanese imperialism. Furthermore, these postwar strategies were largely planned and implemented by the very same economic bureaucrats and company managers who had served Imperial Japan, and many feared it was a revival of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.”¹¹ Progressive intellectuals in Japan often criticized, and some of them continue to criticize, this character of Japan’s compensation.

In the case of South Korea, which had a particularly fraught postcolonial relationship with Japan, Japan concluded a treaty in 1965 to provide grants and soft loans as compensation for its 35-year imperial rule of the Korean Peninsula. This “compensation,” however, addressed post-war economic development in South Korea, but not the misery of those who were victims of war under Japanese colonial rule. Both Japanese and South Korean governments put economic development before the resolution of their shared history problem. Because of this neglect, historical controversies between the two nations, such as that over the legality of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty of 1910, continue. Also, although there was an official recognition by the Japanese government of legal responsibility for war reparation based on the 1965 treaty,¹² the issue of compensation for individual victims such as forced laborers and “comfort women” remains unresolved. Because the victims were forced into silence by the developmental dictatorship in postwar South Korea, only more recently—since the process of democratization began in the late 1980s—have they begun to dare accusing the Japanese state of war crimes. Only in the 1990s, after the demise of the “1955 system”¹³ and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s long-time rule in Japan did the Japanese government begin to respond to these concerns.

In the course of the geopolitical transformation from the Cold War division of Eastern and Western Bloc to a cross-border market system with gradual liberalization and multi-polarization, international relations in Northeast Asia have become very close. In response to this trend, attempts have appeared to move history education beyond national history and to embrace a trans-national perspective. In Japan, and to some extent in China, these efforts have influenced the writing of history textbooks.

Diplomatic talks between nations in Northeast Asia tend to avoid history issues and attempt instead to strengthen partnerships with future-oriented strategies.¹⁴ To this end, Northeast Asian governments try to promote economic and cultural relations. Included in these efforts is the promotion of apolitical joint history research among two or three nations. Many intellectuals respond to this trend, and strive toward sharing universal ideas in the global system.¹⁵ For example, the project “Japan-China Intellectual Community” was launched to promote cross-border intellectual exchanges during 1997-2003.¹⁶ Chinese historian Liu Jie points out that from the 1990s “multipolarization of history studies” has developed in China, making free research possible and contributing to diversification of the views of history, not necessarily subject to state power. According to Liu Jie the project reflected these trends and was set up as a non-official attempt to construct a common space where “public intellectuals” in East Asia could exchange their opinions freely and think beyond national borders.¹⁷


In general, however, the more globalized knowledge and power are, the wider the gaps between the intellectual elite and the common people. School education plays a central role in shaping people’s worldviews, and the history of prewar Asia also demonstrates that the budding cosmopolitanism of the elite stood in stark contrast to the nationalism of the masses. When the social tensions caused by this gap increase, it can intensify anti-foreign nationalism and chauvinism in society at large. This case shows that nationalistic resentment can be an unintended result of patriotic national education.

In recent years, Japanese educational trends exhibit this push toward patriotism. For example, the 1999 Law Regarding the National Flag and Anthem can be seen as an index of neo-conservative nationalism, since it revives the prewar practice of displaying the national flag and playing the national anthem, even though students are not forced to salute the flag or sing the anthem. Japan’s national flag and anthem were symbols of the rule of the Empire of Japan. These symbols revive the memories of Japan’s war of aggression and its colonial rule, and make neighboring Asian people nervous that Japan may return to prewar militarism, or that there may be a revival of the sense of racial superiority that was prevalent during that period. Even at sporting events, such as the 2004 AFC Asian Cup held in China, the sight of Japanese supporters singing

the national anthem and flying the national flag has the potential to evoke sensitivity and hostility in many neighboring Asians. Also, the influence of mass media on popular sentiment cannot be ignored. The deeply rooted memories of the past war are susceptible to breaking out when prompted by sensational mass media coverage.¹⁸

The recent rise of neo-nationalism as a reaction against globalization and social unrest indicates domestic society and national integration in crisis in Japan, South Korea, and China. In Japan, the Fundamental Law of Education was amended in 2006 for the first time since its establishment in 1947. It adds as the objective of education "to nurture an attitude...to love our country and our home," which is known as the "Patriotism Clause."¹⁹ Seemingly anachronistic, this move is a reaction within Japan to the globalization of history studies, and a response to Korean and Chinese voices criticizing Japanese wartime policy. Education in all three nations becomes a battlefield, in which nothing less than national identity is at stake. According to the results of the Asia-Vision Survey, more than half of Japanese college students get their knowledge about other Asian countries from their school education (see Figure 2). Therefore, the next section takes into account how school education influences people's understanding of history in Japan, as well as in South Korea and China.

Figure 2: Main Sources of Knowledge about Other Asian Countries



Source: Asia-Vision Survey, 2009.

4. History Education and Politics

Louis Althusser, examining ideology, determined the school as one of the fundamental ideological state apparatuses to reproduce a capitalist social system.²⁰ Ernest Gellner analyzes the nation-state as a prerequisite for the establishment of the capitalist system, which demands homogeneous labor power cultivated by the state's general education.²¹ School education, especially the knowledge of history, is the basic common knowledge meant to produce and reproduce a nation. National integration is also a precondition for the free functioning of global markets. These simultaneous trends toward national integration and international interactions raise the possibility of nationalistic clashes. The conflicts between national histories among Northeast Asian countries show this dynamic. In this region, national memories about the war linger, and are influenced by views that emphasize self-victimization.

In Northeast Asia, Japanese history textbooks have caught the public's attention. School education is often used as a political tool, wielded to construct and reconstruct national identity. As such, the Japanese history textbook controversy is suitable to serve as a case to understand these contemporary identity politics.

The Japanese constitution guarantees academic freedom. Every scholar enjoys the right to research independent of state power, and universities ostensibly remain autonomous. School-teachers can also teach students with their own supplemental teaching materials under the principle of the local self-government.²² The primary textbook, however, must be authorized by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. This so-called textbook authorization system is virtually state censorship.

The contents of these official history textbooks, authorized by a government ministry, are assumed to correspond to official statements made in the international context. One expects them to be created with respect paid especially to Japan's neighboring countries, and their relationship to Japanese imperial history. When the Ministry of Education demanded a rewrite of the term used for the Japanese Army's incursion in Northern China from "invaded" (侵略) to "advanced into" (進行), Japanese history textbooks became a diplomatic issue. After receiving the Chinese government's protest against this edit, the Ministry of Education adopted a new authorization criterion, the so-called "Neighboring Country Clause." It declared, "Textbooks ought to show understanding and seek international harmony in their treatment of modern and contemporary historical events involving neighboring Asian countries." By virtue of this clause and to respond to the anti-Japan demonstrations in South Korea in 1992 sparked by the testimony of former Korean "comfort women," a description of "(war) comfort women" appeared in most history textbooks.

The "comfort women" issue manifested itself as Korean nationalism, but it also raised transnational concerns voiced by the United Nations Commissions of Human Rights (UNCHR) and various civic groups. The Japanese government was forced to apologize and disclose the results of their investigations into the alleged, coercive mobilization of Asian women as "comfort women," or prostitutes for Japanese soldiers during the war years. Finally Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono acknowledged the facts about the coercion and wretched living conditions of "comfort women," and the army's involvement in this system. He issued an apology in 1993.²³

On the fiftieth anniversary of the war's end, Prime Minister Tomi'ichi Murayama issued a statement in which he expressed "feelings of deep remorse" and "a heartfelt apology" for Japanese "colonial rule and aggression."²⁴ This declaration set a precedent, which has been followed by successive cabinets whenever the history problem comes up and Japan's relations with neighboring South Korea and China deteriorate.


In a sense, the statement is a product of democratization. With the collapse of the longtime LDP-controlled regime, Murayama—the head of the Japan Socialist Party—formed a coalition cabinet in 1994. The Japan Socialist Party, which subsequently changed its name to the Social

Democratic Party, had adopted policies designed for the protection of the postwar constitution, pacifism, and opposition to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Therefore, the political rise of the Japan Socialist Party meant an increased diplomatic effort to enhance peaceful relations with Northeast Asian countries, especially with China. Although the Japanese political left is assumed to be “progressive,” it also retains a “conservative” element: its policy of protecting the Constitution, which remains the ideal manifestation of “emancipation” from a dark past of the oppression of individual freedom.²⁵ The postwar constitution of Japan signifies the negation of the past of militarism, imperialism, and “fascism”—even if the terms used to describe Japan’s war crimes refer to militarism rather than a political system of fascism²⁶—and expresses the will of the Japanese people to construct a free and peaceful society in the future by overcoming the past.

History is reflexive knowledge that enables us to imagine the future as a process of “progress” or “recession.”²⁷ What kind of past we try to address decides what kind of future we can build. The approaches to issues of war responsibility among Northeast Asian countries are not only “diplomatic cards” used to extend friendship or apply pressure but also to signal the direction in which the countries may progress cooperatively. Having suffered from Japan’s imperialism, other Northeast Asian countries retain a deep mistrust of Japan. Therefore they continue to demand sincere remorse and apology, especially in light of the various reactionary movements that also continue to rise in Japan.

According to the opinion poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun in response to anti-Japanese protests in China in 2005, nearly half of Chinese (48%) and South Koreans (43%) thought that Japan’s apology was the most effective means to resolve the history problem. Japanese people, however, thought it would be exchange—cultural, economic, and political—(29%) rather than apology (13%) (see Figure 3). Japanese people might wish to forget the loathsome wartime past. This seems to be a factor of difference and an obstacle to coming to a mutual recognition of history. Postwar generations seem to have little consciousness about history, and therefore little sense of responsibility for the past and for how it might influence the future. This is quasi-realism: they see only the very transient present, but cannot actually contemplate the future and its relation to the past.

Figure 3: Views on the Most Effective Way to Resolve the History Problem




Source: Asahi Shimbun, April 27, 2005.

Contrary to the general image this constructs, however, Japanese youth are not necessarily indifferent when it comes to the history problem. According to the results of the Asia-Vision Survey in 2009, about 80% of Japanese college students do care about this issue (see Figure 4).

According to the results of a three-year survey (2005-2007) conducted by the Genron NPO in China and Japan on the question of whether the history problem could be resolved by deepening relations between the two nations, we see that Japanese were more pessimistic than Chinese (only about 26% of Japanese respondents in 2005, 27% in 2006 and 30% in 2007 thought that resolution was possible). In contrast, Chinese people seemed significantly more optimistic for the future (about 51%, 50% and 52% respectively). In Japan, a significant group of respondents indicated that even if relations deepened, the history problem would not be resolved (about 30%, 36% and 33% of Japanese, compared with about 11%, 14% and 23% of Chinese in the three years respectively), but that at least, the bilateral relations could not deepen without the resolution of the history problem (about 23%, 22%, 22% of Japanese, compared with about 26%, 32%, 20% of Chinese) (see Figure 5). Even after the anti-Japanese protests intensified in China in 2005, these tendencies changed very little.


Figure 4: The Importance of the History Problem



Source: Asia-Vision Survey, 2009.

These opinions influence the Japanese government's attempts at resolving the history problem and develop friendly relations with the neighboring countries. Several differences remain, however, between the various levels of government and public opinion. Intellectuals both within and without Japan also have their own assessments.

Figure 5. Views on Japan-China Relations and the History Problem



Source: Created by author from data in Genron NPO, The 3rd Japan-China Joint Opinion Poll in 2007.

5. Historiography and Controversies over the Recognition of History

The Murayama government, in addition to a general apology, specifically addressed the issue of “comfort women” and supported the foundation of the Asian Women’s Fund. This fund collected private funds from Japanese people and donated it as “money of compensation” (償い金) to former “comfort women” in Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, etc. from 1995-2007.

Some women’s human rights groups, the Korean government and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights criticized the fund for its “private nature.” They alleged that the “comfort women” system was a war crime and a “crime against humanity” and the Japanese government should accept its legal responsibility and apologize for it by providing state compensation for the victims and also by promoting education about the issue in Japan.²⁸ This criticism was reflected in the refusal by some former “comfort women” to accept the “money of compensation.” On the side of Japan, there were some reasons why the Japanese government avoided taking legal responsibility for the issue. If the Japanese government had accepted legal responsibility, the government would have had to extend the same treatment to other individuals who might have claims against the government, such as Japanese orphans who were left behind in China when Japan withdrew from China in the waning days of the war, and Japanese prisoners of war in the Soviet Union, who were forced to do hard labor in Siberia, many of them even long after Japan’s surrender and many also dying while in incarceration. Therefore, before examining whether the Japanese army and government had coerced women to work in “comfort stations,” and before acknowledging this activity as a crime, the Japanese government tried to resolve the issue through private “money of compensation.” Paradoxically, this action prompted attacks by both rightwing nationalists in Japan who denied Japan’s war responsibility and by leftwing liberals who criticized the “private” nature of the fund.²⁹

With the rise of reactionary movements led by nationalist politicians of the right-wing LDP after Murayama’s statement in 1995, policy on this issue began to shift. In connection with a group dedicated to reforming Japanese textbooks, they attacked the “masochistic view of history” that saw Japan as an evil aggressive state, and criticized what they saw as “servile” apology diplomacy in the postwar era. According to their argument, the historical records were seen as inadequate to prove that the Japanese army forced women in colonies to work as sex slaves.³⁰ As a result, the description of this issue disappeared from Japanese history textbooks in 2000.

This dramatic elimination of the “comfort women” issue from textbooks due to a lack of written historical records exemplifies how positivist claims about the lack of “evidence” have been used by revisionist historians to assert that the admission of Japanese responsibility in the comfort women issue is not based on “historical facts.” Reactionary politicians who wish to deny or reject any claims of Japanese responsibility have fully exploited the positivism among these historians.

The group responsible for this move, The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, was formed in 1996 by scholars gathering around the title “The Association for Advancement of an Unbiased View of History.” Its textbook, the *New History Textbook*, was approved by the Ministry of Education in 2001, and was used by only 0.039% of schools in 2001, but the adoption rate rose to 1.7% in 2009. While these percentages remain small, the textbook authors’ view of history has been authorized and officially approved. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this textbook caused controversies in Japan, China and South Korea. The *New History Textbook* introduces many myths that were used to instill patriotism into the subjects of the Japanese Empire and it makes the history of the war short and ambiguous to diminish Japan’s war responsibility and emphasize the nation’s prewar history. Hence, the textbook authors’ view of history is criticized as “historical revisionism,”³¹ and also as representing the revival of the prewar view of the Emperor’s state history or “neo-nationalism.”

However, the authors of this textbook are not necessarily anti-Asia, as they do raise the emancipatory aspects of Japan's role in the "Greater East Asia War"³² in which Japan assisted Asian colonies in achieving independence from the West. However, their affirmation of the war has caused protest in China and Korea, since it ignores the suffering these nations endured as colonies to the Japanese Empire. Straying further from an explicitly anti-Asia stance, the history textbook continues to express anti-U.S. sentiments. The proponents argue today's Japan faces a crisis of the loss of an "independent mind." This sentiment adopts the tone of Yukichi Fukuzawa, an influential exponent of Japan's modernization in the earlier Meiji period. Arguing that the Japanese lost their self-confidence as a result of the U.S. postwar occupation policies and Japan's meek submission to them, they are anxious about Japan's future in the competitive globalized world where protection by the U.S. is not as pronounced as during the Cold War. Their view of history is not simply a restoration to the prewar mythical past. They attempt to address the problems of the present world with solutions that differ from postwar democracy and pacifism. Indeed, according to them, under the Cold War structure, postwar democracy and pacifism—ostensibly universal ideals—took the form of isolated particularisms. For example, the ideal of "peace" often took the form of demanding Japan's disengagement from global conflicts, rather than insisting on global peace.³³ Furthermore, the modernization theory that undergirded American policy in the immediate postwar years supposed that any particular "backward" country could progress to a universal modernity, which was posited as an abstract Western model; further, it assumed that particularities of national character could serve or hinder modernization.³⁴

This development model of nation-states has undergone a thorough critique in recent years on the basis of growing cross-border movements and transnational relations. On the one hand, when the nation-state system began to be shaken by the liberalization trends around the world in the 1990s, history studies began to take on the task of deconstructing nationalism by illuminating its imaginary nature and the oppressiveness of the nation-state. On the other hand, globalization began to threaten people's sense of stability, shake their pride in their nation's economic growth and prosperity, and unsettle their identity based on economic development. This instability has given rise to xenophobia and exclusivist nationalist movements. One consequence of these trends has been the emergence of so-called "neo-nationalism" that contains both the "cosmopolitan" tendencies of globalization and strong attitudes toward the anti-Japanese nationalism in the neighboring countries, which ironically has been the result of the growing cross-border exchanges of opinions. As an exponent of "neo-nationalism," the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform takes on the recent critique of the nation-state and reaffirms the nation-state while attempting to reconstruct Japanese nationalism. The attempt to intensify national integration is a reaction to the negative aspects of globalization. Moreover, the authors of the *New History Textbook* and other nationalists profess that their aim is to reverse the "postwar historiography" and the "postwar regime."

Indeed, in this author's view, postwar historiography in Japan was too inclined to positivism, and a fixation on the "object" of study. As a result, the contents of history education became a dry, meaningless enumeration of the facts and rote learning to prepare students for grueling examinations. Students of this system cannot understand the real meaning of history and how it relates to them. To cope with this shortcoming in education, conservatives in particular invoke ethics and patriotism. Moreover, positivism cannot avoid the process by which neutral, objective studies are used to certify dominant power and thought. Postwar historiography has reconstructed national history on the basis of democracy and pacifism authorized by the Constitution and the presupposed nation-state system. Today, as constructivism attempts to replace positivism, the emphasis is on narrating memories from various points of view. It is inevitable that all historians have their own sets of values, which inform their perspectives and approaches to historical facts. History is a kind of personal story. This does not mean that everyone is free to discriminate or

harbor prejudices. Despite their ideas of “unbiased view of history” and “freedom,” the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform cannot open up new horizons, as long as it remains fixated on what it sees as a lack of Japanese self-esteem and self-awareness. Their own failure or refusal to recognize and come to terms with Japan’s imperial past marks them as particularly lacking in historical self-awareness.

In the contemporary milieu in Japan, historical positivism plays a reactionary role, and constructivist versions of history can exploit this. For example, the *New History Textbook* reduced the Nanking Massacre to a quantitative issue, arguing that historical records were limited. Yuzo Mizoguchi points out accurately that this emphasis on the uncertainty of numbers transforms the existence of the fact itself into an uncertainty; it tries to make the historical fact appear as an “illusion.”³⁵ This quasi-positivism based on selective “facts” has many biases in affirming prewar Japan.³⁶

Some people have the idea that revealing the historical “truth” will lead to the resolution of the history problem, and this is often the hope of joint history research. However, revealing the “truth” also opens old wounds and intensifies conflicts over what constitutes “truth,” as demonstrated by the history textbook controversies. In other words, dialogue about history has the potential to lead into a vicious cycle, or, the opposite, to reconciliation. For example, common educational materials on history for Japan, South Korea, and China, named *History to Open the Future*, published in 2005, attempted a transnational response to the history textbook controversies and tried to create a shared historical recognition among the three nations. It is said that this dialogue was not necessarily attempting to compose a complete shared history at this point, but rather, it aspired to the more modest and attainable goal of discussing the differences of recognition among the three countries.³⁷ Following this strategy, Hiroshi Mitani suggests that historians should begin by sharing issues, rather than sharing conclusions. A step in the right direction is simply noticing where memories diverge, and the origins of this divergence.³⁸ If joint studies go well, reconciliation could—little by little—become a possibility. Whether we can share a vision of the history and reconcile depends on the people’s will to pursue a common future.

