JAPAN, CHINA AND THE CASE FOR EAST ASIAN REGIONAL COOPERATION

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the relations between Japan and China as the key determinant of East Asian regional cooperation. To this purpose, methodological approaches of realism, liberalism and constructivism and the implications of their interpretations for East Asia are discussed. The paper argues that first, difficulties in China-Japan relations result from the rapidly changing economic, social and political environment in which China and Japan find themselves today. Second, the paper proposes that a Japan with a standard foreign and security policy which takes into account its close economic and social relationships with Northeast Asia, and a China having accomplished its opening up and reform project would likely be in a position to find common ground on how to tackle future questions of bilateral and regional concern. Third, it is argued that multilateral cooperation is a necessary framework to support the current transformation process by addressing the numerous transnational challenges to East Asian societies and reducing strategic uncertainties created by the rapidly changing East Asian environment.

INTRODUCTION

Due to the involvement of great powers and many of the world's leading national economies, international relations of Northeast Asia are not only of particular interest to the region itself, but to the whole international community. Since the end of bipolarity, the world has witnessed a China which is continuously increasing its 'comprehensive national strength' while promoting its 'peaceful rise' or 'peaceful development' and the construction of a 'harmonious (international) society'. At the same time Japan is pursuing the path towards a 'normal state', becoming more and more active in the field of foreign and security politics. Both developments and the influence of United States' (US) policies in the Asia-Pacific, represent a considerable potential for rivalries and frictions between great powers in Northeast Asia. Economic relations are major drivers of Northeast Asian international cooperation. Over the past decades, economic development caused a surge in inter-Asian trade flows and led to a certain degree of division of labour between East Asian countries and the emergence of an economic and political regional sphere. However, despite steadily growing interdependence, political regional cooperation has remained modest and distrust continues to hinder the further integration of markets and societies. Most striking is the continuing antagonism between the two major actors in the region, China and Japan.

The security structure of Northeast Asia continues to be dominated by the bilateral alliances of the US with South Korea and Japan. However, since the end of the Cold War, various initiatives for multilateral regional political and security cooperation in East Asia have been promoted. Most important are the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) established in 1994 and the ASEAN+3 (APT) framework which became operational with the first summit held in Kuala Lumpur in 1997 and eventually led the way to the first East Asian Summit in 2005. Also, APEC despite its focus on economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific has some important political functions.[1] While ASEAN seemed to be in 'the driver's seat' for the first phase of regional integration it has become apparent that the 'ASEAN-way', stressing the norm of non-interference not only substantially limits the capacity of existing ASEAN-related institutions, but also hinders their development and expansion into new areas. In order to address the strategic uncertainties caused by changes in the region, and to address long-standing sources of conflict, more pragmatic and effective approaches to multilateral cooperation seem necessary. The numerous great powers involved in Northeast Asia however disagree on the purpose and scope of multilateral cooperation. The proceedings at the first East Asian Summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 displayed the extent of disagreement between China and Japan. Commenting on ASEAN+3, Acharya notes that further progress in regional integration would require the overcoming of Sino-Japanese competition for influence in East Asia and the demonstration of the ability to provide concrete solutions to regional problems.[2] Van Ness as well, is convinced that the future of East Asia will be determined by the nature of China-Japan relations.[3] The importance of China-Japan relations for regional cooperation, and thus for a positive development of the East Asian region, raises questions about the impact of China-Japan relations on East Asian regional cooperation and about the current trend in China-Japan relations. This paper explores the reasons and dynamics which lie behind the attitudes of these two countries towards each other and their views of the East Asian region.

This paper argues that first, difficulties in China-Japan relations result from the rapidly changing environment in which China and Japan find themselves.

Globalization and economic development have transformed socio-economic structures and brought about new challenges to governments and civil societies in both countries. These developments necessitate new ways of thinking, including new understandings of the roles of China and Japan and new approaches to address the emerging challenges in East Asia. The Chinese embrace of the modernization project has led to high economic growth rates and caused the deep transformation of domestic social structures. The loss of orientation after the successful completion of the Japanese modernization project at the end of the 1990s and the subsequent entering of the post-modern era also brings new challenges for which common understandings and solutions are no longer adequate. This causes uncertainties at the international, state and sub-state levels and no consensus about how to address these challenges has been found. Additionally, the regional environment has changed in a way which, after decades of social and political separation, brought China and Japan together again and therefore drastically increased their roles in view of the other. Second, the paper proposes that a Japan with a standard foreign and security policy which takes into account its close economic and social relationships with Northeast Asia, and China having successfully accomplished its opening up and reform project would likely be in a position to find common ground on how to tackle future questions of bilateral and regional concern. This would inevitably lead the way to stronger social and political regional integration. Third, given the uncertainties originating from domestic and systemic challenges to China, Japan and Northeast Asia as a whole, it is argued that multilateral cooperation is a necessary framework to support the current transformation process. Such cooperation will be able to provide guidelines for state actions and may create and clarify international norms and thereby mitigate uncertainties about individual state policies and reduce collective action problems.

The first section of this paper is a brief review of existing approaches to East Asian international relations and their consequences for regional integration. The second section looks at the domestic and systemic determinants of the Chinese and Japanese identities as constituting elements of their respective foreign-policies. The third section offers the paper's conclusion by looking at how the interaction between China and Japan influences regional cooperation and integration and vice versa.

DIFFERENT METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES, DIFFERENT FUTURE PROSPECTS

Studies of the Northeast Asian region are heavily influenced by the theoretical approaches taken. Given the complexity and interdependence of the salient issues, and despite methodological frameworks applied, research outcomes often reflect the personal background and research interests of the authors. Generally, power-based explanations, due to their assumptions that the roles and characters of states are given, tend to focus on the structural level of analysis, to highlight the existing security dilemmas which split the region into two and consequently paint a sceptical outlook on cooperation. Christensen, for instance, examines the Northeast Asian region and its security dilemmas from a realist viewpoint.[4] He argues that the presence of the US military in the region prevents security dilemmas from exacerbating. He posits that the US, in its role as an offshore-balancer is able to provide the necessary security for South Korea and Japan while restraining the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and thereby reassuring China. Kang rejects pessimistic approaches which stem from realist or liberal thinking.[5] While the realists over-emphasize the role of material power in determining policy outcomes, liberals tend to argue that the lack of formal multilateral institutions means that the region remains unstable. Instead of anarchy,

Kang perceives the East Asian states as embedded in a hierarchic structure which enables accommodation between the great powers of the region and defies the realist prediction and the need for policies of mutual balancing.