6. Instead of a Conclusion

In this article, I have shown that the history problem is a present political issue. The issue is essentially about nationalistic clashes based on national histories, and it certainly requires a transnational resolution.

Prewar imperialism had divided Northeast Asia into empires and colonies, which intensified the clash of nationalisms within the region, and, after Japan’s defeat and decolonization of the other countries, the Cold War divided Northeast Asian countries into separate ideological camps and consolidated the nation-states of Japan and Korea (although Korea then was divided through a civil war). The lasting divisions of this region cast a shadow on today’s situation in the form of a chasm of historical recognitions. Therefore, the resolution of the history problem, including the postwar compensation of victims and reconciliation, remains incomplete.

However, the controversies over history have shown the need for dialogue across borders. While it is true that dialogue can degenerate into a vicious circle of conflicting nationalisms, without it no reconciliation is possible. Even with government compensation of war victims, there is no certainty that compensation alone would heal the pain, or allow victims to find a way to forgive. Overcoming the past might be, as Hannah Arendt said, impossible.³⁹ Nevertheless, we must consider how to work through the past to forge a path to the future. It might take a long time. We cannot categorically say that forgetting and oblivion is a sin by arguing that reflecting upon history makes for a better future. As Nietzsche argues, forgetting is a virtue, since forgive-

ness is not easy, and resentment is difficult to bear.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, it was the one-sided forgetting on the part of Japan that deteriorated Northeast Asian relations. Rather than the freedom to forget, perhaps it is the freedom to remember and take responsibility for the past that will liberate the future of Northeast Asia.

Reflections on, and apologies for, past transgressions are a requisite for mutual trust and co-existence in any region, and this is especially so for Northeast Asia, in which the movement of people and ideas is increasing. In this context, a resolution would not in itself be an end, but a way to begin a community built on the past.

Notes

- 1 Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?" Lecture at Sorbonne, March 11, 1882 (Japanese translation: Tetsu Ukai, trans., *Kokumin towa Nani ka*, Tokyo: Kawaideshoboshinsha, 1997, p. 62). This article is available at http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/core/hss3/e_renan.html (accessed June 10, 2010).
- 2 "Comfort women" (慰安婦 or 従軍慰安婦) is the euphemism for women working in military brothels, especially those who were forced into prostitution by the Japanese military during the Second World War.
- 3 The prominent opinion leader of postwar democracy in Japan, Masao Maruyama, formulated this predominant view. See Masao Maruyama, *Thought and Behavior in Modern Japanese Politics*, London: Oxford University Press, 1963. For the expanded edition of the book in Japanese, see *Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo* (Thought and behavior in modern politics), Tokyo: Miraisha, 1964.
- 4 The Asia-Vision Survey is an opinion survey of students at Asian universities and graduate schools, conducted by the Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) in the Waseda University Global COE Program. The survey took place at 31 Japanese universities in 2009 and collected responses from 1,725 students. For results and the report, see: http://www.waseda-giari.jp/sysimg/imgs/20100330_asia_vision_report.pdf (accessed March 30, 2010).
- 5 For example, after the agreement on joint history research by Japanese and Chinese intellectuals at the Japan-China Summit Meeting in 2006, the Japan-China Joint History Research Committee was created.
- 6 Kitaoka's statement is published in *The Japan Forum on International Relations Bulletin*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Fall 2002), <http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/bulletin/j-bulletin36/bulletin.htm> (accessed June 10, 2010).
- 7 The Japan-China Joint History Research Committee, *The First "Japan-China Joint History Research" Report*, January 31, 2010, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/rekishi_kk.html (accessed January 31, 2010).
- 8 Immanuel Wallerstein, "Construction of Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism and Ethnicity," in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class*, London: Verso, 1991, p. 78.
- 9 On this determination of party system, see Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976 (Japanese translation: Norio Okazawa and Hideyuki Kawano, trans., *Gendai Seitogaku: Seito Shisutemu Ron no Bunseki Wakugumi*, Tokyo: Wasedaigaku Shuppanbu, 2000).
- 10 One of the reasons given for the decision to alleviate Japan's postwar war reparation burden was the lesson drawn from the economic situation in the post-WWI German Weimar Republic, in which economic recovery was never achieved, and further, it led to the rise of fascism within Germany.
- 11 When Japanese companies began to transfer their production bases to Southeast Asia and China, and Asian economic networks developed dramatically, English-language studies on Japan tended to transform their concerns from Japan's history of modernization, which served as a rationalization of the Western policy of liberalism, to "Japan's wartime Empire." Some historians of Asian Studies might see today's phenomenon of regionalization in Asia as a revival of imperialism. See Peter Duus, "Japan's Wartime Empire: Problems and Issues," in Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. xi-xxvii; Peter Duus, "Imperialism Without Colonies: The Vision of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Zone," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 54-72 (Japanese translation: Fujiwara Ki'ichi, trans., "Shokuminchi Naki Teikokushugi," *Shiso*, No. 814 (April 1992), pp. 105-121); Sven Saaler, "Pan-

- Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Overcoming the Nation, Creating a Region, Forging an Empire,” in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann, eds., *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History*, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 1-18; and Prasenjit Duara, “The New Imperialism and the Post-Colonial Developmental State: Manchukuo in Comparative Perspective,” *Japan Focus* (February 2010), http://www.japanfocus.org/articles/print_article/1715 (accessed March 10, 2010).
- 12 For the official understanding about the history problem including war reparations, see the homepage of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq16.html (accessed June 10, 2010). About the official release of the amount of the war reparation, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taisen/qa/shiryo/pdfs/shiryo_07.pdf (accessed June 10, 2010).
 - 13 The term “1955 system” was first used by political theorist Jun’nosuke Masumi. See Jun’nosuke Masumi, “Senkyuhyaku-gojugonen no Seiji Taisei” (The 1955 political system), *Shiso*, No. 480 (June 1964). Generally, the “1955 system” refers to the two-party system established in 1955, which was constituted by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the leftist Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). Although various factions and smaller parties coalesced into the conservative right or the progressive left, the proportion of LDP to JSP members elected to the Diet was two to one and the dominance of the LDP lasted for about forty years. However, the conservative party could not hold more than two-thirds of the seats in the parliament that were needed to approve constitutional amendments. In this sense, the “1955 system” meant a quasi-democracy and a liberal political system based on the balance of power between the conservatives and progressives.
 - 14 For example, the “Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century” of 1998 pledged a “common determination to raise to a higher dimension the close, friendly, and cooperative relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea which have been built since the normalization of their relations in 1965 so as to build a new Japan-Republic of Korea partnership towards the twenty-first century.” See also: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html> (accessed March 30, 2010). Although this declaration was realized after democratization in South Korea, it inherited the interpretation of the agreement on war reparations and the suspension of the history problem from the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.
 - 15 On this social structure and thought in pre-war Japan, see Osamu Kuno and Shunsuke Tsurumi, *Gendai Nihon no Shiso: Sono Itsutsu no Uzu* (Modern Japanese thought: Its five swirls), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1956.
 - 16 Sun Ge, one of the coordinators of this project, argued that intellectuals seek only the objective facts of history, and they cannot allow for “sentimental memory.” He attempted to distinguish “sentimental memory” from narrow-minded nationalism, but the difference remains difficult to discern. On Sun Ge’s argument, see Sun Ge, *Ajia wo Kataru Koto no Jirenma: Chi no Kyodo Kukan wo Motomete* (Dilemma in discussing Asia: In search of a common intellectual space), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2002. Concerning this project, see Teru Shimamura, “Igokochi no Warusa’ ni Chokumensuru to Iukoto” (On being thrust into an uncomfortable position), Yoichi Komori et al., eds., *Higashiajia Rekishi Ninshiki Ronsho no Metahisutori: Kan’nichi Rentai Nijuichi no Kokoromi* (The meta-history of the history recognition controversies in East Asia: Twenty-first attempts at Korea-Japan solidarity), Tokyo: Seikyusha, 2008, pp. 28-43.
 - 17 Liu Jie, “Higashi Ajia Rekishi Ninshiki eno Chosen” (A challenge toward East Asia history recognition), Jun Nishikawa and Ken’ichiro Hirano, eds., *Kokusai Ido to Shakai Henyo* (International mobility and social transformation), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2007.
 - 18 In light of the Chinese anti-Japanese protests in 2005, opinion polls about historical recognition between China and Japan were conducted. Examining one of these surveys, some people attributed the anti-Japanese “sentiments” or “self-conscious” nationalism to the influence of the mass media. See Narumi Yoshimoto and Shigeto Sonoda, “Chugokujin Daigakusei ni Mirareru Nashonarizumu Ishiki to Rekishininshikimondai ni Taisuru Taido: 2007 nen Hukutan Daigaku Chosa no Bunseki Kekka kara (Consciousness of nationalism and attitudes toward the history recognition issue among Chinese university students: From the analysis of a 2007 Fudan University survey),” *GLARI Working Paper*, March 2008. Needless to say, mid-20th century sociology devoted itself to the elucidation of a mass society where individuals were no longer independent but were moved by new socio-economic powers such as the mass media. For example, see Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, New York: Avon Books, 1941 (Japanese translation: Rokuro Hidaka, trans., *Jiyu kara no Toso*, Tokyo: Sogensha, 1951), and David Riesman, *The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961 (Japa-

- nese translation: Hidetoshi Kato, trans., *Kodokuna Gunshu*, Tokyo: Misuzushobo, 1965).
- 19 On the articles of the revision of the Fundamental Education Law, see: http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houan/kakutei/06121913/06121913/001.pdf (accessed June 10, 2006).
 - 20 Louis Althusser, *Sur la Reproduction* (On reproduction), Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995 (Japanese translation: Nagao Nishikawa, trans., *Saiseisan ni Tsuite*, Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2005).
 - 21 Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983 (Japanese translation: Takashi Kato, trans., *Minzoku to Nashonarizumu*, Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2000).
 - 22 Public elementary schools and public junior high schools must use the textbook that their school district adopts, based on the decision of the local education board. On the other hand, high schools, national schools, and private schools can choose the textbooks they will use at the school, based on the preference of the teacher using the textbook. Under the textbook authorization system, a movement to advocate the use of the *New History Textbook* appeared, and indicates political intervention in education. Concerning this issue, see Yoichi Komori, Yoshikazu Sakamoto and Yoshio Yasumaru, eds., *Rekishi Kyokasho Nani ga Mondai ka: Tettei Kensho Q&A* (What is at stake with the history textbook? A thorough examination Q&A), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2001, pp. 126-131.
 - 23 On “the Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono on the results of the study on the issue of ‘comfort women’,” see: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html> (accessed March 30, 2010). As for the relationship of the history recognition controversies to the “comfort women” issue, see Shin’ichi Arai, “‘Ushinawareta Junen’ to Rekishininshiki Mondai” (The lost decade and the issue of history recognition) in Yoichi Funabashi, ed., *Ima Rekishi Mondai ni Do Torikumuka* (How to deal with the history issue now), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2001, pp. 42-54.
 - 24 “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama ‘On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end’ (15 August 1995),” <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html> (accessed March 30, 2010).
 - 25 In recent years, arguments over constitutional reform intensified, especially among politicians in the LDP who adopt the viewpoint that the postwar constitution is an “imposed constitution.” However, this argument ignores the fact that the contents of the Constitution contain universal ideas generally recognized in the international community. Also, it effaces the history in which it was constructed through the collaboration of SCAP members and Japanese politicians who adopted it in exchange for preservation of the Emperor system. The general population also received the new Constitution as the promise of emancipation. See John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, New York: W. W. Norton & Co. / New Press, 1999 (Japanese translation: Yoichi Miura and Tada’aki Takasugi, trans., *Haiboku wo Dakishimete: Dai Niji Taisengo no Nihonjin*, Vol. 1 and 2, Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2004), and Shoichi Koseki, *Nihonkoku Kenpo no Tanjo* (The birth of the Japanese constitution), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2009. The direction of postwar pacifism and democracy was determined by a prewar communist idea that Japanese society harbored a semi-feudal structure and militarism that had to be overcome by a modern democratic revolution. This is the so-called 1932 Thesis.
 - 26 Takeo Sato points out that in Japan, “war” was problematized as the loser’s responsibility. This differs from the situation in postwar Germany, in which the past “system” of Nazi Germany became the problematized object that was addressed. According to Sato, the reason why Japan was inclined to “reparation” (unlike Germany, which addressed mostly “compensation”) is that Japan treated reparation in terms of the pre-World War I recognition concerning the responsibility of the loser for the outbreak of war. See Takeo Sato, “Nihon no Sengohosho Mondai Kaiketsu eno Teigen” (A proposal for the resolution of the postwar reparation issue) in Yoichi Funabashi, ed., pp. 57, 65. Indeed, the consciousness of “losing” is strong in Japan, which has resulted in reactionary attitudes, such as the negation of war crimes and the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal as a winner’s judgment, an affirmation of prewar Japan, and urges to keep an independent self-defense force. However, it has also been noted that Japan’s war crimes can be understood in terms of interwar ideas, the illegality of war and of moral obligations to injustice and illegal actions.
 - 27 Concerning reflexive knowledge, see Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, Cambridge: Polity Press, in association with Blackwell Publishers, 1994 (Japanese translation: Kiyobumi Matsuo et al., trans., *Saikiteki Kindaika: Kindai ni okeru Seiji Dento Biteki Genri*, Tokyo: Jiritsushobo, 1997).
 - 28 For example, in 1998 Gay J. McDougall reported to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights that Japan’s “comfort women” program during World War II was sexual slavery and systematic rape in violation of human rights. The report advised that the Japanese government was liable for the “comfort

- women” system as a “crime against humanity.” In 2008, the United Nations Human Rights Council also demanded that the Japanese government accept legal responsibility and apologize unreservedly for the “comfort women” system by compensation for victims and also by conducting education about the issue. The violence against “comfort women” could be regarded as sexual violence from the viewpoint of gender, which is a modern concept. Indeed, “humanity” has often been used as a “diplomatic card” to pressure countries and justify the hegemonic rule of an empire. However, it should be noted that “humanity” is the ultimate platform for appeal to reason against international or supra-national violence.
- 29 For the “Asian Women’s Fund” and the opposition to it, see Haruki Wada, “Ajia Josei Kikin Mondai to Chishikijin no Sekinin” (The Asian Women’s Fund and intellectuals’ responsibility), in Yoichi Komori et al., eds., pp. 133-153.
 - 30 On this rightwing argument from the viewpoint of interaction between the Japanese nationalist discourse and the Chinese and Korean criticisms of Japan, see Tsuneo Akaha, “The Nationalist Discourse in Contemporary Japan: The Role of China and Korea in the Last Decade,” *Pacific Focus*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (August 2008), pp. 156-188.
 - 31 Tetsuya Takahashi, *Rekishi Shusei Shugi* (Revisionist history), Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2001.
 - 32 The term “Greater East Asia War” was officially defined by Japanese wartime government after the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. This term implied that Japan did not intend to invade Asia but to liberate Asia from Western colonization and to construct the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere”; using the term “Greater East Asia War” entails the affirmation and glorification of war on the side of Japan from wartime to the present. Because of these connotations, under the Press Code issued by the SCAP to censor the Japanese news media, the use of the term “Greater East Asia War” was banned during the occupation. After the occupation ended, some former Asianists like Husao Hayashi used the term and affirmed the goal of the “Greater East Asia War.” However, the more generally used term for the war in Japan has been the “Pacific War” or the “Second World War.” The term “Greater East Asia War” is used with an affirmative nuance in the contemporary nationalist discourse, e.g., in the New History Textbook, by disregarding the negative aspects of the war.
 - 33 Concerning the interdependence of particularism and universalism in the nation-state system, see Naoki Sakai, foreword by Meaghan Morris, *Translation and Subjectivity: On Japan and Cultural Nationalism*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997 (Japanese translation: *Nihon Shiso to iu Mondai: Hon’yaku to Shutai*, Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 1997), and Naoki Sakai, Brett de Bary and Toshio Iyotani, eds., *Nashonariti no Datsukochiku* (Deconstructing nationalism), Tokyo: Kashiwashobo, 1996.
 - 34 For an inclusive review of postwar Japan studies, including modernization theory, see John Dower, Umemori Naoyuki, trans., “Nihon o Hakaru: Eigoken ni okeru Nihon Kenkyū no Rekishi Jojutsu” (Weighing Japan: Historical narratives in English-language studies of Japan), *Shisō*, No. 855-856 (September and October 1995); and Sheldon Garon, “Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese History: A Focus on State-Society Relations,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (May 1994), pp. 346-350.
 - 35 Yuzo Mizoguchi, “Chugokuan no Mondaiten wa Nanika” (What is the problem with the views on China?), in Komori et al., pp. 35-36.
 - 36 The same observation is applicable to the work of the popular novelist Ryotaro Shiba. As an example, one of his novels, *Saka no Ue no Kumo*, affirms the Russo-Japanese War, which enabled Japan to annex the Korean peninsula. See Ryotaro Shiba, *Saka no Ue no Kumo* (Clouds above the slope), Vols. 1-8, Tokyo: Bungeishunju, 1999. In Japanese textbooks, this war was, implicitly or explicitly, treated as an imperialist war, resulting in the gain of a new territory as war reparations and enabling the colonization of Korea. The reading of novels has declined in recent years, but Shiba’s novels are eagerly read by some powerful people such as politicians, company managers, researchers and students. Moreover, these novels are dramatized for TV broadcasting and made into movies.
 - 37 Liu, pp. 52-54.
 - 38 Hiroshi Mitani, “Mirai no Tame no Rekishi Taiwa” (Dialogue on history for the future), in Hiroshi Mitani and Kim Tae-Chang, eds., *Higashiajia Rekishi Taiwa: Kokkyo to Sedai o Koete* (Dialogue on East Asian history: Transcending national boundaries and generations), Tokyo: Tokyodaigaku Shuppankai, 2007, pp.13-14.
 - 39 Hannah Arendt, *Men in Dark Times*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968 (Japanese translation: Hitoshi Abe, trans., *Kurai Jidai no Hitobito*, Tokyo: Chikumashobo, 2005).
 - 40 Friedrich Nietzsche and Jinjo Kiba, trans., *Dotoku no Keihu*, Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 2006, pp. 37-40, 62-64. The English version, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, translated by Iran Johnston is available at <http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/Nietzsche/genealogytofc.htm> (accessed June 10, 2010).