Newer theoretical approaches acknowledge that non-material aspects do wield significant influence on foreign and security policy-making. Buzan and Weaver, although building on realist assumptions, developed a framework which focuses on the growing importance of regional dynamics in international relations.[6] They argue that the East Asian region including Australasia constitutes one Regional Security Complex (RSC), which is mainly defined through the geographical proximity of its states. Security policies within the RSC are explained by a mix of realist arguments and constructivist elements. According to Buzan and Waever, RSC are determined by the distribution of material power and historically informed patterns of amity and enmity. Moreover, these scholars emphasize the impact of securitization on national and international security practice. While Buzan and Waever are quite able to describe international relations in East Asia, their approach is a rather static explanation and falls back on conventional realist predictions in case of changes in the system, leaving little space for regional cooperation.

Other scholars take a closer look at processes which constitute the interests of states, arguing that not only material factors, but also the interactions between states generate, or socially construct, ideas of societies about their own role, about who they are and how to relate to others in a specific environment. These constructivist approaches differ from rationalist theories such as realism or liberalism in three respects: first, actors are not considered as atomistic egoists, but social entities; second, actors' interests are not exogenously given, but constituted through social interactions; third, society is not seen as a strategic realm where actors rationally pursue their interests, but as a constitutive realm, an environment which generates actors as knowledgeable social and political agents, the realm that makes them who they are.[7] These approaches do not dismiss the influence of material structures, but they leave more room for the explanation of international cooperation since they are not based on the assumption of an anarchic self-help system and combine analyses of sub-state, state and systemic levels. In his research on the drivers behind East Asian regionalism, Rozman primarily looks at the national identities of China, Japan, Russia, Korea and the US and how they relate to one-another.[8] He argues that the growing importance of regions in world politics is a result of processes of globalisation and that regional spheres help to mitigate its impact on states. Wendt explains international relations with a systemic constructivist approach.[9] He argues that the ability to overcome collective action problems – realists would term them as security dilemmas, liberalists would depict them as prisoners' dilemmas, depends on whether the actors' social identities create self-interests or collective interests. Self-interest is determined by particular representations of the relationship between the 'self' and 'other'. Explaining the formation of self-interest, Wendt distinguishes between domestic and systemic determinants.

With regard to the East Asian region, each of the three schools shows explanatory weaknesses. Realist approaches have difficulties in explaining why Japan does not balance the US or at least China and why South Korea or Vietnam do not balance China or Japan. Moreover, realist political strategies face problems of how to avoid conflicts which in turn would severely harm national interests. For instance, Chinese realist strategists face the dilemma in how to increase their material power in order to make China more secure against the US-Japan alliance without pushing Japan more into the arms of the US and provoking more offensive policies from Tokyo,

Washington, as well as Taipei. On the other side, realists when designing US security policies towards Asia, face the dilemma of how to contain China's influence without by this same strategy promoting the emergence of a revisionist state they want to avoid or contain.[10] Also, rationalist approaches have difficulties in explaining some specific policies in Northeast Asia. One question for instance is why Japan prioritises the resolution of open questions about a group of abductees over the prevention of a hostile and nuclear armed North Korea. Liberalist explanations face the criticism of failing to explain why there is still considerable lack of trust and rivalry between the highly interdependent trading partners in East Asia, China and Japan. Also, it is difficult to explain in liberalist terms why even common values of democracy and common security threats cannot prevent South Korea and Japan from having considerable rifts in their bilateral relations. Lastly, it is apparent that multilateral institutions such as ASEAN, ARF, ASEAN+3 and APEC are widely unable to address regional security issues and bring the stake-holding states closer together in search of solutions. Constructivist scholars need to admit that especially the governments of great powers such as the US, Russia, China and Japan think in realist categories and therefore also act accordingly. This gives power-based explanations considerable value. Moreover, the effects of global developments such as questions related to climate change, energy security or societal changes on state identities are difficult to explain with constructivist arguments alone.

JAPANESE AND CHINESE EAST ASIAN IDENTITIES

Looking at present China-Japan relations, main aspects consist of the ongoing increase in economic interdependence combined with increasing numbers of people-to-people exchange in the form of tourism, education and business relations on one hand. On the other hand, political tensions over interpretations of the common past, delineations of territorial claims and questions of regional foreign and security policies such as the denuclearization and stability of the Korean peninsula, the status of Taiwan and the modernization and deployment of conventional and nuclear armed forces top the bilateral agenda.

These controversial debates reflect uncertainties about how to address the domestic, regional and global challenges China and Japan are facing. As it is apparent, both states face multiple and intertwined challenges to their national (traditional) security, economic, environmental and food security as well as social stability. Consequently, new policies and the adoption of new ways of thinking are necessary in order to successfully confront these challenges. The East Asian political environment influences and is influenced by the changing identities of China and Japan. There is a need to significantly redefine their roles in the national, bilateral, regional and global contexts. This means that both China and Japan need to find new definitions of the 'self' and 'other', which will then constitute new social identities in the East Asian regional context.[11] As noted above, there exist many good reasons for both states to work together in addressing salient regional security issues. However, bilateral and, thus, regional multilateral cooperation remains difficult. This produces a number of collective action problems which stem from a particular representation of the 'self' and 'other', which promote self-interests before collective interests. A balance between the two poles within a national identity would mean that leaders would take into account their counterpart's views and concerns and recognize commonalities, whereas the absence of positive identification would make the other party a mere object of regional politics and define national interests with regard to narrow self-

interests only. This is necessarily a mutually constituting process which is not only influenced by the two actors' perceptions, but includes a wide range of factors.

The following section tries to identify domestic and systemic factors which influence the way Chinese and Japanese leaders think about their role in East Asia and how they look at the roles of other actors and subsequently enact foreign policies. It therefore focuses on issues which have particular influence on the perceptions of the 'self' and 'other' in the bilateral context. It is necessary to note that the distinction between domestic and systemic determinants serves only to structure the arguments. It is the actual purpose of the concept of identity to link the sub-state, state and systemic factors with each-other.