Human Rights and Culture in the Asian Region

Elisa Nesossi

Abstract

Numerous attempts to create a regional human rights system in Asia have proven unsuccessful, and human rights are still intended as an ideal principle. Nevertheless, the last two decades witnessed a proliferation of “human rights talk” at both the regional and national levels.

This article offers an interpretation about past and current official human rights talks at the regional level in Asia and considers the reasons for privileging a specific conception of human rights over other competing visions. In addition, it assesses the impact that the human rights visions articulated in Asian talks have upon the creation of a regional human rights system. This article gives particular attention to the official talks on human rights at the regional level, considering how the relationship between rights and culture is conceptualized.

On the whole, the article demonstrates how the utilization of culture as a concept in talks about rights in the last thirty years has changed only partially, indicating different but equally opportunistic approaches to the concept of human rights.

1. Introduction

Human rights regionalism is a relevant reality in the overall architecture of the international protection of human rights. Since the concept's first appearance in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter,¹ human rights regionalism has become more than a mere concession for the maintenance of peace or a theoretical possibility for the pacific settlement of disputes. According to the proponents of regionalism in the contemporary legal arena, “United Nations and regional institutions need one another and should continue to work closely in addressing regional issues as well as international issues.”² Only a meaningful division of labor between global, regional and domestic systems could produce a valuable response to human rights violations. Indeed, in virtue of their flexibility, regional systems may combine an immediate response to specific problems with long-term strategies.³

In the overall architecture of the international human rights law, regional institutions are structurally in an intermediate position. This intermediate institutional level has never been intended to be a substitute for either the international structure or the domestic one; rather, this system has been devised to complement and supplement the structure in place. It is indeed subsidiary to domestic instruments whenever national governments have violated human rights or their remedies have failed.⁴ Moreover, it is complementary to the UN system; the latter lacks the internal co-ordination and efficacious instruments for investigating and redressing human rights violations at the national level. Proponents of human rights regionalism assert that in virtue of their intermediate position, regional systems are able to include both the core setting of basic rights as well as many regional and domestic particularities, thus enhancing a non-absolutist conception of universality.

In contrast to the other world regions, Asia does not have a regional human rights system based upon regional human rights documents and institutions such as courts or commissions.⁵ In the last fifty years, numerous attempts have been made to create regional or sub-regional hu-

man rights mechanisms in Asia. Since the 1960s, UN-sponsored seminars in the Asia-Pacific have been following one another, bringing together government representatives, regional NGOs, National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) and UN agencies to explore possibilities of developing regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights.⁶ Historical and more recent attempts include a number of seminars, conferences, and fifteen regional workshops organized by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) South Asia Office,⁷ which have discussed regional technical cooperation for the establishment of regional and sub-regional human rights mechanisms. Four priority pillars of cooperation have been established – national human rights action plans (NHRAP),⁸ human rights education, NHRI⁹ and the right to development and economic, social and cultural rights¹⁰ – and states have sought to gradually undertake related activities.¹¹ Domestic actions are reviewed periodically during regional workshops.

The initiatives undertaken preliminarily addressed the need for regional arrangements, but the overall lack of any meaningful developments limited their significance. Even the 2007 ASEAN Charter, designed “to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms” provides a very hesitant approach to human rights. George Yeo, Singapore’s Foreign Minister, provided an assessment of the Charter by saying, “I’m not sure whether it will have teeth but it will have a tongue. It will certainly have moral influence, if nothing else.”¹² Similarly, the Singaporean Second Foreign Minister, Raymond Lim, argued that the ASEAN Human Rights Commission, as defined in the Charter, “will likely be consultative rather than prescriptive.”¹³

To this day, the quest for a regional mechanism has not died down and still represents an ongoing appeal for many human rights practitioners around Asia. These practitioners look at this goal as the only concrete option to provide justice where national institutions are unable or unwilling to offer it.¹⁴

This article offers an interpretation about past and current human rights talks at the regional level in Asia and considers the reasons for privileging a specific conception of human rights over other competing visions. Additionally, it assesses the impact that the human rights visions articulated in Asian talks have upon the creation of a regional human rights system. Moreover, the article gives particular attention to the official talks on human rights at the regional level, considering how the relationship between rights and culture is conceptualized. On the whole, it demonstrates how the concept of culture, as it has been utilized in talks about rights in the last thirty years, has changed only partially, indicating different but equally opportunistic approaches to conceptualizing human rights.

Human rights represent important catalysts in the overall process of regional integration, as they significantly promote social and institutional integration by codifying social behavior and deepening the sense of regional community and solidarity. Indeed, the relationship between culture and rights is an important one and deserves an accurate analysis in the context of regional integration in Asia. The first story told by this article regarding the relationship between human rights and culture in Asia is that of opposition; the two concepts live here in a closed and static image of culture that hampers the creation of a human rights system. Thus, this narrative paradoxically presents Asian culture as outwardly unified, but internally so diverse as to obstruct social integration at the regional level. The second story talks about changes in understanding about culture – now intended as an open and dynamic concept – which has developed from the process of globalization; further, it explains the effects of an emerging “human rights culture” which may lead to gradual socio-cultural integration in the region.

The paper is organized in three main sections. The first section offers a brief overview of the contested relationship between human rights and culture, as it has been conceptualized by anthropologists in the last decades. The second part assesses the way human rights have been discussed

in Asia, particularly in the context of the ASEAN group of nations. Particular attention is given to the relationship between human rights and culture and the way it has evolved in the last twenty years. The third and concluding part of the article considers the impact of ASEAN approaches to human rights and culture on the realization of human rights regionalism.

On the whole, the article represents a significant contribution to the literature on regional integration, as it discusses one highly contentious area in the general discourse on regionalism and integration. Differently from the existing literature on human rights and regionalism, which mainly considers legal, political or international relations perspectives, this article provides an interpretive approach to discourses about human rights and culture in Asia that may shed light on the inherent dynamics of social and institutional integration.

2. Human Rights and Culture: A Contested Relationship

Neither rights nor culture are easily definable concepts and, over time, views and definitions have transformed, sometimes complementing each other, sometimes conflicting or overlapping. Approaches toward rights are often the result of historically grounded cultural conceptions.

The instrumental use of both the concepts for political purposes has indeed generated confusion about definitions, as well as skepticism about the substantive value of human rights. According to Twining, in order to provide a fair definition of rights, it is important “to maintain broad distinctions between human rights talk as forms of political rhetoric, of legal expositions and argument, and as moral discourses.”¹⁵ Thus, in *General Jurisprudence*, Twining offers a critical overview of the main conceptions of human rights that have developed in the last fifty years, framed within specific historical backgrounds, and he unravels five major conceptualizations of the term “human rights.” These are: human rights as a legal regime, as substantive moral theories, as discourses, as political ideas and practice and as Western colonial and neo-colonial ideology.¹⁶

The relationship between human rights and culture has often been an area of contention. During the 1990s, an essentialized understanding of culture shaped the universalism-relativism debate, which opposed global standards of social justice and respect for global practices. While supporters of universalism argued that human rights principles should apply indiscriminately to all cultures, relativists asserted the importance of cultural differences over universal standards.¹⁷

Underlying the universalism-cultural relativism debate was the substantive moral understanding of human rights as a set of universal moral principles applicable to all people at all times, and everywhere, irrespective of beliefs and cultures. Such a view – grounded in European religious and philosophical thinking dating back to the Greeks and the Romans – was based on the belief of a universal human ontology and the idea that human rights were embedded in original values shared by all human beings because of their common nature.

To oppose the argument on the universality of human rights values, relativists used a broadly defined concept of culture indicating a coherent, uniform and timeless whole in the meaning systems of a given group. In order to mark a distinction between universal and local values, culture became a reified,¹⁸ essentialized and homogenous entity, drawing definite boundaries between the “Us” and the “Others.”¹⁹

Both the instrumental use of the rhetoric of culture to legitimize claims of power and the strengthening of the process of globalization led theorists to question the universalism-relativism debate. Indeed, although it was still acceptable during the 1990s to use earlier European anthropological conceptions that maintain that culture is integrated, harmonious, consensual and bounded, in the new century, these views are considered largely obsolete.

New conceptions of culture have emerged and the concept has started to take the form of a

hybrid and porous entity that may promote change and develop.²⁰ As argued by Merry:

*In the last two decades, world system theory has criticized the model of society as an isolated 'billiard ball' within global economic and cultural processes (Wolf 1982)...Culture is now understood as historically produced rather than static; unbounded rather than bounded and integrated; contested rather than consensual; incorporated within structures of power such as the construction of hegemony; rooted in practices and symbols, habits, patterns ...and negotiated and constructed through human action rather than superorganic forces.*²¹

With the new century, the “rights versus culture perspective” has shifted toward a “human rights culture perspective” in which human rights have progressively become part of the cultural discourses at various levels – transnationally, nationally and locally. Thus, beside a legalist approach toward rights, two other main perspectives prevail; that is, human rights as globally circulating discourses, and human rights as local experiences of communities in struggle.

Amartya Sen, for example, argues that the survivability of human rights does not depend upon grounded moral theories, but upon rights’ claims in open discussions both within and across societies.²² Accordingly, “‘rights talk’ is a form of discourse with varied and changing content, which provides a framework for argument, negotiation, interpretation and articulating or making claims.”²³ Others, like Baxi and Rajaghopal, have developed “subaltern perspectives” of human rights, according to which human rights are not based on moral or legal principles but emerge directly from local struggles against poverty and injustice.

Anthropologists like Merry have also started to look at different cultural sites where international or regional elites conceptualized and translated rights into international legal standards. UN meetings have become the subject of study, being “shaped by a culture of transnational modernity, one that specifies procedures for collaborative decision-making, conceptions of global social justice...Its [human rights laws] documents create new cultural frameworks for conceptualizing social justice.”²⁴

3. The Asian Approaches to Human Rights and Culture

The fact that Asia is lacking a regional human rights system made of commissions, courts and foundational legal standards does not mean that the concept of human rights has not influenced regional practices and discourses, or that the region is completely silent in this respect. In Asia, as in other parts of the world, different perspectives about culture and rights have been informing both individual and collective discourses.

This section of the article looks at the approach toward human rights and culture adopted by Asian decision-makers in the last three decades and assesses its impact upon the tentative creation of an Asian regional human rights system.

(1) Culture Versus Rights

During the 1990s, Asian leaders rejected human rights by claiming to be defending culture. The Asian debate over human rights set “Asian values” against universal human rights, asserting Asia’s cultural uniqueness and the inappropriateness of human rights in the regional context. The “Asian values” argument that emerged after the 1993 Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights denied the universal applicability of human rights, rejected civil and political rights as being specifically Western and culturally inadequate for the Asian communitarian context, and stressed the primacy of economic development over civil and political rights. The Declaration asserts that

“while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.”²⁵

Mainly promoted by elites from Singapore and Malaysia,²⁶ the “Asian values” discourse asserted that Western liberal democratic values are inapplicable in the Asian context; the discussion characterized such values as a Western imposition conflicting with the indigenous values of Asia, detrimental to Asian economic development. Assuming a unifying cultural mantle for Asia, the “Asian values” proponents argued for the idea of Asian cultural uniqueness based on Confucian and communitarian roots. However, the fact that the highly westernized elites of Singapore and Indonesia welcomed industrialization and its consequences made the rejection of human rights in the name of “Asian values” highly suspicious.²⁷

The 1997 “ASEAN-Vision 2020” – a clear expression of its times – did not make any reference to human rights, but mentioned the importance of social justice and the rule of law. In the document, ASEAN leaders envisioned “the entire Southeast Asia to be, by 2020, an ASEAN community conscious of its ties with history, aware of its cultural heritage, and bound by a common regional identity.”²⁸

Various Asian and Western scholars have already discussed at length the fallacious approach taken in the “Asian values” debate. Thus, it is clear that the “Asian values” debate prompted some focused reflection on the moral value of human rights and the concept of culture. The fact that human rights were perceived as a neo-colonial imposition by Western countries raised skepticism toward the morality of the concept itself. As relativists, Asian leaders implicitly supported the view that “there can be no essential characteristics of human nature or human rights, which exist outside of discourse, history, context or agency,”²⁹ and that human rights are socially constructed concepts to impose political power, hegemony.³⁰

Without questioning whether human rights could be grounded only on Western concepts of natural law, individualism and liberalism, or if they could be adapted to local circumstances, the proponents of the “Asian values” debate rejected the concept of human rights *tout court*, raising local culture against any claims of universalism in human rights. The extreme cultural relativism proposed by the Asian leaders was based on a static and closed idea of culture, which implicitly served legitimacy and power purposes. This “essentialist view of culture” echoed Romantic nationalism, an approach that conceived “diversity as a problem to be solved”³¹ and impeded new and alien ideas from being absorbed or reshaped, making intercultural dialogue extremely difficult. The “Asian values” debate used culture as a rhetorical object. Those who recognized human rights were seen to deny and reject the Asian culture. Conversely, those who considered the value of culture as supreme were seen to override the pursuit of universal human rights.

The 1997-1998 Asian economic meltdown seriously affected Asian confidence in economic development, and brought the public debate on “Asian values” to an end. Nevertheless, a number of scholars admit that the debate is still highly salient now, and continues to be important when considering human rights approaches in individual Asian countries.³² Yet, “although the Asian values argument is less often articulated now, it represents one of many ways that leaders assert that human rights violate the fundamental cultural principles of a nation or a religion and therefore cannot be adopted.”³³

Even though the concept “Asian value” seems overly anachronistic now, it must still be admitted that it did carry weight enough to have stimulated sustained reflections both in Asia and in Western countries about the significance of *culture* when constructing a normative moral order; furthermore, it questioned the assumption that human rights truly represent “the best medium for cross-cultural discourse and dialogue”³⁴ within diverse systems of justice. The next section of the article shows whether, and in what ways, the relationship between culture and rights has been reshaped in current official approaches to human rights in the ASEAN context.

Because of the developments and the sustained discussions on human rights in ASEAN, this sub-region represents an interesting and comparatively simpler laboratory for elucidating the main characteristics of the relationship between human rights and culture in the whole Asian region. Indeed, the ASEAN case may be intended as illustrative of the challenges facing Asia more generally.

(2) Human Rights as a Cultural Process?

Since the late 1990s, human rights issues have been discussed in a more open and frank manner.³⁵ While roundtable discussions and meetings at the regional and sub-regional levels seem not to have been particularly effective in producing practical results, they have nonetheless been important for reiterating on a periodical basis the need to foster the creation of regional and sub-regional human rights mechanisms;³⁶ in addition, on a broader scale, they have been useful for understanding the regional nuances of human rights talks by legal and political elites and institutions. Not only have the meetings set priorities for action, but they have also contributed to shaping the regional discourses on human rights, and to consolidating common positions within the larger Asian context.³⁷ Official human rights meetings at the regional and sub-regional levels are representative of the local, regional and the globally circulating human rights culture.

Even without producing tangible results, the various meetings dedicated to human rights in ASEAN demonstrate that the resistant approach toward human rights that characterized the 1990s has shifted toward forms of acceptance concerning the concept of rights. Katsumata argues that:

*In the global community of modern states today, its core members, the advanced industrialized democracies, are championing a set of liberal reforms, thereby creating a social environment which defines human rights as an element of legitimacy in this community....In such circumstances the ASEAN members have 'mimetically' been adopting the norms of human rights which is championed by the advanced and industrialized democracies motivated by their desire to be identified as advanced and legitimate.*³⁸

While “mimetic acceptance” does not indicate a substantial change in approach toward the concept of human rights, it shows that human rights discourses cannot be totally avoided; they have been progressively entrenched in the culture of the region and have thusly formed an important part of a wider global rights culture. The formal commitment to participate in the international community – already expressed in the 1997 “ASEAN-Vision 2020” and the “Hanoi Plan of Action”³⁹ – translates into an obligation to heed human rights.

Indeed, Asian countries are responding to what they once considered Western hegemonic discourses by using their same language; that is, they are using human rights discourses to frame their arguments and articulate their claims both regionally and internationally. In adopting the language of rights, Asian countries formally commit themselves to “the dominant mode of moral engagement in an interconnected, uncertain and rapidly changing world.”⁴⁰

However, this commitment does not mean that human rights are talked about in Asia because of an ideological adherence or legal commitment to the concept; but because Asia is an actor in the global arena, it must participate in a global culture where human rights play a significant role. Indeed, the “step by step, constructive and consultative approach” which informs the commitment to human rights in all the major ASEAN human rights documents, and the related lack of urgency for the creation of stable institutions and legal mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights, “raises the suspicion that the UN annual workshops are means for states to avoid establishing any such permanent arrangements under the pretext of appearing committed to the ideal.”⁴¹

Official elites approach human rights as ideals, the objects of expectations, which they may then discuss. Dato Param Coomaraswamy aptly expressed this perspective in the Welcome Remarks to the 8th Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, when he explained that “our [ASEAN’s] chosen approach has always been engagement and so we welcome this opportunity to again meet with all of you and *talk*, openly and frankly, about *what we can expect* and *what we should strive for*, given the situation at hand.”⁴² In a similar fashion, after the creation of the ASEAN inter-governmental commission on human rights, the ASEAN heads of state applauded the new organ not by steadily supporting its action, but by mildly expressing “confidence that ASEAN cooperation on human rights will continue to evolve and develop.”⁴³

The fact that human rights are discussed at the regional level with little visible effort to translate talks into practice indicates the difficulties inherent in the process of regional, or even sub-regional consensus building upon concepts like human rights and social justice. The creation of a transnational consensus means that a compromise must be reached – across differences in ideology, political and cultural practices – that in such “a diverse cultural context,” as expressed in the ASEAN Charter, is quite difficult to achieve.

While human rights are accepted as a matter of principle, no concrete attempt to make them regionally specific has been made yet. The creation of regional courts and commissions, for example, would represent a fundamental step in making human rights claims possible since, without courts, the meaning, content and scope of human rights remain utterly vague. Talks about rights are fundamental, though void and meaningless if not concretized in legal practice. As it has been demonstrated in other regional contexts, the existence of regional standards and courts would represent promising avenues to improve national legal systems and raise the quality and sophistication of domestic human rights litigation.

For example, after Brazil’s ratification of the American Convention of Human Rights in 1992, the regional human rights system became a powerful tool in the hand of Brazilian activist lawyers who started to engage in rather aggressive domestic human rights litigation.⁴⁴ Eastern European countries have followed a similar path after their accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.⁴⁵

Admittedly, the creation of a regional legal regime would indicate a genuine step forward in the human rights cause in Asia, but it would bring significant challenges to the national interests and the political *status quo* in various states. Challenges would come both from within and from outside the domestic borders of the various states.

First, the creation of regional legal instruments would defy the principle of non-interference at its very core. Individual states would have to be externally accountable, at least regionally, for the abuses against their citizens, and would have to put in place domestic mechanisms for the enforcement of human rights principles. Regional courts would decide upon cases involving individual states and their citizens, and states would be compelled to enforce the decisions taken by judges often speaking a foreign language. Specifically, at the regional level, this would also lead to the creation of legal mechanisms and institutions incorporating Asian approaches to human rights, and, at the national level, it would request the implementation of new legal instruments or the reform of existing laws – all changes associated with significant economic costs and human resources involvement.

Secondly, the attempt toward “regionalization” of international principles would lead to a significant self-reflection upon regionally specific cultural perspectives and practices that must be then “legalized” in human rights documents. In order to put in place a human rights legal regime reflective of the cultural context from which it has emerged, Asian leaders would need to clearly define the meaning of Asian culture and its relation with rights.

Indeed, based on the assumptions that “law is the result of local knowledge, not placeless principles,” and that the “law is constructive of social life and not reflective, or...not just reflec-

tive,”⁴⁶ it is believed that the adoption of a human rights law would inevitably prompt a more sustained reflection of local needs in relation to wider global and regional contexts. The creation of a human rights regime will not only be reflective of social life discourses, but it would also create new expectations and possibilities for different social actors located at the regional or domestic level.

To limit human rights discourses to political statements rather than legal commitments represents, first, an attempt to discourage a “bottom up” approach towards human rights – an approach based upon the active involvement of civil society – and secondly, an attempt to limit the emergence of a culture of rights which may oppose the political *status quo*. The language of legal rights is a powerful and threatening one, which, once entrenched in culture, may become part of local communities’ approaches to reality and can, rephrasing Twining, “stimulate and enlarge moral imagination.”⁴⁷ Political struggles in the name of rights are becoming increasingly common even in most conservative political regimes, like China, for example,⁴⁸ and demonstrate the power of the language of rights, a power which may inevitably create anxieties among regional elites. Indeed, with respect to practices, the pursuit of human rights requires people to become involved in specific political and legal processes, perhaps not ideal when trying to promote peace and security in the region.

4. Conclusion

This article is a very modest attempt to delve into the complex relationship between rights and culture in a specific regional context, and to show the latent tensions inherent between the two concepts. The cases of Asia and ASEAN in particular represent an interesting laboratory for this specific study.

The article demonstrates that both the “Asian values” debate and contemporary approaches toward human rights are both born from very specific historical circumstances. The “Asian values” debate represented the exemplification of a romantic understanding of culture, intended as a static, homogeneous, coherent and consensual entity. In view of their recent colonial past, Asian countries, in an apparently contradictory move, deliberately adopted a markedly Western approach to culture to resist the neo-colonial imposition of liberal values.

The contemporary approach toward human rights represents a more complex and sophisticated reaction to Western concepts, and as such is much more difficult to decipher. Asian elites do not talk anymore about an anachronistic dichotomy between rights and culture, but they do accept to be a part of a global human rights culture that pretends to accept plurality and diversity. Again, they speak the language that Western countries may easily understand. However, simply by committing to the ideal of rights and playing a waiting game in their practice, they do not offer any substantive and regionally specific contributions to the circulating culture of rights; rather, they simply act as spectators. While a circulating human rights culture alone may be able to trigger regional solidarity and solidify values promotable at the regional level, it may hardly promote integration as such. Only the creation of legal institutions codifying regional human rights behavior might lay the foundation for integrating and facilitating integration agreements. Integration would strengthen human rights institutions and solidify the meaning of a human rights culture in the region.

Notes

- ¹ Charter of the United Nations, adopted June 26, 1945, entered into force October 24, 1945, as amended by General Assembly Resolution 1991 (XVIII) December 17, 1963, entered into force August 31, 1965 (557 UNTS 143); 2101 of December 1965, entered into force June 12, 1968 (638 UNTS 308); and 2847 (XXVI) of December 20, 1971, entered into force September 24, 1973 (892 UNTS 119). See <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml> (accessed July 16, 2010).
- ² Bernard Ramcharan, "Complementarity between Universal and Regional Organizations/ Perspectives from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights," *Human Rights Law Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 8 (2000), p. 324.
- ³ Abdullahi An-Na'im, "Human Rights in the Arab World: A Regional Perspective," *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2001), pp. 701-732.
- ⁴ The primary responsibility for the protection of human rights in a country lies within the government of that country. As a consequence, one of the most notably stringent among the admissibility criteria to file a case before a regional court is the "exhaustion of national remedies." See Art. 2 and Art. 5(2)(b) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966; Art. 35 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Art. 46 of the American Convention of Human Rights; Art. 50, Art. 56 (5) of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights; and Art. 6 (2) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Establishment of an African Court.
- ⁵ The other three world regions – Africa, America and Europe – have created regional human rights arrangements based on the work of courts and commissions acting within the framework of regional treaties and various legal standards. In Europe, the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights is the main European regional instrument for the protection of human rights created by the Council of Europe. The European Court of Human Rights is the main institutional organ responsible for protection against violations of the rights inscribed in the 1950 Convention. In the African context, the 1986 African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights – the main human rights treaty in the region – is the formulation of the Organization of African Unity. An African Court on Human and People's Rights came into being in 2004. In the American region, the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights is the main regional instrument for the protection of human rights. Compliance is overseen by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, both organs of the Organization of American States.
- ⁶ The 1981 General Assembly Resolution 36/154 requested the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to facilitate the dialogue among Asian member states on adequate arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights in the region.
- ⁷ A "Seminar on Human Rights in Developing Countries" was held in 1964, and a "Southeast Asia and Pacific Conference of Jurists" was held in 1965; resolutions on a human rights regional body in Asia were consecutively adopted by the General Assembly of the UN starting from the late 1970s. The "Colombo Seminar on Human Rights" was held in 1982 to discuss the need for an Asian Human Rights Commission. After that, workshops on regional cooperation for the promotion and protection of human rights further explored possibilities for Asian human rights regionalism. Workshops were held in Manila in 1990, Jakarta in 1993, Seoul in 1994, Kathmandu in 1996, Amman in 1997, Teheran in 1998, New Delhi in 1999, Beijing in 2000, Bangkok in 2001, Beirut in 2002, Islamabad in 2003, Doha in 2004, Beijing in 2005, Bali in 2007 and Bangkok in 2010. A summary of the main issues discussed during these regional workshops may be found at: http://bangkok.ohchr.org/news/events/asia-pacific-regional-framework-workshop-2010/files/introduction_key_documents_annual_meetings.pdf (accessed July 16, 2010).
- ⁸ Recommendations for the creation of NHRAP stem back from the World Conference on Human Rights held in Vienna in 1993. The Conference made two specific recommendations concerning national human rights action plans: first, each state should draw up a national human rights action plan identifying steps for improving the promotion and protection of human rights; secondly, the UN would establish a comprehensive program to help states implementing the plans. See General Assembly, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. A/CONF.157/23, July 12, 1993, [http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/\(symbol\)/a.conf.157.23.en](http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en) (accessed July 16, 2010).

- ⁹ The normative instrument for the NHRI are the Paris Principles, so called because they were adopted in Paris in 1991 at an international workshop organized by NHRIs. The Principles provide that NHRIs should be established in national constitutions or other legal documents that set out their role, powers and mandate. Accordingly, NHRIs should make recommendations to governments on a broad range of human rights related issues. For the Paris Principles, see <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/parisprinciples.htm>. (accessed July 16, 2010). On the NHRI in the Asia-Pacific region, see Brian Burdekin, *National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007.
- ¹⁰ The Framework for Regional Technical Cooperation in the Asia and Pacific Region was adopted by participants to the sixth workshop held in Tehran in 1998.
- ¹¹ During the third workshop held in Seoul in 1994, participants agreed to adopt a “step by step,” “building block” approach to the creation of regional arrangements.
- ¹² Quotes in “Historic ASEAN charter lacks teeth,” *The Australian*, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/historic-asean-charter-lacks-teeth/story-e6frg6t6-111114913802> (accessed July 16, 2010).
- ¹³ Quoted in “Human Rights Body Consultative,” *The Straits Times*, http://www.yawningbread.org/arch_2007/yax-787.htm (accessed July 16, 2010).
- ¹⁴ Sou Chiam, “Asia’s Experience in the Quest for a Regional Human Rights Mechanism,” *Victoria University Wellington Law Review*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (June 2009), p. 128.
- ¹⁵ William Twining, *General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 177.
- ¹⁶ Twining, op. cit.
- ¹⁷ This study will not go deeply into the debate on universal conceptions of human rights *versus* cultural relativism, which have already been widely debated in a variety of studies. Even after the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action – a formal agreement on the universality of human rights – international seminars, conferences and publications have continued to address the dichotomy universality/cultural relativism. See Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab, *Human Rights: New Perspectives, New Realities*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. Scholars have also developed and supported ideas of “thin” and “thick” accounts of human rights, and theory of weak and strong cultural relativism. See Michael Freeman, “Universal Human Rights and Particular Culture,” in Michael Jacobsen and Ole Brunn, eds., *Human Rights and Asian Values: Contesting National Identities and Cultural Representations in Asia*, Richmond: Curzon Press, 2000; Joseph Chan, “Thick and Thin Account of Human Rights: Lessons from the Asian Values Debate,” in Michael Jacobsen and Ole Brunn eds., op. cit.; Jack Donnelly, “Cultural Relativism and Human Rights,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1984), pp. 400-419; Jack Donnelly, *International Human Rights*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. For a critical view, see Fernando R. Teson, “International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism,” *Virginia Journal of International Law*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1985), pp. 869-898; Amartya Sen, “Universal Truths: Human Rights and the Westernizing Illusion,” *Harvard International Review*, Vol. 20 (1998), p. 40.
- ¹⁸ Berger and Luckeman defined “reification” as “the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, ... the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something other than human products – such as facts of nature...” Kapferer considers “reification of culture” as the process of “the production of culture as an object in itself.” See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, London: Penguin, 1967; Bruce Kapferer, *Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia*, London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988.
- ¹⁹ Roger Martin Keesing, *Cultural Anthropology: A Contemporary Perspective*, Fort Worth, Texas and London: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998.
- ²⁰ Sally Engle Merry, *Human Rights & Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006, p. 9.
- ²¹ Sally Engle Merry, “Changing Rights, Changing Culture,” in Jane Cowan, Marié-Bénédicte Dembour and Richard A. Wilson, eds., *Culture and Rights. Anthropological Perspectives*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 41.
- ²² Amartya Sen, “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2004), p. 315.
- ²³ Twining, p. 175.
- ²⁴ Merry, *Human Rights & Gender Violence*, p. 16.

- 25 The Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights adopted April 7, 1993, UN Doc A/Conf.157/ASRM/8-A/CONF.157/PC/59(1993):3:8), <http://law.hku.hk/lawgovtsociety/Bangkok%20Declaration.htm> (accessed July 16, 2010).
- 26 Mathathir Mohamad and Lee Kuan Yew, prime ministers of Malaysia and Singapore, respectively, were strong advocates of the Asian values.
- 27 Jane Cowan, Marié-Bénédicte Dembour and Richard A. Wilson, "Introduction," in Jane Cowan, Marié-Bénédicte Dembour and Richard A. Wilson, eds., p. 7.
- 28 "ASEAN Vision 2020," <http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm> (accessed July 16, 2010).
- 29 Richard A. Wilson, "Human Rights, Culture and Context: An Introduction," in Richard A. Wilson, ed., *Human Rights, Culture and Context: Anthropological Perspectives*, London: Pluto Press, 1997, p. 5.
- 30 Very similar views are shared by other human rights theorists around the world, including, for example, Richard A. Wilson, Jack Donnelly and Ronald Dworkin. See Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*, London: Duckworth, 1977; Jack Donnelly, *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.
- 31 Jane Cowan, Marié-Bénédicte Dembour and Richard A. Wilson, p. 3.
- 32 Leena Avonius and Damien Kingsbury, eds., *Human Rights in Asia: A Reassessment of the Asian Values Debate*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.
- 33 Merry, *Human Rights & Gender Violence*, p.14.
- 34 Twining, p. 179.
- 35 Hiro Katsumata, "ASEAN and Human Rights: Resisting Western Pressure or Emulating the West?" *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (2009), p. 622.
- 36 An interesting result of these discussions among the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been the creation of the Asian Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in October 2009. Details on the AICHR may be found on the official website of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, <http://www.aseansec.org/22769.htm> (accessed July 16, 2010).
- 37 Abul Hasnat Monjurul Kabir, "Establishing National Human Rights Commissions in South Asia: A Critical Analysis of the Processes and the Prospects," *Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law*, Vol. 2, No.1 (2001), p. 53.
- 38 Katsumata, p. 625.
- 39 At the 1997 "ASEAN-Vision 2020," it was said: "We see an outward-looking ASEAN playing a pivotal role in the international fora, and advancing ASEAN common interest." Similar commitment was expressed in the late 1990s in the Hanoi plan of action, meant: "to promote ASEAN's standing in the international community and strengthen confidence in ASEAN as an ideal place for investment, trade and tourism."
- 40 Talal Asad, "On Torture, or Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment," in Richard A. Wilson, ed., p. 128.
- 41 Asia Pacific Human Rights Network, "Establishing a Regional Human Rights Mechanism for the Asia-Pacific Region. Report of the Asia Pacific Human Rights Network. Bangkok, February 2004," *Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2004), p. 83.
- 42 Emphasis added by the Author. For an extract of the Welcome Remarks by Dato Param Coomaraswamy at the 8th Workshop on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, see <http://www.aseanhr-mech.org/downloads/Dato%20Param%20Cumaraswamy.pdf> (accessed July 16, 2010).
- 43 Cha-Am Hua Hin Declaration on the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. See <http://www.aseansec.org/documents/Declaration-AICHR.pdf> (accessed July 16, 2010).
- 44 See Raymond A. Atuguba, "Human Rights and the Limits of Public Interest Law: Ghana's Reaction to a Messy World Phenomenon," *UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 2008), pp. 97-128; Oscar Vilhena Vieira, "Public Interest Law: A Brazilian Perspective," *UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 2008), pp. 219-262.
- 45 Edwin Rekosh, "Constructing Public Interest Law: Transnational Collaboration and Exchange in Central and Eastern Europe," *UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 2008), pp. 55-96.
- 46 Clifford Geertz, "Local Knowledge: Fact and Law in Comparative Perspective," in Clifford Geertz, *Local Knowledge*, New York: Basic Books, 1983.
- 47 Twining, op. cit.
- 48 According to official statistics, in 2005 alone there were 87,000 protests around China. Most of the pro-

testors claimed a violation of their rights. See Tracy Quek, “China Riots Won’t Lead to Rebellion,” *The Straits Times*, February 12, 2009, <http://www.asianewsnet.net/news.php?sec=1&id=3903> (accessed July 16, 2010).

Lingua Francas in Higher Education in Northeast Asia and ASEAN Countries: Implications for Regional Cooperation on Languages

Sae Shimauchi

Abstract

This research aims to analyze the issues and challenges of language as a medium of instruction in institutions of higher education in East Asian countries in the context of student mobility and internationalization of higher education. It also explores the possibility of forging regional cooperation among Northeast Asian and ASEAN countries. In the age of globalization, we are facing the challenge of coexistence between national languages and with English as the medium of instruction in institutions of higher education. Language as a medium of instruction is a driving force for student mobility within this region, students' motivation for learning and upward social mobility. Instructional language is also tied to the raising of cultural awareness and may also influence the creation of regional identity. That is, language is not just a tool for education but it also may have a huge impact on the people of East Asia in terms of facilitating cross-cultural experiences and creating a future regional identity through regional cooperation and integration.

This study aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of globalization on language issues, such as the dominant role of English in each country's approach to the internationalization of higher education. The article also looks at the experience of the European Union and ASEAN as regional collaboration models, with a main focus on the two organizations' positions on English and multilingualism in regional dialogue and policy harmonization, i.e., the relationship between English and other languages, in their respective regions. Thirdly, the focus of the discussion shifts to the issue of language in Northeast Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and China. The comparison with the EU and ASEAN cases allows us to offer some observations about the specific situation of language as a medium of instruction in higher education and the trends in student mobility and language policy in Northeast Asia. It is hypothesized that language as a medium of instruction impacts students' motivation to learn, seek mutual understanding and secure social mobility and future careers, as well as their views of the countries in which they choose to study.

Finally, this research is an attempt to highlight the implications for dialogue and regional cooperation toward the development of a regional language framework as an element of East Asian regional integration.

1. Introduction

This paper focuses on the current issues of language as a medium of instruction in the context of internationalization in higher education in Japan, South Korea, China and ASEAN, as they are key actors in East Asia. Against the backdrop of deepening globalization, the three Northeast Asian countries and ASEAN countries held an East Asian Summit in 2005 with the aim, among others, to establish a practical framework for cooperation, alongside the process of internation-

alization, in higher education for future East Asian integration.¹ In the dialogue at the East Asian Summit from 2005 to 2010, the importance of cooperation and the establishment of a regional framework in higher education between ASEAN+3 countries has been well emphasized.² Therefore, in this paper, “East Asia” refers to 13 countries: 10 ASEAN member countries, excluding East Timor, plus Japan, South Korea and China. In the East Asian region, the political, economic and cultural diversity that exists is a treasure but also an obstacle to regional cooperation. Unlike the European Union, East Asia does not yet have an institutional framework for regional integration, nor does it have a shared regional identity and norms to support the integration. However, people are witnessing increasing student mobility within East Asia.³ This so-called “de-facto” integration can be seen especially in the educational field.

Internationalization in higher education has many dimensions. As Knight defined it, internationalization of higher education can be an aim in itself wherein an international, intercultural, or global dimension is incorporated into the purpose, functions or delivery of postsecondary education.⁴ For example, leading universities around the world are now introducing international/transnational education programs and are expanding agreements for exchanging students among higher education institutions. Moreover, in the discussion of WTO and GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), higher education has become an export commodity.⁵ Today, flows of international students represent important economic benefits and countries are eager to develop programs to attract more international students to their institutions.

The ASEAN countries established an ASEAN University Network (AUN) in 1995.⁶ AUN aims to strengthen the existing network of cooperation and promote collaborative programs. AUN now consists of 26 leading universities from all of the member nations of ASEAN. In Japan, China and Korea, “Campus Asia” was launched to promote exchange and cooperation among universities, representing the first trilateral cooperative venture in higher education between them.⁷ These regional frameworks of cooperation have been developed to enhance regional student mobility and also to respond to the current growing flow of students in East Asian countries. Traditionally, the flow of international students from Asia was vertical, toward more advanced Western countries in what Altbach has described as the “Core-Periphery” structure in higher education.⁸ The vertical flow of international students has yet to become a lateral and horizontal pattern of mobility within East Asia. According to Trow’s model, higher education is moving from an elite-type model towards a massification and universal type of higher education.⁹ East Asia is not an exception. Gross enrollment rates in higher education in East Asia have reached 98% in South Korea, 58% in Japan, 23% in China, 45% in Thailand and 35% in Malaysia.¹⁰ With these high enrollment rates, studying abroad is now more accessible to the general public.