The concept of the identity of a nation answers the questions: Who are we? What should we collectively aspire to be? What is especially important about being Japanese or Chinese? And what is it that significantly distinguishes us from the rest of the world?[12] When looking at states' identities, it is important to distinguish between the formation and the enactment of identity. Also, the officially promoted identity is not necessarily congruent with the actual identity. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the concept of identity '(…) is a bridging concept which serves to integrate studies of political culture, role theory, *realpolitik* and *idealpolitik* perspectives on national interest and purpose, and long-time continuities amid historical flux'.[13] A state may therefore have multiple identities which may even conflict with each other and, apart from their constantly changing nature, become variably salient in particular situations.[14] When analyzing foreign and security policy making, the concept of securitization is also helpful to explain how political systems react to new situations and use specific issues to bolster their legitimacy and promote their interests. The securitization of a specific issue and an actor connected to that issue changes the representation of the 'self' and 'other'. The other actor is depicted in specific terms which highlight the way it is different from the 'self'. The securitizing actor argues that the situation therefore requires special means to deal with threats originating from that 'other' actor. Securitization is a direct consequence of the inability to deal with a new situation through normal political processes.[15]

According to Wendt, domestic determinants of identity formation can be grouped into three aspects. First, the corporate nature of the state is of relevance. The making of a group, that is, a state, creates a feeling of self (insiders) and others (outsiders). Second, the nature of state-society relations is important to understand the formation of self-interest. Lastly, nationalism, the collective identity based on cultural, linguistic and ethnical ties is a domestic determinant of self-interest. However, Wendt does not further elaborate on these categories. Dittmer and Kim contend that a comprehensive investigation of national identities should not only look at categories which differentiate the insiders from the outsiders, but also encompass the symbol-system of a nation-state with which the community identifies.[16] For the purpose of this study, that is, to analyse collective action problems, it seems useful to structure the arguments roughly according to the lines of Wendt's categorization.

In sum, domestic determinants in China and Japan have a strong influence on their respective national identities which in turn constitute interests in their foreign policies. In both countries, the turbulent history from the middle of the 19th to the middle of the 20th century led to the creation of narratives about the past which helped rebuild the identities of the Chinese and Japanese states after the end of World War II and the Chinese civil war. These common understandings about the nation were formed by the respective elites to bolster their rule and to stabilize the state as a social construct. Moreover, the emergence of the Cold War, namely the fact that the US

administration decided to build up Japan as a shield against communism, deeply affected the understanding about the past and thus shaped the nation's view of its own role in the region – a region which was for decades split into two blocs. Only after the end of the Cold War, political space for the regional actors to substantially expand their international cooperation beyond the establishment diplomatic relations opened up. However, this space is still restricted by the remaining divisions of the Cold War on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Straits.

Additionally, in China and Japan, the contemporary political systems are deeply conditioned by the state-building processes of the post-war period. This is most apparent in the long ruling periods of the CPC and the LDP. While the Chinese system is considerably more restrictive towards the emergence of a civil society and potentially hinders the socialization of political and societal actors, the Japanese system displays an inward-looking, conservative perspective which is focussed on the US as the dominating point of reference. After relative stability in the 1970s and 1980s, rapid societal changes within China and Japan, and in their environment, accelerated the processes of identity formation and adaptation. The CPC as well as the LDP-led political systems have to prove their ability to address the new challenges. Numerous uncertainties about how the two governments can solve salient challenges to the Chinese and Japanese societies make people look back into the past in order to find solutions and self-confidence. This may lead to growing nationalism since 'pride in past accomplishments can translate into confidence about an uncertain future.'[17]

Considering the long common history of China and Japan, it becomes apparent that each takes an important place in the other's understanding of the 'self' and is therefore an indispensable part of their respective national identities. The consequence is that for China, it is Japan that is the most significant 'other' and for Japan, it is China that is the most important 'other'. This is despite the fact that the US does have considerable influence on the political thinking of both states. The respective understandings of the past and thus the understanding of the 'self', coupled with the effects of the challenged societal and governmental structures, make the 'other' more estranged and differentiated from the 'self'. This complicates bilateral and regional cooperation. Having had a look at domestic influences on a state's understanding about its own role and its own identity, the next section looks at how these aspects fit into the context of a state's regional and global environment.

Three types of mechanisms influence collective identity formation at the systemic level: structural contexts, systemic processes and strategic practice.[18] The description of the intersubjective structural context includes the discussion of mutual threat perceptions which arise from social knowledge, shared understandings and expectations, as well as definitions of the 'self' and 'other' resulting from the perception of the present security order. Intersubjective structures are not static, but influenced by systemic processes and strategic practices. Therefore, systemic processes are dynamics in the external context of state action which alter the environment for all subjects. Apart from increasing economic interdependence, scarcity of fossil fuels, the effects of climate change, global food shortages, lack of drinkable water and the trans-national pollution of air and seas belong to this category of developments which alter the environment in which states conduct security policies. Strategic practices describe rhetoric and behavioural actions of a state which affect the perceptions of other actors,[19] which means that political discourses in one state are created and influenced by foreign and security policies of other states and vice versa.

In contrast to the views of scholars of classic realism and neo-realism, this paper argues that material structures explain little by themselves. It is the views on