In the age of mass and universal types of higher education in East Asia, the role of higher education for attracting and accommodating globalized human resources has become more and more important as a source of national benefits and for gaining international competitiveness. Internationalization of higher education has become a crucial strategy for each country with political, economic, academic and sociocultural rationales.¹¹ According to Knight, English, as a medium of education, has become an important tool in increasing the number of incoming students and in promoting the internationalization of education in any country, and East Asia is no exception. Every international student confronts the issue of language as a medium of instruction in deciding where to go for a study-abroad experience. Students tend to choose their destination country based on the language in which they will study, taking into consideration how they can enhance their language proficiency, which they think is important for their future careers. Competency in the English language is an important qualification for university students in many countries since it is a tool of empowerment that can improve their socioeconomic status in many cases. Therefore, it is important to look at how the countries of the region deal with the issue of language as a medium of instruction, how they balance the international language and national

language, and how they manage the strategy of internationalization in higher education in terms of languages.

2. Triangulation: A Feature of East Asia, Languages and Higher Education

The purpose of this section is to identify the distinct features of languages and language issues in the region and examine why some issues, which have been debated elsewhere in the world, have not been discussed in East Asia.

In East Asia, when we discuss language issues, we are always confronted by the historical and political background of the region. However, the language issues are inevitable and are something we must face on a daily basis since language is the core element of people's communication and solidarity in a society. In comparison with the European Union, which has established a regional policy for languages such as "plurilingualism,"¹² East Asia has two distinguishing aspects we need to consider in discussing language issues in the regional context.

The first aspect relates to the diversity of the region. East Asia is characterized by diversity in many aspects: culture (including religion and language), politics, economy, geography, and the environment. These aspects of diversity are an important asset of this region. Its languages are especially important, as they are the primary means of communication and constitute an important part of each culture and its people's pride. In terms of linguistic diversity, there are almost 7,000 languages in the world, and 25% of them are found in the thirteen countries of East Asia.¹³ In addition, nine of the regional countries are home to more than 50 languages each: 726 languages in Indonesia, 293 in China and 175 in the Philippines. In contrast, there is not a single country in Europe that has more than 50 languages within it. Therefore, we can say that East Asia has more linguistic diversity than Europe. For the countries that contain various small languages, language policy is a somewhat sensitive issue and is closely related to the unity of the people. In the context of East Asia, we can say that language policy is a matter of importance for national sovereignty and is also associated with national educational policy, which should be free of interference by other nations. Therefore, even when East Asian countries have discussed and developed various kinds of regional cooperative frameworks in education, especially in higher education, in recent years, there has been little discussion on regional cooperation in language issues.

Secondly, a language is not just a tool for learning. Many East Asian countries experienced educational imperialism and cultural, social and linguistic assimilation in the colonial period during the 19th and 20th centuries. Then, a language was not just a means of communication; it was also an instrument of command and control over the country under imperialism, used to influence the occupied people into complying with the dominant power and to embed the colonial power's knowledge and academic system in the colonized country. After gaining independence from the colonial powers such as England, France and Japan, many East Asian countries struggled to establish governance and self-determination and to achieve national unification. Language policy is one of the fundamental requirements for a new government to unify its citizens, establish nation-states and develop a stronger national identity. So, these countries consider language issues to be a matter of national sovereignty with which outsiders should not interfere. Given this background, East Asia is lagging behind other regions, such as Europe, in the development of a policy of harmonization to achieve common objectives and deal with common language issues, including the role of languages.

Meanwhile, the regional language policy suggested by this study concerns itself with a more feasible field for future regional cooperation compared to other language-related areas, such as language rights and preservation of minority languages in East Asia. A student's linguistic proficiency in higher education can be an additional asset that complements, not replaces, his/her

proficiency in his/her mother tongue or other languages related to his/her identity. In this author's view, therefore, it is possible and proper to consider how the East Asian community might discuss and deal with language issues, especially the role of language as a medium of instruction in higher education in this region in the context of regional cooperation.

The languages that can be acquired through education, work and increasing mobility are the ones people would choose. Students in higher education in East Asia are now moving around the world through international collaborative frameworks and international programs that are proliferating in East Asian higher education. Students start to acquire and improve their new languages through the instruction they receive in higher education and through social communication in destination countries. In addition, the middle class in Asian countries will grow in the future¹⁴ and, as we noted earlier, gross enrollment rates in higher education are already getting higher. Now, in the age of globalization, we witness increasing use of English in the international arena including higher education and communication among international students. English and its expanding power is also an important issue we need to discuss in the context of East Asian higher education.

3. Language as a Medium of Instruction in Higher Education: Theoretical Frameworks

Traditionally, international students from East Asia studied abroad in Western countries. P.G. Altbach characterized Asian universities as imported models of Western universities and pointed to their post-colonial structure.¹⁵ In the age of globalization, however, we are witnessing greater international student mobility within East Asia. Jane Knight has pointed out that an unexpected result of globalization is the growing importance of regions.¹⁶ In East Asia, we are witnessing burgeoning student mobility, international cooperation and institutional networks in higher education. In this phenomenon of "regionalization" many countries are attempting to establish themselves as a regional educational hub "to capitalize on the growing demand for higher education from Asian countries and the desire to increase their competitiveness in research and technology."¹⁷ In addition, many elite universities in East Asia have recently appeared in world rankings and seem to be gaining international competitiveness. At the same time, most higher education institutions in the region seek to attract more international students through so-called "international programs," which enable international students to study in English without knowing the local language or languages of the destination country. English has acted as a driving force for students in East Asia.

According to David Crystal, English has already become the lingua franca in East Asia in political dialogue, civil society and university life, and for university students it is now a key incentive to study abroad.¹⁸ Crystal is a positive promoter of "New Englishes"¹⁹ and favors the further expansion of the role of English in global communication. He acknowledges that the history of a global language can be traced through the successful expansion of military, political and economic power, such as British imperial power and the current dominance of U.S. power, but he argues that English is no longer associated with the political authority it once held. According to him, English is a "neutral" tool for communication that can facilitate regional cooperation and social integration. He also maintains, "[I]t is inevitable that a global language will eventually come to be used by more people than any other language. English has already reached this stage."²⁰ Crystal sums up, "English is playing a central role in empowering the subjugated and marginalized, and eroding the division between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'."²¹

In contrast, Robert Phillipson points to the possible linguistic divide among East Asian citizens. According to him, learning to use English as an international language has served the interests of English speaking countries and countries which host international students, and, as a

consequence, the process has perpetuated the North-South gap and exploitation. English has also brought a linguistic disparity between elite and non-elite inside each country.²² He observes that access to the dominant language (English) is very unequally distributed and, consequently, a linguistic divide within a country can be a major concern and challenge for the government and this calls for intense discussion.²³

Phillipson agrees with Crystal on the point that English is now entrenched worldwide, as a result of British colonialism, international interdependence and ‘revolutions’ in technology, transport, communications and commerce. However, the difference between these two scholars is that Phillipson sees the dominant role of English in the context of power relations, as English is the language of the United States, the major economic, political and military force in the contemporary world. His working definition of English Imperialism is that “the dominance of English is asserted and maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages.”²⁴ He also asserts that “in the early colonial phase of imperialism, the elites in the Periphery consisted of the colonizers themselves, whether as settlers or administrators. In present day neo-colonialism, the elites are to a large extent indigenous, but most of them have strong links with Centre. Many of them have been educated in Centre countries and/or through the medium of the Centre language and old colonial language.”²⁵ According to Phillipson, English is used widely to maintain and further expand supranational and international links; English linguistic imperialism operates globally as a key medium of Center-Periphery relations.²⁶

Phillipson’s argument is based on the Core-Periphery theory, according to which dominant nation-states reign over the countries in the Periphery. The unequal power relationship exists because the Core countries possess much greater structural resources, including higher education institutions – specifically universities and academic publishers – than countries in the Periphery.

Gramsci’s theory can also explain the language issue in higher education in East Asia. His writings have influenced many scholars and there are many interpretations and applications of his theory of hegemony and language. According to Peter Ives, for example, English is a requisite for upward social mobility and attainment of privileged positions in society. Therefore, not only elites but also the general public who understand that the language provides the access and opportunity to power, capital and resources “spontaneously” choose English as their medium of learning in higher education. Cultural invasion is directly tied to individuals’ “spontaneous” desire and takes place through mass media, the Internet, international mobility and flow of human resources and student exchange.²⁷ This “spontaneity” is a very important analytical concept to understand student gravitation toward English in East Asia. The expansion of English is surely influenced by the internationalization of higher education and reflects the strategy used by governments and educational institutions that expect to gain economic benefits from increasing their student population. However, the growing population of students studying in English is actually driven by the individual students’ desire to gain competence in the global language in the process Gramsci called “spontaneity.”

Therefore, we must try to understand what role lingua franca plays in higher education in East Asia from individual students’ perspectives and how the language they choose promotes regional integration.

4. Lessons from the EU Experience

Economic and political integration in the East Asian region is years behind EU integration. In terms of regionalization in higher education and student mobility in East Asia, this author believes there is much to be learned from the experience and the philosophical background of the

EU policy.

In Europe, despite the successful integration process in the fields of trade, economy, finance and law, there seems to be resistance to cultural integration.²⁸ European countries have maintained the belief that the cultural and linguistic pluralism that exists among them is a part of their historical heritage and is an important asset to be preserved. Confronted with language issues, such as the triangular structure of global language (English), national language (official language in each nation), and regional or local language, in the process of regional integration, the EU has developed three important norms and frameworks for regional coordination and cooperation.

The first element is the LINGUA plan and SOCRATES program. The original purpose of the LINGUA plan was to facilitate regional mobility of the labor force through the enhancement of workers' foreign language competency while preserving the existing linguistic diversity in the region. Along with the regional higher education policy known as the Erasmus program, the LINGUA plan was integrated into the SOCRATES program in 1995.²⁹ The SOCRATES program is designed to facilitate intercultural interaction and cross-border mobility of students in Europe. Europe, as one region, has set clear objectives in its educational policy to support study abroad and student mobility. The SOCRATES program also contributes to the enhancement of mutual understanding by giving students the opportunity to learn foreign languages and experience foreign cultures. The EU's program locates the regional language policy (i.e., the LINGUA plan) within the higher education policy (the SOCRATES program), both committed to the deepening of mutual understanding.

The second element is the original norms of "plurilingual" education for European residents. "Plurilingualism" was advanced by the language policy division of the Council of Europe. The core idea is that every EU citizen is expected to command two foreign languages besides her/his own mother tongue.³⁰ Since language proficiency is considered an important basis for knowledge-based societies, emphasis on foreign language acquisition has grown.³¹ To supplement the plurilingual education policy, the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages has been introduced as a guideline for assessing and monitoring foreign language acquisition with the aim of facilitating intercultural interaction and the cross-border mobility of students and workers in Europe.³² Within this framework an implementing scheme called "European Language Portfolio" (ELP) has been developed, according to which students can evaluate their language proficiency and progress in their foreign language learning. These collaborative frameworks on the practical and ideational levels help EU countries share plurilingual education as a common experience.

Lastly, the establishment of the "European Year of Languages" is a symbolic expression of the commitment of the EU members to the promotion of language learning as an important element of regional integration. To encourage language learning by all persons residing in Europe, enhance the recognition of multilingualism and raise awareness of the linguistic and cultural diversity in the European Union, many policy measures have been established, including some designed to preserve the languages of minority and immigrant communities.³³ Regarding the EU's emphasis on multilingualism, questions are often raised about the definition of multilingualism and the scope of activities to be undertaken to preserve the region's linguistic diversity. Multilingualism in EU operations stands for its cultural wealth but it also entails a huge burden in terms of financial and human resource commitment.

Implementation of multilingual or plurilingual education policy might be beneficial to East Asian countries in preserving the region's linguistic diversity and respect of the differences, but it would also impose a huge financial burden. East Asian countries would need to allocate huge budgets to carry out such a policy, and it would not be realistic. However, the European experience suggests that we need to promote discussions about regional cooperation in language policy among East Asian countries both at the government and institutional levels, and in both practical

and philosophical terms. As we will discuss in detail in the following pages, the laissez-faire liberalism in language expansion would lead to the dominance of English in East Asia.

5. English as the Lingua Franca in ASEAN Countries

(1) The Limitation of Multilingualism

In the EU case, the more official EU languages exist, the more challenges arise. Multilingual situations require more human resources and financial burdens than monolingual situations. ASEAN, whose economic size is smaller than EU, has difficulty setting up every national language of the ASEAN countries as an official language and employing translators and interpreters in international conferences. Moreover, in the 27 countries in the EU, more than 95% of EU citizens are speaking in their official languages that the EU has established. On the other hand, ASEAN has more linguistic diversity so that even if they chose the dominant languages in each nation, they would not be the first languages for the majority of ASEAN citizens. So, it is not realistic to implement multilingual dialogue at a regional level as in the EU.

ASEAN member countries have held dialogues about regional cooperation in the context of ASEAN integration. The first statement on the language issue appeared in the “Vientiane Action Program” issued at the 10th ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos in 2004.³⁴ Article 3.4 of the Action Program, “Promoting an ASEAN Identity,” refers to the agreement to “mainstream the promotion of ASEAN awareness and regional identity in national communications plans and educational curricula, people-to-people contact including through arts, tourism and sports, especially among the youth, and the promotion of ASEAN languages [*sic*] learning through scholarships and exchanges of linguists.”³⁵ This Action Program emphasized the significance of regional identity for the ASEAN citizens and recognized ASEAN languages as an essential element of boosting common identity.³⁶ Agreement among the ASEAN countries on pursuing common objectives is a recent development and they still face difficulties in carrying out the regional policy in this area at a practical level. ASEAN is a region with many ethnic communities and languages, and how to define “ASEAN languages” (whether to include only official/national languages or minority languages as well), and how to balance English as the de-facto common language in dialogues at government, market and civic levels still remain important questions.

English has become the dominant language in ASEAN. Already in 2007, Article 34 of the ASEAN Charter stated, “the working language of ASEAN shall be English.”³⁷ As Kirkpatrick observes, English is functioning as the lingua franca in ASEAN in various forms for communicative strategies.³⁸ In higher education, the ASEAN University Network (AUN) was founded in 1995 by ASEAN member states and is currently composed of 26 leading universities and colleges from all ASEAN states. The purpose of AUN is to promote human resource development in higher education in ASEAN, and it cooperates with ASEAN dialogue partners including Japan, Korea and China; additionally, most of the programs that facilitate student mobility and enhance academic exchanges are conducted in English.³⁹

In the next section, we will look at the cases of Malaysia and Thailand. Both countries are now trying to become educational hubs in the ASEAN region and are actively internationalizing their higher education systems. They have different historical backgrounds, including that of the establishment of higher education and language as a medium of instruction in universities, but these cases illustrate how the language issue in higher education is handled.

(2) Malaysia: Transnational Programs and Issues

Until the 1980s, the Malaysian government focused on the role of education for national unification and the formation of national identity.⁴⁰ With globalization gathering momentum, the

strengthening of international competitiveness and fostering of global human resources became international trends; hence Malaysia was faced with the need for policy reform. Malaysia has been well known as a country with a large number of its students studying abroad, and its brain drain issue has become quite serious since the 1990s. In response, the country has actively promoted English as a medium of instruction, instead of Malay.

According to Sugimura, Malaysia has taken this strategy for two reasons. First, education with Malay as a medium of instruction has caused a decline in students' linguistic performance of English, in the country. Secondly, education in Malay has proven inadequate to follow international academic trends. To enhance its international competitiveness, Malaysia has recognized the necessity of educating its students in English.⁴¹ The reintroduction of English in the Malaysian education system after the British imperial period shows the recognition of English as an international language. Even though Malay is used by the majority of Malaysian citizens, it cannot replace English, which enables them to access the international academic world.

The Malaysian higher education system is also well known for its "transnational programs." These programs are conducted in cooperation with overseas higher education institutions with English as the medium of instruction. Transnational programs have been developed in response to the increasing demand for higher education and liberalization of education as a service. Malaysia is now eager to expand its higher education system into the global market in order to attract more international students from the neighboring countries and to become an "educational hub" in the region. Malaysia has been sending many of its students to English speaking countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and has also been receiving an increasing number of international students from the neighboring ASEAN countries, as well as Northeast countries such as China and South Korea.⁴² Malaysia is proud to have various types of transnational programs enabling students to study in English with lower academic fees than their counterparts in English speaking countries.

These types of transnational programs represent a new type of study abroad experience. Some higher education institutions in Malaysia provide various types of international programs and transcend national borders. English as a medium of instruction in these transnational programs provides a broader opportunity for those who are willing to study abroad and enables Malaysia to receive international students instead of just sending their students.

(3) Thailand: Strategies toward Becoming an "Educational Hub"

Thailand has kicked "internationalization of higher education" into high gear with a long-term higher education policy that started in 1990 and has provided "international programs" taught in English. The beneficiaries of these programs are mainly local Thai students. Thai institutions of higher education also actively accept students from overseas and cooperate with their counterparts abroad. As in the Malaysian case, the Thai government also aims to be an "educational hub" through a campaign to accept 50,000 international students by 2011.⁴³

An example of a Thai international program can be seen at Chulalongkorn University, the leading national university in the country. It started offering a BALAC (Bachelor of Arts Program in Language and Culture) in 2008.⁴⁴ This program requires both students and administrators to use English as a common language and students are able to choose from a wide range of languages offered through the Faculty of Arts, including such Eastern languages as Chinese, Japanese and Korean, and Western languages such as French, German, Spanish, Italian and Russian. However, no ASEAN languages, such as Malay or Filipino, are included in this program. The director of the BALAC program states that the reason this program does not offer any regional language is that there is no demand from the students' side to learn any ASEAN languages since English is already commonly used in interactions among ASEAN countries and people.⁴⁵ He adds that languages such as French, Japanese and Korean are popular among their students due to their

attraction to the cultures associated with those languages.

This kind of international program in Thailand has targeted both local Thai students and international students from the surrounding countries whose families are temporarily living in Thailand. Programs in English enable the students to study in a common language that is widely used internationally, and also offer them more access financially and geographically.

(4) English as the Lingua Franca in ASEAN

As Sugimura points out, study abroad has different aspects: one is the aspect of international cultural exchange and mutual understanding among international students and local people in the host countries. Another aspect is the political and economic role of national strategies to compete for human capital and greater international presence.⁴⁶ In the cases of Malaysia and Thailand, the latter aspect can be seen through the use of English as a medium of instruction. However, it is difficult to assess the former dimension, which is the facilitation of mutual understanding and cultural exchange. International programs with English as the medium of instruction have obviously opened the door for international students to study in non-English speaking countries. However, the sociocultural impact is still not clearly conceptualized by stakeholders in those programs.