them that give them meaning and label material power as threatening, potentially threatening, neutral or conductive to the interest of a state confronted with them. It is therefore not clear from the beginning whether economic or military power constitutes security threats, but it depends on how they are perceived and what the (self-) perceived role of the observer in the structure is. This does not mean, however, that material structures do not matter. As current discourses about the East Asian security order clearly show, the facts that some states' economies grow faster and that their armies are being modernized, influence how other states look at them. It also changes the view states have of their own position and role within the system. This section thus looks at how perceptions of the material security structure in East Asia influence the views of China and Japan on the representation of the 'self' and 'other'.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the structure of the Northeast Asian region has been characterized by the presence of the US as the sole superpower with military bases in the western Pacific, Japan and Korea, as well as Japan as a maritime great power on the one hand. On the other hand, these states face the great powers of Russia and a 'rising' China. While South Korea as a middle power is still increasing its economic and military strength, it is caught in the division of the peninsula remaining from the Cold War. The regional security architecture continues to be dominated by the alliances of the US with South Korea, Japan and Australia, and Washington's commitment to the status quo of Taiwan. The strategic cooperation of the US with the rising great power of India as well as increasingly important ties with Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines complement the picture. North Korea with its masses of soldiers, its ballistic missiles arsenal and weapons of mass destruction represents a potential source of conflict. According to the realist reading, the main issue however is the 'rise of China', that is, the increase of Chinese military and economic power relative to that of the US and its allies. Important aspects of the discourse are the facts that the US is tied down in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and that the stagnation of its economy is looming. These issues cloud the prospects of the US ability to project power into the western Pacific and uphold the necessary level of deterrence to perform the balancing function in order to keep the region stable.[20] Consequently, the conflict over the status of Taiwan and the nature and orientation of the regime on the Korean Peninsula are an outflow of the rivalry between the US and its allies on the one hand and a 'rising China' on the other.

A Chinese realist view first sees the unipolarity of the global system which the US is dominating. It is therefore the US's intention to prevent any other power from challenging its primacy in East Asia as it seeks to balance Chinese power, and strengthen and build up alliances with Japan, Australia, India, and possibly ASEAN states as well. The Korean Peninsula and Taiwan are two cornerstones in this strategy. Taiwan is, together with the Okinawa island chain, blocking the passage to the Pacific Ocean and controlling the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) between Northeast and Southeast Asia. In the hand of the US or a pro-US regime, Taiwan would be an 'unsinkable aircraft-carrier' for the containment and domination of China in the event of a conflict. The expansion of US forces on the Korean Peninsula would be similarly threatening because the US could advance as far as to the Chinese territorial border. In view of this potential confrontation, the increase of Chinese comprehensive national power is of utmost importance. Most worrisome is the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance with its enlarged territorial scope. Given the deliberate ambiguity in the Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation, the US could not only use facilities in Japan, but also count on support from the well-trained and equipped JSDF in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. Moreover, Japan and the US are developing a ballistic

missile defence system which is based on platforms such as Aegis equipped missile destroyers like the Japanese Kongo-Class. It could therefore not only protect US bases in Japan, but also cover warships protecting Taiwan from Chinese efforts to keep China united. Cooperation with India is potentially dangerous since the rising great power of South Asia possesses nuclear weapons and delivery systems. China-India relations are tense because of the disputes over the demarcation of borderlines in the Himalayan area. In realist terms, China needs to prevent a US-led containment by forging good relations with ASEAN states and balancing the US through an alignment with Russia and the Central Asian states. The dilemma however, is how to balance the US and deter it from interfering into Mainland-Taiwan relations without prompting a Japanese arms-build-up and pushing it even closer to the US.

A Japanese realist perspective focuses on the growing Chinese economy which produces the resources for the modernisation of its military. Beijing's economic clout enables it to strike favourable political bargains with its neighbours, especially ASEAN and the Koreas. It also increases the economic dependence of Japan on China. Additionally, the modernisation of the PLA, together with the build-up of a blue-water navy, which is about to receive nuclear ballistic submarines, is worrisome and expresses China's willingness to gain regional hegemony. This way of looking at the region creates several dilemmas for Japan. One is how to balance the dangers of abandonment or entrapment within the alliance with the US. Second, on a bigger scale the concern is not to get squeezed between the US and China, that is, to make sure to stay in the right position in the US-China-Japan triangle. Third, assuming that states try to maximize their national security to assure their survival in the inevitable conflict with other states striving for their respective national security and status, some Japanese strategists even worry about the future direction of a Korean Peninsula united under the leadership of Seoul. They fear that, given the turbulent past, a unified and powerful Korea might turn against Japan.[21] The main dilemma, however, is how to balance or contain the rise of China without provoking it to further rearm and become hostile.[22]

Despite the fact that realist explanations of East Asian security ignore important domestic factors which decisively influence foreign and security policies and despite the fact that realist patterns of thinking end up in multiple and intertwined security dilemmas, this kind of looking at the region has some explanatory value. This is mainly because realist ways of thinking are prevalent in the US, China and Japan and thus shape great power politics. However, the current security order in Europe and the majority of the East Asian states' foreign policies cannot be explained in material terms or on the basis of realist assumptions alone.[23] We need to ask for the rationale behind realist calculations and other factors which influence foreign policies, that is, to ask which factors promote a strict delineation of the 'self' and 'other' and which factors bring these two dimensions of a state's identity closer together. Systemic transformation caused by economic development and dynamics of globalization which lead to increased interdependence of states is crucial in this respect. In particular, stakeholders become more vulnerable to disturbances such as interstate and intrastate conflicts which significantly raise the opportunity-costs of failed cooperation.

Strategic processes consist of determinants which originate from gradual changes in the environment all states are in. These are not caused by specific state actions, but are the result of long-term developments, mostly on the global scale. Looking at the East Asian region, economic growth is certainly the one strategic process which has propelled the region onto the world stage and heavily influences

inra-regional dynamics. The most important feature is the growing interdependence of the East Asian economies. Since the mid-1980s, intra-regional and bilateral trade and investment flows have risen dramatically despite political animosities and security crises on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits.[24] This means that China and Japan have strong interests in a stable political environment which provides a climate conductive for investment. As a consequence, confrontations between China and the US, between China and Japan, but also on a smaller scale between China and Taiwan or on the Korean Peninsula are harmful to respective national interests. Moreover, it shows the overwhelming and still growing importance of China and Japan for the economic and political future of the East Asian region.