6. English as an International Language and National Languages as Alternatives

(1) China

China is promoting the study of the Chinese language to increase the number of international students coming to China. In the process of promoting internationalization in higher education, China has strategically established Confucius Institutes at overseas higher education institutions in conjunction with the promotion of international economic and trade relations.⁴⁷ Confucius Institutes represent efforts to project Chinese soft power. They are sponsored by the Chinese Ministry of Education for the purpose of teaching and expanding the Chinese language and culture, as well as for enhancing intercultural understanding. The first Confucius Institute was established in Seoul in 2004, and the number of Confucius Institutes has increased very rapidly in higher education institutions all over the world. There were almost 300 institutes in 88 countries as of the end of 2009.⁴⁸ Chinese soft power has been applied to the “nationalization” of higher education at foreign universities.

This project is a new model of language policy by one country that is tied to higher education institutions. Confucius Institutes are flexible and can adapt to overseas higher education institutions with different organizational structures and financial support systems. However, China’s very active export of its national language and culture and the rapid increase in the number of Confucius Institutes around the world have brought about negative reactions and criticisms. Yang has insisted that Confucius Institutes are “the most systematically planned soft power policy so far.”⁴⁹ Since Confucius Institutes are tightly connected with overseas higher education, the Chinese strategy to promote their national language can be interpreted as a nationalist campaign and as a political strategy rather than a cultural and academic strategy.⁵⁰

(2) South Korea

The English education boom that has been seen in South Korea in the last decade reflects the Koreans’ special interest in English as a global language. It is worthwhile to note that South Korea depends on trade for 92% of its GDP. The international emphasis of Korean corporations explains why many internationally well known companies in South Korea require their new employees to have TOEIC (English proficiency test) scores higher than 900. English is now not only

a requirement for new employees but also a condition for graduation from universities.⁵¹ Moreover, South Korea incorporated English language education into the primary school curriculum in 1997. The boom in learning English among the Korean people is called “English fever.” Many parents are willing to have their children study English at an early educational stage and private English teaching institutes have proliferated rapidly, especially in the urban areas of the country. Studying abroad in English speaking countries, including the Philippines as a cheap destination, has also become popular among the relatively high economic status families, even for primary school children.⁵²

Some high schools in South Korea have also started using English as a medium of instruction. The Korean Minjok Leadership Academy was established in 1996 “to provide academic tools necessary to achieve the highest levels of excellence and leadership,” “to contribute positively to the welfare of Korea” and “to contribute a major share to the progress of the world community.”⁵³ Most of the teachers in the Academy received PhDs from universities in English speaking countries and the Academy’s graduates tend to pursue studies in leading universities in the United States and top universities in South Korea.

“English fever” can be seen not only among the elite students but also among those studying in Japanese universities and colleges. According to this author’s interviews with Korean students in Tokyo, some plan to take advantage of their universities’ student exchange programs and go to the United States, for example, to pursue further studies in English. This desire illustrates that Korean students are keen to have high levels of English proficiency even though they are studying in Japan and have attained advanced levels of Japanese language proficiency.⁵⁴ To them, English is indispensable both in education and in career pursuits.

Similar to the Confucius Institutes which aim to promote a national language, Korean Cultural Institutes incorporated Korean language institutes as “King Sejong Institutes,” and they plan to expand up to 150 locations around the world by 2015.⁵⁵ The King Sejong Institutes have also been established in cooperation with overseas higher education institutions so that people find them similar to the Confucius Institutes set up by the Chinese government. The number of King Sejong Institutes has started to expand as recently as 2009 and their impacts have not yet been reported, but it is worthwhile to follow how they will expand.

As seen above, in contrast to the English fever that grew voluntarily and spontaneously in Korean society, the King Sejong Institutes represent a national policy designed to promote Korea’s national language to the world. This can be related to the development of nationalism in Korea. Nationalism in Korea expressed itself in the promotion of the Korean language during the period of Japanese imperialism before World War II. Korean nationalism was also evident in the official language promotion for national unification by the newly independent government in postwar Korea. In the age of globalization, however, strong promotion of languages is seen both in the spread of English as an international language and in the promotion of the Korean language as a national language.

(3) Japan

In 2007, The Japanese government published the “Asian Gateway Initiative,”⁵⁶ emphasizing the importance of attracting and fostering international human resources in the country and for Japan to become a hub for human networks. Japan also recognized the need to internationalize higher education in the country as part of a national strategy to define Japan as an integral part of Asia. In 2008, the former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda pledged to pursue an Asian version of the Erasmus Plan. In 2010, the leaders of Japan, South Korea, and China agreed to hold a symposium on “Campus Asia” to facilitate academic exchange and student mobility among the three countries at the higher education level.⁵⁷ Japan seems to be supportive of regional cooperation among the ASEAN+3 countries.

While South Korea and China have adopted language policies promoting their national languages to the world especially in the context of overseas higher education, Japan seems to be reticent about adopting a national language policy. One reason for this may very well be that the nation has the negative historical legacy of educational imperialism in Asia during its imperialist period. If the Japanese government establishes active language and cultural institutes similar to the Confucius Institutes or the King Sejong Institutes, reaction from former colonial countries will be very negative and damaging to Japan's image.

The Japan Foundation is a government-affiliated organization that supports Japanese language and cultural education overseas, but it does not seek close institutional collaboration with higher education institutions abroad; in this sense, it differs from the Confucius Institutes or the King Sejong Institutes. While the number of people studying the Japanese language has increased, especially in Asian countries (80% of them in East Asia and Southeast Asia), students in higher education institutions studying Japanese represent around 25% of all Japanese language learners.⁵⁸ A review of Japanese language education published by the Japan Foundation contains various kinds of research around Japanese language education, but the focus of most research is limited to micro perspectives such as classroom practices, curriculum and evaluation systems and so on.⁵⁹ Macro perspectives on Japanese language policy cannot be found in the projects sponsored by the Japan Foundation.

7. Conclusion: Implications

Globalization has brought English to East Asia as the dominant language in international discourse. English has become an indispensable language, the lingua franca in academic, economic and political lives in the region.⁶⁰ English is also the linguistic promoter of the "regionalization" of higher education in East Asia.⁶¹ We are witnessing different reactions to this phenomenon among the East Asian countries. We see in the Korean, Japanese and Chinese cases that each government is showing its own vision for fostering the competence of its students who are proficient in English to compete in the global market; at the same time, their visions for arresting the decline of their own national languages differ as well. The perceived imbalance between national languages and the global/international language is a common challenge in East Asia, as it is elsewhere in the world.

The cooperative process of language policy formulation for the region as a whole is not only an issue for ASEAN; it is also a key question for Japan, South Korea and China. Due to the growing interdependence in the East Asian region, dialogue between the ASEAN countries and their Northeast Asian partners about regional cooperation in general has continued during the last decade,⁶² and now, they need to decide how to ensure policy harmonization in many areas, including educational cooperation and regional language policy. In order to facilitate student mobility and academic exchanges and to foster regional citizens' ability to contribute to the future development of an East Asian community, it is necessary to establish a regional cooperative scheme in higher education and languages as a medium of instruction.

Looking at the internationalization of higher education in East Asia, it is very clear that English has become the lingua franca in higher education within the region. We have also seen that there are different interpretations regarding English as a global language. It is not sufficient simply to criticize the current dominance of English as a lingua franca; we also need to ask ourselves whether the dominance of English as a global language is beneficial for deepening mutual understanding and promoting regional integration in East Asia. The presupposition which defines English as the *de facto* lingua franca may neglect the reality of multilingual coexistence in East Asia, overlook the rights and interests of the people who do not have access to English, and ob-

scure the reasons and methods by which this inequality was created. The disparity between the elite who have an advanced command of English and the non-elite who do not benefit from the internationalization of higher education is growing wider and wider. Since English is seen as the principal language of instruction in higher education, programs that had been conducted in national languages are being replaced by English, as can be seen in many cases mentioned in this article. This division is a negative aspect of the global expansion of English.

The recognition of the dominant role of English as the lingua franca and the internationalization of higher education based on that acknowledgement neglect the fact that one of the treasures of the East Asian region is cultural diversity. Since culture and language are intertwined, language learning and practice will definitely contribute to mutual understanding between peoples and countries with different cultures. In the process of regional integration, the European Union decided to have a clear vision for language policy in the region as a whole, and the policy is known as “plurilingualism.” In contrast, East Asian countries have scarcely had any discussion about a framework for language policy in the context of regional cooperation in higher education. On the contrary, in this region, especially in Northeast Asian countries, language policy takes on a strictly nationalistic hue, and language issues tend to be framed in nationalistic terms, as we have seen through the examples of the Confucius Institutes and the King Sejong Institutes.

The issues of language as a medium of instruction in higher education and as a catalyst for student mobility are obviously interrelated. Because of the globalization process and the associated focus on one dominant language, many minority languages are in danger of disappearing,⁶³ and even national languages appear to be losing their power in each regional country’s effort to facilitate international student mobility. Language issues as they relate to the internationalization of higher education have been taken up only at the national level; they have escaped attention at the regional level. Language policy issues are raised only in the context of national sovereignty and sensitive political issues in East Asian countries. As a result, international cooperation in education within the East Asian region, especially regarding language issues, is rarely a topic even in the context of higher education. To remedy the situation, we need to bring up language issues in our discussion of regional integration, with particular attention to advancing regional cooperation in higher education and regional language policy at both the practical and the ideational level.

Notes

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**Apirat Petchsiri, José Luis de Sales Marques and William Roth, eds.,
*Promoting Human Rights in Asia and Europe: The Role of Regional
Integration*, Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Publishing House, 2009.**

Miki Honda

1. Introduction

In its newly launched charter, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), under its motto “One Vision, One Identity, and One Caring and Sharing Community,”¹ envisions itself some four decades after its creation in 1967. With the introduction of the new charter in November 2007, ASEAN hopes to accelerate its integration by putting it on a similar legal footing to the European Union, making it, in the words of the Association’s Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, “more rules-based and more people-oriented.”²

The Charter enumerates ASEAN’s purposes and principles and establishes formal rights and expectations of the member states, but the Association’s reluctance to act on its own rules may be the greatest obstacle to realizing its long-term goal of establishing EU-style unification. Most observers are concerned that the ASEAN policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states continues to serve as an excuse to do little in the face of human rights violations.

Through a highly controversial process, ASEAN foreign ministers created a High Level Panel³ in 2008 and a year later the member states at last agreed on the terms for the human rights body⁴ stipulated in the charter, to be known as the Asian International Commission on Human Rights (AICHR).⁵ However, no one is sure what effect the AICHR will have on the ongoing human rights abuses in the region.

Promoting Human Rights in Asia and Europe: The Role of Regional Integration explores the relations between regional integration and human rights in Asia through a comparison with those in Europe. Two questions are raised in this volume: Whether there exists a relationship between the efforts at regional integration and the implementation of human rights; and whether, in comparison with the expansion of the promotion of human rights in the European Union both internally and externally, the cause of human rights would necessarily be advanced if regional integration were to occur in Asia.

This book is unique in three respects. Firstly, it attempts to see whether there is a relationship of some form between different degrees of regional integration and degrees of respect for human rights values by the parties involved in the process of integration. While Europe is generally regarded as a promoter of norms, namely democracy and human rights, Asia is often regarded as a more despotic region. Yet the integration in the modern context is a world phenomenon, and both Asia and Europe are now experiencing it. Secondly, the views presented by the contributors to this book are multidisciplinary in nature, from those of economics and political science, to law and jurisprudence. Thirdly, the contents of this book present contributions from scholars at a wide range of career stages, from distinguished professors to young scholars, the more senior scholars including Ali M. El-Agraa, a prominent economist, and Vitit Muntarbhorn, a professor of law at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok.

This volume is the eighth in the EU-Network of European Studies Centres in Asia’s (NESCA) Research Dialogue Book Series, representing the results of the EU-NESCA joint research agenda. The project comprises four European and five Asian universities: Justus-Liebig-

University Giessen in Germany, the Institute of European Studies at Free University of Brussels in Belgium; Fondation Nationale des Science Politiques in Paris; the University of Warwick in the UK; the Institute of European Studies in Macao, China; the Centre of European Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai; Korea University in Korea; the Interdisciplinary Department of European Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok; and the National Centre for Research on Europe at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. The EU-NESCA project, launched in 2006, aims at widening and deepening the research cooperation between the European research area, NESCA, and the European Studies associations in Asia.

2. Chapters on “Regionalism and Human Rights”

Part I of this book discusses the relations between regionalism and human rights from the perspective of political science. The first chapter, “Regional Integration and Human Rights: European-Asian Reflections,” is written by Muntarbhorn, who has served as the UN Special Rapporteur on child prostitution, child pornography, and the sale of children, and also as Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). Muntarbhorn innovatively discusses ten separate “entry points” for promoting regional integration in Asia with a bearing on human rights. The author gives readers a clear perspective on how to relate the issues of regional integration and human rights. The author proposes several considerations, among which the following are the most outstanding in this reviewer’s opinion.

First, Muntarbhorn traces the stages of development of human rights initiatives at a regional level. In Europe there is an intergovernmental regional human rights system, including the European Convention on Human Rights and its various protocols, and the system provides direct access and remedies to individuals who seek to overturn state actions that they believe breach their human rights under the Convention. Asia-Pacific, on the other hand, has seen some initiatives at a more modest level, such as a regional network of national human rights commissions. Second, on the question of whether it is realistic to promote human rights through an economic and political integration organization, Muntarbhorn observes that the integration of some human rights elements into a regional economic entity is already evident in the EU. In Asia, ASEAN and its Charter refer to human rights but, according to the author, the agenda there is more economics and politics than human rights. Third, as for the kinds of rights that should be included in an integration scheme, Muntarbhorn says that universal human rights standards based on the indivisibility of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights should be included. However, Muntarbhorn says there may be a degree of ambivalence at the regional level. Asian states tend to prefer economic, social and cultural rights to civil and political rights and they also like to advocate broad state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of the state. Fourth, as far as a monitoring mechanism of human rights is concerned, the author tells us that both the EU and the European Convention have various mechanisms for dealing with the issue. Importantly, both systems have courts which are the ultimate arbiters. In Asia, the ASEAN human rights body has just been formed but there will definitely be no regional court in the near future. Muntarbhorn concludes that while the negative situation remains concerning the implementation of human rights standards and norms, regional integration can help promote and protect human rights. A key challenge, he suggests, is to ensure that no one and no entity has a monopoly of power.

The next chapter, “Economic Rights and Regional Integration,” is written by Ali M. El-Agraa, a professor of International Economics, International Economic Integration, and EU Studies in the Faculty of Commerce at Fukuoka University in Japan. Concerning the relations between regionalism and economic rights, El-Agraa explicitly asserts that economic rights have

nothing to do with regional integration because regional integration is governed by WTO's Article XXIV, which does not mention either economic rights or human rights. According to El-Agraa, the EU is the only regional integration scheme that has been endeavoring to give economic rights a legally-binding basis, though this will not happen even when the Lisbon Treaty⁶ has been ratified. And even then, the enactment would not be embrative as long as Poland and the UK continue to exercise their rights to opt-out, thus rendering the term "regional integration" somewhat meaningless within this context. However, the author says that this should not distract from the fact that the EU has been able to make progress on human rights in some areas.

This conclusion, El-Agraa says, has relevance to ASEAN since it is the only other scheme of regional integration in the world that has incorporated human rights in its recently adopted Charter. However, El-Agraa argues that everything concerning human rights in ASEAN is not only left hanging in the air, but is also conditional on the ratification of the Charter. The author observes that ASEAN has just one item, Article 1.6, with regard to economic rights. The Article includes, "To alleviate poverty and narrow the development gap within ASEAN through mutual assistance and cooperation." But, El-Agraa points out, what form the assistance should take, the nature of the cooperation, and how this should be enforced, are not specified.

The chapter "Cultural Relativism and Human Rights" by Andreas Vasilache, an associate professor at the University of Bielefeld in Germany, considers whether it is possible to theoretically deduce the existence of intercultural values, and thus, to theoretically prove the universal, intercultural validity of human rights; this claim would contrast the view among many that human rights are a Western product that do not fit into the systems of non-Western civilizations, Asia, Africa or Islam. Vasilache argues that it is necessary to make a distinction between political and ethical particularism on the one hand, and epistemic cultural relativism on the other, and that a sophisticated relativistic attitude leads in no way to the particularism of basic values and rights, but provides the most conclusive basis for the intercultural legitimization of essential values and human rights. The author examines the preconditions and the very basis of any implementation of human rights, and thus restricts herself to the discussion of the epistemological and methodological possibility for deducing and theoretically validating the existence of certain intercultural basic values and human rights. Vasilache concludes that the existence of very basic universal rights can be stated and insisted on without challenging cultural relativism; rather, it is necessary to recognize that cultural formations and civilizations are particular formations with a strong legitimate claim to contextual and relative validity.

Part I concludes with a political science analysis, "A Tool for Regional Integration: Supranational Courts in Europe and the Protection of Human Rights," by Laurent Scheeck, a lecturer at the Institute of European Studies, Free University of Brussels. Scheeck takes an in-depth look at the remarkable interrelationship between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECourHR). Scheeck argues that supranational courts have developed a common supranational "jurisprudential human rights screen" to supersede national and private actors. Scheeck characterizes the European human rights system by two features. First, the European Union (EU) as such suffers from a rather severe human rights deficit, which is in sharp contrast to its discourse on the universalism of human rights. Second, human rights have always been supported by a set of powerful pro-European actors, not only to protect rights at or from the supranational level and thereby reinforce the power of supranational institutions, but also to promote the deepening of integration through the "constitutionalizing power of rights."

Scheeck says the European courts' increasingly nested linkage has given rise to new forms of supranational judicial diplomacy between judicial actors of the ECJ and the ECourHR, and this activity has had a deep impact on law as well as policymaking. With regard to the relations between networks and hierarchies, these political effects of the relationships between the European courts can also be brought down to two hierarchical dynamics from a socio-political perspec-

tive. The dynamics of conflict, cooperation and competition of the two courts relate to the jurisprudential annexation of the EU to the ECHR, and to the ECJ's cooperation and/or resistance to this dynamic of subordination. They also relate to the simultaneous supranational form of inter-institutional cooperation by which the ECJ and the ECtHR tend to subject national and private actors to EU law and European human rights law. It thusly appears that, whereas lawyers are indeed increasingly operating in the "network modus," they are strategically doing so to pursue hierarchical interests in a transnational space.

3. Chapters on "The Impact of Regional Integration on Human Rights"

Part II begins with a review of the legal history of the European Union. Titled "The EU and Human Rights: Leading by Example?" the first chapter of this section, written by Andrea Ott, University Lecturer at Maastricht University in the Netherlands, looks back at the 50 years of the European integration process with a focus on internal and external aspects of human rights policy.

European integration has come a long way from a regional trade organization achieving a customs union and internal market to an organization founded on the "values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities," as Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty declares. Not only is the Union built on the principles of equality and human rights internally, but the declaration also makes it clear that the Union's mission is to apply these values as guiding principles in its relations with non-member countries, Otto says.

What looks like a coherent system internally and externally is contradicted by the long and winding road to the adoption of the EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights. Once seen in 1999 as a good initiative to bring the citizen closer to the integration project, the adoption of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter is innovative; namely, it occurred through a convention rather than an intergovernmental conference of EU member states. The author says, however, that it also has been a victim of old politics, with major resistance to written human rights catalogs in the UK, and new resentments in Poland, reflected by the outcome of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2007. Notwithstanding the British resistance and the Polish resentments, the EU institutions in the European Parliament on December 12, 2007 proclaimed the Charter revealing the disconnect from the Treaty of Lisbon both symbolically and legally. While legally binding for most of the member states, it will not be binding on the UK and Poland. Moreover, all 27 EU members added explanations of their interpretations of the rights stemming from the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Consequently, the Union has been criticized for its inconsistencies with respect to the protection of human rights worldwide, and especially in its enlargement process through the addition of new members.

Ott says, looking back at the fifty years of the European integration process, in the last thirty years, the human rights policy has developed incrementally, both internally and externally, and not in a coherent fashion. According to the author, this disjointedness was inherent in the modest foundations of the Union as a technocratic entity tasked to establish a customs union and economic cooperation among its members. Due to the growing influence of EU law on national legislation and the efficient implementation of EU law based on legal principles of supremacy and direct effect, a quick remedy was found by the ECJ to introduce general principles of human rights law into the Community legal order. But this ad hoc solution was not sufficient for most of the member states. The EU also discovered that a stronger emphasis on human rights and a more holistic approach to human rights policy would contribute to the much needed infusion of legitimacy to this entity. Ott says the Treaty of Lisbon can be praised for finally achieving its two

long-term aims, a legally binding document codifying a set of fundamental human rights, and a legal basis for a future accession to the ECHR. In the author's view, however, the latter objective might be a double-edged sword. The ECHR could acquire two different legal standings, namely one via the supremacy of EU law over national law, and the other as an international agreement that has already been a part of national legal systems for many years, though not very consistently across the 27 member states with regard to human rights violations. In addition, situations could arise where it would be rather difficult to define the actor, as would be the case if actions were taken on the intergovernmental level, or if legal instruments that left a certain amount of discretion were implemented, as in the case of directives. And lastly, it needs to be noted that the agreement and the organization pursue different aims and objectives. The agreement is specifically for human rights protection, while the EU needs to balance different aims and interests. It needs to be carefully assessed whether the ECHR accession is of added value or if it leads to further legal problems in light of the special supranational legal order of the Union and the complex division of competences between the EU and its member states. Ott concludes that, with human rights standards in Europe becoming more homogenous, and cooperation models between highest courts finally advocated, the coexistence between courts on international, supranational and national levels serves the different aims of the entities involved and can contribute to a more coherent protection of human rights in the region.

The next chapter, "The Impact of European Political Integration on the Member States' Human Rights Policies Towards China," is written by Giuseppe Balducci, Academic and Research Assistant at the EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies Department of the College of Europe. The author uses fieldwork to offer fascinating new insights into the impact of European political integration on the foreign policies of the EU member states. The EU has emerged internationally as a promoter of norms, namely democracy and human rights. However, this chapter maintains that there is no such thing as a normative power Europe without a coherent, consistent and coordinated overall European normative foreign policy. This article, therefore, attempts to test the existence of a European normative foreign policy by applying the EU's assumed normative influence on its member states' foreign policies to the case of China.

Balducci tests the hypothesis that the EU plays an important role not just in promoting international norms outside its borders but also in shaping its member states' foreign policies through a comparative analysis of the EU and its member states' human rights policies towards China. The author picks up four member states—Germany, Sweden, France and the UK. Balducci explains his reasons for choosing the four states as follows: Germany was the first European country to include political conditionality in its relations with developing countries; Sweden is the largest donor in relative terms in the field of human rights and democracy and it epitomizes the Nordic approach to such issues; France has a foreign policy which resonates only in a limited way with the new international human rights and rule of law concerns and can be considered as an example of a Mediterranean approach; the UK has external relations with developing countries which have been characterized by Tony Blair's ethical approach to the inception of the Labor Party's government. Balducci analyzes the four EU member states' human rights policies towards China and the interactions among them in the following four case studies grouped around two dimensions: (1) the human rights dialogue at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) and the arms embargo against China, which fall within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) dimension, and (2) the negotiations for China's accession to WTO and human rights projects on the ground, which fall within the European Community (EC) dimension. In the case of the UNHCR, the EU followed the practice of tabling resolutions critical of China since 1990. The EU-China bilateral human rights dialogue was suspended after the 1995 UNHCR resolution criticizing China. However, France and Germany pushed for a constructive dialogue with China at the EU level, against the Nordic countries' opposition. The UK position,

on the other hand, swayed between the non-committal stance of Germany and France and the ethical approach of the Nordic countries. The coordination meeting was held but no consensus was found. In the case of the UNHCR, the fear of losing commercial deals with China played a big role in the calculations of all EU member states that were initially opposed to the abandoning of the UNHCR resolution. This case, Balducci says, seems to deny the normative influence exerted by the EU on its member states. Since member states belong to the EU, the fear of losing market access in China was greater.

Also, for the arms embargo on China, there was discrepancy between the Franco-German stance and the Nordic countries' position. With the initiative of Germany and France, a resolution calling for the lifting of the embargo was close to being adopted in 2003 despite the Nordic countries' objection, but was killed because of strong pressures from the United States. In this case, it would appear plausible to attribute the failure to the fear of being left alone by the other member states against the ire of an influential international actor, the United States. Rather than an ethical foreign policy choice, it was one of "hedging foreign policy," the author asserts.

The case of the WTO is different from either of the previous two cases. As far as Sino-European economic interactions were concerned, the tensions between member states in the Council and the European Commission negatively affected the formulation of a coherent and responsive policy toward the negotiation of China's accession to the WTO. This result was due to the divergent policies between China and the EU member countries. Their differences stemmed from their historical legacies and differing economic ties with China. The dissimilarities between the various approaches toward China and the consequent clash between the Commission and the Council might therefore help explain certain inconsistencies in the European negotiation with China. Similarly, it can be inferred that the Commission's lack of comprehensive authority to negotiate multilateral trade deals with a single voice has hindered the Commission's bargaining power as well as other issues such as human rights. During WTO negotiations little concern was raised over human rights. In the final five years of negotiations for China's WTO accession, no member states in the Council put forward the idea that China's entry should be linked with respect of human rights, and more specifically labor rights, as has been requested by the European Parliaments, Trade Union lobbies and European NGOs. The unanimity reached at the WTO level, where no member states put forward any proposal to link human rights and trade, could be explained by the member states' attitude of leaving the human rights confrontation to the EC when it comes to dealing with trade.

At the intergovernmental CFSP level, when it comes to high politics normative decision on the occasions of the UNHCR and bilateral material sanctions, Balducci finds that member states are influenced by their membership in the EU but the influence has no normative character. Rather, according to the author, the EU membership creates strong disincentives to follow independent policies. At the supranational EC level, the author highlights the tendency of member states to leave the EC to deal with controversial issues, thus freeing their hands to pursue their mercantilist policies. However, when it comes to trade relations it is shown that the EC has no real power to link normative issues with trade, thus leading to an utterly non-normative approach. Balducci concludes that the EU is not categorized as a normative power and it qualifies rather as "a normative paradox." No coordination, coherence or consistency is found between the EU normative attempts and those of its member states towards China.

In "Normative Power or Hegemony? The EU's Human Rights Transmission to Africa," Jian Junbo, Lecturer and Researcher at Fudan University in China, explores how the EU's human rights policies can be transmitted to Africa. Jian regards the EU as a normative power rather than a hegemonic power in comparison with the United States. Jian says the EU integration is not only a process of internal homogenization and consolidation but also an expansion of norms internationally. And in the process of expansion of normative power to the world, human rights are

a core value for the EU as important as democracy, good governance, rule of law and so forth. However, human rights transmission to Africa is not easy. Jian points out that two challenges have always existed or emerged in the context of globalization. The first challenge involves the cultural differences between Europe and Africa, and the second challenge stems from world competition of soft power in which the most important competitive counterpart for Europe is the United States. Additionally, with more people coming to Africa, there is more capital and investment flowing into the continent from emerging industrialized countries. Generally, Jian states, international hegemony has three dimensions: cultural domination, coercion if necessary and maintaining domination as the final objective. With regards to the human rights transmission to Africa, on the one hand the EU recognizes itself as the early and successful practitioner of universal values and as the would-be director of protection and promotion of human rights in Africa; this one-way transmission of human rights is consistent with the character of hegemony. On the other hand, external expansion of normative power can be regarded as a coercive approach. In conclusion, Jian says the normative-power EU is dreaming of international hegemony by cultural transmission to non-EU countries in order to enhance its influence in the international community. But Jian believes the EU will be challenged by more competitive powers emerging from other regions, in which Africa and other countries have more chances to accept what they favor and enhance their own cultural statuses in international society.

The last chapter in Part II, "Gender Issues in the EU and China: A Comparative Perspective," is written by Yang Na, a PhD candidate of International Relations at Nankai University in Tianjin, China. The author compares the progress on gender equality in the European Union and China. After reviewing the evolution of EU gender policy over 30 years, Yang details the gender issues in China from the perspectives of education, law and policy measures to improve the situation, paying special attention to the differences in gender equality between cities and rural areas in the country. Yang finds some similarities between China and the EU on gender issues and identifies huge differences in social models both among EU member states and in China, as well as big differences between cities and rural areas in China. One big difference the author notes is that the EU members, candidate states and civil societies can communicate well with each other to improve the status of women, and they have a special committee in the European Parliament dealing with women's issues including the Committee on Women's Rights and Equal Opportunities, an equal opportunities consultation committee in the EU Commission, whereas China does not have such forums. Yang stresses the need to create some institutions to increase communication between the central government and regional governments, and between governments and citizens in China. Yang concludes that China has an advantage over the EU because China has a strong central government, so it is relatively easy for the Chinese government to create a specific sector as a bridge between civil society and policy makers, necessary to realize gender equality, make policies fit for women's conditions, and improve the relief procedure and institutions on employment discrimination. But, it is hard for the EU to do that, Yang says. All that EU member states can do is to try to make common gender policies at the Union level and, at the same time, make specific policies on their own according to their different situations.

4. Conclusion

This book is a product of the series of workshops held by the EU-NESCA joint research members. In this volume, distinguished scholars provide young scholars with a chance to write articles. The quality of the papers varies, but the group, with diverse academic backgrounds ranging from political science and economics to history and law, succeeds in exploring the relations between the efforts at regional integration and the implementation of human rights. In the first

part of the book, more senior scholars from Europe and Asia present their theoretical views on regional integration and human rights, and in the second part, younger scholars offer more critical case-based analyses.

The book offers some answers to its main question of whether there exists a relationship between the efforts at regional integration and the implementation of human rights. In this reviewer's opinion, although negative situations remain concerning the implementation of human rights standards and norms, regional integration can help strengthen human rights and integration together, and regional integration can in turn be deepened if it involves the human rights dimension and helps to enhance the sense of regional community, greater legitimacy and social commitment.

As we survey the cases in Europe, Asia and Africa, we see that regional integration inevitably results in actions that have consequences for the realization of human rights in the countries that make up each region. It is obvious, however, that regional integration in Europe, Asia and Africa is proceeding in its own way, at its own pace, and under different circumstances in each region, with its unique mix of cultural, historical, social, economic and political backgrounds. We cannot easily compare the integration processes in the different regions by using one theory or one measure. Each region faces its own human rights issues at each level of integration that it reaches.

On the European front, the integration of some human rights elements into a regional economic entity such as the EU is already evident, as is seen in its incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, its recognition of the European Convention, and its future accession to the latter. In Asia, however, the process is more complex at this point. ASEAN has been referring increasingly to human rights, at least in its rhetoric, and has recently set up a human rights body, AICHR. The ASEAN Charter refers to human rights in its preamble and in its various sections. Yet, one should not be disingenuous about the political context behind all of this. As Muntarbhorn points out, democracy is linked to human rights in the European context—such as the precondition that only democratic countries are allowed to join the EU—but there is no such stipulation for ASEAN, and this absence has implications for the implementation of human rights.

The Asian region is arguably too large and too heterogeneous to have one inter-governmental human rights system for the entire geographic space. The only human rights treaty of a rather broad geographic scale is the Arab Charter on Human Rights, which covers West Asian countries. At a more modest level, some initiatives are found in Asia, e.g., anti-trafficking treaties and child welfare arrangements ratified by the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, and the Declaration on the Rights of Migrant Workers adopted by ASEAN. The way ahead for Asia may be to explore further smaller scale efforts for specific issues.

As for a monitoring system for human rights implementation, Europe already has supranational judicial diplomacy between judicial actors of the ECJ and the ECourtHR, which has a deep impact on law and policymaking in the region, but Asia has not reached the stage to create such a system.

It is uncertain whether Asian countries can set up a regional court similar to the European courts, or a commission or committee with the power to advise or adjudicate. It is even uncertain whether Asia will see the emergence of a channel for individuals to present cases against a state or an institution for its human rights abuse. The only international channel available for Asian people currently is found at the UN. UN human rights treaties and mechanisms open doors to complaints by individuals.

As regional integration deepens in the future, there will be demands for additional human rights treaties and mechanisms, and if necessary, member states will accordingly explore ways to establish appropriate measures. However, if regional integration in Asia reaches a very deep level, paradoxically it may become harder to enforce human rights in member states. Sovereign

states acting on their own can more easily legislate for human rights. The issue of national sovereignty versus the rights of individual citizens will emerge at some future point. There needs to be further development of legal systems, mature discussion and careful research on the ways to use collective sovereignty of nations for human rights purposes. We need to continue to monitor the future evolution of the relationship between the efforts toward regional integration and the implementation of human rights.

Notes

- ¹ This “motto” of ASEAN is mentioned both in the Preamble to the ASEAN Charter and in Article 36.
- ² Address by ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan on “Possible Cooperation between ASEAN and ALA,” at the 10th ASEAN Law Association (ALA) General Assembly in Hanoi, Vietnam, October 15, 2009. The address is available at <http://www.aseanlawassociation.org/10GAdocs/speech3.pdf> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- ³ Terms of Reference for the High Level Panel on an ASEAN Human Rights Body were approved by the 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on July 21, 2008. See <http://www.aseansec.org/HLP-TOR.pdf> (accessed January 27, 2011). The High Level Panel was created by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in 2008 in the process of consulting people in the ASEAN member-states on the “powers and functions” of this human rights body. It held meetings with members of the civil society and other sectors in Singapore in July 2008, Thailand in August 2008 and the Philippines in September 2008.
- ⁴ In accordance with Article 41 of the ASEAN Charter, the Terms of Reference of the ASEAN human rights body were approved by the 41st ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on July 21, 2008.
- ⁵ The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was launched during the ASEAN Summit in July 2009. For further information, visit <http://www.aseansec.org/22769.htm> (accessed January 27, 2011).
- ⁶ Lisbon Treaty, *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 306, Vol. 50 (December 17, 2007).

Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, eds., *Non-Western International Relations Theory—Perspectives on and beyond Asia*, London and New York: Routledge, 2010.

Seiko Mimaki

1. Introduction

In his seminal article in 1977, “An American Science: International Relations,” Stanley Hoffmann wrote that International Relations Theory, born and raised in America, is “too close to the fire,” and so “needs triple distance.” The discipline, according to Hoffmann, should move away from the contemporary world towards the past, from the perspective of a superpower toward that of the weak and the revolutionary; from the glide into policy science, it should relocate itself to that steep ascent toward the peaks of traditional political philosophy and the questions it raises.¹

Since then we have witnessed Critical IR Theory in full bloom. According to Critical IR theorists, knowledge cannot be value-free. As Robert W. Cox pointed out, theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose. Of course, theory can be sophisticated so as to transcend its own perspective, but the standpoint of the original proponent of a theory is always contained somehow within it. Moreover, positivist theorists in an hegemonic country tend to legitimize the political and social structure of the world in which their country enjoys its dominant status, by using their theoretical knowledge. That is why we need “critical” theory, which is differentiated from traditional “problem-solving” theory. While the latter focuses on understanding the present international order, the former has a normative concern with social changes and human emancipation.²

Critical IR theorists have made much progress in revealing how traditional IR theories, especially Realists’ state-centric analyses, contributed to perpetuating and reinforcing the existing American hegemonic order, and to expanding the scope of IR Theory beyond the level of the nation state to encompass the whole of humanity. Many voices that had long been marginalized within the IR community have gradually come to be heard by their mainstream counterparts. Many IR specialists have become increasingly aware of the America-centric character of IR Theory and have endeavored to reconstruct the field as a non-American enterprise. More attention has been paid to various indigenous intellectual traditions of non-American IR communities.

Critical IR theorists have gained ground in Western IR communities, as is evident in the growth of British IR theory, continental IR theory, and Commonwealth IR theory.³ Although some scholars have referred to non-Western thoughts as a possible source of IR theory,⁴ most of their attention has been on the writings of critical thinkers of European heritage, such as Kant, Hegel, Marx, Gramsci, Adorno, Horkheimer and Habermas. As a result, while they have been successful in discovering the possibility of de-Americanizing the IR field, the Critical IR theorists have not been able to reveal the West-centric bias in the field sufficiently.

Overcoming West-centric IR is not just an academic problem. It is becoming necessary for those of us in the non-Western world. In the 21st century, non-Western countries have increased their influence, and the gap between the current West-centric IR Theory and the realities of the world has become a serious problem. We are now in urgent need to properly reflect non-Western voices and perspectives in the IR Theory debate and to construct truly global IR theories for ana-

lyzing and understanding the dynamics of the world in which we live.

Therein lie the novelty and significance of the book reviewed here. Citing Robert Cox's argument, "Theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose," the editors of this collective work assert that the mainstream IR theories, including Critical IR theories, are presented as universal theories but speak for the West, thusly perpetuating its power, prosperity, and influence. The central goal of this book is to challenge the Western domination from outside the West by introducing non-Western IR traditions to the Western IR audience; all the while, it encourages non-Westerners to contribute to the IR Theory debate in proportion to the degree to which they are involved in their practice. Including case studies on Chinese, Japanese, South Korean, Southeast Asian, Indian and Islamic indigenous IR, this book challenges the current West-centered IR field.

In the volume's introductory chapter, "Why is there no non-Western international relations theory?" Acharya and Buzan argue that IR scholars should pay more attention to the non-Western IR tradition and its theoretical possibilities because "Western IRT [IR Theory] is both too narrow in its source and too dominant in its influence to be good for the health of the wider project to understand the social world in which we live" (p. 2). An original aspect of the book is that every contributor tries to identify distinctive Asian patterns, whereas previous theoretical works on Asia have been concerned with just "testing" Western IR theories on Asia. Acharya and Buzan pose five possible reasons for the absence of non-Western IR Theory: (1) Western IR Theory has discovered the right path to understanding IR; (2) Western IR Theory has acquired an hegemonic status in the Gramscian sense; (3) non-Western IR theories do exist, but are hidden; (4) local conditions discriminate against the production of IR theory; and (5) the West has had a big head start, and what we are seeing is a period of catching up. These five hypotheses are then explored in the following case study chapters and mainly in the concluding chapter, which is written by the two editors.