The value of liberal explanations is to point to larger developments in the environment of all actors, on which a single or group of states has only limited influence. Strategic processes lead to growing interdependence of states in the international system. As a consequence, states need to establish norms and regimes to regulate and coordinate their policies. Examples are the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Kyoto Protocol and the Chiang Mai Initiative. These institutions facilitate international cooperation and lead to the internalisation of norms of international political practice. Furthermore, the increased level of interaction leads to a higher degree of socialization. This means that by dealing with each other and participating in a multilateral framework, actors get in closer contact, learn to better understand others' points of view and internalize common norms.[25] Strategic processes, by leading to increased interdependence, significantly increase the opportunity costs of failed cooperation and show the actors that they share the same environment and confront the same problems. Thus, actors are in win-win or lose-lose situations and absolute gains, rather than relative ones, matter. Strategic processes therefore create not only the need, but also the opportunity for states to cooperate. The recent agreement between China and Japan to cooperate on energy conservation and the reduction of CO_2 emissions is one example.[26] As such, the pressure for cooperation reduces the salience of the liberal-realist dilemma, which predicts that economic growth not only leads to increased interdependence but also to increased economic power which is easily transformed into military power.[27]

The influence of strategic processes on the representations of the 'self' and 'other' in a state's identity is ambiguous. There is the potential that states are singled out as responsible for causing distress laid upon the international community. For instance, China could be blamed for contributing heavily to regional pollution and global warming, while another point of view may blame developed countries for their excessive consumption of energy. Also, a sense of competition for rare natural resources or even food and water may arise. However, the effects of strategic practices described above are material facts. They can be quantified, qualified and the sources are indentifyable. Above all, the whole community of states is negatively affected and thus involved. It is therefore not helpful to name one party as the 'other' and demonize it. Rather, common challenges may offer opportunities for international cooperation since technical issues are only indirectly connected to the core of a state's identity. This is not to deny that strategic processes may significantly strain bilateral relations when they become securitized. Drinking water resources and fishing grounds are the most prominent examples.

Determinants of strategic practice consist of deliberate state actions. The intentions of governments are expressed through verbal or non-verbal communications or material actions. It is important to distinguish the intentions of actors when they make their decisions and the way strategic behaviour is perceived by

other actors in the system. Since we are interested in the impact of strategic practice on the views and understandings of other actors, it is useful to look at the way actions of a specific state are perceived by another and how this changes the latter's view on the intersubjective structure and thus its views of the 'self' and 'other'.

The Chinese foreign and security policies from 1989 to 1993 were strongly influenced by the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet bloc produced a salient national identity crisis in China. Though the decision to intervene with troops to disperse the demonstrations at Tian An Men square was a purely domestic act of politics, it had wide ranging international repercussions. International reactions to the June 4th Tian An Men incident resulted in a reversion to a conservative policy line and created a siege mentality within the leadership in Beijing. The Japanese government, in the wake of the Tian An Men incident, only reluctantly imposed the sanctions agreed upon at the G-7 summit and relaxed restrictions relatively soon after. However, the image of China in the Japanese public had suffered a severe blow.[28] This is the background on which strategic practices under the Jiang administration can partly be understood.

Despite confrontational strategic practices such as nuclear testing in 1994, 1995 and 1996, large scale military exercises near Taiwan in 1995, 1996 and 2001, aggressive assertiveness regarding territorial claims in the East and South China Seas and defence modernization, an increasing range of cooperative actions were taken. The invitation ASEAN had sent to Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing to attend the summit in Kuala Lumpur in December 1997 provided an opportunity to engage with the principal neighbours in East Asia and laid the groundwork for policy coordination within the ASEAN+3 framework. The need to cope with the Asian financial crisis generated the first opportunity for China and Japan to initiate the coordination of monetary policies in the event of an international crisis. The signing of the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in November 2002 and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN in October 2003, together with the offer to establish a China-ASEAN Free-Trade Agreement by 2010 further improved the image of China in the region.[29] At the ASEAN Regional Forum's meeting in June 2003, Beijing proposed to create an ARF Security Conference as a standing body; the proposal was subsequently implemented.[30] Since 2003, Beijing has played an active and constructive role in coordinating the Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. With the support of UN sanctions in response to the August 2006 nuclear test by North Korea, the view of China as a responsible great power has gained support. Further, milestone agreements in September 2005 and February 2007 reached within the Six-Party Talk framework led to the handover of documentations on North Korea's nuclear research and the destruction of key facilities for the production of fissile material in Yongbyon in July 2008.

After the newly elected Prime Minister, Abe Shinzo, made Beijing the destination of his first state visit in October 2006, the Chinese Prime Minster, Wen Jiabao, was invited to Japan and in April 2007 conveyed a favourable image of a modern and open China. Following the December 2007 visit of Prime Minister Fukuda to Beijing and Hu's visit to Japan in May 2008, there was hope that an agreement on the common exploration of natural gas resources in the East China Sea, located just west of the Japan-claimed median line, could be reached. However, it took further negotiations until a statement on a preliminary agreement was issued in July 2008.

The election of Ma Ying-jeou of the Guomindang as President of Taiwan in March 2008 created an opportunity for détente over the Taiwan Straits. Flight

connections between Taiwan and the Mainland were soon permitted, which allowed for tourism and business travel to be started. Further negotiations were planned to enable the establishment of regular flight and ferry connections and relax mutual restrictions on investment and trade. The political impact of the Olympic Games in Beijing in August is yet to be assessed. While the expectations for complete freedom of press, information and demonstration during the games were not met, the sports event nevertheless brought China closer to the rest of the world and the latter to some extent closer into China.

Japanese strategic practice relevant for relations with China, from the 1990s on mainly revolves around two issues: the approach of Japanese political exponents to historical events between 1895 and 1945, and the transformation of Japanese national security policies. Opinions about the past, especially when declared by politicians, matter because they express their ideas about contemporary Japan and its role in East Asia. In the time period between 1989 and 2002, the main issues were the visit to Yasukuni shrine by Prime Minister Hashimoto in July 1996 and the textbook controversies after June 1996 and April 2001. From 2001, regular visits to Yasukuni by Prime Minister Koizumi, in spite of Chinese and Korean protests, became a major issue which influenced regional politics. The Korean and Chinese leaders refused to interact with their Japanese counterparts in bilateral and multilateral meetings such as ASEAN+3. Moreover, Yasukuni visits and statements of cabinet ministers which clearly promoted revisionist views of historical events further alienated Japan from Korea and China.

The changes in Japan's national security policy after 1989 were influenced by the impact of the 1991 Gulf War. It was then, when the fragility of Japan's post-Cold War security stance became clear as the US expected more of its alliance partner than the mere financing of military campaigns. The general trend to revise the Yoshida doctrine was supported by the strategic practices of North Korea, China and the US, as outlined above. In February 1995, the US East Asian Strategic Review, better known as the 'Nye or Armitage Report' suggested a revision of the US strategy in the Asia-Pacific, giving a central role to Japan as 'the linchpin' of the post-Cold War regional security architecture. The Japanese government in November 1995 adopted a National Defense Program Outline which reoriented defence policies according to the new role Tokyo was given by the US regional security strategy.[31] Subsequently, and with the background of the changes in the regional security environment, the Joint Declaration on US-Japan Defense Cooperation was made public by Prime Minister Hashimoto and US President Clinton in April 1996. This declaration and the signing of the US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation are highly significant because they enlarged the geographical scope of application of the US-Japan defence alliance. Instead of a delineated geographical area, the scope was now defined according to situational aspects in which a crisis would threaten Japan's security. In February 2005, the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee issued a statement which announced the transformation and realignment of the US-Japan alliance for the future, which included an explicit comment on the US-Japan cooperation on the Taiwan question.[32] Over the following years, two areas of the US-Japan security cooperation have been of particular interest: logistical support for US operations overseas such as in the campaigns in Afghanistan from 2001 and in Iraq from 2003; and cooperation in the development and deployment of a Ballistic Missile Defence system (BMD) in the western Pacific. Hughes argues that the 'war on terror' has served as a means for Tokyo to adjust its security policies by strengthening its military posture and the alliance with the US in view of 'rising China'.[33]

Dynamics in Japan-China relations changed when Prime Minister Abe, soon after his election in October 2006, paid his first overseas state visit to Beijing and refrained from further visits to the Yasukuni shrine. The improvement in bilateral relations was marked with the return visit by Premier Wen Jiabao to Japan in April 2007 and led to the highly symbolic port calls of a PLA Navy missile destroyer to Tokyo in November 2007 and a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) missile destroyer to China in June 2008. Prime Minister Fukuda continued Abe's pragmatic policies when he visited Beijing in December 2007 and received Hu Jintao in Japan in May 2008. In June 2008, a preliminary agreement on the joint exploration of the Chunxiao natural gas field in the East China Sea was reached. The two leaders also met at the G-8 summit in Hokkaido, Japan in June and during the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games in Beijing in August 2008. The first trilateral summit meeting including the Korean President had to be postponed due to the unexpected resignation of Prime Minister Fukuda in September 2008.

Japan's approach to multilateral regional cooperation is based on the desire of Tokyo to forge closer relations with ASEAN in order to prevent its isolation from East Asia while at the same time strengthening the alliance with the US to counter Beijing's growing power. The ASEAN members were unwilling to privilege their relations with one great power. The result of Prime Minster Hashimoto's efforts was the first ASEAN+3 summit in December 1997.[34] The need to coordinate monetary policies in order to cope with the Asian financial crisis brought another opportunity for Tokyo and Beijing to demonstrate their responsible leadership in the region. However, the Japanese proposal of an Asian Monetary Fund failed due to the opposition of the US; remaining was the Chiang Mai Initiative in the form of currency swap agreements and the Asian Bond Markets Initiative. In 2000, Prime Minister Koizumi proposed a tripartite foreign ministers' meeting. [35] However, as the proceedings at the first East Asian Summit in December 2005 showed, Tokyo and Beijing did not share the same vision of a future regional institution, nor could they agree on a negotiating basis for a bilateral, not to mention an East Asian, Free Trade agreement.

Strategic practices alter the way China and Japan perceive the East Asian security architecture. They alter views the actors have of their counterparts in the region and indirectly also change the understanding of their own role in the system and the future of their own state. Looking at the development of the foreign and security policies of China and Japan from 1989 to 2008, two major trends are discernible. First, the Chinese foreign and security polices became more moderate and differentiated. While the stance towards Taiwan remained uncompromising and determined, Beijing gradually refrained from sabre-rattling and recently has showed a certain willingness to normalise cross-Strait relations. At the same time it has displayed increasing interest in workable relations with Tokyo, recognising it as an important actor and dialogue partner in East Asia.[36] However, Beijing has continued to emphasize the necessity of increasing comprehensive national strength and has showed little interest in more open information about its defence policies and planning. China's regional security strategy may therefore be seen as an attempt to create a regional space by strengthening cooperative and collaborative relationships with neighbouring countries.[37] Second, Tokyo has gradually shifted its security-policy from passive and complete reliance on the US under the Yoshida-doctrine towards an active involvement in global and regional security affairs. However, it has remained largely uncompromising on historical and unflexible in territorial and bilateral issues. Moreover, the US continues to be the nexus of Japan's foreign and security policies

which means that Japan prioritizes its interests in strengthening the bilateral relationship with the US, and recently, Australia and India as well.[38] Japan is therefore interested in economic regional integration, but remains suspicious about any form of regional security-political cooperation.[39]

Looking at the development of relations between China and Japan since the beginning of the 1990s we see a China which is gradually developing a new national identity as an Asian economic and (responsible) political great power while Japan is shedding off its Cold War identity of a 'civilian' or 'economic power'. With China's increasing involvement with the rest of the world, Beijing is becoming more confident in the political arena. Recent strategic practices such as settling all territorial disputes with Russia and partly with India, refraining from using the history-card vis-à-vis Tokyo, showing some flexibility to compromise on the exploitation of the Chunxiao gas field in the East China Sea, accepting a port call by a JMSDF missile destroyer, dropping the 'century of humiliation' discourse from public statements and rapprochement with Taipei also indicate this trend in identity change in terms of foreign policy. Nevertheless, in light of challenges towards governance, the identity crisis in domestic politics is set to continue for the time being, as the discourse on '5000 years of glorious civilization' is still very much alive. This, and the importance and sensitivity given to the Taiwan question, continues to limit Beijing's options for a comprehensive regional strategy. It is therefore questionable whether China will be able to successfully implement its policies to create a regional sphere in the form of an East Asian Community any time soon.