2. Case Study Chapters

The book then presents seven case-study chapters. The second chapter (the first case study) is "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?" written by Yaqin Qin. According to Qin, the main reason why Chinese IR Theory is absent is the traditional worldview in China, which lacks an awareness of "international-ness." The traditional Chinese worldview, called *Tianxia* (All-under-Heaven), was firmly based on the Confucian concept about the universe. In this worldview, there was no defined entity with a finite boundary, nor were there related concepts such as sovereignty and territorial integrity. This worldview was practiced in the tributary system, which endured from 221BC to the early 1880s. This system was an unequal and quasi-international system, wherein China was the sole, dominant actor maintaining stability and providing an international system for interaction among states. In this system, there was no legal equality among the constituent units and therefore there were no "like units" as neo-realists would assume. The situation changed after the Opium War (1841), and the traditional tributary system was defeated and replaced by the Westphalian system. Chinese intellectuals began to gain an awareness of Western modernity and regarded the West as the only teacher from whom to learn. They did not have much interest in creating a distinct Chinese IR school. However, Qin seems confident about creating a distinctive Chinese school of IR Theory in the future by using potentially rich sources, such as the traditional *Tianxia* worldview, the revolutionary thinking which has been a main driving force of Chinese modernization since 1898 and the reformist thinking beginning in the late 1970s that has brought about great economic development and social transformation in China.

"Why are there no non-Western theories of international relations? The case of Japan" by

Takashi Inoguchi reflects on the development of IR study in Japan and looks for elements that would be useful for the future development of Japanese IR Theory. First, Inoguchi asks, “[A]re there any theories of international relations in Japan?” His answer is a “qualified yes.” As an example, the author observes that “flying geese pattern” regional integration theory can be seen as a positivist middle-range theory. In the normative domain, Inoguchi mentions that Japan has developed a kind of “proto-constructivist” theory of identity formation. Yet, his overall assessment of Japan’s past theoretical advance is negative. According to Inoguchi, the international environment surrounding Japan did not leave much room for Japan to develop its own way of conceptualizing the world. In the interwar period, Japan was a failed challenger to American hegemony and in the post-war period, Japan has been embedded in the global governance system dominated by the United States. Moreover, the relatively weak academic tradition of positivistic hypothesis testing in social sciences and a relatively strong tradition of descriptive work in the country has also discouraged the development of distinctive Japanese IR Theory. According to Inoguchi, current Japanese IR studies are characterized by four major intellectual currents: *staatslehre*, historicism, Marxism and positivism. Even today these four traditions coexist quite amicably without significant efforts toward integration. Due to the situation described by Inoguchi as “diversity without disciplinary integration,” the Japanese IR community has been in an isolated position from the world IR communities, even from the IR communities in the neighboring countries, Korea, Taiwan and China. Inoguchi introduces the proto-theoretical arguments of the three distinguished thinkers in wartime Japan—Nishida Kitaro, an innate constructivist; Tabata Shigejiro, a popular sovereignty theorist of international law; and Hirano Yoshitaro, a Marxist theorist of regional integration—suggesting that they would have a universal audience if translated into English. Inoguchi concludes that if IR theories are understood as narrowly American-style positivistic theories, there are no Japanese IR theories, but if IR theories also include constructivists, normative theories, and legal theories, then there are Japanese IR theories.

“Why is there no non-Western international theory? Reflections on and from Korea,” written by Chaesung Chun, analyzes the reason for the relative underdevelopment of IR theorizing in Korea. Korea had long been deprived of opportunities to develop its own IR Theory. Traditionally, Korean scholars, mostly Confucian philosophers, lived in the Sino-centric tributary system. Then, Korea suffered under Western imperialist powers, followed by Japanese colonial rule. Soon after the foundation of the South Korean government in 1948, the Cold War environment placed the Korean IR community under the strong influence of American academia, which was dominated by political realism. After “importing final products” in the 1950s and 1960s, however, Korean scholars gradually turned to the task of adapting the Western theories to explaining South Korea’s international realities. With the end of Cold War, the American influence faded, and the call for Korean IR Theory became louder. Chun, while admitting that Western IR theories, especially realism and security studies, have been helpful in explaining the international relations surrounding South Korea, still stresses that many assumptions underlying Western theories cannot be uniformly applied to the international relations of Northeast Asia, which is characterized by multiple organizing principles of international relations and overlapping political identities. Chun concludes that the central challenge for a postmodern IR project is to comprehend different stages and logics in different regions within coherent theoretical frameworks, and this is the main task for non-Western academia.

The fifth chapter, “Re-imagining IR in India,” is written by Navnita Chadha Behera. Interestingly, this chapter begins by criticizing Indian scholars’ attempts at creating an indigenous, Indian IR school to catch up with Western IR communities. She warns that even if they were to succeed in creating an Indian school of IR, it would at best earn a small, compartmentalized space *within* the master narrative of the Western-dominated IR field. She suggests that, instead, Indian scholars should “re-image” IR itself toward a post-Western IR Theory. As the first step toward

this goal, she proposes a reconsideration of the three sets of *givens* in which Indian IR scholars have been embedded: infallibility of the Indian state modeled after the Westphalian nation state, thorough internalization of the philosophy of political realism, and positive faith in the wisdom of modernity. She cites Gayatri Spivak's famous sentence, "what is important in a work is what it does not say... This is not the same as a careless notation [but] what it refuses to say," and calls the reader's attention to the "silence" of traditional Indian IR communities. Traditional IR theorists in India have seldom paid attention to India's own heritages as a source of knowledge creation for new IR Theory. In the Indian IR communities, the attempts to conceptualize nationalism by India's leading figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Rabindranath Tagore were all but forgotten because they were regarded as irrelevant to the rational, scientific and modern world of IR. Even Kautilya's realist political philosophy, which predated Hobbes' "state of nature" and Machiavelli's *Prince*, has never been a serious concern for Indian IR scholars. Behera emphasizes that the Indian IR communities cannot produce a non-Western IR Theory as long as they continue to fight the intellectual battle with the West on a "turf chosen by the West, with tools designed and provided by the West and rules-of-game set by the West."

"Southeast Asia: Theory between modernization and tradition," by Alan Chong examines the absence of non-Western IR Theory in Southeast Asia. He points out that modernization, as the culmination of the region-wide processes of colonialism and nationalism, has been one of the biggest impediments to non-Western IR theorizing in Southeast Asia. Due to the strong belief in modernization, both Western scholarship on Southeast Asia and post-1945 indigenous scholarship have dismissed many indigenous sources as invalid for the modern scientific age. Mainstream Western observers of the region have explained Southeast Asian states as prone to conflict because they are insufficiently modernized along Westphalian lines, and staunch realists have presented pessimistic views of Southeast Asian regionalism. Such discourse of modernization-realism has long penetrated Southeast Asian IR scholarship. Chong warns that if Southeast Asian IR scholarship continues to delude itself within the discourse of modernization-realism, it will never be able to offer innovative Asian ideas. He concludes the chapter by introducing various attempts at transitional and hybrid theorizing as a new enterprise to develop non-Western theoretical perspectives.

The next, seventh chapter is entitled "Perceiving Indonesian approaches to international relations theory," and is written by Leonard C. Sebastian and Irman G. Lanti. Their central contention is that Indonesia may provide a useful exploratory study into non-Western theories that could be both innovative and emancipatory. The authors admit that because of weak institutional structures in Indonesian IR departments and a lack of physical resources and proper funding, there is no significant effort to develop an Indonesian IR Theory. Yet the authors are confident there is a wealth of indigenous sources that IR scholars can use for theorizing. The authors pay special attention to the politico-cultural traits of the various indigenous ethnic groups such as the Javanese, the largest ethnic group, and the Seberang communities, which have a more individualistic political culture than the Javanese. When the Javanese try to influence people, they prefer the power of "personal charisma" to the Western "power through the barrel of a gun." The Javanese would likely approach a difference of opinion by efforts to find a middle ground while the Seberang would likely approach the same situation by recognizing the differences. Especially, the Javanese political culture deeply affects Indonesian leaders' political behavior and their foreign policy. For example, in Suharto's support of the so-called "ASEAN way," we can see the influence of the Javanese conception of attaching great importance to harmony and solving differences through closed-door discussions away from the public eye. The authors conclude that the Western IR approach focusing on solely rationalist explanations or solely constructivist explanations may not capture the essence of Indonesian IR thinking, which is greatly influenced by the country's indigenous traditions.

“International relations theory and the Islamic worldview” is written by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. Her central contention is that Islam, which she defines not as a region but as a culture-religion-identity-worldview, recognizes and theorizes about the world sharply different from the West. Tadjbakhsh asserts that the nature of Islamic IR Theory is “decidedly normative,” which is based not on empirical observations of behaviors or predictions of what behaviors would be, but on how institutions reflect the essence of an idea, a norm, and a morality. For Islam, the state is not an end in itself, but is, rather, a means towards securing an Islamic “good life” and spreading Islamic values. While power/capability is the driving force in realism and neorealism, Islamic theory relies on social cohesion and a social unity for progress towards a moral good. The most typical contrast between Islamic IR Theory and Western IR Theory revolves around the idea of peace. In Islamic tradition, justice is the ultimate ethical impetus and peace should be based on justice. This concept of peace is clearly at odds with the realists’ dictum that order should precede justice. Though Western IR theories have internalized the Enlightenment norms of secularization and rationality and seriously neglected the ideational factors such as religion, culture and identity, these ideational factors are critically important to understand Islamic international relations. Contrary to the Westphalian model, in the Middle East strong sub-state and powerful super-state identities always compete with the state for loyalty. Islamic states are always in dilemma between the aim of the state to survive in the international arena and the aim of Islam to maintain domestic legitimacy. Tadjbakhsh concludes that Islamic IR Theory does exist, but it is not always put into practice because of the ultimate tension between the “raison of state” and the “raison of Islam.”

3. Theoretical Chapters

In the ninth chapter, “World history and the development of non-Western international relations theory,” Buzan and Richard Little stress the importance of bringing more historical world perspectives into IR Theory. IR theorists and world historians are still alienated from each other despite the importance of developing synergistic relationships between their two fields. Why? The authors point to the IR theorists’ deep-rooted Eurocentrism. World historians are rapidly moving away from a Eurocentric perspective. There is increasing interest in comparative method, or in Pomeranz’s words, the principle of “reciprocal comparison,” which entails “viewing both sides of the comparison as deviation when seen through the expectation of the other, rather than leaving one as always the norm.” In the field of world history, there is also growing attention to “connected history,” which questions the established boundaries and the established notion of periodization. By contrast, most IR theorists are still locked into a Eurocentric framework. They do not have much interest in theorizing about the emergence and expansion of a global international system/society. Neorealists and neoliberals take the existence of such a system/society as given. Constructivists have begun investigating the evolution of the European international system/society, but they have yet to develop a global take on this issue. Even the English School, which has a clear awareness of comparative and world historical perspectives on the study of international relations, has not found a way out of Eurocentrism. For example, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson’s *The Expansion of International Society* (1984), which deals with the question of global connections, presupposes that the basic features of the contemporary international political structure have been inherited from Europe. They even insist that “it was in fact Europe and not America, Asia or Africa that first dominated and, in so doing, unified the world; it is not our perspective but the historical record itself that can be called Eurocentric.” Problematically, many IR theorists would accept this argument. The authors insist that in order to develop a more nuanced understanding of a global international society, IR theorists should bring more world historical

perspectives into IR Theory, and move away from the assumption that the history of modern Europe has encompassed quintessential elements of international relations. They conclude the chapter by stressing that non-Western IR theorists should have a crucial role to play in this challenge.

The concluding chapter, “On the possibility of a non-Western international relations theory,” is written by Acharya and Buzan. Here the authors answer the five main questions posed in their introductory chapter, and offer their assessment of the prospect for building non-Western IR Theory in the future. About the first possible reason of the absence of non-Western IR Theory—that Western IR Theory has discovered the right path to understanding IR—the authors assert that Western IR Theory is not always the “right path” to understanding non-Western international relations, and as such, it is challengeable. On the second hypothesis—that Western IR Theory has acquired a hegemonic status in the Gramscian sense—they admit that the hegemonic standing of Western IR theory is one of the core reasons for the absence of non-Western IR theory in Asia. They also confirm the third and fourth hypotheses that non-Western IR theories do exist but are hidden, and that local conditions discriminate against the production of IR theory. They emphasize that in order to fully explore the “hidden” non-Western IR theories, it would be necessary to improve the unsatisfactory academic situations surrounding non-Western IR scholars. They then admit the validity of the fifth hypothesis, that the West has had a big head start, and what we are seeing is a period of catching up, though they also emphasize that Asia is not in a mere copying mode and there is plenty of room for divergent development.

After verifying the five hypotheses, the editors confirm that the current Western-centric IR Theory does not capture the needs and conditions in Asia adequately, and therefore, it will definitely be necessary to develop non-Western IR Theory. Overall, the editors are optimistic about the future development of non-Western IR theories. Certainly it would be an exaggeration to say that a fully-fledged Asian or non-Western IR Theory will emerge soon, but there are plenty of pre-theoretical resources in the non-Western world, including classical traditions, thinking and foreign policies of leaders, and works of scholars. Moreover, there are various paths to developing non-Western IR Theory. The editors emphasize that the development of non-Western IR Theory need not be a matter of projecting pure indigenous ideas, nor should it be a matter of wholesale adoption/borrowing of foreign ones. It can also proceed through mutual adaptation or contextualization of Western ideas, in a process that Acharya calls “constitutive localization.” The reader sees the IR Theory debate broadened in a constructive direction toward a truly global IR Theory.

4. Conclusion

Since the 1980s, a significant number of critical IR works have posed serious questions about the America-centric nature of mainstream IR Theory. However, this book is novel in its attention to the more deep-rooted problem, that is, the West-centric nature of IR Theory, which even distinguished critical IR works could not properly reveal. However, considering the fact that this book is virtually the first major attempt to discover and construct non-Western IR Theory, we may suggest some points for further development.

First, although all of the contributors agree that it is necessary to discover and construct non-Western IR Theory, they do not agree on *what kind* of non-Western theory should be built. Some contributors focus on the possibilities of non-Western “problem-solving” theory, which could address and explain various problems in Asia more properly than Western IR theories, while others seek a non-Western “critical” theory for the purpose of bringing emancipation to non-Western peoples whose voices have been denied by Western discursive power. In this reviewer’s view, the proposition about the various possibilities for non-Western “problem-solving” theory is more de-

veloped than that about the call for non-Western “critical” theory.

Second, we should ask whether efforts to create an indigenous IR school, such as a Chinese IR school, a Japanese IR school or an Islamic IR school make sense as a critique of Western-hegemonic IR Theory.⁵ The search for an indigenous IR Theory does not necessarily include a counter-hegemonic project. Rather, in some cases, it may serve as a justification of hegemony. For example, the recent calls for a distinctively Chinese IR school coincide with the rise of Chinese power in the 21st century. In some cases China’s traditional concepts, such as *Tianxia* (All-under-Heaven), have been used to justify China’s hierarchical empire rather than to achieve a post-hegemonic order.⁶ Among all the contributors, with thanks, perhaps, to the strong academic tradition of subaltern studies and post-colonial studies in India, Behera is most clearly aware of this danger. She warns that creating an Indian IR school is not a real solution to the Western-dominated IR Theory, saying that such an attempt would at best earn some space for Indian scholars *within* the existing IR framework but never contribute to building a *new* non-hegemonic site of knowledge where different traditions of the IR field all over the world can engage in a healthy dialogue and co-exist. Acharya and Buzan stress that “the likely role of non-Western IRT is to change the balance of power within the debates, and in so doing change the priorities, perspective and interests that those debates embody” (p. 236). However, in the reviewer’s opinion, the greatest possibilities for non-Western IR Theory may not lie in bringing about changes *within* the existing IR, but in creating a *new* post-Western, anti-hegemonic IR Theory.

Finally, if non-Western IR scholars are to seek a post-Western IR Theory, one of their most important tasks will be the theorization of the colonialist and racist hierarchy that endured as the dominant factor of international relations in past centuries. The so-called “Westphalian strait-jacket,” which treats international relations as a closed system of “like units,” has made us blind to the simple historical fact that the society of nations was not a society of equals, but a society of unequals until African independence in the mid-1960s. Even after the international order is formally decolonized, *de facto* colonialism and racism are never things of the past. Yet, Western IR theorists have largely been silent on the problem of Western imperialism and racism despite their huge impact on non-Western peoples.⁷ Even Critical IR theorists, whose main goal is human emancipation, have not adequately addressed the anti-colonial struggles and anti-racist struggles that took place all over the world in the 20th century.⁸ Today, Western IR theorists are increasingly aware that the development of the IR field has become entwined with Western imperialism in the real world,⁹ but non-Western IR scholars can definitely play a role in extending the emancipatory project to the deprived peoples in the non-Western world and in opening up the possibilities for post-colonial and post-racist Critical IR Theory.

Notes

- ¹ Stanley Hoffman, “An American Social Science – International Relations,” *Daedalus*, Vol. 106, No. 3 (Summer 1977), pp. 41-60.
- ² Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” *Millennium*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 1981), pp. 126-155. For an overview of the core arguments of Critical IR Theory, see Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White, “Still Critical after All These Years? The Past, Present and Future of Critical Theory in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 33 (July 2007), *Special Issue—Critical International Relations Theory after 25 Years*, pp. 3-24.
- ³ See, for example, Steve Smith, ed., *International Relations: British and American Perspectives*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1985; Robert Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis, *International Relations—Still an American Social Science: Toward Diversity in International Thought*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001; Knud Erik Jørgensen, “Continental IR Theory: The Best Kept Secret,” *European Jour-*

nal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 9-42; Knud Erik Jørgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen, eds., *International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Schools, Destinations*, London: Routledge, 2006; and Timothy Shaw and Lucian M. Ashworth, "Commonwealth Perspectives on International Relations," *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 5 (September 2010), pp. 1149-1165.

- ⁴ For example, Robert W. Cox, "Towards a Posthegemonic Conceptualization of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun," in Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- ⁵ This point is also developed by Ching-Chang Chen's excellent review of this book: Chen, "The Absence of Non-Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 2011), pp. 1-23.
- ⁶ William A. Callahan, "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-hegemonic or a New Hegemony?" *International Studies Review*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (December, 2008), pp. 749-761.
- ⁷ Robert Vitalis, "The Grateful and Genours Liberal Gesture: Making Racism Invisible in American International Relations," *Millenium*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 331-356; Branwen Gruffydd Jones, *Decolonizing International Relations*, London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006.
- ⁸ John M. Hobson, "Is Critical Theory Always for the White West and for Western Imperialism? Beyond Westphalian towards a Post-Racist Critical IR," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 33, Special Issues (July 2007), pp. 91-116.
- ⁹ David Long and Brian C. Schmidt, *Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005.

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