Japan has gone beyond its understanding of a purely economic power and is about to transform its understanding of the Yoshida-doctrine. Despite its support of the UN system, including the contribution of peacekeeping forces as a part of its re-orientated foreign and security policy line, Japan is struggling to find its new role in the region. While Tokyo is developing its national security strategies and the means to implement them, it has been unable to develop security political and foreign policy doctrines which separate its interests as an independent state from those of the US. In order to find its new role in East Asia, its relations with the US had to be normalized. Only then could Japan turn, at least partially, towards East Asia (and China), define itself according to the new realities and effectively promote regionalism. As a consequence, Tokyo will sooner or later need to deal with China and Korea so as to redefine its East Asian identity. This means that apart from sole reliance on the US, alternate foreign policy strategies need to be developed. However, current political discourses solely concentrate on the alliance and exclude new approaches to the region.[40] However, in the context of East Asian economic development and the subsequent emergence of the new region, as well as China's domestic growth and societal opening, Beijing has gotten much closer to an internationally active Japan.

Globalisation is conducive to the emergence of East Asia as a region, and the splitting forces of the Cold Ware era are weakening. China and Japan now no longer just exist next to each other, but are with each other in East Asia. This increases the potential points of friction. Ironically, disputes over official versions of national history cause clashes between the political elites in both countries while at the same time displaying commonalities of the CPC and the LDP as long-ruling parties, entrenched at the hold of power since the end of the 1940s. Domestic challenges to the legitimacy of these ruling elites complicate pragmatic and compromising foreign policy-making and the 'square facing' of respective histories. Residual amounts of feelings of victimhood help to blame 'the other' and deflect pressures to change the existing structures and ways of thinking. As a result, old approaches to international

relations prevail. Tokyo pursues a China-policy which is often called 'reluctant realism', 'soft-containment' [41] or 'enmeshment'. [42] Therefore, initiatives to get economically and politically closer to Northeast Asia are restricted by calculations of power politics. As a consequence, calls for East Asian (economic) integration are mixed with efforts to further strengthen the US-Japan alliance and improve relations with Australia and India rather than Northeast Asian states. [43] Beijing, despite its gradually open economic policies, is highly weary of any moves of other parties which relate to Taiwan. It is in this context that Japan plays a significant role as the 'other' in Chinese policy discourses while China plays this role for Japan.

Let us turn to the question of which set of determinants (pressures originating from domestic issues, geo-strategic calculations of traditional security or non-traditional security challenges caused by strategic processes) will gain in relative importance and how these factors will interact with each other. With regard to memories of the past, Tamamoto argues that the debates about questions of history help to make history continuous, to make it flow again. [44] Suh writes that historical contentions look war-like, but under certain conditions, act like diplomacy. He argues that once history is institutionalized, it may start to lag behind changes on the ground. If that dissonance creates the desire to renegotiate history in order to bring it in accordance with the current reality, history can serve as an object of communicative action. [45] Moreover, strategic processes continue to create realities which cannot be negotiated away or denied. It is a fact rather than a social construction, that economic integration and threats to food and environmental security concern all states in the region and make them dependent on each other. This does not only bring the need to cooperate, it also changes the views of the 'self' and 'other' and is conducive to the formation of collective identities. Structural change is closely related to identity formation. [46] Thus, in order to keep up with the recent structural changes, be they material or ideational, the national identities of China and Japan come under pressure to adapt. Therefore, states need to overcome their fears of being engulfed by states with whom they would identify. Given the fact that it is impossible to know the other's true intentions, self-restraint leadership and political institutions need to support this process. [47] It seems that the struggle in China-Japan relations to create mutual trust is caused by the difficulties of China and Japan to accept the other as an equal partner. Chinese nationalism, grounded in a feeling of historic-cultural superiority and Japanese nationalism grounded in a feeling of civilizational superiority, both augmented with a sense of self-victimization, spur mutual suspicion. However, socialization which occurs in tandem with globalization and growing economic interdependence is conductive to the development of shared identities, that is the blurring of boundaries between 'self' and 'other' and the adoption of common norms, values, attitudes and behaviours. [48]

When assessing the interpretations offered by the schools of realism, liberalism and constructivism, which were introduced at the beginning of the paper, three points regarding East Asian regional cooperation should be pointed out. First, a purely realist analysis looking at the material factors of power paints a static picture and tends to focus on the 'hard power' component of East Asian international relations. As a consequence, this approach displays difficulties in explaining how historical knowledge informs contemporary state behaviour in Japan and China and how systemic, that is, the 'rise of China', and gradual system change induced by economic development and globalization lead to the transformation of the nature of international relations. Second, liberal approaches focussing on material transactions and the role played by institutions are well able to describe dynamics of increasing

interdependence in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific, including the opportunity costs of failed cooperation. However, this is insufficient to explain international relations. Irrational behaviour such as subjective threat perceptions and policy preferences that lead to choices of second and third best outcomes cannot be fully understood on the basis of liberal theories' basic assumptions such as the rationality and self-benefit maximizing nature of actors. Third, the constructivist focus on interactions between social groups and states as social actors enables it to explain the impact of shared understandings of history, as well as processes of systemic change on international relations, including the origins of collective action problems. This is possible since the constructivist approach acknowledges that decisions in international policy making are taken by social actors, that is, groups of human beings. By abandoning the positivism of modernist thinking, it does not rely on generalized and static assumptions about human and state behaviour and is therefore able to look deeper into the reasons behind policy decisions which change Japan-China bilateral and East Asian international relations.

CONCLUSION

Japan's finding of its new identity as an East Asian state with a standard foreign and security policy which takes into account its close economic and social connections with Northeast Asia would imply the awareness of dealing pragmatically with China as a main partner in the region. At the systemic level, Japanese and US policies and geopolitical interests would become less tangled. Beijing would focus more on Japan rather than the US in conducting its regional (and global) policies. However, a strong reliance of Tokyo on the alliance with Washington would most likely lead to the continuation of Japan's insulation from East Asia.[49] China and the US being indeterminate, Japan could, in principle, reshape the region.[50] However, a stumbling block is Japan's past identity as a civilian power which created the myth of its relative security-political insignificance in East Asia.[51] As a result, there is insufficient awareness about options in foreign policy other than those already existing. This phenomenon is currently supported by academia, which tends to ignore Japan as a significant security actor in East Asia and the world.[52] As Hagström demonstrates, this is also connected to the concept of power, which dominates academia in international relations. This concept largely refers to absolute material terms such as the possession of nuclear weapons and means of power-projection, asw well as the political will to pursue national interests by the use of force.[53] Akaha shows convincingly how changes in the regional and global security environment, and the subsequent Japanese drive for the further strengthening of the US-Japan alliance favours hard over soft power and therefore frustrates Japan's desire to play a larger regional and domestic role.[54] Effective leadership in the East Asian region does not depend on material factors, but on the capability to form political coalitions on the basis of a leader's vision of international order.[55] As a consequence, Nabers thinks that Japanese and Chinese competition for influence in a future East Asian region may even help to bring about institutional change. In light of the domestic determinants discussed above, a change in Japan's political landscape may lead to higher domestic credibility of the government in Tokyo, which would mitigate the domestic origins of the current identity crisis. As a result, the government would need to worry less about its domestic legitimacy and would be able to implement more cooperative and forward-looking foreign and security policies.

In this context, China, having accomplished its real 'great leap forward', that is, its period of extremely rapid economic growth, would likely be less concerned about how to catch up with the 'West' and Japan in order to gain international status. Most of all, the socio-economic challenges the leadership in Beijing faces related to fast economic growth would display less threatening dynamisms and enable the government to conduct more pragmatic foreign and security policies. Beijing would not need to fear as much internal destabilization due to economic inequalities, environmental problems and movements to challenge the political structure. It would be better able to cooperate internationally and be less concerned about what is frequently termed as foreign intervention into its domestic affairs. The question of the status of Taiwan could be addressed more pragmatically. Lastly, slower economic growth in China would ameliorate threat perceptions based on the extrapolation of recent growth rates and fear from repercussions in the event of domestic turmoil and instability.

The question is how to manage the transition period from post-Cold War identities to East Asian identities in Japan and China and make sure that the countries' paths are leading to sustainable peaceful coexistence. In contrast to the means of balancing, containment and deterrence, approaches of multilateral security may help, but they need to at least partially address the salient problems of regional security. Regional cooperation in East Asia is able to contribute to processes of de-securitization. Issues that are currently perceived as threats to national security interests become clearer when they are pragmatically discussed and addressed within bilateral or multilateral contexts. Often, threat perceptions need to be toned down in light of newly gained common knowledge. Moreover, bilateral issues get diluted within multilateral frameworks. [56] As a consequence, systemic pressures from geopolitical calculations are mitigated. Were cooperation among Northeast Asian states to become stronger and looked at in a less realist way of thinking, Japan could escape from the dilemma of 'entrapment or abandonment' within the alliance with the US and need not worry about getting squeezed or left out due to improving relationships between the US and China or the Koreas. The Koreas and other East Asian states need not worry about getting trapped between China and Japan within a bipolar regional structure and China need not worry about containment by a US-led alliance system. Last but not least, regional cooperation is the only effective way to address pressing transnational challenges to national and human security, such as piracy, the spread of infectious diseases, transnational pollution and food and water shortages aggravated by the effects of climate change.

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[11] Social identities are (…) 'sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others.' Cited from: Mc Call, G., Simmons, J., 1978. *Identities and Interactions*. New York: Free Press.

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[13] Dittmer, L., Kim, S.S. (eds.), 1993. *China's Quest for National Identity*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press., p. 245.

[14] White, L., and Cheng, L., 1993.'China Coast Identities: Regional, National, and Global', in Dittmer, Kim et al. 1993, p. 162.

[15] Buzan, B., Waever, O., De Wilde, J., 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, p. 29.

[16] Dittmer, Kim (eds.) 1993, p. 19.

[17] Barbalet, J.M., 1998. *Emotion, Social Theory and Social Structure: A Macrosociological Approach*, New York: Cambridge University Press. Cited in Gries, P., 2005.'Nationalism, Indignation and China's Japan Policy', *SAIS Review*, Vol. 15, No. 2:107.

[18] Wendt, 1994, p. 388.

[19] Wendt, 1994, p. 389.

[20] See also: Armitage, R., Nye, J., 2007. *The US-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020*, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. 20.

[21] National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), 2008. *Report of the Council for Defense and Strategic Studies for FY 2005-FY 2006*, p. 6. Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 153.

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[27] Buzan and Waever, 2003, p. 196.

[28] Drifte, 2003, p. 29.

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[31] For the context of this revision refer to Hughes, C., 2005. *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 368-9, London: Routledge, pp. 67.

[32] Joint Statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Washington DC, 19.02.05 available: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html, accessed 02.09.08.

[33] See also Hughes, C., 2007.'Not quite the 'Great Britain of the Far East': Japan's Security, the US-Japan Alliance and the 'War on Terror' in East Asia. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 2:329 and 336.

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[35] National Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (NIDS), 2005, p. 43.

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[37] Amako, S., 2007. 'The Idea of New International Order China is Seeking and East Asia Community', *Waseda University Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI) Working Paper*, December 2007, p. 6,7.

[38] One example is Japan's reluctance to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with ASEAN, see National Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (NIDS), 2005, p. 48.

[39] Amako, S., 2007, p. 15.

[40] Suh, looking at the South Korea-US Security Alliance explains very well how alliance discourses impact states and societies. Alliances contribute to the 'othering' of third parties and may privilege a nation's national security discourse in a way that leaves alternative policy options completely sidelined, if not ignored. Suh, J.J., 'Bound to Last? US-Korea Alliance and Analytical Ecleticism', in Suh, J.J., Katzenstein, P., Carlson, A., (eds.) 2004. *Rethinking Security in Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 131-224. Hughes, 2005, p. 57., looking at Japan, comes to a similar conclusion.

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[42] Drifte, 2003, pp. 84.

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[45] Suh, J.J., 2007.'War-like History or Diplomatic History? Contentions Over the Past and Regional Orders in Northeast Asia', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 3:384, 387.

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[47] Wendt, 1999, p. 357.

[48] Johnston, A.I., 'Socialization and International Institutions: The ASEAN-Way and International Relations Theory', in Ikenberry, G.J., Mastanduno, M., (eds.), 2003, pp. 114, 115.

[49] Drifte, 2003, p. 15.

[50] Ibid, p. 177.

[51] Hagström, L., 2006.'The Dogma of Japanese Insignificance: The Academic Discourse on North Korea Policy Coordination', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 79, Iss. 3:387-410.

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[53] Hagström, L., 2005.'Ubiquity of 'Power' and the Advantage of Terminological Pluralism: Japan's Foreign Policy Discourse', *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 6., No. 2:145-164.

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